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Principally,  Joint  stock  companies  are  governed  by  the  principle  of  majority  rule,  which 
means  that  while  they  are  formed  and  continue  to  work  through  participation  of  every 
shareholder,  only  those  who  hold  a  majority  of  voting  shares  can  make  decisions  in 
companies.  The  principle  relies  on  contract  and  is  often  supported  by  company  law.  In 
the  main,  it  is  advantageous  to  companies,  the  judiciary  and  the  economy.  It  facilitates 
collective  action,  allows  management  to  focus  on  the  daily  running  of  the  company 
business  and  encourages  corporate  financing,  which  is  decisively  important  for 
corporations.  It  also  saves,  by  curbing  minority  actions,  the  courts'  time  and  the  public 
budget.  In  one  sense,  however,  it  can  also  be  dangerous  to  the  rights  and  interests  of 
minority  shareholders.  Using  the  majority  rule,  majority  shareholders  may  fix  for 
themselves  private  benefits  or  adopt  policies  which  are  poor  and  consequently  harmful 
to  companies.  Such  danger  could  discourage  likely  investors  from  investing  their 
capital  in  companies  and  might  undermine  one  of  the  main  purposes  of  the 
corporation  as  an  institution  introduced  by  law  and  business  practice  to  solve 
problems  encountered  in  raising  substantial  amounts  of  capital.  This  research  seeks  to 
study  in  the  light  of  English  and  Iranian  company  laws  difficulties  deriving  from 
application  of  the  majority  rule  for  minority  shareholders  and  possible  ways  and 
mechanisms  which  can  be  used  to  sensibly  curb  the  occurrence  of  such  difficulties.  To 
this  objective,  it  identifies  four  factors  which  can  explain  how  and  why  the  rule  is  liable 
to  abuse  by  majority  shareholders  and  examines  the  mechanisms  provided  by 
company  laws  of  England  and  Iran  which  attempt  to  strike  a  balance  between  the  rule 
of  majority  and  interests  of  minority  shareholders. Table  of  Contents 
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3 Introduction 
Although  its  management  makes  most  decisions  within  companies,  almost  any  act  of  a 
company  can  be  ratified  by  a  resolution  adopted  by  majority  of  its  shareholders.  Any 
such  resolution  would  then  be  considered  to  be  the  decision  of  the  whole  company, 
and  not  merely  a  decision  made  by  a  specific  group  in  the  company.  This  is  a 
fundamental  principle  known  as  the  principle  of  majority  rule.  The  rule  is  normally 
accepted  by  company  members  in  their  constitution  and  often  prescribed  by  the 
company  laws  of  most  countries.  '  It  is  generally  seen  as  advantageous  to  companies, 
the  judiciary  and  the  economy  at  large.  For  companies,  it  facilitates  collective  action', 
allows  management  to  focus  on  the  daily  running  of  the  company  business'  and 
encourages  corporate  financing  which  is  decisively  important  for  corporations.  4  As 
regards  the  judiciary,  it  saves,  by  curbing  n-dnority  actions,  the  courts"  time  and  the 
I  Cooper  v.  Gordon,  (1869),  LR  8  Eq  249,  Per  Stuart  V.  C.;  See  Davies,  P.  L.,  "'Gower's  Principles 
of  Modern  Company  Law",  (1997),  6th  ed.,  London,  Sweet  &  Maxwell,  at  pp  585-587,705. 
2  Hager  Mark  M.,  "Bodies  Politic:  The  Progressive  History  of  Organizational  'Real  Entity' 
Theory",  University  of  Pittsburgh  Law  Review,  (1989),  Vol.  50,  Pittsburgh,  at  p  633. 
3  Griffin  Stephen,  "Company  law:  Fundamental  Principles",  (1996),  2nd  ed.,  London,  Pitman,  at 
pp  299-300;  Farrar  John  H.,  "Company  Law",  (1991),  London,  Butterworths,  at  pp  318-319; 
Cheffins  Brian  R.,  "'Company  Law:  Theory  Structure  And  Operation",  (1997),  Oxford, 
Clarendon  Press,  at  pp  14-16. 
4  Black  Bernard  S.,  ""Is  Corporate  Law  Trivial?:  A  Political  and  Economic  Analysis",  North- 
Western  University  Law  Review,  (1990),  Vol.  84,  No  2,  Chicago,  North-western  University  Law 
School,  at  p  552;  Bebchuk  Lucian  Arye,  "Limiting  Contractual  Freedom  in  Corporate  Law:  The 
Desirable  Constraints  on  Charter  Amendments",  Harvard  Law  Review,  (1989),  Vol.  102, 
Cambridge,  Mass.,  Harvard  Law  Review  Publishing  Association,  at  pp  1830-1. 
4 public  budget.  '  To  the  economy,  the  rule  helps  companies  to  prosper  and  the  more 
companies  prosper,  the  better  the  economy  and  the  society  are  served.  ' 
Yet,  in  one  sense  the  rule  can  also  be  unjust,  since  it  requires  a  concentration  of  power 
in  the  hands  of  the  majority,  who  may  exercise  it  abusively.  A  majority  decision  can  be 
ignorant  of  minority  shareholders'  interest  and  even  taken  honestly  can  involve  poor 
strategies  that  are  harmful  to  companies.  '  The  abuse  possibility  can  increase  when  the 
rule  is  put  together  with  certain  company  law  principles  which  coordinate  to  isolate 
and  trivialise  minority  shareholders  in  companies.  The  idea  that  company  is  a  separate 
person  in  law  and  it  is  the  company  itself  that  can  as  a  proper  plaintiff  take  action  in 
relation  to  any  claim  against  individuals  who  have  committed  wrong  against  the 
company  and  that  a  shareholder  would  be  barred  from  complaining  before  the  courts 
in  respect  of  corporate  actions  confer  almost  all  the  corporate  power  to  the  majority. 
The  courts,  on  their  part,  have  also  shown  reluctance  to  deal  with  claims  where  a 
shareholder  is in  dispute  with  the  majority  shareholders,  generally  taking  the  view  that 
disputes  of  this  kind  should  be  settled  in  general  meetings.  They  tend  to  note  the 
separate  personality  principle  and  to  emphasise  that  a  minority  shareholder  is  not 
entitled  to  exercise  rights  that  inhere  in  the  company  itself.  Such  rights  principally  fall 
within  the  power  of  the  majority  shareholders  who  can  exercise  them  freely.  Even  if  the 
courts  want  to  hear  minority  shareholder  disputes,  practical  difficulties  which  exist  on 
the  path  of  the  plaintiff  will  discourage  him.  Usually  the  suspected  wrong  involves 
5  Mac  Dougall  v.  Gardiner  (1875),  1  Ch.  D.  p  13  per  Melish  L.  J.;  Gray  v.  Lewis,  (1873),  8  Ch  App, 
1035,  at  p  1051  per  James  L.  J.;  See  also  Pettet  Ben,  "Company  Law",  (2001),  Harlow,  Longman, 
at  pp  227-8;  Griffin  (above,  note  3)  at  pp  301-2. 
6  MacNeil,  lain,  "Company  Law  Rules:  An  Assessment  from  the  Perspective  of  Incomplete 
Contract  Theory",  Journal  of  Corporate  Law  Studies,  (June  2001),  Oxford,  UK,  Hart  Pub,  at  p  117; 
Cheffins  (above,  note  3)  at  pp  18-19. 
5 complex  issues  relating  to  company  operations  and  its  financial  matters  which  are 
difficult  to  understand  and  where  a  shareholder  is  able  to  assess  such  matters,  he  can 
be  denied  access  to  the  information  needed.  Directors  can  always  refuse  to  give  the 
required  information,  taking  the  argument  that  the  demanded  information  involves 
commercial  secrets.  The  costs  of  taking  action  contrast  to  its  probable  benefits  can  be 
disproportunate  and  thus  can  constitute  a  further  disincentive  for  a  minority  plaintiff.  ' 
If  abuse  of  right  by  the  majority  is  possible,  then  arguably,  the  law  is  deficient  because 
it  fails  to  ensure  controllers  will  conu-nit  no  abuse.  Such  possibility  could  discourage 
likely  investors  from  investing  their  capital  in  companies  and  might  undermine  one  of 
the  main  purposes  of  a  company  as  an  institution,  in  that  Posner9  and  others"  have 
suggested  that  a  company  is  primarily  a  device  introduced  by  law  and  business 
practice  to  solve  problems  encountered  in  raising  substantial  amounts  of  capital-" 
The  possibility  of  abuse  of  rights  by  majority  shareholders  against  rights  and  interests 
of  minority  shareholders  in  companies  has  focussed  attention  of  the  regulators  on 
devising  some  mechanism  which  could  sensibly  and  fairly  resolve,  in  one  way  or 
another,  the  majority/  minority  conflict  and  strike  a  desirable  balance  between  the  rule 
of  majority,  on  the  one  hand,  and  protection  of  minority  shareholders,  on  the  other. 
However,  those  mechanisms  have  struggled  to  achieve  optimum  effect  because  of  the 
7  Rajak  Harry,  "'Source  Book  of  Company  Law",  (1995),  Bristol,  Jordans,  at  p  530. 
8  Farrar  (above,  note  3)  at  p  442;  Parkinson  J.  E.,  "Corporate  Power  and  Responsibility",  (1993), 
Oxford,  Clarendon  Press;  New  York,  Oxford  University  Press,  at  pp  241-6. 
9  Posner  Richard  A.,  "Economic  Analysis  of  Law",  (1992),  Boston,  London,  Little,  Brown,  at  p 
392. 
10  Farrar,  John  H.,  "Company  Law",  (1985),  London,  Butterworths,  p  6. 
11  Cheffins,  Brian  R.,  "Minority  Shareholders  and  Corporate  Governance,  ",  The  Company  Lawyer, 
(2000),  London,  Oyez  Publishing  Limited,  Vol.  21,  No  2,  p  41. 
6 difficulty  in  reconciling  two  seemingly  contrary  goals.  Either,  they  lay  excessive 
emhasis  on  majority  rule  and  give  insufficient  attention  to  the  protection  of  minority 
shareholder  rights  which  resulted  in  unjust  enrichment  by  majority  shareholders  at  the 
expense  of  minority  shareholders.  "  Or  conversely,  they  impose  overly  intrusive 
measures  for  the  protection  of  minority  rights  which  have  led  corporations  to  witness 
slowing  down  or  cessation  plus  escape  of  substantial  investors  from  company  sector.  13 
Like  elsewhere,  English  and  Iranian  corporation  laws  have  noticed  the  conflict  between 
majority  and  minority  rights  and  have  attempted  to  resolve  it.  While  both  regard  the 
majority  rule  as  a  key  principle,  they  have  tried  differently  to  resolve  a  possible  conflict 
of  the  rule  with  minority  shareholders'  rights.  As  to  the  former,  the  law  emphasises  on 
the  rule  of  majority  which  is  found  in  the  famous  Foss  case  14  and  which  has  been 
15 
supported  by  subsequent  cases  ,  meanwhile,  it  also  acknowledges  that  minority 
shareholders  must  have  some  voice  so  as  to  prevent  the  former  making  abuse  of  rights. 
Consequently,  it  confers  on  minority  shareholders  strong  protection  to  address  the 
issue  of  abuse  of  rights  by  the  majority"  and  in  doing  so  it  is  not  particularly  concerned 
about  directors'  involvement  in  the  wrongdoing.  "  As  to  the  latter,  while  the  law 
supports  govemance  of  majority  shareholders,  which  is  stated  in  the  joint  Stock 
12  The  point  was  well  explained  by  Sealy  who  speaks  of  the  task  of  the  lawmakers  to  strike  a 
delicate  balance  in  the  relationship  between  the  majority  and  minority  shareholders.  [Sealy  L.  S., 
"Cases  and  Materials",  (2001),  London,  Butterworths,  Chap  10  at  p  4771. 
13  Parkinson  (above,  note  8)  p  19. 
14  Foss  v.  Harbottle  (1843)  2  Hare  461. 
15  Mac  Dougall  v.  Gardiner  (1875),  1  Ch.  D.  13;  Burland  v.  Earle  (1902),  AC  83,  PC,  p  93-94,  per 
Lord  Davey;  Mozley  v.  Alston  (1847)  1  Ph  790;  Macaura  v.  Northern  Assurance  Co.  Ltd.  (1925), 
AC  619;  Lee  v.  Lees'Air  Farming  Ltd.  (1961),  AC  12. 
16  These  protections  include  'bona  fide  for  the  benefit  of  the  company  as  a  whole',  derivative 
action,  just  and  equitable  winding  up,  and  unfairly  prejudicial  remedy  which  will  respectively 
be  considered  in  Chapters  three  and  five  below. 
7 Companies  Act  1969,  Sections  86-88",  it  tends  to  focus  on  the  idea  that  executive  rather 
than  controlling  power  might  involve  abuse.  "  Hence,  its  solutions  concern  in  great 
part  to  the  shareholder  /management  conflict  rather  than  that  of  the  majority  /minority. 
It  only  confronts  the  issue  of  majority  abuse  of  rights  against  minority  shareholders 
where  a  wrongdoer  director/  shareholder  wants  to  vote  in  the  general  meeting  to  ratify 
their  own  misconduct.  'O  However,  the  possibility  of  abuse  is  not  exclusive  to  directors 
as  it  is  possible  to  imagine  a  case  of  abuse  where  a  director  is  not  involved.  Majority 
shareholders  may  commit  abuse  through  passing  of  unjust  and  discriminatory 
resolutions,  thereby  diverting  the  company"s  assets  and  its  profits  to  themselves.  It  is 
also  possible  that  they  relieve  wrongdoer  directors  from  liability  on  some  personal  and 
self-interested  grounds  at  the  expense  of  the  company  and  its  minority  shareholders.  In 
such  cases,  minority  shareholders  often  have  no  internal  or  external  recourse.  The 
majority  rules  within  the  company  and  the  courts  tend  not  to  entertain  minority  claims 
irrespective  of  their  merits.  Constitutions  may  further  restrict  a  shareholder's  choice  to 
exit  from  inhospitable  companies  and  there  might  even  be  no  market  for  corporate 
shares  where  companies  are  private. 
This  research  seeks  to  study  difficulties  deriving  from  application  of  the  majority  rule 
for  minority  shareholders  and  the  mechanisms  introduced  by  the  company  laws  of 
17  Though,  in  practice,  it  is  often  the  case  that  a  wrongdoer  director  involves  in  the 
wrongdoing.  See  Wedderburn  K.  W.,  "Shareholder's  Rights  and  The  Rule  in  Foss  v.  Harbottle", 
(1958),  Cambridge  Law  Journal,  Cambridge,  Cambridge  University  Press,  p  97. 
18  Corresponding  to  Persian  calander  year  1347.  (Hereafter  cited  as  JSCA). 
19  Section  51  Trade  Code  1933,  (corresponding  to  Persian  calendar  year  1311  -  Hereafter  is  cited 
TQ  Sections  614,615,631,663  and  667  Civil  Code  1929,  (corresponding  to  Persian  calendar 
year  1307  -  Hereafter  is  cited  CQ  Sections  129,130,131,133,142,143  JSCA. 
20  Section  129  JSCA. 
8 England"  and  Iran  which  attempt  to  strike  a  balance  between  interests  of  minority  and 
majority  shareholders.  It  aims  to  carry  out  a  three-fold  job.  First,  it  tries  to  show  the 
wrongdoing  opportunity  that  an  inflexible  and  rigid  understanding  of  the  majority 
rule  may  yield  in  favour  of  the  majority  shareholders,  which,  in  tum,  will  result  in  an 
appreciation  of  the  problems  that  might  arise  for  minority  shareholders.  Second,  it 
examines  the  existing  reconciliation  mechanisms  in  the  two  company  laws  of  England 
and  Iran  in  order  to  identify  their  strengths  /weaknesses  hereby  to  provide 
recommendations  to  improve  those  mechanisms.  Third,  it  highlights  strengths  of 
certain  English  company  law  measures  regarding  this  relationship  which  might  be  of 
use  to  its  Iranian  counterpart  in  that  they  help  the  Iranian  company  law  to  establish  not 
only  efficient  but  also  just  working  framework  within  which  both  the  majority  and 
minority  groups  are  benefited. 
The  research  is  divided  into  five  Chapters;  each  addresses  a  question  which  is  pertinent 
as  to  pursuing  one  of  the  above-mentioned  objectives.  As  to  the  first  objective, 
Chapters  one  to  four  are  relevant,  as  they  generally  clarify  and  examine,  from  varying 
aspects,  the  very  concept  of  the  majority  rule.  The  intention  is  to  show  how  and  under 
what  circumstances  majority  shareholders  could  make  opportunistic  use  of  the 
majority  rule  against  minoritry  shareholders"  interests  in  corporations.  Chapter  five 
and  one  section  in  Chapter  three,  which  concerns  limiting  freedom  of  shareholder 
voting,  seek  to  pursue  the  second  objective.  They  generally  concern  demonstrating  and 
21  By  English  company  law,  I  refer  to  statutory  law  as  well  as  common  law  relevant  to 
companies  which  are  in  operation  in  England,  as  distinguished  from  the  company  laws  of  other 
three  constituent  countries  of  the  United  Kingdom;  i.  e.  Scotland,  Wales  and  Northern  Ireland. 
The  main  source  of  reference  is,  however,  the  Companies  Act  1985  which  applies  (with  certain 
reserves  for  Scotland)  in  all  constituent  countries  excluding  Northern  Ireland. 
9 examining  the  mechanisms  which  currently  exist  in  English  and  Iranian  company  laws 
and  which  are  meant  to  provide  cerain  minority  protections  that  prevent  abuse  of 
power  by  majority  shareholders.  In  the  end  and  in  pursuit  of  the  third  objective,  the 
research  will  complete  by:  surnmarising  the  gist  of  issues  discussed  in  each  Chapter; 
displayin  strengths  and  weakness  of  the  two  systems  plus  providing  some  W9 
recommendations;  and  highlighting  the  ideas,  and  mechanisms  which  exist  in  the 
English  company  law  that  could  be  useful  to  learn  by  the  Iranian  company  law. 
To  achieve  the  first  objective,  I  shall  discuss  four  issues.  The  first  issue,  to  be 
considered,  concerns  justification  of  the  majority  rule  in  corporations.  The  rule,  as  we 
shall  see,  can  act  against  the  autonomy  of  dissident  minority  shareholders.  Using  the 
majority  rule,  majority  shareholders  can  conspire  against  minority  interest  or  they  may 
simply  adopt  foolish  policies  that  are  prejudicial  to  the  company  and  its  shareholders. 
Company  law  theorists  tend  to  support  governance  of  majority  rule,  while  being 
potentially  liable  to  abuse.  Why  and  how  they  do  so  can  explain  why  minority 
shareholders  should  tolerate  certain  risks  associated  with  control  by  the  majority  and 
in  part  sheds  light  on  the  question  of  what  is  the  source  of  some  of  minority  difficulties 
that  stem  from  the  majority/  minority  conflict  in  corporations.  The  question  of 
justifications  for  majority  rule  is  discussed  in  Chapter  one.  The  Chapter  reviews  three 
most  influential  theories  (political,  economic  and  doctrinal)  developed  by  scholars  of 
company  law  to  appreciate  the  majority  rule.  Further,  as  the  corporate  governance 
structure  can  be  relevant  to  explain  how  the  majority  rule  is  justified  and  what  sort  of 
problem  minority  shareholders  face  and  because  different  structures  may  generate 
different  justifications  and  in  turn  cause  different  minority  problems,  the  Chapter 
compares  corporate  governance  structures  which  exist  in  English  and  Iranian 
corporations. 
10 The  second  issue,  which  is  worth  consideration,  relates  to  scope  of  majority  rule.  The 
issue  is  important  for  the  purpose  of  my  first  objective,  as  it  demonstrates  the  field  of 
application  of  majority  rule.  It  also  helps  one  to  undersand  where  minority  difficulties 
could  stem  from  and  where  the  help  of  law  is  more  required.  This  is  because  the 
question  of  field  concerns  with  determining  areas  and  circumstances  in  which  the  rule 
of  majority  can  apply.  When  the  field  is  clear,  one  can  easily  judge  whether  or  not  an 
act  of  majority  is  forceful  and  binding  against  minority  shareholders.  As  the  rule  has 
no  application  on  areas  which  fall  outside  such  field,  it  can  generate  little  difficulties 
for  minority  shareholders.  An  abusive  exercise  of  power  by  the  majority  shareholders 
in  such  areas  can  be  responded  adequately  through  a  shareholder  action.  These  aside, 
minority  shareholders  can  be  put  into  misery  in  areas  and  in  respect  of  issues  which 
fall  within  the  powers  of  majority  shareholders.  The  same  may  also  occur  when  the 
field  is  not  clear.  The  courts  tend  not  to  hear  minority  allegations,  which  are  normally 
categorised  as  internal  shareholder  disputes.  The  question  of  field;  i.  e.  determination 
of  what  powers  majority  shareholders  enjoy,  is  something  which  must  be  answered  in 
the  light  of  corporate  constitutions  and  laws  relevant  to  companies.  The  question  is 
subject  of  my  consideration  in  Chapter  two.  The  chapter  is  divided  into  two  sections. 
Section  one  concerns  legal  rules  and  the  intention  is  to  explain  relevance  of  such  rules 
in  making  the  framework  within  which  the  majority  rule  works.  By  legal  rules,  I  refer 
in  this  section,  to  rules  that  derive  from  general  laws  which  are  binding  on  companies 
as  a  matter  of  public  order  and  regulation  rather  than  being  a  matter  of  minority 
protection.  As  the  latter  issue  will  be  discussed  later  in  Chapter  five,  I  will  avoid 
repeating  that  discussion  here.  Section  two  considers  the  relevance  of  corporate 
constitutions  and  specifically  concerns  examination  of  four  constitutional  mechanisms 
that  coordinate  to  shape  the  nile  of  majority's  field  of  application.  These  mechanisms include  internal  division  of  power,  ultra  vires  issues,  special  majority  requirement  and 
personal  rights. 
The  third  issue,  to  be  considered,  concerns  nature  of  majority  rule.  It  is,  in  fact,  about 
demonstrating  and  examining  the  way  in  which  the  majority  rule  works.  The  intention 
is  to  show  how  majority  shareholders  can  abuse  the  mechanism  of  majority  rule  in 
order  to  benefit  themselves.  Generally  speaking,  the  rule  works  through  the 
mechanism  of  voting.  The  mechanism  allows  shareholders  to  vote  on  matters  which 
affect  them  collectively,  but  final  decision  is  taken  as  a  matter  of  principal  by  a  majority 
resolution  of  the  shareholders  which  relies  on  the  'one  share,  one  vote'  rule.  This 
mechanism,  which  is  considered  as  being  a  respect  for  capitalism,  also  allows 
shareholders  to  exert  their  voting  rights  freely.  Once  voting,  a  shareholder  assumes  no 
duty  to  regard  interests  of  other  shareholders  and  can  cast  their  votes  in  a  complete 
self-interested  manner.  The  result  is  that  shareholders  who  possess  more  shares  can 
apply  absolute  control  over  corporations;  a  control  which  is  often  too  dangerous  to  be 
tolerated  by  minority  shareholders.  The  question  of  nature  of  the  majority  rule  is 
discussed  in  Chaper  three  and  has  fivefold.  The  first  fold  demonstrates  how  private 
ordering  can  affect  the  voting  mechanism.  The  second  fold  considers  the  question  of 
whether  the  voting  mechanism  plays  any  controlling  function.  Assuming  that  the 
voting  mechanism  functions  as  a  control  device,  the  third  fold  concerns  the  question  of 
whether  shareholders  who  control  corporations  have  any  legal  duty  to  consider 
minority  interests.  Given  that  majority  control  is  quite  often  found  in  small  rather  than 
large  companies  and  that  majority  and  minority  can  comprise  different  groups  as  to 
different  issues,  the  fourth  fold  relates  to  the  question  of  whether  the  law  is  to  relax  in 
relation  to  the  protection  of  minority  shareholders  in  large  companies.  Finally,  the  fifth 
12 fold  considers  the  question  of  whether  institutional  shareholder  voting  can  be  relevant 
to  reduce  the  majority  /minority  conflict  in  corporations. 
The  fourth  issue  that  requires  consideration  concerns  corporate  directors'  role  as  to  the 
majority/minority  conflict.  Directors  who  take  most  decisions  in  corporations  can  as  an 
independent  organ  exercise  the  entrusted  power  impartiaHy,  taking  consideration  of 
elements  which  best  serve  the  interests  of  the  corporations.  Further,  they,  unlike 
shareholders,  are  under  legal  duties  to  take  careful  and  disinterested  decisions  which 
benefit  the  company  as  a  whole  and  which  can  be  enforced  by  shareholders.  At  the 
same  time,  directors  themselves  can  in  varying  ways  be  a  source  of  abuse  when  certain 
conditions  exist.  Where  one  or  few  shareholders  dominate  a  corporation,  corporate 
directors  can  facilitate  abuse  of  power  by  majority  shareholders.  Directors  in  such 
corporation  are  normally  chosen  and  controlled  by  the  dominating  shareholders  and 
often  only  majority  shareholders  can,  as  a  matter  of  principle,  enforce  their  duties. 
Hence,  they  are  very  unlikely  to  take  side  with  a  dissident  minority  shareholder. 
Where  shareholders  are  dispersed,  directors  are  likely  to  cause  mismanagement.  They 
may  not  want  to  pay  proper  attention  to  the  companies'  business  and  further  can 
pursue  policies  that  benefit  not  the  company  and  its  shareholders  but  rather  directors 
themselves.  Internal  control  in  such  companies  is  weak  and  the  market  may  not 
discipline  wayward  directors  adequately.  Mismanagement  affects  shareholders  equally 
and  hence  is  not  considered  as  a  majority/  minority  issue.  It  is  important,  however,  for 
the  purpose  of  my  discussion,  as  it  explains  why  the  concept  of  shareholder  control, 
while  being  liable  to  abuse  by  majority  shareholders,  can  outweigh  control  by 
management  m  corporations.  A  proper  analysis  of  directors'  role  and  duties  can  help 
the  reader  undersand  the  importance  of  shareholder  control  in  corporations  and  can 
uncover  indirect  factors,  ways  and  circumstances  through  which  such  control  can  be 
13 used  opportunistically.  It  will  further  enable  one  to  discover  the  source  of  some  of 
minority  difficulties  and  those  of  shareholders  generally  and  it  can  also  be  useful  to  the 
lawmakers  as  they  can  learn  and  draft  tailored  laws  in  this  matter.  The  question  of 
directors'  role  is  examined  in  Chapter  four. 
As  I  mentioned  earlier,  Chapter  five  and  one  section  in  Chapter  three  pursue  the 
second  objective.  They  examine  mechanisms  existing  in  current  English  and  Iranian 
company  laws  which  provide  special  protection  for  minority  shareholders  and  which 
are  provided  to  shareholders  with  the  intention  to  curb  abuse  of  power  by  the  majority 
shareholders.  The  intention  is  to  see  how  successful  the  existing  mechanisms  have  been 
as  to  implementing  their  mission;  i.  e.  reconciling  majority  and  minority  interests.  As  to 
the  English  company  law,  four  mechanisms,  two,  with  common  law  origin,  and  two, 
statutory,  are  relevant.  The  common  law  mechanisms  include  the  "bona  fide  for  the 
benefit  of  company  as  a  whole'  rule  which  was  introduced  by  the  Allen  case  and  which 
is  discussed  in  Chapter  three  and  the  'derivative  action"  which  is  the  subject  of  my 
consideration  along  with  the  statutory  mechanisms  in  Chapter  five.  As  regards  the 
former,  the  intention  is  to  show  how  the  common  law,  as  distinguished  from  the 
statutory  law,  evolved  in  order  to  accommodate  minority  concerns  into  the  voting 
mechanism.  As  regards  the  latter,  the  discussion  seeks  to  demonstrate  and  examine 
how  the  common  law  has  managed  to  specify  and  respond  to  circumstances  within 
which  certain  abusive  behaviours  of  majority  shareholders  are  likely  to  occur.  The 
statutory  mechanisms  which  are  exclusively  discussed  in  Chapter  five  include  the  'just 
and  equitable  winding  up'  and  'unfairly  prejudicial"  remedies.  A  number  of  questions 
which  concern  the  remedies'  natures,  jurisdictions,  conditions  of  availability,  and 
utilities  will  be  raised.  As  the  latter  remedy  can  have  some  clash  with  the  'no  reflective 
loss'  principle  and  with  the  derivative  action,  the  discussion  will  consider  the  remedy's 
14 relation  with  the  two  mentioned  mechanisms  too.  The  idea  is  twofold.  First,  it  is  meant 
to  see  what  and  how  the  Parliament  has  done  to  fill  the  gap  which  exist  in  common  law 
as  to  preventing  abuse  of  right  by  majority  shareholders.  Second,  it  seeks  to  determine 
whether  the  Parliament  has  been  any  successful  to  facilitate  formation  of  a  just  and 
efficient  reconciliation  between  the  majority/  minority  interests  in  joint  stock 
companies. 
As  to  the  Iranian  company  law,  five  mechanisms  that  provide  either  a  general  or 
special  protection  to  minority  shareholders  against  abuse  of  rights  by  majority 
shareholders  will  be  examined.  These  include  the  "no  abuse  of  rights'  which  is  a 
constitutional  principle  and  provides  a  general  protection,  right  to  convene  a 
shareholder  meeting,  cumulative  voting,  disinterested  ratification  and  commencing 
corporate  actions  by  shareholders  which  are  company  law  provisions  and  which  offer 
special  protection  to  minority  shareholders. 
As  this  research  involves  consideration  of  the  issue  in  the  English  and  Iranian  company 
laws  and  because  the  former,  unlike  the  latter,  enjoys  strong  minority  protection  which 
could  be  relevant  to  address  the  issue  of  abuse  of  rights  by  majority  shareholders  in 
Iranian  corporations,  I  will  follow  a  comparative  approach  in  which  the  English 
company  law  is  taken  as  the  basic  model.  The  intention  is  to  take  some  lesson  from  the 
English  company  law  that  are  useful  to  improve  Iranian  company  law  regarding  its 
approach  to  the  majority/  minority  issue.  To  this  end,  I  have  divided  each  Chapter, 
excluding  Chapter  two,  into  two  parts.  Part  one  concerns  examination  of  the  law  in 
England  and  part  two  while  examines  the  same  issue  in  the  law  of  Iran  does  some 
comparisons  between  the  laws  in  the  two  jurisdictions.  As  to  the  Chapter  two,  the 
same  approach  is  pursued  unless  there  will  be  no  division  into  two  parts.  The 
15 discussion  and  comparison  in  this  Chapter  are  integrated.  Much  of  the  discussion  in 
each  Chapter  goes  to  the  English  part,  as  it  is  the  basic  model  and  because  otherwise 
could  have  hurt  briefness  of  the  research  by  covering  many  issues  that  were  in  fact 
similar. 
Two  questions  regarding  the  method  of  this  study,  which  I  need  to  address  before  the 
very  study  starts,  are  to  see  whether  it  is  possible  to  extend  English  approach  to  its 
Iranian  counterpart  and,  if  the  answer  is  positive,  whether  the  English  approach  is 
worth  learning  from?  As  regards  the  first  question,  it  is  important  to  note  that  there  are 
undeniable  socio-economic  as  well  as  legal  differences  between  England  and  Iran  that 
n-dght  blur  the  prospect  of  any  extension.  "  England  is  a  western  country  that  follows  a 
market  economy  based  on  capitalism.  This  means  the  commerce  in  England  is 
considerably  left  to  the  private  sector  and  the  market  is  largely  seen  as  a  self-regulator 
of  its  activities.  In  this  context,  so  far  as  commercial  actors  keep  in  line  with  complying 
with  their  contractual  rights  and  duties  and  play  fair,  there  will  generally  be  no  other 
limitation.  Also,  its  legal  system  belongs  to  the  common  law  family,  which  is  generally 
described  as  a  judge-made  law  system  meaning  that  judges  may  create  law  by 
referring  the  earlier  judges'  decisions.  "  Although  the  superior  source  of  law  is  statute, 
certain  areas  of  law  are  essentially  the  creation  of  the  judges  and  in  areas  where  the  law 
is  not  fully  indicative  there  is  also  an  important  dimension  of  judicial  creativity  in  the 
24 
task  of  statutory  interpretation,  which  enables  the  courts  to  remedy  statutory  gaps. 
22  These  differences  will  be  discussed  more  in  Chapter  one.  See  below  at  1.2. 
23  Mayson  Stephan,  French  Derek  and  Ryan  Christopher,  "Mayson,  French  &  Ryan  on 
Company  Law"  (2001),  18th  ed.,  London,  Blackstone,  p  22;  Holborn  Guy,  "Legal  Research 
Guide",  (2001),  London,  Butterworths,  p  161. 
24  Mayson  Stephan,  French  Derek  and  Ryan  Christopher,  "Mayson,  French  &  Ryan  on 
Company  Lax,  ý,  "  (2003),  1911,  ed.,  Oxford,  Oxford  University  Press,  at  0.3.2.3. 
16 In  contrast,  Iran  is  a  developing  country  whose  economy  is  partly  government  directed 
and  partly  market  driven,  adjusted  in  accordance  with  Islamic  mandatory  rules.  This 
means  the  law  concerning  commercial  activities  in  Iran  is  not  that  much  facilitator.  The 
government  monopolizes  many  areas  of  commercial  activities"  and  even  supervises 
the  private  sector  in  the  remaining  areas  that  are  not  within  its  monopoly.  26  Legally,  it 
relies  on  a  system  that  most  resembles  systems  in  the  civil  law  camp.  Its  law  is  mostly 
contained  in  codes  enacted  by  the  Parliament  in  the  early  twentieth  century  and  since 
then  amended  from  time  to  time.  The  code  is  the  definitive  source  of  law,  and  the 
courts  have  no  power  to  fill  in  gaps  in  statutes  on  their  own  initiative  or  by  reference  to 
earlier  decisions.  That  is  for  the  Parliament  to  do.  "  Judges,  however,  are  of  power  to 
interpret  the  existing  code  making  use  of  general  principles  of  law  and  rules  of  Islamic 
law  in  order  to  resolve  a  particular  dispute  in  case  of  silence,  obscurity  or  inconsistency 
in  the  statutes.  "  Albeit,  judges  can  consult  with  the  earlier  judges"  decisions  and 
Islamic  law  jurists"  opinions,  but  they  cannot  copy  each  other  or  earlier  decisions  or 
proceed  by  way  of  analogy.  These  are  strongly  prohibited  by  statutes"  and  Islamic  law 
rules.  'o 
25  Activities  in  relation  to  these  areas  include  all  sorts  of  huge  and  mother  industries,  foreign 
trade,  large  mines,  banking,  insurance,  power  production  and  supply,  dams,  water  supply 
channels  network,  radio  and  TV,  post,  telegraph  and  telephone,  aeroplanes,  vessels,  air  and  sea 
industries,  roads,  rail  roads.  [Article  44  Constitution  of  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran  1980, 
(corresponding  to  Persian  calendar  year  1358  -  hereafter  cited  as  CIRI)]. 
26  Art  22  CIRI. 
27  This  is  principally  to  ensure  separation  of  powers  between  the  Legislative  and  the  Judiciary. 
See  Osooli  Mohamad,  ""Methods  of  Interpretation  of  the  Codes  in  Private  Law",  (1973),  Doctoral 
Thesis,  University  of  Tehran. 
28  Section  3  Civil  Procedure  Act  2000,  (corresponding  to  Persian  calendar  year  1378  -  hereafter 
is  cited  CPA). 
29  Section  3  CPA. 
30  Islamic  law  rules  (Shari'ah  law)  in  this  research  refer  to  such  rules  as  understood  and  defined 
by  the  Shari'ah  scholars  (jurists)  in  the  Shiah  camp;  to  be  precise,  Shiah  Jafary  School  which  is 
the  prevailing  creed  among  Iranians  (see  Chapter  one  below  at  1.2);  as  distinguished  from  that 
17 Taking  these  systematic  differences  as  barrier,  one  may  doubt  the  possibility  of  a  likely 
extension.  However  this  is  to  be  rejected  by  looking  at  striking  similarities  between  the 
two  systems,  especially  in  terms  of  social  and  economic  needs.  Both  systems  permit  the 
use  of  company  device  and  regard  it  as  the  responsibility  of  govenunent  to  exercise 
through  company  law  a  measure  of  control  over  the  activities  of  companies.  Most 
importantly,  company  laws  in  the  two  jurisdictions  share  similar  concerns  in  relation  to 
achieving  balance  between  majority  interests  and  those  of  the  minority  shareholders.  " 
As  regards  the  second  question,  there  are  sound  reasons  suggesting  that  English 
approach  is  worthy  of  consideration  by  the  Iranian  company  law.  While  English 
approach  gives  power  to  majority  shareholders,  it  acknowledges  the  possibility  of 
majority  abuse  of  right  and  offers  corresponding  devices  to  protect  minority 
shareholders  and  this  is  suggestive  to  the  Iranian  company  law.  Second,  English 
approach  seems  fit  with  areas  such  as  Iran  where  companies  tend  to  have  a  controlling 
shareholder.  Most  joint-stock  companies  in  Iran  are  either  small  private  companies  or 
public  companies  substantially  owned  by  the  state  and  its  dependant  institutions.  32 
of  the  Sunni  camp  (with  its  four  main  Schools;  i.  e.  Hanafi,  Hanbali,  Maliki,  and  Shafi).  While  in 
the  latter  analogy  (Qiyas)  is  a  source  to  be  used  besides  the  other  three  sources  (the  Qur'an,  the 
Sunna  of  the  Prophet  Mohammad,  and  the  ljma  or  consensus  of  the  community  of  scholars)  to 
comprehend  Shariah  law,  in  the  former,  the  use  of  analogy  is  strongly  prohibited.  See 
Mohammad  Ebn  Yazid  Ghazvini  "Sonan  Ebn  Majed"  (787  A  D),  Vol.  2,  Tehran,  Amirkabir 
publication  Para  Judgment,  p  776;  MacMillen  Michael  J.  T.,  "Islamic  Capital  Markets: 
Developments  and  Issues",  (2006),  Capital  Markets  Law  journal,  Vol.  1,  No.  2,136  at  138,  Oxford 
journals,  Oxford  University  Press. 
31  See  Lord  Hoffmann's  argument  in  the  famous  ONeill  case.  There  he  speakes  of  the  ways  in 
which  common  law  as  well  as  civil  law  systems  work  to  curb  abuse  of  right  cases.  He 
demonstrates  that  while  common  law  workes  on  a  fact  specific  and  case  by  case  basis,  its  civil 
law  counterparts  developed  a  general  principle  of  'abus  de  droit'  to  deal  with  abuse  of  rights 
cases.  He  then  concludes  that  this  is  only  a  different  way  of  doing  the  same  thing.  [O'Neill  and 
Another  v.  Phillips  and  Others,  (1999),  2  All  ER  961  HL  at  969  per  Lord  Hof  fmann] 
. 
32  Sotoodeh  Tehrani,  Hasan,  "'Trade  Law",  (1997),  Tehran,  Dehkhoda  Publication,  vol.  2,  at  p  3. 
18 Third,  the  existence  of  strong  minority  protection  measures  with  prospect  of  various 
remedies  available  to  minority  shareholders  in  the  company  law  of  England  may  help 
Iranian  company  law  to  improve  its  weak  minority  protection  measures  through  which 
optimum  corporate  investment  and  the  development  of  a  strong  corporate  sector  is 
encouraged. 
19 Chapter  I:  Justifications  for  Majority  Rule 
Why  corporations  work  on  the  basis  of  majority  rule  and  also  why  corporation  laws 
often  support  the  governance  of  majority  shareholders  have  been  matters  of 
controversy  among  scholars  of  company  law.  Several  theories  have  been  developed  to 
address  those  questions.  Each  theory  has  put  emphasis  on  certain  elements,  but  there 
has  never  been  an  agreement  among  them.  How  those  theories  emerged  is  a  further 
interesting  and  pertinent  issue  which  needs  to  be  addressed.  It  is  my  intention  in  this 
Chapter  to  examine  those  theories  and  questions  in  the  light  of  the  English  and  Iranian 
corporation  laws. 
To  this  end,  I  shall  raise  and  examine  the  question  in  respect  of  each  jurisdiction 
separately;  hence,  discussion  in  this  Chapter  is  divided  into  two  sections.  One  deals 
with  the  examination  of  the  issue  in  the  English  company  law  and  the  other  takes  the 
case  of  Iran.  In  the  English  section,  which  covers  much  of  the  discussion,  I  will  explain 
how  and  why  majority  rule  emerged  and  survived  in  English  corporations.  This  will  be 
done  through  a  three-fold  study  that  examines  the  political,  economic  and  doctrinal 
factors  which  have  been  most  relevant  to  found  the  rule  of  majority  in  English 
corporations.  In  the  Iranian  section,  I  will  explain  why  majority  rule  did  not  emerge  in 
business  vehicles  and,  instead,  has  been  imported  to  Iranian  company  law  from 
continental  Europe.  A  related,  and  of  course  a  key,  issue  is  to  find  some  explanations 
for  the  question  of  why  Iranian  company  law  at  the  time  of  its  original  adoption  chose 
to  learn  from  the  continental  European  model  of  laws  rather  than  the  Anglo-American 
model. 
20 One  issue  to  be  borne  in  mind  is  that  the  focus  of  discussion  in  this  Chapter  wiH  be  on 
reviewing  justifications  for  the  majority  rule  in  the  majority  /minority  shareholder 
relationship.  To  put  it  simply,  the  Chapter  seeks  to  find  some  answers  to  the  question 
of  why  of  majority  and  minority  shareholders,  only  the  former  should  have  the  final 
say.  Therefore,  the  Chapter  will  assume  that  shareholders  play  a  controlling  function 
within  corporations.  This  is  done  irrespective  of  the  issues  which  have  recently  been 
raised  and  discussed  by  company  law  theorists  and  which  have  challenged  in  various 
ways  the  idea  of  shareholder  control.  These  issues  are  inclusive,  on  the  one  side,  of 
theories  that  deny  shareholder  control',  and  on  the  other  side  theories  that  support 
participation  of  non-shareholder  interest  groups  in  control  of  corporations.  '  These 
areas  will  be  examined  later  in  Chapters  three  and  four  and  thus  I  do  not  intend, 
neither  do  I  feel  it  necessary,  to  bring  more  into  my  discussion  here.  However,  to  the 
extent  that  it  is  pertinent,  I  need  to  remind  the  reader  that  the  current  company  laws  in 
both  England  and  Iran  have  rejected  such  theories  and  persisted  with  the  idea  of 
shareholder  control.  ' 
1  These  theories  will  be  examined  in  Chapter  three  at  111.1.4  below. 
2  These  theories  will  be  examined  in  Chapter  four  at  IV.  1.1.13.3  below. 
3  For  England  see  section  309  (1)  Companies  Act  1985;  Company  Law  Reform,  "Modem 
Company  Law  for  a  Competitive  Economy:  The  Strategic  Framework"  (London,  DTI,  1998), 
para  2.5;  Company  Law  Reform,  "'Modem  Company  Law  for  a  Competitive  Economy:  Final 
Report"  (London,  DTI,  2001),  URN/942  &  URN/943,  paras  1.52,1.56-1.57,3.51;  Nolan  RC, 
"Indirect  Investors:  A  Greater  Say  in  The  Company?  "  (2003),  3  Journal  of  Corporate  L-aw  Studies, 
73,  at  pp  73-7;  Gower  L.  C.  B.,  ""Gower's  Principles  of  Modem  Company  Law"',  4th  ed.,  London 
(1979),  Stevens,  at  pp  553-4;  For  Iran,  see  this  Chapter,  at  1.2  below. 
21 1.1.  The  case  of  England 
What  justifies  application  of  the  majority  rule  in  companies  forms  an  interesting 
question,  bearing  in  mind  that  a  company  as  a  body  corporate  is  normally  composed  of 
two  member  groups  of  majority  and  minority  shareholders  who  may  have  differing 
interests.  A  number  of  theories  have  been  developed  to  address  the  question.  To  begin 
with,  there  is  a  political  theory  which  tries  to  extend  certain  political  ideas  to  the 
apolitical  sphere  of  companies,  using  analogies  between  companies  and  states.  Another 
is  the  economic  theory  which  supports  majority  rule  for  its  economic  advantages.  And 
finally,  there  is  the  doctrinal  justification  which  has  been  developed  by  the  courts  and 
legal  scholars  to  explain  governance  of  majority  shareholders  in  corporations.  I 
respectively  examine  these  three  theories  in  the  following  parts. 
1.1.1.  Political  approach 
The  political  approach  is  a  theory  developed  by  those  who  view  corporations 
politically  to  explain  the  relationship  between  shareholders  and  directors.  The  theory 
normally  relies  on  some  analogies  between  states  and  corporations  in  order  to  extend 
principles  of  political  democracy  from  the  former  to  the  latter.  4  By  making  analogy  in 
4  See  generally  Hill  Jennifer,  "Visions  and  Revisions  of  the  Shareholder",  The  American  Journal  of 
Comparative  Law,  (2000),  Vol.  48,  Berkeley,  Ca.,  American  Association  for  the  Comparative  Study 
of  Law,  at  pp  52-53;  Buxbaum  Richard  M.,  "The  Internal  Division  of  Powers  in  Corporate 
Governance"'  (1985),  California  Law  Review,  No.  6,  vol.  73,  at  p  1671,  Berkeley,  Calif.,  University 
of  California,  School  of  Jurisprudence;  Selznick  Philip,  "'Law,  Society,  and  Industrial  justice", 
Russell  Sage  Foundation,  (1969),  at  p  259. 
22 respect  of  organisational  structure  and  bureaucratic  hierarchy',  concepts  of 
participation  6,  membership  /citizenship',  organisational  objective',  division  of  powers, 
and  decision-making  machinery  existing  in  both  corporations  and  states9,  this 
approach  argues  that  a  corporation  requires  some  form  of  government,  as  does  any 
entity  composed  of  individuals.  According  to  it,  corporate  citizens  (shareholders) 
should  be  able  to  exercise  control  over  decisions  and  conducts  of  corporate  leaders 
(management)  in  the  corporate  community"  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  latter  pursue 
the  shareholder  interest  objective.  11  However,  as  shareholders  are  often  numerous  in 
modem  corporations  and  because  they  as  autonomous  persons  may  have  varying 
interests  over  how  to  manage  corporate  affairs  and  how  managers  should  be 
controlled,  they  can  easily  fall  into  disagreement.  As  a  result,  the  idea  of  shareholder 
control  over  management  which  is  seen  by  the  theory  as  desirable  and  necessary 
would  be  lost  if  such  disagreements  were  to  persist.  To  ensure  that  shareholders  will 
be  able  to  exert  control  effectively,  the  theory  proposes  a  representative  democratic 
5  Latham  Earl,  ""The  Body  Politic  of  the  Corporation",  in  The  Corporation  in  Modern  Society, 
edited  by  Edward  Sagendorph  Mason  (ed.  )  (1960),  5,  Cambridge,  Mass,  pp  218-220;  Bottomley 
Stephen,  "'From  Contractualism  to  Constitutionalism:  A  Framework  for  Corporate  Governance" 
(1997),  Sydney  Law  Review,  vol.  19,277,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Sydney,  Sydney,  at  pp 
288-298. 
6  Buxbaum  (above,  note  4). 
7  Pound  John,  "'The  Rise  of  The  Political  Model  of  Corporate  Governance  and  Corporate 
Control"  (1993),  New  York  University  Law  Review,  vol.  68,1003  at  pp  1007-1013,  New  York,  New 
York  University  School  of  Law;  Villiers  Charlotte,  "'European  Company  Law-Towards 
Democracy?  ",  European  Business  law  Library,  (1997),  Aldershot,  Ashgate,  pp  197-205. 
8  Mason  Edward  S.,  "Introduction",  in  The  Corporation  in  Modern  Society,  Edited  by  Edward 
Sagendorph  Mason,  (1960),  Cambridge,  Mass,  at  p  11. 
9  Brewster  Kingman,  "The  Corporation  and  Economic  Federalism"',  in  The  Corporation  in  Modern 
Soclet 
, 
i/  edited  by  Edward  Sagendorph  Mason  (ed.  )  (1960),  5,  Cambridge,  Mass,  at  p  72. 
10  See  generally  Ferran  Ellis,  "'Company  Law  and  Corporate  Finance"  (1999),  Oxford,  Oxford 
University  Press,  at  p  246;  Hill  (above,  note  4)  at  pp  52-53. 
11  Buxbaum  (above,  note  4);  Selznick  (above,  note  4)  at  p  259;  Brewster  (above,  note  9)  at  72; 
Mason  (above,  note  8)  at  p  11;  Villiers  (above,  note  7)  at  pp  197-205;  Pound  (above,  note  7)  at  pp 
1007-1013;  Latham  (above,  note  5)  at  pp  218-220;  Bottomley  (above,  note  5)  at  pp  288-298. 
23 form  in  which  the  rule  of  the  majority  is  the  applicable  rule.  "  In  such  form,  every 
shareholder  irrespective  of  the  size  of  their  investment  will  have  one  vote  to  be  cast  in 
the  shareholder  meeting,  just  like  the  vote  state  citizens  enjoy  in  political  elections. 
Political  approach  views  the  rule  of  majority  in  corporations  as  an  adoption  from 
democratic  ideas.  Before,  corporations  were  governed  with  a  unanimity  rule.  Since 
then,  however,  they  have  been  treated  like  political  bodies,  which  can  work  through  a 
majority  decision,  and  where  unanimous  voting  is  no  longer  a  requirement.  13  Political 
approach,  therefore,  justifies  the  rule  of  the  majority,  using  the  same  arguments  that 
are  normally  brought  for  majority  rule  in  politics.  Since  the  origin  of  arguments 
represented  by  this  theory  derives  from  the  views  developed  by  political  thinkers,  it 
seems  helpful  to  consider  the  main  arguments  that  have  been  brought  for  the  principle 
of  majority  rule  in  politics. 
1.1.1.1.  justifications  for  majority  rule  in  politics 
In  politics,  majority  rule  is  described  as  a  mechanism  developed  by  democratic  theory 
to  solve  what  is  called  the  collective  action  problem.  In  the  dictionary  definition, 
democracy  is  a  govemment  in  which  the  supreme  power  is  vested  in  the  people.  14  This 
suggests  that  the  power  of  leaders,  and  their  decisions  and  conduct,  can  only  be 
justified  so  far  as  they  reflect  the  popular  wish.  Clearly,  the  popular  wish  refers  to  all 
individuals  and  groups  rather  than  a  mere  dominant  group  of  individuals  in  the 
12  See  generally  Buxbaurn  (above,  note  4);  Mason  (above,  note  8)  at  pI  I;  Pound  (above,  note  7) 
at  pp  1007-1013;  Latham  (above,  note  5)  pp  218-220;  Bottomley  (above,  note  5)  at  pp  288-291; 
Brewster  (above,  note  9)  at  72;  Villiers  (above,  note  7)  at  pp  197-205;  Hill  (above,  note  4)  at  pp 
51-57. 
13  See  Chater  three  (below,  at  111.1.1). 
14  Chambers  Concise  Dictionary,  Edited  by  Schwarz  Catherine,  Edinburgh,  Chambers,  6993. 
24 society.  In  practice,  however,  it  is  difficult  to  establish  the  popular  wish  because  it  is 
not  a  single  wish.  Opinions  and  interests  may  disagree  from  one  group  to  another.  If 
people  disagree  in  their  opinion  and  interests,  then  there  should  be  a  mechanism 
through  which  they  can  overcome  disagreements  and  make  an  ultimate  decision  which 
reflects  the  popular  wish.  This  mechanism  in  the  view  of  the  democratic  theory  is 
majority  rule  which  authorises  the  majority  of  the  people  of  each  generation  to  make 
ultimate  decisions  in  the  name  of  the  population.  The  democratic  theory  in  this  way 
rules  out  two  possible  alternatives  to  majority  rule,  unanimity  rule  and  rule  by  the  few. 
In  its  view,  unanimity  is  unworkable  due  to  the  problem  of  size,  and  can  lead  the 
society  to  fall  into  anarchy.  "  Rule  by  the  few,  on  the  other  hand,  contradicts  human 
reason  for  it  requires  assuming  few  people  to  have  priority  over  the  many.  16ThUS  the 
rule  of  majority  inevitably  becomes  the  next  best  alternative.  " 
number  of  arguments  have  been  developed  to  justify  the  rule  of  majority  in 
democratic  societies.  For  one,  majority  rule,  it  is  suggested,  springs  from  equal 
treatment  to  individuals.  For  another,  it  leaves  unaffected  the  freedom  of  the  greater 
number  of  people  and  hence  is  the  next  best  alternative  after  unanimity.  Furthermore, 
majority  rule,  it  is  said,  improves  the  quality  of  decisions  taken  by  the  government.  In 
summary,  it  is  possible  to  classify  the  arguments  for  the  rule  of  the  majority  into  two 
categories: 
15  See  Locke,  John,  "Of  Civil  Government'"  (1632-1704),  Introduction  by  Carpenter  W.  F.  (1943), 
London,  Dent,  at  pp  180,181;  Dahl  Robert  A.,  "Democracy  and  Its  Critics"'  (1989),  New  Haven, 
London,  Yale  University  Press,  pp  46,167;  Gewirth  Alan,  "'Community  of  Rights"  (1996), 
Chicago,  London,  University  of  Chicago  Press,  at  pp  13,14. 
16  See  Dahl  lbid.,  at  pp  75-77. 
17  Arblaster  Anthony,  "'Democracy"  (1987),  Open  University  Press,  pp  65,67;  Lively  Jack, 
"Democracy"  (1975),  Oxford,  Blackwell,  pp  13,17,18;  Dahl  (above,  note  15)  at  pp  49-51,153; 
25 Quantitative  argument 
The  underlying  idea  of  the  quantitative  argument  is  to  prioritise  the  majority  rule 
simply  because  it  embraces  more  people  who  will  then  have  more  force.  "  This 
viewpoint  considers  the  majority  to  be  composed  of  aggregations  of  individuals,  each 
with  an  equal  amount  of  power,  who,  when  combined,  wield  much  greater  power.  The 
bigger  the  size  of  the  group  the  more  power  it  possesses  and  the  more  merits  it  will 
have  in  governing  the  society.  A  recent  example  of  the  quantitative  justification  can  be 
found  in  the  famous  "'Social  Contract"'  theory  which  argues  that  early  individuals, 
living  in  the  state  of  nature,  came  together  and  agreed  with  each  other  to  unite  into 
society,  which  is  governed  by  the  majority  rule  for  mutual  self-protection.  " 
The  social  contract  theory,  however,  suffers  from  difficulties.  Historically,  the 
hierarchical  societies  in  which  social  contract  theorists  lived,  indicate  that  their 
members  never  actually  convened  to  consent  to  a  social  contraCt.  20  Further,  the  theory 
is  unable  to  provide  any  moral  value  as  it  simply  relies on  force.  "  Above  all,  the  theory 
is  incapable  of  preventing  a  likely  majority  injustice  as  it  fails  to  consider  the  risks 
Commager  Henry  Steele,  "Majority  Rule  and  Minority  Rights"'  (1943),  London,  Oxford 
University  Press,  p  9. 
18  Smith  T.  V-,  "Compromise,  Its  Context  and  Limits",  Quoted  in  Spitz  Elain,  "Majority  Rule" 
(1932),  Chatham,  N.  J.,  Chatham  House,  at  p  185. 
19  Hobbes  Thomas,  "Leviathan"  (1651),  Menston,  Scholar  Press,  Chap.  xviii,  Secs.  I  and  3; 
Rousseau,  Jean  Jacques,  Social  Contract,  Translated  by  Cole  J.  D.  H.  (1923),  London,  Dent,  pp 
85-87;  Locke  John,  "The  Lock  Reader:  Selections  From  the  Works  of  John  Locke",  with  a  general 
introduction  and  commentary  by  John  W.  Yolton,  (1977),  Cambridge,  Cambridge  University 
Press,  p  245;  Locke  (above,  note  15)  at  pp  180,181;  For  more  detailed  study  of  Hobbes',  Locke's 
and  Rousseau's  thoughts  see  Mims  Edwin,  The  Majority  of  the  People  (1941),  Chap.  I 
"Sovereignty",  New  York,  Modem  Age  Books,  at  pp  10-47. 
20  Frug  Gerald  E.,  "The  City  as  a  Legal  Concept",  Harvard  Law  Review,  (1980),  Vol.  93, 
Cambridge,  Mass,  Harvard  Law  Review  Publishing  Association,  p  1086. 
26 associated  with  any  absolute  exercise  of  majority  rule  in  societies  (what  is  often  termed 
as  'majority  tyranny').  most  contemporary  political  writers  agree  to  say  that  the 
likelihood  of  tyranny  is  one  associated  with  the  nature  of  power  no  matter  who  holds 
the  power,  one  man,  a  few  people  or  the  majority.  " 
1.1.1.1.2.  Qualitative  argument 
The  qualitative  argument  looks  for  a  moral  justification  of  the  rule,  something  that 
could  explain  why  one  should  feel  a  moral  duty  to  obey  the  majority.  It  can,  itself,  be 
classified  into  two  dimensions:  substantive  and  procedural. 
A)  Substantive 
Theorists  in  this  category  generally  took  the  view  that  majority  rule  is  desirable  not 
only  because  it  helps  reach  good  results  but  also  because  it  sufficiently  comprises  of 
good  elements.  They,  however,  viewed  good  elements  differently.  To  Aristotle,  who 
was  perhaps  the  earliest  theorist  in  this  category,  good  elements  meant  collective 
wisdom.  In  his  view,  government  by  the  majority  is  desirable  because  it  benefits  more 
than  any  other  form  of  goverrtment  from  the  collective  wisdom  of  the  people.  "  For 
Jeremy  Bentham,  it  was  a  matter  of  interest  maximisation.  According  to  him,  societies 
are  composed  of  equal  individuals  who  naturally  tend  to  pursue  their  own  happiness. 
A  good  form  of  government  is  the  one  that  respects  this  natural  desire  in  as  many 
21  Kendall  Willmore,  John Locke  and  the  Doctrine  of  Majority  Rule  (1965),  Urbana,  University 
of  Illinois  Press,  pp  113-119;  Barker  Ernest,  Reflections  on  the  Government  (1942),  Oxford 
University  Press,  at  pp  35-36. 
22  Dahl  Robert  A.,  "A  Preface  to  Economic  Democracy"  (1985),  Berkeley,  University  of 
California,  at  p  18;  Alexis  de  Tocqueville  Democracy  in  America,  Chapter  XV,  available  at  the 
following  website:  http:  //xroads.  virginia.  edu/-HYPER/DETOC/l_chl5.  htm;  Villiers  (above, 
note  7)  at  p  8. 
27 people  as  possible,  which  is  government  by  the  majority  of  the  people.  24  In  the  view  of 
Hans  Kelsen,  freedom  maximisation  was  the  underlying  good  element.  In  his  view, 
people  naturally  prefer  to  have  the  type  of  order  that  produces  least  restraints.  A  good 
order,  thus,  is  the  one  that  limits  fewest  people's  freedom.  "  The  good  element  in 
Barker"s  view  was  unanimity.  The  formula  he  suggested  was  "'government  by 
discussion",  in  which  every  citizen  offers  his  opinion  and  through  the  exchange  of 
opinions  the  final  decision  is  made  by  the  rule  of  the  majority.  Such  a  decision  bears 
imprints  from  all  the  ideas  proposed  in  the  discussion  process  and  hence  becomes 
inherently  right  because  it  is  not  the  decision  of  a  mere  majority,  but  is  made  by  all  for 
all.  "  For  Hallowell,  it  was  a  simple  matter  of  faith.  In  his  view  majority  rule  is  justified 
simply  because,  and  as  far  as,  we  believe  in  certain  transcendental  truths  and  common 
values  on  the  basis  of  faith  rather  than  reason.  " 
B)  Procedural 
The  underlying  idea  for  those  who  value  majority  rule  procedurally  is  to  deny  any 
substantive  goodness  for  majority  rule.  From  this  viewpoint,  majority  rule  is  simply  a 
good  device,  using  which  is  most  likely  to  lead  the  community  towards  good  ends. 
Majority  rule  is  not  inherently  good.  If  we  view  it  as  a  good  rule,  it  is  simply  for  it  is  the 
23  Aristotle's  Ethics  and  Politics,  Book  VII,  Vol.  2.  Translated  from  the  Greek  by  Gillies  John, 
1797,  London,  at  pp  185,189,323,284,285. 
24  Bentham  Jeremy,  "An  Introduction  to  The  Principles  of  Morals  and  Legislation",  Oxford, 
1907,  Ch.  1,  para.  4. 
25  Kelsen  Hans,  Quoted  in  Spitz  Elain,  "Majority  rule"  (1932),  Chatham,  N.  J.,  Chatham  House, 
at  p  159. 
26  Barker  (above,  note  21);  A  similar  view  has  more  recently  been  taken  by  Manin  and  Held, 
who  argue  that  a  legitimate  decision  is  not  one  that  necessarily  follows  from  the  will  of  all,  but 
rather  one  that  results  from  the  involvement  of  all  in  the  political  process.  [Manin  Bernard,  "On 
Legitimacy  and  Political  Deliberation",  Political  Theory,  Vol.  15,  No.  3.  (Aug.,  1987),  338-368, 
Translated  from  French  by  Elly  Stein  and  Jane  Mansbridge,  at  p  352,  Sage  Publications  Inc.; 
Held  David,  "Models  of  Democracy"  (1996),  Oxford,  Polity,  pp  301-3021. 
28 only  available  device  that  can  effectively  help  people  reaching  justice  and  good  ends. 
Thomas  Jefferson  was  the  leading  thinker  in  this  dimension.  "  According  to  him, 
people  derive  their  power  from  God  and  they  have  a  natural  right,  given  to  them  by 
God,  to  exercise  that  power  through  a  majoritarian  government,  which  is  the  next  best 
device.  To  Jefferson,  the  governance  of  the  majority  is  justified  for  it  is  hard  to  imagine 
a  case  in  which  the  majority  of  the  people  fall  into  intentional  wrongdoings  and 
corruption  against  society,  while  these  are  much  more  likely  to  occur  in  other  forms  of 
governance.  Nevertheless,  the  majority  may  conu-nit  mistakes,  but  this  is  not  a  matter 
of  much  concem  as  it  is  impossible  to  eliminate  human  error  completely. 
1.1.2.  Economic  approach 
Economists  often  support  the  majority  rule  for  its  efficiency-enhancing  feature.  Central 
to  the  most  economic  theories  in  analysing  rules  particularly  rules  concerning 
companies,  is  the  concept  of  efficiency.  "  Rules  matter  only  for  and  so  far  as  they 
promote  efficiency.  As  individuals  naturally  tend  to  pursue  benefits  rather  than  costs'O, 
they  choose  among  alternatives  a  rule  which  is  efficient;  i.  e.  whose  benefits  exceed  the 
costs.  For  example  in  the  case  of  a  simple  two-sided  contract,  every  party  considers  his 
personal  interest,  and  when  they  are  convinced  after  cost/benefit  consideration  that 
the  contractual  rule  is  going  to  maximize  their  joint  gain,  the  agreement  will  be 
27  Hallowell  John  Hamilton,  "'The  Decline  of  Liberalism  as  An  Ideology""  (1943),  Berkeley,  Los 
Angeles,  University  of  California  Press,  at  pp  53-54. 
28  See  Jefferson  (1743-1826)  quoted  in  Spitz  Elain,  ""Majority  Rule",  (1932),  Chatham,  N.  J., 
Chatham  House,  at  p  159. 
29  An  economist  might  define  allocative  efficiency  as  using  resources  in  their  best  application 
with  lowest  possible  cost.  See  generally  Posner  Richard  A.,  "Economic  Analysis  of  Law",  (1992), 
Boston,  London,  Little,  Brown,  at  p  3;  Cheffins  Brian  R.,  Company  Law:  Theory  Structure  and 
Operation  (1997),  Oxford,  Clarendon  Press,  at  p  7;  Maughan  C.  W.  and  Copp  S.  F.,  "Company 
Law  Reform  and  Economic  Methodology  Revisited"  (1999),  The  Company  Lawyer,  Vol.  21,  No.  1, 
London,  Ovez  Publishing  Limited  at  pp  20-21. 
29 reached.  In  such  case,  the  contract  is  efficient  because  every  contract  party  is  served  by 
it.  However  in  a  more  complex  case  there  can  be  a  contract  between  more  than  two 
persons  who  have  an  ongoing  relationship  and  who  must  choose  with  a  view  to 
making  profit  a  collective  rule.  In  the  latter  case,  the  contractual  rule  may  not  at  all 
times  be  beneficial  for  all  persons  involved.  It  may  benefit  some  and  hence  be  seen  by 
those  benefited  as  efficient,  while  harming  some  others  who  view  it  as  being  inefficient. 
There  are  two  varying  approaches  among  economists  on  how  to  evaluate  a  collective 
rule.  One  approach  argues  that  a  rule  is  efficient  when  it  benefits  some  party  without 
producing  cost  for  anyone.  This  so-called  "Pareto'  efficiency  model  was  introduced  by 
Mr  Vilfredo  Pareto,  a  19thcentury  Italian  economist.  The  other  approach  argues  that  a 
choice  is  efficient  when  it  benefits  only  the  greatest  possible  number  of  individuals. 
This  is  called  'Kaldor-Hicks-'  and  was  developed  by  the  two  20th  century  British 
economists,  Professor  Nicholas  Kaldor  and  John  Hicks,  who  proclaimed  that  a 
particular  change  is  efficient  if,  in  aggregate,  the  benefits  associated  with  the  change 
exceed  the  costs.  The  latter  which  has  attracted  overwhehning  support  among 
economists  rejects  the  former  simply  because,  it  argues,  collective  choices  inevitably 
have  adverse  effects  to  the  interests  of  some  individuals  and  it  is  impossible  to  guard 
people  against  such  effects.  " 
Application  of  the  majority  rule  in  companies  can  be  described  as  being  one  of  the 
consequences  of  entertaining  the  Kaldor-Hicks  model  of  efficiency.  Shareholders  in 
30  Bentham  (above,  note  24). 
31  See  Cheffins  (above,  note  29)  at  pp  14-16;  Posner  (above,  note  29)  at  p  14;  Gower  (above,  note 
3)  at  p  554;  Roe  Mark  J.,  "Corporate  Law's  Limits",  Columbia  University  (2002),  p  16  also 
30 corporations  adopt  resolutions  with  a  majority  vote,  which  means  such  resolutions 
may  leave  only  majority  shareholders  better  off  while  allowing  minority  shareholders 
to  feel  worse  off.  Yet  this  is  efficient  because  majority  shareholders  as  persons  who 
possess  more  shares  in  companies  will  be  benefited  more  compared  with  those  who 
have  less  investment.  This  extra  financial  motive  will  encourage  substantial  wealth- 
holders  to  appreciate  the  risk  of  investment  in  companies.  "  Any  sub  majority  rule  can 
place  control  of  majority  investment  in  the  hands  of  minority  shareholders  who  may 
not  show  adequate  care  for  majority  interests  and  this  is  not  efficient.  "  Minority 
shareholders,  too,  appreciate  the  risk  of  control  by  the  majority  shareholders  as  a 
matter  of  contract  because  they  wiR  obtain  in  aggregate  more  benefits  than  harm.  34 
Any  subsequent  dissatisfaction  on  the  part  of  minority  shareholders  will  not  cause  a 
decline  from  the  exercise  of  the  majority  rule  in  companies  because  with  arrangements 
where  one  party  is  dissatisfied  with  how  things  have  worked  out,  assets  overall  may 
available  at  Social  Science  Research  Network  Electronic  Library  at 
http:  /  /papers.  ssrn-com/abstract=260582. 
32  Black  Bernard  S.,  "'Is  Corporate  Law  Trivial?:  A  Political  and  Economic  Analysis",  North- 
Western  University  Law  Review,  (1990),  Vol.  84,  No  2,  Chicago,  Northwestern  University  Law 
School,  at  p  552;  Bebchuk  Lucian  Arye,  "Limiting  Contractual  Freedom  in  Corporate  Law:  The 
Desirable  Constraints  on  Charter  Amendments"",  Harvard  Law  Review,  (1989),  Vol.  102,  pp  1830- 
1;  MacNeil  lain,  "'Company  Law  Rules:  An  Assessment  from  the  Perspective  of  Incomplete 
Contract  Theory",  Journal  of  Corporate  Law  Studies  (June  2001),  Oxford,  UK,  Hart  Pub,  p  117; 
Jensen  C.  Michel  and  Meckling  William  H.  "Corporate  Governance  and  "Economic  Democracy': 
An  Attack  on  Freedom"',  in  Proceedings  of  Corporate  Governance:  A  Definitive  exploration  of  the 
Issues,  edited  by  C.  J.  Huizenga,  UCLA  Extension  (1983),  at  pp  1-6  available  at  Social  Science 
Research  Network  (SSRN),  Electronic  Library  at:  http:  //papers.  ssrn.  com/ABSTRACT 
ID=321521;  Posner  (above,  note  29)  at  pp  91-6;  See  Cheffins  (above,  note  29)  at  pp  18-19]. 
33  Jensen  &  Meckling  (above,  note  32)  at  p  6;  See  also  Easterbrook  Frank  H.  and  Fischel  Daniel 
R.,  The  Economic  Structure  of  Corporate  Law",  (1991),  Harvard  University  Press,  Cambridge, 
Mass.  London,  UK,  Ch.  1  at  p  409;  Black  (above,  note  32)  at  pp  552,555-6;  Bebchuk  (above,  note 
32)  at  pp  1830-1;  Ferran  (above,  note  10)  at  p  246;  Farrar  John  H.,  "'Company  Law",  (1991), 
London,  Butterworths,  at  p  222;  Lee  Hazen  Thomas,  "Silencing  the  Shareholders'  Voice",  North 
Carolina  Law  Review,  (2002),  Vol.  80,  at  p  1917  available  from  the  Social  Science  Research 
Network  at  http:  //ssrn.  com/absract  - 
id=329800;  Lowenstein  Louis,  "'Shareholder  Voting 
Rights:  A  Response  to  Sec.  Rule  19c-4  and  to  Professor  Gilson"'  (1989),  Columbia  Law  Review,  Vol. 
89,  No.  5,  New  York,  Columbia  University  Press,  at  pp  982-3. 
31 still  be  transferred  into  more  valuable  uses.  In  such  cases,  other  parties  may  gain  more 
than  what  the  disappointed  individual  has  lost.  Thus,  contractual  arrangements  that 
favour  majority  rule  ex  ante  will  even  ex  post  meet  the  Kalder-Hiks  standard  of 
efficiency.  " 
Although  economists  confirm  that  original  adoption  of  majority  rule  by  corporations 
occurred  with  a  view  to  democratic  ideas,  they  emphasise,  however,  that  the 
endurance  of  majority  rule  in  corporations  for  so  long  has  been  caused  by  an  efficiency 
consideration  which  resulted  in  the  adaptation  of  the  rule.  Such  adaptation  is  most 
manifested  through  a  historical  investigation  of  how  the  rule  of  the  majority  evolved  in 
corporations.  In  a  recent  investigation,  it  has  been  shown  that  corporations  have 
16 
travelled  three  stages  over  time.  At  the  very  early  period  of  their  introduction  37 
,  they 
have  been  working  with  a  rule  of  unanimous  shareholder  voting.  Unanimous  consent 
was,  however,  impractical  because  of  its  inability  to  allow  progress  and  improvement 
and  further,  it  was  liable  to  abuse,  as  an  individual  member  could  opportunistically 
take  advantage  of  the  situation  by  withholding  his  consent  in  order  to  extract  some 
34  Man-ne  Henry,  "'Some  Theoretical  Aspects  of  Share  Voting  in  the  Economics  of  Legal 
Relationships",  Columbia  Law  Review,  New  York,  Columbia  University  Press,  (1964),  Vol.  64, 
1427. 
35  See  Posner  (above,  note  29)  at  p  14,  Cheffins  (above,  note  29)  at  pp  15-16. 
36  Dunlavy  Colleen  A.,  "Corporate  Governance  in  Late  19th  Century  Europe  and  the  United 
States,  The  Case  of  Shareholder  Voting  Rights"  in  Comparative  Corporate  Governance:  The  State  of 
the  Art  and  Emerging  Research  edited  by  Hopt  K.  J.,  Kanada  H.,  Roe  M.  j.,  Wymeersch  E.  and 
Prigge  S.  (eds.  ),  (1998),  Oxford  University  Press,  at  pp  12-13;  See  also  Carney  William  J., 
"'Fundamental  Corporate  Changes,  Minority  Shareholders,  and  Business  Purposes"  (1980), 
American  Bar  Foundation  Research  Journal,  Chicago,  American  Bar  Foundation,  at  pp  69,77-97; 
Hager  Mark  M.,  "Bodies  Politic:  The  Progressive  History  of  Organizational  'Real  Entity' 
Theory",  Univcrsity  of  Pittsburgh  Law  Review  (1989),  Vol.  50,  Pittsburgh,  at  pp  633-4. 
37  The  Russia  Company  was  perhaps  the  earliest  example;  it  was  granted  its  charter  in  1555, 
followed  by  the  foundation  of  the  English  East  India  Company  in  1600.  [See  Chaudhuri  K.  N., 
"The  English  East  India  Company"  (1965),  London,  Cass,  at  pp  3,261. 
32 extra  benefit  for  himself 
. 
3'  As  companies  grew  in  size  and  the  need  for  changes  become 
more  common,  companies  and  corporate  laws  replaced  unanimity  with  majority  rule. 
Yet,  the  new  rule  which  worked  on  the  basis  of  one  vote  for  each  shareholder",  aimed 
at  safeguarding  individual  shareholders  as  members  of  the  corporation  4'  rather  than  as 
owners  of  a  portion  of  the  corporate  capital.  In  the  eighteenth  century  a  new  practice 
emerged  in  Britain  of  giving  the  larger  shareholders  additional  votes.  Since  then  the 
general  direction  of  change  in  the  nineteenth  century  in  Britain  was  from  the  more 
democratic  alternative  towards  plutocratic  power  relations  in  which  each  share  carried 
a  vote.  This  practice  is  now  widely  accepted  and  normally  is  put  in  the  form  of  a 
default  rule  in  company  laws  of  most  countries. 
Why  corporations  have  travelled  from  adoption  to  adaptation  in  respect  of  majority 
rule  can  be  answered  in  the  light  of  differing  features  which  have  existed  in  between 
corporations  and  states.  A  democratic  state  relied  on  public  recognition  and 
legitimisation  rather  than  private  contracts.  Such  a  state  often  pursued  for  the  good  of 
the  public  objectives  other  than  mere  profit  maximisation.  The  state's  membership 
could  include  every  individual  and  body  corporate  that  resided  in  its  jurisdiction,  and 
normally  required  no  especial  qualification  from  members.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
corporation  as  a  business  vehicle  relied  on  private  contracts  with  a  view  to  making 
38  See  Cheffins  (above,  note  29)  at  pp  17,238;  Bebchuk  (above,  note  32)  at  pp  1830-31;  Schwarts 
Alan  and  Scott  Robert  E.,  "Contract  Theory  and  The  Limits  of  Contract  Law",  Yale  Law  journal 
(2003),  vol.  113,  New  Haven,  Conn.,  Yale  Law  journal  Co.,  Yale  University,  School  of  Law,  at  p 
3  also  available  at  Social  Science  Research  Network  (SSRN),  Electronic  Library  at: 
http:  //papers.  ssrn.  com;  Romano  Roberta,  ""Answering  The  Wrong  Question:  The  Tenuous 
Case  for  Mandatory  Corporate  Laws",  Columbia  Law  Review,  No.  7  (1989),  Vol.  89,  New  York, 
Columbia  University  Press,  at  pp  1559-1601. 
39  Ratner  David  L.,  "The  Government  of  Business  Corporations:  Critical  Reflections  on  the  Rule 
of  One  Share,  One  Vote",  Cornell  Law  Review  (1970),  Number  1,  Vol.  56,  Cornell  University, 
Cornell  Law  School,  at  pp  3-5;  Ferran  (above,  note  10)  at  pp  249-250. 
33 41  profit  for  the  contract  parties,  i.  e.  corporate  members.  In  corporations,  only 
shareholders  were  considered  as  members  and  other  interested  groups  such  as 
employees,  customers,  suppliers  and  directors  were  excluded.  Also,  corporations 
worked  to  maximise  only  their  shareholders'  wealth,  as  shareholders  supplied  them 
42  with  the  finance  required  for  corporate  operations.  These  differing  features  could 
have  made  the  original  adoption  unworkable,  ineffective  and  inefficient  in  the 
corporate  context  and  hence  they  had  to  be  addressed  through  adaptation  which 
subsequently  occurred  most  noticeably  in  respect  of  voting.  Such  adaptation 
distinguishably  separated  the  majority  rule  that  existed  in  democratic  states  and  the 
majority  rule  that  works  in  corporations.  " 
40  Ratner  (above,  note  39)  at  p  6. 
41  Hill  Jennifer,  ""Public  Beginnings,  Private  Ends:  Should  Corporate  Law  Privilege  the  Interests 
of  Shareholders?  "',  in  International  Corporate  Law,  Edited  by  Fiona  Macmillan  Vol.  1  (2000) 
Oxford,  Hart,  at  p  18  and  Hill  (above,  note  4)  at  p  43;  Mason  (above,  note  8)  at  pp  1,5;  Selznick 
(above,  note  4)  at  pp  47-48;  Farrar  John  H.,  ""Company  Law"',  (1985),  London,  Butterworths,  at  p 
3;  Hager  (above  note  36)  at  p  575;  Cheffins  (above  note  29)  at  pp  17,238;  Jensen  C.  Michel  and 
Meckling  William  H,  "'Theory  of  the  Firm:  Managerial  Behaviour,  Agency  Costs  and  Ownership 
Structure",  (1976),  3,  Journal  of  Financial  Econnomics.,  Amsterdam,  Holland,  at  305;  Easterbrook 
&  Fischel  (above,  note  33)  at  Ch.  1;  Easterbrook  Frank  H.  and  Fischel  Daniel  R.,  "Voting  in 
Corporate  Law",  The  Journal  of  Law  and  Economics  (June  1983),  Chicago,  University  of  Chicago 
Law  School,  at  p  401;  Easterbrook  Frank  H.  and  Fischel  Daniel  R.,  "The  Corporate  Contract"', 
Columbia  Law  Review,  No.  7  (1989),  Vol.  89,  New  York,  Columbia  University  Press,  pp  1430-5. 
42  Roe  Mark  J.,  "'The  Shareholder  Wealth  Maximization  Norm  and  Industrial  Organization" 
(2001),  Harvard  Law  School,  p  3,  Social  Science  Research  Network  (SSRN), Electronic  Library  at 
www.  ssrn.  com  (Working  Paper  No  019  ID  282703);  Stout  Lynn  A.,  "Bad  and  Not-So-Bad 
Arguments  for  Shareholder  Primacy",  (2002),  Southern  California  Law  Review,  Vol.  75,1189; 
Leader  Sheldon,  "Private  Property  and  Corporate  Governance:  Part  1:  Defining  the  Interests", 
edited  by  Fiona  Macmillan  Patfield  (ed.  ),  Kluwer  Law  International,  London,  (1995),  pp  94-96; 
Gower  (above,  note  3)  p  554;  Manne  (above,  note  34);  Farrar  (above,  note  33)  at  p  319. 
43  Section  370(6)  Companies  Act  1985  and  Art  54,  Table  A;  See  also  Ferran  (above,  note  10)  at  p 
320;  Birds  John  &  Others  (eds.  ),  "Boyle  &  Birds"  Company  Law"  (1995),  3RD  ed.,  Jordans,  Bristol, 
p  210;  Leader  Sheldon  &  Dine  Janet,  "United  Kingdom",  in  The  Legal  Basis  of  Corporate 
Governance  in  Publicly  Held  Corporations,  (1998),  219  at  p  233,  Kluwer  Law  International. 
34 1.1.3.  Doctrinal  approach 
Generally  speaking,  there  are  four  lines  of  arguments  in  case  law  and  between 
company  law  scholars  to  justify  the  majority  rule  in  companies.  These  are:  1)  the 
business  judgment  rule;  2)  the  proper  plaintiff  principle;  3)  the  fear  of  multiplicity  of 
actions;  and  4)  the  internal  management  principle,  which  will  be  examined  respectively 
below. 
1.1.3.1.  Business  judgement  rule 
According  to  the  business  judgement  rule  (BJR),  directors  will  not  be  held  responsible 
for  errors  of  judgement  when  they  make  business  decisions  in  good  faith.  The 
argument  relies  on  the  policy  consideration  that  since  directors  often  must  necessarily 
make  judgements  in  uncertain  business  circumstances  and  on  the  basis  of  incomplete 
information,  it  will  not  be  fair  to  blame  them  for  their  errors  of  judgements  and  for 
taking  decisions  that  subsequently  turn  out  to  be  bad  . 
44TbUS, 
the  gist  of  the  errors  of 
judgements  rule  is  to  provide  a  safe  harbour  for  directors  of  companies  when  they 
make  honest  business  judgements,  hereby  further  to  stimulate  directorial  initiative  and 
risk-taking  in  companies  . 
4' 
A  full  examination  of  the  BJR  is  to  be  discussed  elsewhere. 
46 
44  Re  City  Equitable  Fire  and  Insurance  Co.  Ltd  (1925)  Ch  407  at  408  per  Romer  June;  see 
generally  Eisenberg,  Melvin  Aron,  "'The  Duty  of  Care  and  The  Business  Judgement  Rule  in 
American  Corporate  Law"  (1997),  Company  Financial  and  Insolvency  Law  Review,  185  Oxford, 
Mansfield  Press,  at  p  195;  Arsalidou,  Demetra,  "'Objectivity  vs  Flexibility  in  Civil  Law 
jurisdictions  and  The  Possible  Introduction  of  The  Business  Judgement  Rule  in  English  Law" 
(2003),  Company  Lawyer,  24  (8),  228,  London,  Oyez  Publishing  Limited,  at  p  232;  Davies  P.  L., 
"Gower  and  Davies'  Principles  of  Modern  Company  Law",  London,  Sweet  &  Maxwell,  (2003), 
7th  ed.,  Chapter  16,  at  p  436;  Stapledon  G.  P.,  "Mismanagement  and  The  Unfair  Prejudice 
Provision",  Company  Lawyer  (1993),  14  (5),  94-97. 
45  Eisenberg  (above,  note  44)  at  p  191;  Tunc,  Andre,  "The  Judge  and  The  Businessman"  (1986), 
Law  Qtiarterly  Review,  102  (Oct),  549-554,  London,  Stevens  and  Sons;  Arsht,  Samuel  S.,  "The 
Business  Judgement  Rule  Revisited"  (1979),  Hofstra  Law  Review,  Vol.  8,93,  Hempstead,  N.  Y., 
Hofstra  University  School  of  Law,  at  p  99;  Branson,  Douglas  M.,  "'The  Rule  That  Is  Not  a  Rule: 
The  Business  Judgement  Rule"  (2002),  Valparaiso  University  Law  Revicw,  vol.  36,631,  Valparaiso, 
35 What  I  am  going  to  suggest  here  is  that  this  rule,  contrary  to  what  some  might  argue, 
does  not  really  constitute  a  justification  for  the  rule  of  majority  in  companies.  The 
reason  simply  lies  in  the  nature  of  the  shareholder/  corporation  relationship. 
Shareholders  unlike  directors  do  not  act  as  agents  of  the  corporation.  They  are  more 
likely  to  be  seen  as  owners  of  the  corporation  and  because  of  that  title  they  assume  no 
duty  of  care  and  further  they  wiR  not  need  the  protection  of  the  BJR.  Therefore  when 
shareholders  decide,  for  example,  to  reappoint  or  dismiss  a  particular  director,  to  ratify 
a  director"s  breach  of  duties,  to  alter  articles  of  association,  to  merge  the  company,  to 
sell  all  assets  or  to  dissolve  the  company,  they  do  not  need  to  exercise  care. 
Some  company  law  scholars  argued  that  the  BJR  is  applicable  not  only  to  directors  but 
also  to  shareholders  where  they  make  business  decisions.  For  instance,  Mayson,  French 
and  Ryan  spoke  of  it  as  one  of  the  reasons  for  the  rule  in  Foss  v.  Harbottle  4'  and  in 
describing  the  current  position  of  English  company  law  on  this  issue  proclaimed  that  'a 
court  will  not  review  the  merits  of  a  lawful  decision  of  members  or  directors  of  a 
company'  . 
4' 
As  examples  from  case  law,  they  referred  to  cases  like  Shuttleworth  v.  Cox 
Brothers  and  Co.  Ltd. 
49 
,  Howard  Smith  Ltd.  v.  Ampol  Petroleum  Ltd. 
50 
, 
Carlen  v.  Drury 
51 
and 
the  like"  none  of  them  were  really  pertinent.  The  Shuttleworth  case  was  related  to 
Ind.,  Valparaiso  University  School  of  Law,  at  pp  632,636;  Parkinson  J.  E.,  "'Corporate  Power  and 
Responsibility",  1993,  Oxford,  Clarendon  Press,  at  p  109. 
46  See  Chapter  III  (below,  at  IV.  1.1.  C). 
47  Foss  v.  Harbottle  (1843)  2  Hare  461. 
48  Mayson  Stephan,  French  Derek  and  Ryan  Christopher,  "Mayson,  French  &  Ryan  on 
Company  Law"'  (2003),  19th  ed.,  Oxford,  Oxford  University  Press,  at  p  586. 
49  Shuttleworth  v.  Cox  Bros  &  Co  (Maidenhead)  Ltd,  and  Others,  (1927),  2  KB  9,  pp  20-23  per 
Scrutton  L.  J. 
50  Howard  Smith  Ltd.  v.  Ampol  Petroleum  Ltd.  (1974)  AC  821. 
51  Carlen  v.  Drury  (1812)  1  Ves  &B  154. 
52  Lord  v.  Governor  and  Co.  of  Copper  Miners  (1848),  2  Ph  740;  Inderwick  v.  Snell  (1850),  2  Mac 
&G  216. 
36 resolving  a  dispute  arisen  between  majority  and  minority  shareholders  on  the  issue  of 
alteration  of  the  company  articles  and  the  court  rejected  the  claim  because  the  dispute 
was  a  matter  of  internal  management  rather  than  business  judgement.  The  Howard 
case  was  not  a  case  of  shareholders  making  business  judgements  but  rather  was  a  good 
example  of  not  holding  directors  responsible  for  errors  of  judgement.  In  the  third  case, 
too,  the  disputed  issue  was  essentially  one  of  the  internal  matters  to  be  settled 
internally  and  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  BJR. 
Some  American  scholars  have  offered  similar  suggestions.  "  For  example,  Arsht  took 
the  view  that  "to  the  extent  a  majority  or  controlling  stockholder  usurps  the  function  of 
the  board  of  directors  by  influencing  or  directing  the  directors"  decision,  such 
stockholder  may  have  the  benefit  of  the  business  judgement  rule'.  "  This  view, 
however,  may  work  only  if  the  controlling  shareholder  acts  as  a  shadow  director.  "  Yet, 
a  controlling  shareholder's  exemption  from  liabilitY  in  this  case  is  not  because  he 
makes  a  qua  member  business  decision,  but  rather  for  the  fact  that  he  makes  the 
decision  qua  director. 
1.1.3.2.  Proper  plaintiff  principle 
The  procedural  aspect  of  the  majority  rule  is  known  as  the  proper  plaintiff  rule  which 
was  recognised  by  the  courts  through  the  famous  Foss  v.  Harbottle  case  56 
- 
It  can  be 
described  as  "the  elementary  principle  that  A  can  not,  as  a  general  rule,  bring  an  action 
53  Lee  Hazen  (above,  note  33)  at  p  1916. 
54  Arsht  (above,  note  45)  at  p  111,  para  note  85. 
55  Sections  214  and  251  Insolvency  Act  1986;  See  also  section  741  (2)  Companies  Act  1985. 
56  Foss  v.  Harbottle  (1843)  2  Hare  461. 
37 against  B  to  recover  damages  on  behalf  of  C  for  an  injury  done  by  B  to  C.  "  The  proper 
plaintiff  principle  is  one  of  the  most  important  consequences  of  the  property  right, 
whereby  only  the  owner  of  a  piece  of  property  has  right  to  initiate  action  in  respect  of 
that  property.  5'  However,  application  of  this  general  principle  in  the  company  law 
context  is  not  so  straightforward  because  in  that  context  shareholders  may  simply  wish 
to  represent  themselves  as  owners  of  the  corporate  property  and  its  incident  right  of 
action.  To  correct  this  illusionary  picture,  company  law  supplements  the  proper 
plaintiff  rule  with  another  general  principle  of  separate  corporate  personality59,  which 
recognises  ownership  right  for  the  company  itself  rather  than  its  shareholders.  "  The 
proper  plaintiff  rule  has  been  maintained  in  many  subsequent  caseS61  and  is 
conventionally  seen,  as  a  matter  of  technique,  decisive  for  commencing  corporate 
claims.  62  The  Court  of  Appeal  in  the  recent  Prudential63  case  regarded  it  as  being 
fundamental  to  any  rational  system  of  jurisprudence,  having  a  wider  scope  and 
applying  to  any  association,  for  example  a  trade  union64or  a  building  society65  that  can 
sue  in  its  own  name. 
57  Law  Commission,  Shareholder  Remedies  (1997),  Law  Com,  No  246,  p  70;  Hale,  (above,  note 
56)  at  p  219. 
58  Davies  (above,  note  44)  at  p  618;  Sterling  M.  J.,  "'The  Theory  and  Policy  of  Shareholder 
Actions  in  Tort",  (1987),  The  Modern  Law  Review,  Vol.  50,468,  London,  England,  Stevens  &  Sons, 
at  p  470;  Hale,  Christopher,  "'What's  Right  With  the  Rule  in  Foss  v.  Harbottle?  "  (1997),  Company 
Financial  and  Insolvency  Law  Review,  Oxford,  Mansfield  Press,  219-221. 
59  Salomon  v.  Salomon  &  Co.  Ltd  (1897),  AC  (HL)  22. 
60  Sealy  L.  S.,  "Problems  of  Standing,  Pleading  and  Proof  in  Corporate  Litigation"',  in  Company 
Law  in  Change  edited  by  Pettet,  (1987),  London,  Stevens,  at  p  7;  Wedderburn  K.  W., 
"Shareholder's  Rights  and  the  Rule  in  Foss  v.  Harbottle",  (1957),  Cambridge  Law  journal, 
Cambridge,  Cambridge  University  Press,  at  p  196;  Farrar  (above,  note  33)  at  p  444;  Pettet  Ben, 
"'Company  Law"  (2000),  Harlow,  Longman,  at  pp  227-8;  Hale  (above,  note  58)  at  pp  219,221. 
61  Mozley  v.  Alston  (1847)  1  Ph  790;  Macaura  v.  Northern  Assurance  Co.  Ltd.  (1925),  AC  619; 
Lee  v.  Lees'  Air  Farming  Ltd.  (1961),  AC  12. 
62  "1  can  not  but  think  that  ...  the  claims  of  justice  would  be  found  superior  to  any  difficulties 
arising  out  of  technical  rules  respecting  the  mode  in  which  corporations  are  required  to  sue...  " 
[Foss  v.  Harbottle,  (1843)  2  Hare  461  per  Wigram  VC]. 
63  Prudential  Assurance  Co.  Ltd  v.  Newman  Industries  Ltd.  (No  2)  1982,  Ch,  204  p  210. 
64  Cotter  v.  National  Union  of  Seamen  (1929),  2  Ch  58. 
38 However,  the  separate  corporate  personality  principle  is  clearly  not  intended  to 
separate  the  personality  of  the  company  only  from  that  of  a  minority  shareholder.  It 
also  works  to  separate  a  corporation"s  personality  from  those  of  its  majority 
shareholders.  As  a  consequence,  when  we  speak  of  the  proper  plaintiff  principle  as  one 
of  the  foundations  of  the  majority  rule,  we  do  not  mean  to  take  the  majority 
shareholders  as  the  proper  plaintiffs  who  have  the  right  of  action.  If  that  had  been  true, 
we  would  have  denied  the  separate  corporate  personality  of  companies.  As  a  legal 
person,  a  corporation  acts  through  its  representatives.  Articles  of  association  and 
company  law  prescribe  the  rules  on  which  these  representatives  are  elected,  and 
determine  the  extents  of  their  powers  and  the  mechanisms  on  which  they  can  make 
corporate  decisions.  Yet,  majority  rule  and  the  separate  personality  and  the  proper 
plaintiff  principles  can  coordinate  to  make  commencement  of  any  corporate  action 
generally  dependant  on  the  wish  of  the  majority  who  can  influence  corporate 
representatives  indirectly.  In  that  sense,  the  proper  plaintiff  principle  can  support  the 
majority  rule. 
1.1.3.3.  Fear  of  multiplicity  of  actions 
The  fear  of  multiplicity  of  actions  is  a  policy-driven  argument  by  which  the  courts 
support  application  of  majority  rule  in  companies.  It  generally  reflects  the  fear  of  the 
judiciary  of  becoming  involved  in  endless  shareholder  claims  which  take  up  the  courts' 
time  and  waste  public  funds.  The  early  manifestation  of  this  fear  can  be  found  in  the 
65  Farrow  v.  Registrar  of  Building  Society  (1991),  2  VR  589. 
39 judgement  of  James  L.  J.  in  Gray  v.  Lewis  where  he  declared  that  'if  personal  actions  by 
shareholders  were  allowed  there  might  be  as  many  bills  as  there  are  shareholders 
multiplied  into  the  number  of  defendants.  "  The  policy  is  to  absolve  the  judiciary  from 
having  to  take  difficult  decisions  about  matters  of  business  and  internal  management 
of  companies  and  thereby  to  save  judicial  resources.  Yet,  more  benefits  can  derive  from 
the  policy.  It  is  'more  convenient  that  the  company  should  sue,  instead  of  having  any 
number  of  suits  started  and  subsequently  discontinued  by  individual  shareholders 
/.  67 
Shareholder  actions  might  be  fruitless  for  the  simple  reason  that  the  company  would 
convene  a  meeting,  and  pass  a  resolution  to  ratify  the  act  in  question.  They  could 
further  increase  costs  for  companies  by  imposing  on  them  unwanted  consequences  of 
being  involved  in  endless  time  consuming  and  probably  business  disruptive 
litigations.  "  They  might  also  be  used  to  harass  the  company  through  constant 
litigation.  These  can  all  be  avoided  by  the  courts'  refusal  to  hear  shareholder  actions, 
which  saves  companies'  and  their  shareholders"  time  and  money,  and  allows 
companies  to  operate  and  focus  on  ongoing  business  without  unnecessary 
interruption. 
69 
1.1.3.4.  Internal  management  principle 
The  internal  management  principle  is  another  source  of  justification  upon  which  the 
courts  abdicate  their  jurisdiction  in  favour  of  corporate  internal  forums.  'O  It  is,  in  fact,  a 
consequence  of  enforcing  company  contracts,  and  generally  means  shareholder 
66  Gray  v.  Lewis  (1873),  8  Ch  App,  1035,  p  1051. 
67  Farrar  (above,  note  41)  at  p  361. 
68  Mac  Dougall  v.  Gardiner  (1875),  lCh.  D.  13  at  p  25. 
69  Farrar  (above,  note  41). 
70  Mayson  Et.  Al.  (above,  note  48)  at  p  576. 
40 disputes  should  be  settled  on  the  basis  of  internal  rules  at  the  internal  forum  in  the 
company.  Internal  rules  are  mainly  found  in  constitutions,  and  every  member  by 
subscribing  to  the  memorandum  of  association  agrees  to  their  applicability.  7'  They 
regulate  rules  and  methods  by  which  shareholders"  disagreements  should  be  settled 
and  provide  an  internal  forum  for  such  settlements,  often  in  the  form  of  a  general 
meeting  of  shareholders.  The  development  of  the  internal  mangement  principle  as  a 
legal  principle  can  be  seen  as  resulting  from  case  law,  where  the  courts,  by  their 
reluctance  to  hear  disputes  among  shareholders,  created  the  policy  of  non-intervention 
in  favour  of  general  meetings.  Historically,  it  can  be  traced  back  to  the  old  principle  of 
internal  settlement  in  partnerships  that  required  partners  to  settle  their  disagreements 
internally.  "  Early  conunon  law  courts  developed  the  principle  by  stating  laudly  that  a 
/  court  is  not  to  be  required  on  every  occasion  to  take  the  management  of  every  play 
house  and  brew  house  in  the  kingdom'.  "  Subsequently,  this  principle  of  partnerships 
was  by  analogy  extended  by  the  courts  to  companies  in  the  famous  Foss  case.  74  The  Foss 
case  which  was  infact  the  first  judicial  confirmation  of  the  majority  rule  in  companies 
concerned  two  company  shareholders  who  brought  action  against  directors  of  the 
company  in  order  to  compel  them  to  make  good  loss  suffered  by  the  company  on  the 
ground  that  the  defendants  had  sold  their  own  land  to  the  company  at  a  price  in  excess 
of  its  value.  Wigram  V.  C.  rejected  the  action  taking  the  view  that  the  objected 
transaction  is  a  wrong  to  the  company  and  so  far  as  the  company  itself  through  its 
governing  body  of  proprietors  retains  its  functions,  there  will  be  no  recourse  for 
71  Sections  14  (1)  and  22  (1,2)  Companies  Act  1985. 
72  Wedderburn  (above,  note  60)  at  p  196. 
73  Carlen  v.  Drurv  (1812),  1  Ves.  &B  154  at  p  158,  per  Lord  Eldon. 
74  Foss  v.  Harbottle,  (1843)  2  Hare  461. 
41 individual  shareholders  to  take  corporate  actions.  "  The  rule  in  Foss  case  was  then 
supported  by  subsequent  cases"  and  over  time  has  become  a  fundamental  principle  of 
company  law  in  England  that  requires  settIlment  of  internal  disputes  among 
shareholders  through  internal  rules  and  procedures.  "  Accordingly,  the  courts  do  not 
hear  such  disputes  unless  the  plaintiff  shareholders  can  show  that  they  have  tried  all 
the  internal  mechanisms  which  have  proved  to  be  working  inappropriately  or 
unconstitutionally. 
78 
1.1.4.  Comments 
Each  of  the  three  approaches  involves  some  drawback.  The  political  approach  uses 
political  arguments  to  explain  governance  of  the  majority  in  corporations  which  is 
meant  to  monitor  activities  of  the  corporate  management.  The  use  of  political 
arguments  is  to  mean  that  the  approach  relies  on  personality  of  corporate  members 
rather  than  their  capital.  Why  the  majority  should  rule  can  be  answered  the  same  as  is 
done  in  the  politics.  It  should  rule  because  allegedly  it  enjoys  greater  force,  treats 
members  as  equal  human  beings,  allows  them  to  make  maximum  possible  use  of  their 
freedom,  and  offers  them  with  more  benefits  and  better  results.  A  criticism  is  that 
political  arguments  fail  to  work  in  any  human  association  and  group  which  do  not  rely 
on  personality  of  group  members.  79  In  addition,  as  the  approach  relies  on  members 
75  Ibid. 
76  Mac  Dougall  v.  Gardiner  (1875),  1  Ch.  D.  13;  Burland  v.  Earle  (1902),  AC  83,  PC,  p  93-94,  per 
Lord  Davey. 
77  North  West  Transportation  Co  Ltd.  v.  Beatty  (1887),  12  App  CAS  589  per  Richard  Baggallay; 
Shuttleworth  v.  Cox  Bros  &  Co  (Maidenhead)  Ltd,  and  Others,  (1927),  2  KB  9,  at  pp  20-23  per 
Scrutton  L.  J. 
78  Mosteshar  Said  "Derivative  Actions  -A  New  Approach",  New  Law  journal  (1983),  London, 
Butterworth,  at  p  992. 
79  Lowenstein  (above,  note  33)  at  pp  983-4;  Jensen  and  Meckling  (1983),  (above,  note  32)  at  pp  1- 
6;  Black  (1990),  (above,  note  32)  at  p  552;  Bebchuk  (1989),  (above,  note  32)  at  pp  1830-1. 
42 a 
rather  than  their  capital,  it  often  provides  excessive  protection  for  minorities  that  can 
be  inefficient  in  business  corporations. 
The  economic  approach,  on  the  other  hand,  justifies  the  majority  rule,  relying  on  the 
efficiency  argument.  According  to  it,  majority  rule  is  efficient  because  by  granting 
corporate  governance  to  those  who  supply  a  greater  bulk  of  the  corporate  financial 
resource,  it  facilitates  movement  of  capital  towards  corporations.  Further,  majority  rule 
offers  benefits  to  majority  shareholders  that  outweigh  any  likely  impairment  of 
minority  shareholders.  The  approach  can  be  characterised  by  its  complete  reliance  on 
private  contracting  and  market  mechanisms  plus  unwillingness  in  accommodating  any 
legal  intervention  for  the  protection  of  minority  shareholders.  An  important  drawback 
with  this  approach  is  its  capability  to  substitute  interests  of  corporations  with  those  of 
their  majority  shareholders,  whereas  a  company  as  a  legal  person  can  have  interests 
other  than  that  of  a  mere  majority.  80  Therefore,  it  is  debatable  that  majority  rule  is 
desirable  because  it  promotes  efficiency  in  the  company.  In  some  circumstances  it  may 
act  inefficiently  especially  where  shareholders  who  sit  in  the  majority  camp  seek  to 
pursue  self-interested  policies.  81  A  further  drawback,  which  is  pertinent  to  jurisdictions 
whose  corporations  rely  on  external  finance,  is  its  capability  to  discourage  shareholder 
financing  in  corporations.  Recent  empirical  research  by  comparing  legal  rules  across  49 
countries  has  shown  that  there  is  a  causal  link  between  good  legal  protection  for 
80  See  Chapter  three  below,  at  111.1.1-B. 
81  Mayson  Stephan,  French  Derek  and  Ryan  Christopher,  "Mayson,  French  &  Ryan  on 
Company  Law",  (2001),  1811,  ed.,  London,  Blackstone,  at  pp  11-12;  Maclntosh  Jeffrey  G., 
"Minority  Shareholder  Rights  in  Canada  and  England:  1860-1987",  (1989),  Osgoode  Hall  Law 
jourtial,  vol.  27,  No.  3,  Toronto,  Osgoode  Hall  Law  School,  at  p  564. 
43 investors  and  existing  of  a  strong  company  sector  with  investors  wishing  to  take  the 
risk  of  financing  in  companies.  82 
The  doctrinal  approach  justifies  the  rule  using  certain  legal  principles  which  are 
generally  meant  to  benefit  corporations  and  their  shareholders,  the  judiciary  and  the 
society.  The  principles  which  all,  in  one  way  or  another,  support  the  governance  of 
majority  shareholders  seek  to  encourage  financing  and  risk-taking  in  corporations, 
save  the  public  budget,  facilitate  private  ordering  in  the  interest  of  efficiency,  and 
regulate  the  relationships  between  corporations,  shareholders,  and  corporate  directors. 
These  are  worthwhile  objectives  which  are  often  achieved.  Nonetheless,  under  certain 
circumstances  operation  of  the  principles  can  result  in  injustice  to  minority 
shareholders  in  corporations.  This  is  mainly  the  case  where  'the  persons  who  control 
the  company  and  the  persons  against  whom  the  company  has  a  cause  of  action  are  one 
and  the  sarne.  831n  such  cases  a  minority  shareholder  is  not  as  a  matter  of  principle  able 
to  pursue  wrongdoers  unless  there  is,  not  a  simple  disagreement,  but  the  prospect  of 
/an  imminent  disaster  to  the  company  observable  by  all,  or  at  least,  most  reasonable 
people'84  that  is,  of  course,  very  difficult  to  prove.  85The  business  judgement  rule  saves 
a  majority  shareholder/  director  from  liability  for  committing  of  mere  negligence. 
When  the  alleged  negligence  constitutes  a  breach  of  either  the  duty  of  care  or  fiduciary, 
he/she  will  be  safe  from  prosecution  so  far  as  the  matter  falls  short  of  the  concept  of 
82  La  Porta  Rafael,  Lopes-de-Silanes  Florencio,  Shleifer  Andrei  and  Vishny  Robert  W. 
(Hereafter  is  cited  LLSV),  "Legal  Determinants  of  External  Finance"',  (1997)  52  (3),  Journal  of 
Finance,  New  York,  American  Finance  Association,  pp  1131,1132,1149  and  LLSV,  "'Investor 
Protection  and  Corporate  Governance"'  p  29  available  at  Social  Science  Research  Network 
(SSRN),  Electronic  Library  at  www.  ssm.  com,  (ID  183900  code  99092719). 
83  Hale  (above,  note  58)  at  p  219. 
84  Rajak  Harry,  "Sotirce  Book  of  Company  Law",  (1995),  Bristol,  Jordans,  at  p  530. 
85  Sealy  (1987)  (above,  note  60)  at  pp  4-7. 
44 fraud.  The  internal  management  principle  allows  the  wrongdoers  to  ratify  their 
wrongs.  When  there  is  a  dispute  among  shareholders,  the  principle  goes  no  further 
than  to  solve  the  dispute  in  favour  of  the  majority  shareholders.  The  proper  plaintiff 
principle  too  prevents  any  legal  action  to  be  taken  as  to  corporate  wrongs  by  minority 
shareholders.  The  judicial  reluctance  as  to  hearing  of  minority  claims  can  further  be  a 
green  light  for  controllers  to  do  wrong  in  corporations.  In  summary,  these  principles 
when  are  put  together  can  rigidly  ignore  minority  shareholders"  rights,  making  no 
distinction  between  fallacious  and  meritorious  claims  of  theirs.  86 
86  Sealy  (1987),  (above,  note  60)  at  p  7. 
45 1.2.  The  case  of  Iran 
The  issue  of  justification  for  majority  rule  is  relatively  new  issue  in  Iranian  company 
law  and  has  rarely  been  discussed  among  company  law  scholars.  "  The  existing 
literature  on  company  law  often  either  neglects  to  address  the  issue,  or  if  at  all,  tends  to 
describe  the  law  as  it  stands  rather  than  to  analyse  and  explain  it.  Although  it  points  to 
majority  rule  as  a  distinctive  character  of  companies  as  against  traditional  contracts 
and  partnerships,  it  hardly  raises  the  question  of  why  majority  shareholders  should 
rule  in  companies.  This  is  a  key  question  that  has  been  addressed  by  scholars  of  the 
western  economies  since  the  17th  century.  In  fact  in  such  economies,  majority  rule  has 
been  a  key  element  in  the  development  of  modem  companies,  while  in  Iran,  it  did  not 
matter  that  much,  though  adopted  by  company  law. 
Speaking  generally,  the  evolution  of  a  rule  of  law  in  any  legal  system  depends  on  social 
context  and  in  particular  on  the  underlying  cultural,  socio-economic  and  political 
elements  of  that  system.  Where  the  context  is  not  apt  for  a  particular  rule  to  evolve,  the 
rule  will  not  emerge  and  as  a  consequence  may  not  even  matter. 
historical/  contextual  examination  of  the  development  of  Iranian  modem  law  will 
show  that  Iranian  society  was  not  ready  yet  to  generate  an  indigenous  majority  rule  to 
be  employed  for  its  business  vehicles.  Before  the  Pahlavi  period  (1925-1978),  the  law  in 
Iran  was  based  on  Islamic  law"  and  it  did  not  recognise  companies  that  have  separate 
personality  and  work  with  the  majority  rule.  Islamic  jurists  and  political  theorists  were 
reluctant  to  see  business  vehicles  as  separate  persons.  Such  idea  was  capable  to 
87  See  Sotoodeh  Tehrani  Hasan,  "Trade  Law"  (1997),  Tehran,  Dehkhoda  Publication,  vol.  2,  pp 
175-6. 
88  Pasha-Saaleh  Ali,  "The  History  of  Law"  (1960),  University  of  Tehran  Publications. 
46 threaten  the  ideal  of  undivided  community  advanced  by  Islam.  "  Further,  democratic 
values  which  underlie  evolution  of  modem  companies  in  western  economies,  were  yet 
unknown  to  the  Islamic  society  of  Iran.  The  idea  that  political  power  belongs  to  the 
people  who  can  by  majority  rule  make  rules  of  their  own  for  their  collective  affairs 
could  sit  uneasily  with  the  teachings  of  Islam.  'O  Islamic  law  required  Muslims  to 
conform  the  rules  of  Shariah  that  were  already  written  by  Allah.  It  denied  legislative 
power  from  the  ruler  and  only  allowed  him  to  make  administrative  regulations  within 
the  limits  of  Islam.  Islamic  rulers  in  Muslim  societies  viewed  themselves  as  persons 
who  have  the  mission  and  are  entrusted  with  godly  power  to  exercise  the  rules  of 
Shariah  as  demonstrated  in  the  holy  Quran  and  other  Islamic  sources  and  as 
interpreted  by  qualified  interpreters  of  the  Islamic  law. 
Historically  also  Iran  had  never  experienced  democracy.  Political  regimes  were  always 
authoritative  in  nature  and  monarchy  was  the  most  typical  form  of  govemment.  9'  Pre- 
Islamic  Iranian  kings  were  centres  of  absolute  power  that  treated  the  people  like  their 
servants.  The  same  was  true  of  post-Islamic  Iranian  kings;  except  in  the  latter  period 
kings  ruled  often  formally  in  the  name  of  Allah  and  were  called  as  Nayeb  ol  Imam,  one 
89  "Hold  fast,  all  of  you  together,  to  the  cable  of  Allah,  and  do  not  separate,  and  remember 
Allah's  favour  unto  you:  how  you  were  enemies  and  He  made  friendship  between  your  hearts 
so  that  you  became  as  brothers  by  his  grace;  and  how  you  were  upon  the  brink  of  an  abyss  of 
fire,  and  He  saved  you  from  it"  [The  Quran,  3:  1031. 
90  Gibb,  H.  A.  R.,  "The  Islamic  Background  of  Ibn  Khaldun's  Political  Theory",  Bulletin  of  the 
School  of  Oriental  Studies,  University  of  London,  Vol.  7,  No.  1  (1933),  23-31  available  at  the 
following  address:  http:  //Iinks.  jstor.  org/sici?  sici=1356- 
1898%281933%297%3Al%3ATIBOIK%3E2.0.  CO%3B2-%23- 
91  Keddie,  Nikki  R.,  "'Iran:  Religion,  Politics,  and  Society",  Collected  Essays,  London,  F.  Cass, 
Totowa,  N.  J.,  Biblio  Distribution  Centre,  (1980);  Halliday,  Fred,  "Iran:  Dictatorship  and 
Development"  Harmondsworth:  Penguin,  (1979);  Lenczowski,  George,  "'Iran  Under  the 
Pahlavis"  Stanford,  Hoover  Institution  Press,  (1978). 
47 who,  according  to  the  Shiah  Wary  School",  serves  Shariah  law  on  behalf  of  the 
Prophet  Mohammad  and  his  twelve  grandchildren  on  their  absence.  " 
Further,  the  idea  that  collective  decisions  can  be  made  by  a  majority  of  shareholders  in 
companies  was  in  contradiction  with  the  individualist  nature  of  the  Islamic  law  that 
recognised  rights  and  obligations  only  for  natural  persons  and  required  for  party 
consent  in  civil  transactions  and  business  activities.  94  A  contract  could  come  into  force 
and  continue  only  so  far  as  it  could  carry  the  consent  of  each  contractual  party.  The  free 
contracting  principle,  which  is  recognised  in  Islam,  was  short  of  the  capability  to 
render  separate  personhood  to  collective  business  enterprises  and  as  a  consequence 
members  in  such  enterprises  were  treated  as  co-owners.  Unanimity  that  required  the 
consent  of  each  member  for  every  collective  decision  was  therefore  the  only  applicable, 
but  not  necessarily  workable,  rule  and  contractual  efficiency  was  to  mean  the  efficiency 
of  a  transaction  for  parties  as  understood  and  agreed  by  every  party  to  that  transaction. 
Thus,  the  adoption  of  the  law  of  modem  corporations,  that  work  through  the  majority 
rule,  by  Iranian  Law  could  not  follow  a  religious,  cultural  or  political  link,  as  these 
were  not  capable  of  allowing  any  gradual  evolution  of  modem  companies  in  Iran.  In 
92  Shiah  jafary  School  is  the  prevailing  creed  among  Iranians  which  has  also  been  officially 
adopted  by  the  Iranian  governments  since  the  Safavids  (907/1501);  For  a  historical  study  see 
Alesandro  Bausani,  "Religion  in  Iran:  From  Zoroaster  to  Baha'ullah",  Iranian  Studies,  Routledge, 
Volume  36,  Number  I/March  (2003),  103-160;  Savory,  Roger  Mervyn,  "Iran  Under  the 
Safavids"  Cambridge,  Cambridge  University  Press,  (1980);  Nasr  S.  H.,  "Religion  in  Safavid 
Persia",  Iranian  Studies,  Routledge,  Volume  7,  (1974),  271;  Keddie  (above,  note  91). 
93  For  further  study  of  the  School's  thoughts  see  Ayatollah  Ja"far  Sobhani,  "Doctrines  of  Shii 
Islam"',  Translated  and edited  by  Reza  Shah-Kazemi,  Qom,  Imam  Sadeq  Institute,  (2003). 
94  See  generally  Kuran  Timur,  "Why  the  Islamic  Middle  East  Did  not  Generate  an  Indigenous 
Corporate  Law"',  (2004),  University  of  Southern  California,  Department  of  Economics,  Los 
Angeles,  at  pp  12-19,  available  from  Social  Science  Research  Network  (SSRN), Electronic 
Library  at:  http:  //ssrn.  com/abstract=585687  and  from  the  Berkeley  Electronic  Press  at 
48 the  absence  of  such  links  one  may  wonder  why  Iran  did  experience  such  adoption.  One 
possible  (and  of  course  good)  answer  is  to  say  that  the  case  for  Iran  was  perhaps  a 
simple  westernisation  of  the  law  applicable  to  the  traditional  partnership  towards  a 
transplantation  of  the  idea  of  modem  company  as  existed  in  the  western  economies  of 
the  time.  Such  westernisation  began  under  Reza  Shah  (the  founder  of  the  Pahlavy 
monarchy)  in  the  nineteen-  twenties  and  thirties.  Under  his  monarchy  a  great  deal  of 
change  in  law  and  institutions,  similar  to  that  of  Turkey,  occurred  in  Iran.  95  Iranian 
economy  was  about  to  experience  a  sudden  industrialisation  on  the  European  model 
and  companies  could  speed  up  the  process  of  such  industrialisation,  as  they  did  in  the 
European  model.  96  Major  adoption  both  in  form  and  contents  occurred  in  respect  of  the 
Trade  code  97  that  introduced  a  separate  section  on  companies  and  allowed  public  to 
incorporate  companies.  "  This  code  took  the  company  laws  of  France  and  Belgium  as 
models,  but  ensured  that  it  remains  consistent  with  Islamic  principles.  The  code  was 
subsequently  replaced  by  another  Trade  code"  that  except  for  joint  stock  companies 
still  remains  the  applicable  Trade  code  in  Iran.  "'  It  divides  companies  into  seven 
types'O'  and  particularly  in  Section  72  prescribes  the  rule  of  majority.  Mohammad  Reza 
Shah,  the  son  of  Reza  Shah,  continued  this  trend  towards  westemisation.  In  1969,  his 
http:  /  /law.  bepress.  com/usclwps/lewps/artl6;  Schacht,  Joseph,  ""Islamic  Law  in 
Contemporary  States'",  The  American  Journal  of  comparative  Law,  133  at  p  138. 
95  But  unlike  the  case  of  Turkey,  Pahlavies'  westernisation  was  in  most  cases  subject  to 
observation  of  the  Islamic  law,  particularly  the  Shia  Jafari  School  that  survived  by  Art  2  of  the 
1925  amendment  to  the  Constitution.  See  generally  Kuran  (above,  note  94)  at  pp  16-19;  Zagday 
M.  I.,  "Modern  Trends  in  Islamic  Law  in  the  Near,  Middle  and  Far  East",  in  Current  Legal 
Problems,  edited  by  George  W.  Keeton  et  al.  (1948),  Vol  1  London,  at  p  209. 
96  See  generally  Kuran  (above,  note  94)  at  pp  10-12. 
97  Trade  Code  1926  (corresponding  to  Persian  calendar  year  1304). 
98  Civil  Code,  which  includes  family  law,  the  law  of  civil  transactions  and  torts,  was  also 
adopted  from  the  law  of  Europe.  The  adoption,  however,  was  only  in  form  rather  than  in 
contents  which  remained  Islamic. 
99  Trade  Code  1933  (corresponding  to  Persian  calendar  year  1311)  (Hereafter  is  cited  TC). 
100  Pasha-Saaleh  (above,  note  88)  at  p  278;  Sotoodeh  (above,  note  87)  at  pp  11,12. 
101  Section  20  TC. 
49 government  proposed  a  new  collection  of  300  sections  on  the  model  of  France  to  the 
Parliament  in  order  to  address  deficiencies  of  the  Trade  code  in  respect  of  joint-stock 
companies.  The  new  collection  was  passed'O',  and  at  the  moment  is  the  primary  source 
of  law  in  relation  to  the  joint-stock  companies  in  Iran.  It  reconfirms  the  rule  of 
majority"  in  such  companies  and  provides  few  minority  protections. 
104 
One  can  assume  that  Iranian  law  has  justified  the  rule  of  majority  in  companies  in  the 
same  way  as  done  by  scholars  in  western  economies.  There  are  therefore  Iranian 
company  law  scholars  who  speak  of  an  analogy  between  democratic  states  and 
business  associations  and  who  require  the  rule  of  majority  in  order  to  enable  corporate 
members  monitor  activities  of  corporate  executives.  'O'  Likewise,  it  is  said  that  the 
application  of  the  rule  is  efficient  because  it  ensures  more  benefits  than  harm  to 
members.  From  a  legal  perspective  also  majority  rule  respects  corporate  autonomy'  06 
, 
resolves  shareholder  disputes  internally'O'  and  prevents  shareholders  from  initiating 
corporate  claims'"  which  all  are  in  the  economics  of  companies  and  save  the  judiciary 
time  and  money.  '09 
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Governance",  Columbia  Law  School  Centre  for  Law  and  Economic  Studies,  Working  Paper  No. 
131  available  at  www.  ssrn.  com;  Licht  A.  N.,  "The  Mother  of  All  Path  Dependencies,  Towards  a 
Cross  Cultural  Theory  of  Corporate  Governance  Systems"  (2001),  26  Delaware  Journal  of 
Corporate  Law  147. 
52 research  has  also  recently  shown  that  the  formation  of  corporate  governance  structure 
can  depend  on  how  strongly  a  legal  system  protects  its  financial  investors.  "' 
Similar  factors  can  explain  why  Iranian  lawmakers  at  the  time  of  initial  adoption  took 
the  continental  Europe  as  its  model.  From  a  political  perspective,  the  model  was  apt  to 
allow  the  government  to  seize  control  of  the  private  sector.  Iranian  statesmen  for 
different  reasons  have  always  wanted  to  have  a  weak  and  controlled  private  sector.  '  17 
They  were  suspicious  about  modem  companies  and  considered  them  as  a  potential 
threat  to  stability  of  the  Iranian  society  and  government.  Before  the  Iranian  revolution 
of  1978,  the  authoritative  structure  of  the  governing  regimes  gave  rise  to  the  exercising 
of  arbitrary  interference  by  governments  in  private  sector  and  especiaBy  private 
property  and  ownership.  "'  After  the  Islamic  revolution  of  1978,  the  private  sector  was 
treated  worse,  as  the  new  government  viewed  them  rather  suspiciously.  Article  44"9  of 
the  new  constitution  gave  state  protection  to  companies  only  to  the  extent  that  they 
contribute  to  the  growth  of  the  Iranian  economy,  and  Article  22  authorised  the 
government  to  take  statutory  measures  in  order  to  seize  companies  that  fail  to  satisfy 
116  LLSV  (above,  note  82). 
117  jalali  Naini,  Ahmad  R.,  "Capital  Accumulation  and  Economic  Growth  in  Iran:  Past 
Experience  and  Future  Prospects"",  Iranian  Studies,  Volume  38,  number  1,91,  March  2005;  Saeidi, 
Ali  A.,  "'Charismatic  Political  Authority  and  Populist  Economics  in  Post-Revolutionary  Iran", 
Tlilrd  World  Quarterly,  Vol  22,  No  2,219-236,  at  pp  221-2;  Ghani  Nejad  Moosa,  "Brief  Interview 
with  Professor  Moosa  Ghani  Nejad",  29  Aug  2006  available  at  http:  //www.  bbc.  co.  uk/persian/. 
118  Ashraf  Ahmad,  "Historical  Obstacles  to  the  Growth  of  Capitalism  in  Iran:  Ghajarieh 
Period"  (1980),  Tehran,  Zamineh  Publication,  p  61. 
119  "The  economy  of  the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran  is  to  consist  of  three  sectors:  state, 
cooperative,  and  private  ...  ownership  in  each  of  these  three  sectors  is  protected  by  the  laws  of 
the  Islamic  Republic,  in  so  far  as  this  ownership  is  in  conformity  with  the  other  articles  of  this 
chapter,  does  not  go  beyond  the  bounds  of  Islamic  law,  contributes  to  the  economic  growth  and 
progress  of  the  country,  and  does  not  harm  society...  "  [Article  44  Constitution  of  Islamic 
Republic  of  Iran  (1980/1358)  hereafter  cited  as  CIRIJ. 
53 the  public  interest  objective.  "'  The  right  to  form  companies,  therefore,  is  seen  not  as 
deriving  from  freedom  of  association,  but  rather  is  treated  as  a  state-granted 
concession  which  can  be  withdrawn  when  the  public  interest  requires.  As  a  further 
consequence  of  such  viewing,  the  government  has  narrowed  areas  of  economic  activity 
in  which  companies  could  enter.  Dividing  the  economy  of  Iran  into  three  sectors, 
governmental,  co-operative  and  private,  Article  44  has  allocated  exclusively  to 
government  much  of  the  room  for  economic  activity,  even  activities  that  by  their  legal 
definition  are  regarded  as  private.  Goverrunent,  therefore,  monopolises  the  business  in 
most  key  sectors  of  the  economy  and  further  it  applies  control  on  companies  in 
remaining  areas.  Besides,  from  a  religious  perspective,  control  of  the  government  over 
companies  could  also  address  the  factionalism  concern  of  the  Islan-Lic  jurists.  "'  In 
addition  to  these,  government  control  over  the  private  sector  could  generate  income, 
and  its  control  over  the  proceeds  obtained  of  oil  production  and  export  created 
financial  independence  which  could  save  it  from  any  likely  inhospitality  of  the  private 
sector.  These  factors  resulted  in  the  creation  of  many  large  corporations  which  are 
owned  either  totally  or  substantially  (over  50  percent  shareholding)  by  the  state,  and 
which  control  up  to  80  percent  of  the  economy  of  Iran. 
Economically  observed,  the  continental  European  model  could  function  more 
efficiently  than  the  Anglo-American  model  in  the  Iranian  context.  To  begin  with,  the 
Anglo-American  model  was  not  sufficiently  popular  around  the  world,  or  at  least  it 
was  unknown  to  the  Iranian  lawmaker  and  businessmen  on  the  time  of  adoption.  By 
the  nineteen-  thirties  it  only  prevailed  in  United  States  and  its  establishment  in  Britain 
120  "The  dignity,  life,  property,  rights,  residence,  and  occupation  of  the  individual  are  inviolate, 
except  in  cases  sanctioned  by  law.  "  [Article  22  CIRIJ. 
54 was  only  completed  as  late  as  1979.122  Its  adoption,  therefore,  could  require  extra  costs 
of  searching,  learning,  and  practising.  In  contrast,  Iran's  vicinity  and  vast  business 
relationship  with  continental  Europe  and  the  successes  of  European  corporations  made 
the  continental  model  of  corporate  governance  known,  attractive  and  less  expensive  to 
adopt.  The  model  was  also  closer  to  the  traditional  partnership  concept  which  was 
popular  in  Iran  in  that  it  preserved  the  connection  between  ownership  and  control  and 
therefore  it  was  not  as  expensive  to  learn  and  practice  as  the  Anglo-American  model. 
Furthermore,  it  is  now  clear  that  the  Anglo-American  model"s  performance  is  closely 
dependent  on  the  existence  of  a  market  economy  able  to  align  companies  through 
competitive  constraints.  123  In  a  context  like  Iran  in  which  business  was  mainly 
conducted  through  either  closely-held  firms  or  state-owned  associations,  and 
competitive  constraints  were  to  a  great  extent  absent,  and  in  which  the  financial  market 
is  yet  under  developed  and  share  transactions  relatively  uncommon,  adoption  of  the 
Anglo-American  model  could  have  generated  hazardous  consequences. 
121  See  (above,  note  89);  also  see  generally  Kuran  (above,  note  94)  at  pp  12-19. 
122  Cheffins  (2001),  (above,  note  113)  at  pp  81-4;  Cheffins  (2002),  (above,  note  110)  at  pp  3-10. 
123  Cheffins  (1999),  (above,  note  110)  at  pp  11-17;  MacNeil  (2002),  (above,  note  110)  at  pp  291- 
297;  Bebchuk  and  Roe  (above,  note  115)  at  pp  11,22. 
55 1.3.  Conclusion 
This  Chapter  reviewed  from  the  perspective  of  English  and  Iranian  laws  lines  of 
arguments  that  have  been  developed  in  favour  of  application  of  the  majority  rule  in 
companies.  As  to  the  English  company  law,  it  identified  and  examined  three 
approaches  which  have  been  most  influential  in  developing  and  justifying  the  rule  of 
majority  in  corporations.  The  first  approach  (political),  regards  the  majority  rule  as 
being  a  product  of  adoption  from  political  ideas.  It  draws  analogies  between  states  and 
corporations  and  justifies  the  majority  rule  in  the  latter  as  it  is  justified  in  the  former.  In 
this  approach,  majority  rule  is  desirable  only  because  it  facilitates  control  of  corporate 
members  over  the  corporate  management.  Most  company  lawyers  would  accept  that 
democratic  theory  has  been  influential  in  the  development  of  the  current  model  of 
governance  in  corporations.  Many  of  the  structural  and  governance  issues  in 
corporations  including  the  majority  rule  originally  inspire  from  the  democratic  theory. 
Yet  as  the  Economic  theory  explains,  because  of  essensial  differences  wich  exist 
between  corporations  and  states  a  political  justification  could  no  longer  work  in  the 
former.  It  pays  little  attention  to  the  economic  aspect  of  corporations  and  puts 
excessive  emphasis  on  personality  of  corporate  members.  The  political  approach,  thus, 
while  supporting  the  majority  rule  offers  disproportionate  safeguards  for  shareholders 
which  can  be  inefficient.  The  second  approach  (economic),  which  views  endurance  of 
the  majority  rule  in  corporations  as  being  a  consequence  of  adaptation,  seeks  to  justify 
the  majority  rule  using  the  efficiency  argument.  As  corporations  rely  on  finance  which 
is  decisively  important  for  their  business  and  because  corporate  decisions  are  taken 
collectively,  they  need  a  rule  that  can  facilitate  collective  action  and  encourage 
shareholder  financing  and  these  can  only  be  achieved  through  the  majority  rule.  Since 
56 a  rule  cannot  be  for  all,  it  should  inevitably  be  for  the  majority  shareholders  because 
otherwise  would  discourage  financing  in  corporations.  Majority  control  is  the  risk 
minority  shareholders  must  take  to  obtain  greater  value.  The  approach,  however,  can 
facilitate  majority  abuse  as  it  considers  any  minority  involvement  in  the  making  of 
corporate  decisions  and  control  of  companies  entirely  interruptive  and  troublesome. 
The  political  and  economic  approaches  agree  in  the  sense  that  they  both  support 
governance  of  the  majority  in  corporations.  They  diverge,  nevertheless,  in  that  while  in 
the  former  majority  rule  is  a  device  which  enables  corporate  members'  participation  in 
control  over  mangement,  in  the  latter  it  facilitates  financing  rather  than  being  a 
controlling  device.  '  24  Finally,  the  third  approach  (doctrinal),  which  accommodates  the 
rule  within  the  corporate  laws,  seeks  to  justify  the  rule  of  majority,  using  certain  legal 
reasoning  and  policy  considerations.  The  doctrinal  justification,  in  turn,  if  rigidly 
interpreted  is  liable  to  injustice.  The  BJR  is  liable  to  abuse  particularly  where  the  same 
people  hold  both  majority  of  shares  and  managerial  position.  12'  The  proper  plaintiff 
rule  is  also  capable  of  being  diverted  to  serve  the  majority  shareholders  because  under 
majority  influence,  directors  may  differentiate  between  corporate  actions  and  initiate 
only  those  that  benefit  the  controlling  majority.  126  Too,  the  fear  of  multiplicity  of  actions 
argument  is  unable  to  assure  that  only  fallacious  claims  of  minority  shareholders  will 
124  See  Chapter  three  below,  at  Ill.  1-4. 
125  It  will  be  explained  in  Chapter  four  that  Iranian  company  law  does  not  know  any 
systematic  exemption  from  liability  for  corporate  management  as  to  their  negligence.  See 
Chapter  four  below,  at  IV.  2. 
126  Majority  rule  in  Iranian  company  law  is  not  to  explain  why  company  shareholders  from  a 
procedural  standpoint  are  debarred  from  taking  corporate  claims.  That  is  a  consequence  of  an 
amalgamation  of  companies'  separate  personality  and  ownership  rights  and  is  recognised  by 
procedural  rules  of  taking  actions  generally.  See  section  2  Civil  Procedure  Act  2000  (hereafter  is 
cited  CPA)  which  provide:  "'No  court  can  hear  a  claim  unless  a  person  or  persons  having 
proprietary  interest  or  a  person  or  persons  who  are  their  agents  (lawyer),  successors  or  legal 
representatives  initiate  action  and  demand  judicial  trial  according  to  the  law".  Also  see  section 
84  (10)  CPA  that  states,  "In  following  issues  defendant  when  responds  in  substance  can  make  a 
57 be  rejected.  "'  Lastly,  the  internal  management  principle  which  refers  every  dispute  of 
shareholders  to  the  meeting  of  shareholders  relies  on  the  assumption  that  internal  rules 
are  capable  to  offer  autonomous  solutions  for  every  contingency.  This  is  not  correct 
because  contractual  solutions  in  the  company  context  may  not  be  fully  autonomous  as 
they  are  taken,  and  are  changeable,  by  a  majority  decision.  128 
Similar  approaches  although  borrowed  from  the  western  economies  can  be  found  in 
the  Iranian  company  law  too.  It  has  been  made  clear  that  the  society  of  Iran  for  a 
number  of  reasons  was  not  ready  to  generate  an  indigenous  company  law  and  hence  it 
did  not  need  to  justify  the  rule  of  the  majority.  Westernisation  of  the  economy  and 
adoption  of  law  on  the  European  model  further  relaxed  such  need. 
While  the  two  countries  share  in  how  to  justify  the  rule  of  majority,  they  diverge  in 
their  chosen  model  of  corporate  governance.  English  companies  tend  to  have  dispersed 
shareholders.  Unless  the  company  is  small,  no  single  or  few  persons  can  control  the 
company.  Iranian  companies,  on  the  other  hand,  most  often  have  one  (the  state  and  its 
dependant  organisations,  as  to  large  companies)  or  several  controlling  shareholders 
(families,  in  the  case  of  small  companies).  Interestingly,  such  divergence  was  partially 
caused  by  one  similar  factor,  i.  e.  efficiency.  For  England,  a  dispersed  shareholding 
procedural  objection  to  the  claim  initiated  against  him/her  ...  (10)  Plaintiff  is  not  of  interest  in 
the  claim"'. 
127  Iranian  law  also  does  not  recognise  any  policy  that  dictates  abdication  of  judicial 
jurisdiction  due  to  fear  of  multiplicity  of  shareholder  actions. 
128  That,  internal  disputes  must  be  setteled  internally  is  also  the  applicable  rule  in  Iranian 
company  law.  The  only  difference  is  perhaps  one  of  the  source.  While  it  is  a  common  law  rule  in 
England,  internal  management  is  a  statutory  rule  in  Iranian  company  law.  See  section  86  JSCA, 
"Ordinary  general  meeting  is  of  discretion  to  decide  on  all  issues  relating  to  the  company's 
affairs  excluding  issues  which  fall  within  the  authority  of  Founders  and  Extra  ordinary 
meetings". 
58 structure  was  efficient  because  a  concentrated  structure  could  mean  greater  risks,  on 
the  one  hand,  for  majority  shareholders  whose  investment  was  liable  to  the  risk  of 
mismanagement  and,  on  the  other  hand,  for  minority  shareholders  who  were  vicfims 
of  abuse  of  power  by  the  majority  shareholders.  In  the  case  of  Iran,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  concentrated  model  could  function  efficiently  as  companies  depend  mostly  on 
internal  finance  rather  than  external  investment.  In  addition  to  the  efficiency 
consideration,  political  and  religious  factors  were  also  relevant  in  the  case  of  Iran 
because  a  concentrated  model  could  ensure  control  of  the  private  sector  by  the  Islamic 
government.  Nonetheless,  it  must  be  remembered  that  recent  signals  from  Iran  indicate 
that  the  Iranian  lawmaker  currently  seeks  to  pursue  a  gradual  shift  from  a  heavily 
government-directed  economy  towards  privatisation  and  a  market  economy,  which 
could,  in  the  long  term,  mean  development  of  a  less  concentrated  pattern  of 
shareholding  in  Iranian  corporations  and  improvement  of  the  law  so  as  to 
accopmodate  some  more  minority  shareholder  protection  mechanisms  in  Iranian 
compony  law.  "'  This  is  now  noticeable  in  the  Tehran  Stock  Exchange  proclaimed 
policies  which  encourage  dispersion  of  shareholding.  "' 
129  The  government  has  had  a  privatisation  programme  since  the  First  Development  Plan 
(1988-92)  that  has  been  carried  onto  the  Second,  Third  and  Fourth  Development  Plans.  Further 
recently  the  parliament  enacted  the  Securities  Market  Bill,  proposed  by  the  government  in  16 
Oct  2005,  which  mandates  a  higher  standard  of  disclosure  of  information  and  imposes  criminal 
liability  on  those  who  trade  shares  using  hidden  information.  More  recently,  Ayatollah 
Khamina'i,  the  supreme  leader,  has  sought  a  huge  reform  in  the  article  44  of  the  Iranian 
Constitution  so  as  to  displace  much  of  the  government's  monopolies  in  favour  of  greater  private 
sector  participation.  See  jalali  Naini  (above,  note  117)  at  p  92;  Ghani  Nejad  (above,  note  117); 
Iranian  Students  News  Agency  (ISNA)  at  http:  //www.  isna.  ir  (07/02/2006). 
130  According  to  TSE  Listing  Rules  a  public  company's  shares  is  not  accepted  for  listing,  even 
in  the  secondary  table  of  the  main  Hall,  if  less  than  10  shareholders  possess  80  percent  of  the 
company's  issued  shares  at  the  listing  stage.  The  authorised  maximum  shareholding  reduces  to 
75  percent  by  the  end  of  second  year.  And  if  the  company  wishes  its  shares  is  listed  and 
displayed  in  the  principal  table  of  the  main  Hall,  it  needs  to  ensure  that  not  less  than  10 
shareholders  possess  70  percent  shareholding.  See  TSE  Listing  Rules  available  in  Farsi  at  the 
following  website:  http:  //,,  %ýNv,,  %,.  irbourse.  com/FForms/gavanin/Section4.  aspx#B1. 
59 Chapter  II:  Scope  of  majority  rule 
In  Chapter  one,  I  examined  three  lines  of  arguments  which  are  commonly  used  to 
found  application  of  majority  rule  in  companies.  The  intention  was  to  show  why  and 
how  the  rule  is  justified  hereby  to  demonstrate  the  source  of  some  of  minority 
problems.  Justifications  aside,  another  aspect  of  the  majority  rule,  which  needs  to  be 
considered,  is  its  field  of  application.  As  this  research  concerns  in  great  part 
examination  of  the  rule  of  majority,  its  mission  will  not  be  completed  unless  it 
considers  the  field  of  application  of  the  majority  rule  and  I  therefore  dedicate  this 
Chapter  to  such  consideration.  The  Chapter  concerns  the  question  of  scope  and  intends 
to  show  in  which  area  in  the  relationship  between  majority  and  minority  shareholders 
majority  rule  applies.  Although  principally  shareholders  are  required  to  submit  to 
resolutions  adopted  by  a  simple  majority  vote,  this,  however,  does  not  follow  that 
majority  rule  applies  in  every  circumstance  and  on  every  issue.  There  are  limitations  in 
law  that  sensibly  narrows  the  scope  of  applicability  of  the  rule.  '  In  England,  the 
common  law  traditionally  had  collected  these  limitations  under  the  category  of  the  so 
called  "necessity"  which  meant  minority  shareholders  could  initiate  derivative  actions 
when  such  actions  were  the  only  way  to  remedy  wrongdoings  in  companies.  '  The 
necessity  measure,  however,  overwhelmed  the  rule  in  practice,  meaning  that  if  a 
derivative  action  were  open  whenever  the  majority  could  block  a  minority  then  it 
1  Kaye  v.  Corydon  Tramways  (1898),  1  Ch.  348,377  per  Vaughan  Williams  L.  J.;  See 
Wedderburn  K.  W.,  "Shareholder's  Rights  and  the  Rule  in  Foss  v.  Harbottle",  (1957),  Cambridge 
Law  jotirnal,  Cambridge,  Cambridge  University  Press,  at  p  199. 
2  "...  to  allow,  under  such  circumstances,  a  bill  to  be  filled  by  some  shareholders  on  behalf  of 
themselves  and  others,  would  be  to  admit  a  form  of  pleading  which  was  originally  introduced 
on  the  ground  of  necessity  alone,  to  a  case  in  which  it  is  obvious  that  no  such  necessity 
exists...  ",  [Mozley  v.  Alston  (1847),  1  Ph.  790  Per  Cottenham  L.  C.  ]. 
60 would  be  open  all  the  time.  Subsequently,  James  L.  J.  in  the  Macdougall  v.  Gardiner  case 
classified  situations  that  fall  beyond  applicability  of  majority  rule  into  the  fraud  upon 
3 
minority  and  ultra  vires  cases.  A  few  years  later,  Pender  v.  Lushington  added  to  this 
classification  personal  rights  of  corporate  members.  4  In  1950,  Edwards  v.  Halliweff, 
which  was  a  case  about  a  special  majority  reqirement,  brought  the  mentioned 
limitations  together  classifying  them  under  the  following  four  headings:  1)  Where  the 
act  complained  of  is  ultra  vires  or  illegal;  2)  Where  the  matter  could  validly  be  done 
only  by  some  special  majority;  3) Where  the  personal  rights  of  the  claimant  have  been 
invaded;  and  4)  Where  what  has  been  done  amounts  to  a  fraud  on  the  minority. 
Although,  this  classification  has  attracted  considerable  support  in  case  law'  and  among 
many  company  law  writers',  it,  however,  seems  to  be  more  practical  than  academic,  as 
it  does  not  recognise  any  distinction  between  situations  that  fall  beyond  the  ambit  of 
majority  rule  and  situations  that  are  excluded  in  law  from  that  ambit.  '  While  the  first 
three  headings  primarily  fall  outside  the  scope  of  the  rule,  the  fraud  upon  minority 
heading  is  about  transactions  which  are  prima  facie  within  the  power  of  the  majority, 
but  excluded  in  law  for  minority  protection  reasons.  In  any  case  which  involves  one  of 
3  Mac  Dougall  v.  Gardiner  (1875),  lCh  D  13  per  James  L.  J.;  see  also  Burland  v.  Earl  (1902),  AC 
83  per  Lord  Davey. 
4  Pender  v.  Lushington  (1877)  6  Ch  D  70. 
5  (1950)  2  All  ER  1064  per  Jenkins  L.  J. 
6  Bamford  v.  Bamford  (1970),  Ch  212;  Prudential  Assurance  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Newman  Industries  Ltd 
and  others  (No.  2)  (1982)  Ch  204;  Estmanco  (Kilner  House)  Ltd  v.  Greater  London  Council 
(1982)  1WLR  2. 
7  Wedderburn  (1957),  (above,  note  1)  at  pp  203-4;  Farrar  John  H.,  "'Company  Law"',  (1991), 
London,  Butterworths,  at  p  445;  Pettet  Ben,  "Company  Law",  (2000),  Harlow,  Longman,  at  pp 
230-1;  Stedman  Graham  &  Jones  Janet,  "'Shareholders'  Agreement",  (1998),  3rd  Ed.,  London, 
Sweet  &  Maxwell,  at  p  76-80;  Thorne  James  (ed.  ),  "'Butterworth's  Company  Law  Guide",  (1995), 
Butterworths,  London,  UK  at  p  186. 
8  Estmanco  (Kilner  House)  Ltd  v.  Greater  London  Council  (1982)  1WLR  2  per  Megarry  VC; 
Thorne  (above,  note  7);  Pettet  (above,  note  7)  at  pp  230-1;  Farrar  (above,  note  7)  at  p  449;  Sealy 
L.  S.,  "Cases  and  Materials",  (2001),  Chap  10,  at  p  489,  London,  Butterworths. 
61 the  first  three  headings,  a  shareholder  is  permitted  in  law  to  take  action  to  stop 
application  of  the  majority  rule.  In  the  case  of  the  fraud  exception,  however,  there 
would  have  been  no  such  permission  for  a  shareholder,  if  the  law  had  not  expressly 
granted  its  protection. 
For  a  better  understanding  of  the  scope  of  majority  rule  and  in  the  interest  of 
theorization  of  the  existing  practice,  I  prefer  to  follow  a  different  type  of  classification 
which  relies  on  issues  that  fall  beyond  applicability  of  majority  rule,  classifying  such 
issues  by  considering  their  sources.  Accordingly,  limitations  on  the  governance  of 
majority  rule  in  corporations  can  be  classified  into  two  categories;  i.  e.  those  imposed 
by  the  law  and  those  arising  from  the  constitution. 
Limitations  imposed  by  the  law  whether  enacted  by  the  Parliament  or  developed  by 
the  courts  are  always  put  in  a  mandatory  footing,  as  distinguished  from  defaults.  The 
latter  refers  to  rules  that  allow  parties  to  an  arrangement  to  escape  from  the  scope  of 
them.  The  former  relates  to  rules  that  limit  parties'  freedom  and  that  are  not  subject  to 
change.  9  By  legal  limitations,  only  mandatory  rules  are  aimed,  as  defaults  have  no 
intrusive  feature  and  parties  have  always  the  option  to  waive  them.  'O 
9  MacNeil  lain,  "Company  Law  Rules:  An  Assessment  from  the  Perspective  of  Incomplete 
Contract  Theory"",  Journal  of  Corporate  Law  Studies,  (June  2001),  Oxford,  UK,  Hart  Pub,  at  p  107. 
10  Default  or  presumptive  rules  apply  to  company  affairs  without  the  affected  parties  taking 
any  sort  of  affirmative  step.  They  apply  unless  those  governed  by  them  elect  to  opt  out.  Right 
attached  to  shares  is  an  example  of  this.  On  the  contrary,  mandatory  rules  allow  no  option  to 
affected  parties  to  displace  them.  While  defaults  pursue  facilitation  of  bargaining  objective, 
mandatory  rules  seek  to  restrict  and  regulate  market  behaviour  and  to  inhibit  parties  from 
exercising  their  personal  and  contractual  preference  in  certain  cercurnstances.  [Cheffins  Brian 
R.,  "Company  Law:  Theory  Structure  and  Operation",  (1997),  Oxford,  Clarendon  Press,  at  pp 
62 Such  limitations  contribute  in  two  ways  to  draw  the  framework  within  which  the 
majority  rule  works.  Either,  as  a  matter  of  public  order  and  regulation,  they  impose 
limitations  on  private  contracts  and  persons,  wether  natural  or  legal.  Or,  they 
specifically  target  the  majority/  minority  relationship  and  provide  some  protection  to 
minority  shareholders  with  the  intention  to  prevent  abuse  of  power  by  majority 
shareholders.  The  discussion  here  concerns  only  to  the  former.  The  latter  that  include 
the  issue  of  fraud  upon  minority  shareholders  and  derivative  mechanism  will  be  fully 
discussed  later  in  Chapter  five. 
Also,  limitations  imposed  by  the  constitution  affect  the  majority/  minority  relationship 
in  several  ways.  They  divide  corporate  power  between  shareholders  and  directors 
through  which  a  great  deal  of  corporate  powers  is  delegated  to  directors.  By  doing  so, 
they  limit  the  size  Of  power  directly  exercisable  by  the  majority.  They  also  determine 
the  object  for  which  the  company  is  formed  and  should  work  and  they  hereby  majority 
shareholders  from  authorising  any  ultra  vires  activity.  They  may  further  list  certain 
issues  that  require  a  super  majority  vote,  something  which  is  beyond  application  of  the 
majority  rule.  In  addition  to  these,  they  confer  on  members  some  personal  rights  that 
fall  outside  the  power  of  majority  shareholders. 
As  legal  and  constitutional  rules  play  decisive  role  in  the  majority/  minority 
relationship,  I  must  review  and  examine  their  relevance  as  to  such  relationship  and  I 
do  so  in  this  Chapter.  The  Chapter  is  divided  into  two  sections.  Section  one  considers 
the  legal  rules  and  section  two  concerns  with  the  constitution  and  specifically  exan-dnes 
217-219;  Davies,  Paul  L.,  "'Gower  and  Davies'  Principles  of  Modern  Company  Law,  ",  (2003),  71h 
ed.,  London,  Sweet  &  Maxwell,  at  pp  45-46. 
63 four  constitutional  mechanisms;  i.  e.  internal  division  of  power,  ultra  vires  issues, 
special  majority  requirement  and  personal  rights;  that  coordinate  to  shape  the  majority 
rule's  field  of  application. 
64 11-1.  General  laws 
Shareholders  once  taking  corporate  decisions  in  meetings  are  required  in  both  English 
and  Iranian  systems  to  observe  legal  rules  since  complying  with  the  law  is  necessary 
for  every  person,  whether  natural  or  legal.  When  the  lawmaker  prohibits  people  from 
doing  certain  acts,  it  often  aims  to  implement  certain  observations  that  are  ranked  prior 
to  individual  freedom.  To  permit  individuals  to  act  illegally  contradicts  the  purpose  for 
which  the  very  Act  is  enacted  and  condones  an  attack  on  the  law.  Unlawful  activities 
fall  outside  the  power  of  companies  and  as  a  result  cannot  be  authorised  by  majority 
shareholders.  Acts  are  unlawful  when  they  are  prohibited  in  law  in  the  sense  of  legally 
impossible  for  companies  to  engage  such  conducts.  "  The  word  unlawful  covers  any 
violation  to  the  mandatory  rules  of  company  law"  as  well  as  any  act,  which  is 
prohibited  by  the  general  law.  "  Where  a  company  is  engaged  in  unlawful  issues,  a 
minority  shareholder  can  take  action  against  the  company  and  sue  wrongdoers  on 
behalf  of  the  company  for  the  simple  reason  that  illegal  acts  are  totally  outside  the 
power  of  a  company  and  cannot  be  ratified  even  with  the  unanimous  decision  of 
shareholders.  14  In  such  cases,  law  interferes  simply  because  it  is  vital  to  preserve 
interests  of  the  public.  Take  the  case  of  England,  section  142  Companies  Act  1985,  for 
instance,  requires  public  corporations  to  take  steps  to  appropriately  deal  with  major 
loss  of  assets.  Similarly,  section  143  Companies  Act  1985  prohibits  companies  from 
purchasing  their  own  shares  at  a  discount.  Similar  manadatory  rules  can  be  found  in 
Iranian  law  too.  For  example,  majority  shareholders  cannot  take  decision  on  issues 
11  Wedderburn  (1957),  (above,  note  1)  at  p  204. 
12  For  instance,  sections  142  and  143  Companies  Act  1985;  for  case  law  examples  see  Bellerby  v. 
Rowland  &  Marwood's  (1902),  2,  Ch.  14;  Hope  v.  International  Financial  Society  (1876),  4  Ch.  D. 
327. 
13  Powell  \%  Kempton  Park  Racecourse  Co.  (1897),  2  Q.  B.,  pp  242,260,268. 
65 exercise  of  which  constitutes  crime.  "  Similarly,  a  shareholder  meeting  is  not  of  power 
to  exempt  directors  from  their  duty  to  set  the  statutory  saving  for  the  company,  as  the 
duty  to  set  statutory  saving  is  mandatory.  "  Any  violation  to  mandatory  rules  of 
company  law  gives  every  shareholder  right  to  take  action  against  the  company  and 
those  who  are  responsible  for  such  violation,  asking  for  a  nullification  order  and 
damages,  if  any.  " 
English  and  Iranian  company  laws  have  diverged  on  the  issue  of  legal  rules  in  the 
sense  that  the  former  recognises  a  distinction  between  threatened  and  past  unlawful 
activities  as  it  does  so  in  respect  of  ultra  vires  activities",  while  the  latter  knows  no  such 
distinction.  '9 
14  Pennington  Robert  R.,  "Company  Law",  (1990),  611,  ed.,  London,  Butterworths,  at  p  802. 
15  Sections  90,237-240  and  258  (1)  JSCA- 
16  Section  140  JSCA- 
17  See  sections  270  and  273  JSCA- 
18  Pettet  (above,  note  7)  at  pp  230-1;  Thorne  (above,  note  7)  at  p  186;  Farrar  (above,  note  7)  at  p 
446. 
19  This  distinction  will  be  discussed  in  more  details  in  the  following  section.  [See  below,  at 
11.2.21. 
66 11.2.  Constitution 
The  majority/  minority  relationship  is  often  mainly  regulated  through  constitution. 
Corporate  members  through  the  constitution  determine  the  purpose  of  company, 
provide  guidelines  for  corporate  incumbents  on  things  to  do  and  things  not  to  do, 
devise  some  checks  over  controllers,  and  enjoy  some  rights  which  subject  discretion  of 
corporate  authorities.  Constitutional  rules  can,  therefore,  be  described  as  corporate 
self-regulation;  i.  e.  regulations  that  parties  to  the  company  contract  make  to  enable 
their  corporate  vehicle  to  be  incorporated  and  work  efficiently.  The  term  'constitution' 
refers  either  to  the  articles  of  association  of  corporations,  as  it  does  so  in  the  case  of 
Iran  20 
,  or  in  the  case  of  England,  to  both  the  articles  and  the  memorandum  of 
associations.  "  Speaking  generally,  constitutional  rules,  which  limit  the  scope  of  power 
held  by  majority  shareholders,  can  be  classified  into  four  categories  as  shown  below 
and  I  will  examine  them  in  the  following  parts  in  the  light  of  both  Iranian  and  English 
company  laws: 
1.  Internal  division  of  powers 
Ultra  vires  issues 
Special  majorit"Y  requirement 
4.  Personal  rights. 
20  Sections  6,8,17,18,  and  20  JSCA. 
21  Sections  l(l),  2,7(l),  8(2),  10,13,14  Companies  Act  1985. 
67 11.2.1.  Internal  division  of  powers 
In  modem  companies,  the  exercise  of  corporate  power  is  often  divided  between 
shareholders  and  directors.  The  common  format  is  to  vest  the  power  to  run  the 
business  of  corporations  on  a  day-to-day  basis  in  directors  who  exercise  it  through 
borad  decisions  and  to  preserve  for  shareholders  monitoring  function  which  is 
exercised  through  shareholder  meetings.  Accordingly,  shareholders  delegate  broadly 
their  powers  to  directors"  who  run  the  company  business  and  who  take  business 
decisions  for  it.  2'  This  division  of  powers  between  shareholders  and  directors  relies  on 
certain  practical  and  functional  logics.  Practically,  in  the  absence  of  such  division,  it 
appears  almost  impossible  for  dispersed  shareholders  especially  in  large  companies  to 
engage  themselves  with  the  day-to-day  management  of  corporate  business. 
Competition  in  the  market,  which  underlies  business  activities,  requires  quick  action, 
whereas  shareholder  action  is  normally  slow.  Either,  shareholders  do  not  have  time  for 
a  day-to-day  management  of  the  corporate  business  or  even  if  they  have  time,  they 
must  act  collectively  which  is  difficult  and  slow.  When,  for  example,  a  business 
opportunity  emerges  in  the  market,  business  rivals  never  wait  until  a  given  company"s 
shareholders  gather,  discuss,  take  decision  collectively  and  act.  These  difficulties  are 
absent  when  management  is  vested  in  directors.  Functionally,  shareholders  are  not 
often  very  well  experienced  and  informed  of  corporate  business  and,  even  if  they  are, 
they  have  no  or  little  incentive  to  involve  in  running  of  the  corporate  business.  Unlike 
22  Art  70,  Table  (A)  Companies  Act  1985. 
23  "'subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  Act  (Companies  Act  1985),  the  memorandum  and  the  articles 
and  to  any  directions  given  by  special  resolution,  the  business  of  the  company  shall  be  managed 
by  the  directors  who  may  exercise  all  the  powers  of  the  company"'.  [Art  70,  Table  (A) 
Companies  Act  1985];  See  also  Pettet  (above,  note  7)  at  p  226;  Parkinson  J.  E.,  "'Corporate  Power 
and  Responsibility"',  (1993),  Oxford,  Clarendon  Press,  at  p  237,9;  Hale,  Christopher,  "'What's 
Right  with  the  Rule  in  Foss  v.  Harbottle?  "  (1997),  Company  Financial  and  Insolvency  Law 
Review,  Oxford,  Mansfield  Press,  219  at  p  2241. 
68 shareholders,  directors  as  competent  persons  who  have  expertise  in  business  can 
undertake  the  management  professionally.  The  practical  and  functional  logics  aside, 
there  is  also  a  third  logic,  which  concerns  the  majority/  minority  shareholder 
relationship  in  companies.  Internal  division  of  powers  is  capable  to  contribute  to  rein 
the  majority  rule  in  companies.  The  mechanism  of  division  extracts  some  parts  of 
corporate  powers  from  majority  shareholders  and  places  them  in  the  hands  of  directors 
who  may  seem  better  positioned  as  an  independent  authority  in  company  to  exercise 
them.  24  This  might  also  seem  more  realistic  when  one  notes  that  company  law  has 
designed  viable  ways  to  allow  shareholders  have  directors  aligned  with  the  company 
best  interest  objective.  Nonetheless,  once  closely  examined,  it  will  be  soon  realised  that 
the  division  of  power  could  offer  no  significant  protection  to  minority  shareholders. 
Any  extensive  delegation  of  power  to  directors  can  be  dangerous  to  either  minority 
shareholders  or  shareholders  generally.  Where  a  controlling  shareholder  is  present,  it 
can  facilitate  abuse  of  rights  by  the  controllers.  Where  such  control  is  absent,  it  would 
put  directors  in  a  position  that  they  can  easily  pursue  collateral  objectives  and  continue 
office  with  impunity.  "  If  this  were  the  case,  and  as  the  case  law"  and  many 
conu-nentatorS27  have  emphasised  it  is  often  the  case,  then  it  would  seem  very 
24  Farrar  (above,  note  7)  at  pp  315-6,385;  Ratner  David  L.,  ""The  Government  of  Business 
Corporations:  Critical  Reflections  on  the  Rule  of  One  Share,  One  Vote",  Cornell  Law  Review, 
(1970),  Number  1,  Vol.  56,23  Cornell  University,  Cornell  Law  School,  at  pp  21,35-8. 
25  Farrar  John  H.,  "'Company  Law"",  (1985),  London,  Butterworths,  at  p  7;  Parkinson  (above, 
note  24)  at  p  246. 
26  Atwool  v  Merryweather  (1867)  5  Eq.  464  n.;  Daniels  v.  Daniels  (1978)  Ch  406;  Prudential 
Assurance  Co  Ltd  v.  Newman  Industries  Ltd  (no  2)  (1981)  Ch  257,  (1980)  2  All  ER  841; 
Shuttleworth  v.  Cox  Bros  &  Co  (Maidenhead)  Ltd,  and  Others,  (1927),  2  KB  9;  Richard  Brady 
Franks  Ltd  v.  Price  (1937),  58  CLR  p  136;  Howard  Smith  Ltd  v.  Ampol  Petroleum  (1974),  AC  p 
832;  Hogg  v.  Gramphorn  Ltd.  (1967),  1  Ch  254;  Clemens  v.  Clemens  Bros  Ltd  (1976),  2  All  ER 
268;  Re  Smith  and  Fawcett,  Limited  (1942)  1  Ch  304. 
27  Wedderburn  K.  W.,  "Shareholder's  Rights  and  the  Rule  in  Foss  v.  Harbottle",  (1958), 
Caiiibridge  Law  jotirnal,  97,  Cambridge,  Cambridge  University  Press,  at  p  97;  Parkinson  (above, 
note  24)  at  pp  237-246;  Pettet  (above,  note  7)  at  p  226. 
69 unlikely"  that  a  wronged  company  could  take  action  against  its  wrongdoer  directors. 
The  power  to  take  corporate  actions  rests  in  directors  and  in  a  case  where  directors 
themselves  are  the  actual  wrongdoers  no  action  will  commence.  '9  The  safer 
arrangements  is  perhaps  to  have  a  system  of  corporate  governance  in  which 
shareholders  overally  control  directors.  Such  arrangement  can  offer  a  two-sided 
guarantee  for  minority  shareholders.  On  the  one  hand,  in  exercising  their  powers, 
directors  owe  fiduciary  and  care  duties  to  companies  which  means  they  should  act 
carefully  and  sould  regard  interests  of  all  shareholders  not  simply  the  majority.  On  the 
other  hand,  in  the  exercise  of  their  monitoring  role,  the  majority  helps  to  keep 
management  in  the  line  of  shareholder  wealth  maximisation  which  benefits  minority 
shareholders  too.  Yet,  the  overall  control  of  the  majority  over  directors  is  also 
dangerous,  as  majority  shareholders  can  indirectly  influence  management  so  as  to 
push  them  exercise  their  power  only  for  the  benefit  of  the  majority.  Thus,  two  issues 
must  be  addressed.  One  relates  to  examination  of  how  corporate  power  is  distributed 
between  corporate  organs  and  the  other  concerns  consideration  of  directors'  duties  and 
the  relevance  of  their  role  as  to  the  majority/  minority  shareholder  conflict.  I  consider 
the  first  issue  below  but  the  second  issue  will  be  examined  in  Chapter  four. 
In  England,  company  law  determines  for  modem  corporations  two  internal  organs, 
general  meetings  and  boards.  Companies  Act  1985  provides  guidelines  in  general 
terms  about  how  power  is  distributed  between  the  two  mentioned  organs.  It  requires 
28  Parkinson  (above,  note  23)  at  p  237;  Farrar  (above,  note  7)  at  p  444;  Pettet  (above,  note  7)  at  p 
226;  Hale  (above,  note  23)  at  p  224. 
29  In  some  exceptional  cases,  directors  may,  in  fact,  bring  proceedings  to  remedy  wrongdoing 
committed  by  their  fellow  directors.  One  main  case  is  where  the  control  of  the  company  passes 
to  other  persons  such  as  a  liquidator  in  liquidation  or  to  a  new  board  elected  by  a  successful 
takeover  bidder.  [See  Pettet  (above,  note  7)  at  p  226  and  Parkinson  (above,  note  23)  at  pp  237-91. 
70 that  every  company  shall  in  each  year  hold  a  general  meeting  as  its  annual  general 
meeting.  "  In  addition  to  annual  general  meeting,  a  company  may  also  from  time  to 
time  hold  other  general  meetings,  which  are  called  extraordinary  general  meetings. 
Certain  important  matters  can  only  be  decided  by  shareholders  in  extraordinary 
meetings.  "  Shareholders  through  meetings  also  control  activities  of  directors  and  in 
particular  they  have  power  to  reappoint  directors  to,  or  remove  them  from,  the  office.  32 
Companies  Act  1985  also  requires  that  every  company  must  have  a  director  or 
directors  who  manage  company  business"  and  whose  acts  bind  the  company  even 
where  shareholders  fall  in  disagreement  with  them.  "  General  guidelines  aside,  the  Act 
rejects,  perhaps  intentionally,  to  list  in  details  the  sort  of  power  each  organ  will  have 
and  to  tell  how  precisely  the  affairs  of  companies  are  to  be  managed.  These  are  left  to 
shareholders  who  can  determine  them  through  articles  of  associations",  which  is,  as  a 
constitutional  document,  suitable  for  regulating  corporate  internal  relationships  and 
affairs.  36  In  short  of  a  shareholder  drafted  articles,  shareholders  are  assumed  in  law  to 
have  accepted  37  default  articles  prescribed  by  the  Table  A  Companies  Act  1985  which 
provides  in  its  Art  70: 
30  Section  366  Companies  Act  1985. 
31  Some  of  these  matters  are:  to  alter  the  objects  of  the  company  (s  4);  to  alter  the  company's 
articles  of  association  (s  9  (1));  to  change  the  company's  name  (s  28  (1));  to  ratify  ultra  vires  acts 
of  directors  (s  35  (3));  to  authorise  directors  to  allot  shares  (s  80);  to  reduce  share  capital  (s  135 
(1))  Companies  Act  1985. 
32  Section  303  (1)  Companies  Act  1985. 
33  Section  282  Companies  Act  1985. 
34  "...  the  power  of  the  directors  to  bind  the  company  is  deemed  to  be  free  of  any  limitation 
under  the  memorandum  or  articles.  "  [section  35  (1)  Companies  Act  19851. 
35  Pennington  (above,  note  14)  at  p  765. 
36  Sections  7-9  Companies  Act  1985;  unlike  articles,  memorandum  of  associations  governs  the 
external  transactions  of  the  company.  It  is  the  public  document  from  which  those  dealing  with 
the  company  can  establish  significan  features  of  the  company,  such  as  whether  it  is  public  or 
prix,  ate,  limited  or  unlimited  and,  for  a  limited  company  with  share  capital,  the  amount  of  the 
share  capital.  [Sections  1-6  Companies  Act  1985]. 
71 "'Subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  Act,  the  memorandum  and  the  articles  and  to  any  directions  given  by  special  resolution,  the  business  of  the  company  shall  be  managed  by 
the  directors  who  may  exercise  all  the  powers  of  the  company...  " 
However,  both  a  shareholder  drafted  and  the  Table  A  model  articles,  are  inevitably 
incomplete  failing  to  offer  detailed  prediction  of  every  contingency.  Filling  up  of  this 
gap  is  the  responsibility  of  the  case  law,  which  has  given,  from  time  to  time,  more 
guidelines  in  this  respect.  According  to  the  case  law,  directors  do  not  act  as  agents  for 
majority  shareholders.  "  Neither  are  they  agents  for  all  shareholders.  "  This  follows  that 
members  cannot  instruct  directors  about  how  they  shaH  exercise  their  powers. 
Similarly,  it  has  been  accepted  that  running  the  business  is  a  managerial  function  that 
rests  in  directors.  Shareholders  only  exercise  control  through  general  meetingS40  and 
they  cannot  interfere  with  the  exercise  of  managerial  powerS41  that  can  extend  from 
mere  business  issues  to  financial  incidents  of  the  business.  "  Case  law  has  also  made  it 
clear  that  acts  of  shareholders  particularly  in  the  exercise  of  their  controlling  function 
may  affect  directors  in  overall  but  that  is  not  to  be  viewed  as  interference  in  the 
exercise  of  managerial  powers  . 
4'  Likewise,  case  law  prohibits  directors  from  interfering 
in  the  exercise  of  shareholder  powers. 
44 
Iranian  company  law,  on  the  other  hand,  provides  three  internal  organs  for  companies, 
board  of  directors,  inspectors,  and  shareholder  meetings.  The  board  of  directors, 
37  Section  8(2)  Companies  Act  1985. 
38  Automatic  Self-Cleansing  Filter  Syndicate  Co  Ltd  v.  Cunninghame  [1906]  2  Ch  34  p  42-43  per 
Collins  MR. 
39  Gramophone  and  Typewriter  Ltd  v.  Stanley  [1908]  2  KB  89  p  105-106  per  Buckley  L.  J. 
40  Gramophone  and  Typewriter  Ltd  v.  Stanley  (1908),  2  K.  B.  89  per  Moulton  L.  J. 
41  John  Shaw  &  Sons  Ltd.  v.  Shaw  (1935),  2  K  B.,  113  per  Greer  L.  J. 
42  Scott  v.  Scott  (1943)  1  All  ER  582,  per  Lord  Clauson. 
43  Isle  of  Wight  v.  Tahourdin  (1883)  25  Ch  D  320,  Per  Cotton  L.  J. 
44  Hogg  v.  Cramphorn  Ltd.  (1967)  1  Ch  254,  at  pp  268-9  per  Buckley  J. 
72 members  of  which  are  appointed  among,  and  by,  shareholderS45,,  conducts  a  company"s 
business  and  manages  its  affairS46  which  include  representation  of  the  company  in  its 
external  relationships  . 
4'  Before  the  introduction  of  the  JSCA,  directors  were  treated  as 
agents  of,  and  having  agency  relationship  with,  shareholders  and  they  owed  their  duty 
to  shareholders  as  principal.  48  This  was  inconsistent  with  separate  corporate 
personality"  and  was  to  mean  that  directors  had  no  power  unless  what  and  to  the 
extent  that  they  were  given  either  expressly  or  impliedly  through  articles  or  by 
shareholder  resolutions  in  appropriate  cases.  Their  acts  could  create  no  legal  effect 
what  so  ever  in  cases  where  they  exceeded  their  powers  or  breached  their  fiduciary 
duty.  Transactions  of  this  sort  even  in  relation  to  third  parties  were  always  considered 
voidable  and  a  wrongdoer  director  was  also  personally  liable  for  committing  tort  both 
to  the  company  and  to  third  parties  if  his  acts  would  entail  damages.  However,  the 
position  of  the  company  law  in  relation  to  the  power  of  directors  has  changed  sharply 
with  the  enactment  of  the  JSCA.  By  the  new  Act,  directors  are  no  longer  agents  of 
shareholders.  They  act  for  the  company,  owe  their  duties  to  it  and  excluding  certain 
listed  issues  that  fall  within  the  powers  of  meetings,  they  have  very  extensive  power  to 
take  every  action,  which  is  necessary  for  managing  affairs  of  the  company  provided 
that  their  decisions  and  acts  are  in  line  with  the  object  of  the  company.  50  Directors' 
extensive  power  is  deemed  in  relation  to  third  parties  even  where  the  rules  of  articles 
of  association  or  any  appropriate  resolution  of  shareholders  in  meetings  have  no 
45  Section  107  JSCA. 
46  Section  108  JSCA- 
47  Section  118  JSCA  provides  that'except  where  making  and  implementing  decision  on  an  issue 
is  within  the  authority  of  shareholder  meetings,  directors  of  a  company  possess  all  necessary 
powers  in  order  to  run  company  affairs.  ' 
48  Section  56  TA. 
49  Sotoodeh  Tehrani  Hasan,  "Trade  Law",  (1997),  Tehran,  Dehkhoda  Publication,  vol.  2,  at  pp 
151,185-186. 
73 indication  of  that  power,  or  even  where  they  expressly  limit  the  scope  of  such  power 
and  even  if  they  do  not  consider  the  interests  of  the  company  for  which  they  are 
transacting.  " 
The  second  internal  body  that  exercises  certain  corporate  powers  is  inspectors.  They 
investigate  the  company  on  behalf  of  shareholders.  Their  investigation  is  overall  and 
includes  taking  every  step  which  is  necessary  for  the  exercise  of  right  of  control  by 
shareholders  over  corporate  directors  and  their  appointed  management,  and  this,  of 
course,  must  be  exercised  without  interfering  in  the  exercise  of  management's  power  to 
run  the  company  business.  They  are  under  a  statutory  duty  to  the  compan 
Y52  to 
exercise  certain  functions  which  cannot  be  stopped  by  a  majority  resolution.  These 
functions  are:  to  comment  on  directors'  annual  reportS53;  to  control  truth  and  reliability 
of  information  given  by  directors  to  meetingS54;  to  make  sure  company  treats 
shareholders  equally";  to  convene  annual  general  meetings  in  case  of  directors'  failure 
to  convene 
56 
;  to  convene  extraordinary  meetings  when  they  think  it  is  necessary 
5,; 
and 
to  report  any  fault"  and  probable  crimes"  of  directors.  " 
50  Section  118  JSCA. 
51  Such  limitations  are  only  operative  in  relation  between  company  and  its  directors.  [Section 
118  JSCAJ. 
52  See  section  154  JSCA. 
53  Section  148  JSCA. 
54  Sections  148,150  and  151  JSCA- 
55  Section  148  JSCA. 
56  Section  91  JSCA- 
57  Section  92  JSCA- 
58  Section  117  JSCA- 
59  Sections  148-151  JSCA. 
60  Inspectors,  therefore,  perform  quite  different  functions  in  Iranian  corporations  contrast  to 
functions  of  auditors  in  English  company  law  which  are  stated  in  sections  384-394  Companies 
Act  1985.  The  use  of  auditors  as  distinguished  from  inspectors  has  also  been  prescribed  by 
Iranian  company  law  in  section  242  JSCA  which  imposes  a  statutory  duty  on  directors  in  public 
companies  to  invite  official  auditors  to  check  and,  in  case  of  reliability,  certify  the  company's 
accounts  and  business  books  and  balance  sheets  and  other  relevant  financial  documents. 
74 General  meetings  constitute  the  third  internal  body  that  exercise  corporate  power. 
Company  law  prescribes  three  types  of  meetings.  Founders  meeting  is  the  first 
corporate  meeting  which  is  convened  before  the  company  is  legally  formed.  "  All 
founders  and  share  subscribers  are  entitled  to  attend  in  this  meeting  and  each  share 
will  have  one  vote.  62  The  function  of  this  meeting  is  generaHy  to  review  every 
preliminary  step  taken  by  founders  in  the  company  formation  stage  in  order  to  ensure 
everything  is  done  as  accurately  as  the  company  law  requires.  Having  checked  all 
requirements,  they  will  sign  the  articles  and  choose  the  first  directors  and  inspectors 
and  by  doing  this  they  complete  formation  of  company  and  further  finish  the  mission 
of  founders  meeting.  "  The  second  corporate  meeting  is  the  extraordinary  meetings 
which  are  convened  by  directors  to  address  matters  of  fundamental  change  such  as 
alteration  of  articles  of  association,  change  in  the  size  of  the  share  capital,  and  pre-date 
dissolution  of  company.  64  To  be  formally  valid,  this  meeting  requires  participation  of  at 
least  half  plus  one  of  those  shareholders  who  have  voting  rightS6'  and  when  there  is  a 
valid  meeting,  resolutions  are  adopted  by  a  two  third  majority.  66 
61  Section  82  JSCA  exempts  private  companies  of  the  requirement  of  founders  meeting. 
62  Section  75  JSCA. 
63  To  be  formally  valid,  this  meeting  requires  participation  of  subscribers  who  own  at  least  half 
plus  one  of  company  shares.  If  this  requirement  was  not  met  for  the  first  time,  the  required 
amount  of  capital  reduces  to  one  third  of  such  subscribers  and  in  any  case  they  reach  decisions 
by  a  two  third  majority  resolution.  [Section  74  JSCA]. 
64  Sections  83,161,189  and  199  (4)  JSCA;  Also  it  has  authority  to  allow  directors  to  issue 
preference  shares  (sec.  42)  and  debentures  (sec.  56). 
65  If  this  requirement  was  not  met  for  the  first  time,  the  required  number  of  voting  right  holders 
reduces  to  one  third  of  such  shareholders  and  in  any  case  they  reach  decisions  by  a  two  third 
majority  resolution.  [Section  84  JSCA]. 
66  Section  85  JSCA. 
75 Having  aside  funders  and  extraordinary  meetings  which  are  either  single  purposed  or 
exceptional,  ordinary  general  meetings  are  the  third  corporate  meeting  which  regularly 
convened  at  the  instance  of  board  of  directors  at  a  constitutionally  specified  time  and 
on  a  once-a-year  basis  and  hence  is  called  annual  general  meeting.  "  Directors  and 
inspectors  can  also  convene  ordinary  meetings  extraordinarily.  "  Ordinary  meetings 
have  quite  wide  discretion  to  take  decision  on  all  issues  in  relation  to  the  affairs  of 
companies  except  those  which  fall  within  the  powers  of  funders  and  extraordinary 
meetings.  69  They  have  authority  in  particular  to  appoint/  disappoint  directors'O,  to 
review  balance  sheets  and  annual  report  provided  by  directors",  to  check  list  of 
company  assets,  financial  claims  and 
debtS72,  to  verify  and  authorise  distribution  of 
profit  shown  by  directorS73  and  to  ratify  certain  corporate  transactions  in  which 
directors  have  personal  interest.  74  To  be  formally  valid,  this  meeting  requires 
participation  of  those  shareholders  who  own  at  least  half  plus  one  of  company  shares, 
having  voting  right.  If  this  requirement  was  not  met  for  the  first  time,  a  second  call  will 
initiate  and  this  time  participation  Of  whatever  voting  shares  would  suffice"  and  in 
any  case  decisions  will  be  adopted  by  a  simple  majority  of  those  present.  76 
67  Sections  89  and  138  JSCA. 
68  Section  92  JSCA. 
69  Section  86  JSCA. 
70  Section  88  JSCA;  This  is  subject  to  the  authority  of  the  promoters'  meeting  in  respect  of 
appointing  the  first  directors.  [See  above  note  63]. 
71  Section  89  JSCA. 
72  Section  89  JSCA. 
73  Sections  90  and  240  JSCA. 
74  Sections  129-131  JSCA. 
75  Section  87  JSCA. 
76  Section  88  JSCA. 
76 11.2.2.  Ultra  vires  issues 
In  the  case  of  England,  the  ultra  vires  doctrine  used  to  require  companies  to  act  in 
compliance  with  their  object  clause.  A  transaction  made  by  a  director  on  behalf  of  his 
company  which  was  outside  the  object  clause  in  memorandum  of  association  was 
treated  void  having  no  effect  what  so  ever  and  thus  a  third  party  was  not  able  to 
enforce  it.  Such  transaction  was  also  irratifiable  even  with  a  unanimous  consent  of 
company  shareholders.  77  However,  the  traditional  connection  between  a  company's 
objects  and  its  capacity  was  abolished  following  the  Companies  Act  1985.  "  A  company 
has  now  capacity  to  engage  any  legal  act  even  though  outside  its  stated  power  and  the 
majority  is  now  able  to  ratify  such  act  and  therefore  bind  the  company  and  its 
members.  Section  35(3)  Companies  Act  1985  and  section  108  Companies  Act  1989  have 
conferred  such  a  capacity  to  the  majority  to  ratify  ultra  vires  acts.  Thus  ultra  vires 
transactions  no  longer  constitute  a  significant  limitation  on  the  rule  of  majority  in 
English  companies.  An  ultra  vires  act  is  now  within  the  power  of  the  company  capable 
of  being  ratified  by  the  majority.  "  The  only  statutory  check  imposed  by  company  law 
is  the  requirement  of  a  greater  majority,  i.  e.  a  majority  of  three-quarters  of  the  holders 
of  voting  rights.  Yet,  the  object  clause  remains  relevant  for  the  purposes  of  preventing 
the  company  from  engaging  in  any  future  ultra  vires  activities.  A  company  member  has 
right  to  bring  proceeding  in  order  to  restrain  the  company  of  doing  any  future  act  or 
from  the  progressing  any  act  which  is  beyond  the  company's  capacity.  "  This  right  does 
not  affect  any  act  that  is  previously  done  by  the  company.  It  has  also  no  effect  on  the 
77  Ashbury  Railway  Carriage  and  Iron  Co  Ltd.  v.  Riche  (1875)  LR  7  HL  653. 
78  "The  validity  of  an  act  done  by  a  company  shall  not  be  called  into  question  on  the  ground  of 
lack  of  capacity  by  reason  of  anything  in  the  company's  memorandum"'.  Section  35  (1). 
79  North  West  Transportation  Co  Ltd.  v.  Beatty,  (1887),  12  App  CAS  589. 
77 fulfilment  of  obligations  arisen  from  a  previous  act  of  the  company.  "  Neither  it  is  to 
restrain  the  company  from  doing  acts  or  entering  into  transactions  that  are  incidental 
to  the  stated  powers  of  the  company,  as  these  are  not  considered  ultra  vires.  "  In 
addition  to  this,  in  respect  of  acts  that  fall  within  the  capacity  of  the  company  but  are 
outside  the  powers  of  its  directors",  a  member  has  right  to  bring  proceedings  in  order 
to  restrain  directors  from  doing  of  such  acts.  84  However,  again  the  right  has  no  effect 
on  acts,  which  are  previously  done,  or  on  fulfilment  of  obligations  which  arise  from  a 
previous  corporate  act.  85  Although  ultra  vires  transactions  are  now  presumed  valid  in 
favour  of  persons  who  deal  with  company,  this  presumption  does  not  relieve  directors 
from  personal  liability  before  the  wronged  company.  As  Companies  Act  states  any 
special  resolution  that  ratifies  such  acts  shall  not  affect  directors'  liability  unless  a 
separate  special  resolution  actually  relieves  them  from  the  liability.  86 
Although  the  law  is  clear  in  respect  of  when  a  shareholder  can  take  action  in  respect  of 
ultra  vires  transactions,  arguments  have  been  brought  to  challenge  the  law  and  to  give 
right  of  personal  recovery  to  shareholders  in  such  cases.  The  touchstone  argument  is 
the  one  that  suggests  ultra  vires  acts  can  constitute  not  only  a  wrong  to  the  company 
but  also  a  wrong  to  the  membership  rights  of  every  member.  In  other  words,  since 
such  acts  are  unconstitutional,  a  shareholder  can  complain  that  any  departure  from  the 
80  "A  member  of  a  company  may  bring  proceedings  to  restrain  the  doing  of  an  act  which  but 
for  subsection  (1)  would  be  beyond  the  company's  capacity.  "'  [Section  35(2)  Companies  Act 
19851. 
81  See  section  35(2)  Companies  Act  1985. 
82  A-G  v.  Great  Eastern  Rly  Co  (1880)  5  App  Cas  473  (House  of  Lords). 
83  "In  favour  of  a  person  dealing  with  a  company  in  good  faith,  the  power  of  the  board  of 
directors  to  bind  the  company,  or  authorise  others  to  do  so,  shall  be  deemed  to  be  free  of  any 
limitation  under  the  company's  constitution.  "  [section  35A  (1)  Companies  Act  1985]. 
84  Section  35A(4)  Companies  Act  1985. 
85  Section  35A(4)  Companies  Act  1985. 
78 constitution  is  a  departure  from  the  terms  of  his  contract  and  as  a  qonsequence  he 
should  have  a  choice  between  taking  derivative  and  personal  actions.  "  However,  for  a 
number  of  reasons,  this  approach  does  not  seem  correct  and  can  bring  about 
undesirable  consequences.  For  one,  it  allows  dual  actions  (one,  by  a  member  in  his 
personal  capacity,  and  the  other,  by  a  member  in  the  capacity  of  the  representative  of 
the  company)  to  be  taken,  both  for  remedying  the  same  wrong.  This  increases  the 
existing  level  of  overlap  between  personal  and  corporate  rights  and  in  its  extreme 
application  helps  to  defunct  the  majority  rule.  For  another,  it  seems  conflicting  with  the 
nature  of  the  relationships  between  members  and  directors  with  companies.  As  a 
matter  of  company/members  relationship,  an  ultra  vires  act  is  not  attributed  to  the 
company  unless  ratified  by  it.  Without  a  proper  ratification  the  act  is  considered  as 
being  only  the  act  of  company  directors  who  are  not  a  party  to  the  company  contract.  " 
There  are  rules  that  separate  acts  of  companies  from  those  of  persons  who  work  for 
companies.  These  are  usually  labeled  as  the  rules  of  attribution  that  can  be  found  in 
case  law.  '9  One  of  those  rules  is  the  agency  rules  that  refer  to  the  situations  in  which  a 
director  acts  as  agent  of  the  company  and  therefore  his  actions  are  attributed  to  the 
86  Sec.  35(3)  and  sec.  35  A  (5) Companies  Act  1985. 
87  Baxter  Colin,  "'The  True  Spirit  of  Foss  v.  Harbottle",  (1987),  Northern  Ireland  Legal 
Quarterly,  Vol.  38,  No.  1,  Belfast,  Stevens  &  Sons,  at  p  10;  Thorne  (above,  note  7)  at  p  188;  Farrar 
(above,  note  7)  at  pp  445-8;  Pettet  (above,  note  7)  at  pp  230-1;  Pennington,  Robert  R.,  "'Company 
law",  (2001),  8th  ed.,  London,  Butterworths,  at  pp  800-1;  Wedderburn  (1957)  (above,  note  1)  at  p 
206. 
88  The  concept  of  statutory  contract  referred  to  by  section  14  Companies  Act  1985  only  speaks 
of  two  contracts,  one,  between  company  members  inter  se  and  the  other,  between  members  and 
company.  Directors  are  parties  to  neither  of  them.  They  have  a  separate  contract  with  the 
company  to  provide  service  to  it.  As  a  result  they  are  under  contractual  duty  to  the  company 
rather  than  its  shareholders. 
89  Meridian  Global  Funds  Management  Asia  Ltd.  v.  Securities  Commission  (1995)  2  AC  500  per 
Lord  Hoffman  at  p  506;  Trevor  Ivory  v.  Anderson,  (1992),  2  N.  Z.  L.  R.  517;  Tesco  supermarkets 
Ltd  x,.  Nattrass,  (1977),  A.  C.  153;  Lennard's  Carying  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Asiatic  Petroleum  Ltd.  (1915), 
A.  C.  705;  Alder  v.  Dickson  (1955),  1  Q.  B.  158. 
79 company  through  the  normal  rules  of  agency.  'O  These  rules  exclude  ultra  vires  activities 
from  being  attributed  to  the  company  unless  the  company  ratifies  them"  and  once 
ratified,  they  can  constitute  a  breach  of  the  articles  (though  not  illegal)  by  the  company 
for  which  a  personal  remedy  can  be  obtained.  If  the  company  does  not  ratify  the  ultra 
vires  act,  then,  it  is  not  considered  the  act  of  the  company  even  though  a  third  party  can 
92  hold  the  company  bound  to  that  act.  That,  a  third  party  can  hold  a  company  to 
assume  responsibility  for  ultra  vires  acts  of  its  directors,  is  only  an  exception  from  the 
general  principle  in  favour  of  third  parties  acting  in  good  faith.  Therefore,  there  cannot 
be  a  breach  of  membership  rights  as  the  act  is  not  that  of  company  and  as  a 
consequence  no  personal  remedy  would  be  conferred.  The  director  remains 
responsible  for  this  act9'  but  any  action  taken  by  a  shareholder  would  have  to  be 
through  the  derivative  form,  assuming  that  the  company  failed  to  act. 
The  recogniation.  of  personal  right  for  shareholders  in  respect  of  ultra  vires  issues  after 
ratification  can  be  advantageous  as  well  as  disadvantageous.  It  is  advantageous 
because  it  can  eliminate  overlap  between  corporate  and  personal  rights  in  ultra  vires 
cases.  According  to  it,  where  a  case  involves  ultra  vires  activity  only  two  altenate 
contingencies  can  be  imagined.  Either,  it  involves  a  violation  to  personal  right  that  is 
where  the  act  is  ratified.  Or,  it  involves  a  violation  to  corporate  right  that  is  where  it  is 
not  ratified.  It  is  disadvantegous  because  any  such  reading  can  fall  inconsistent  with 
the  logic  of  section  35(3)  Companies  Act  1985  and  section  108  Companies  Act  1989  that 
90  Fairline  Shipping  Corp.  v.  Adamson  (1974),  2  All  E.  R.  967;  Williams  v.  Natural  Life  Health 
Foods  Ltd.,  (1997),  1  BCLC  131;  Kirby  v.  National  Coal  Board  (1958),  SC  514;  Hedley  Byrne  & 
Co.  Ltd.  v.  Heller  &  Partners  Ltd.,  (1964),  A.  C.  465. 
91  See  also  section  35  (3)  Companies  Act  1985. 
92  Section  35A  (1)  Companies  Act  1985. 
93  Section  35A  (5)  Companies  Act  1985. 
80 allow  ratification  of  ultra  vires  acts  by  companies.  As  Lord  Dave  Y94  and  Knox  J'5  put  it  a 
minority  plaintiff  cannot  have  a  larger  right  to  relief  than  the  company  itself  would 
have  if  it  were  plaintiff.  As  a  result,  a  minority  shareholder  cannot  complain  of  acts, 
which  are  capable  of  being  confirmed  by  a  special  majority  unless  it  is  shown  that  the 
majority  in  ratification  has  committed  fraud  upon  the  minority.  96  When  an  ultra  vires 
act  is  threatened  a  shareholder  has  a  personal  right  to  apply  to  the  court  to  restrain 
such  proposed  act.  The  reason,  as  Knox  J  explained  lays  in  the  fact  that  "neither  of  the 
two  bases  for  the  rule  (in  Foss  v.  Harbottle)  is  applicable,  that  is  to  say  the  matter  is  not, 
by  definition,  a  mere  question  of  internal  management  nor  is  the  transaction  capable  of 
ratification  by  or  on  behalf  of  the  company".  97  However,  when  the  case  relates  to  a  past 
ultra  vires  transaction  involving  a  compensation  demand  for  the  loss  to  the  company, 
only  the  wronged  company  can  initiate  action  and  any  action  by  minority  shareholders 
must  be  in  a  derivative  form,  which  must  also  be  subject  to  observation  of  section  35  (2, 
Companies  Act  1985. 
In  the  case  of  Iran,  the  ultra  vires  doctrine  still  persists  in  company  law.  9'  Legal  persons 
can  perform  only  functions  that  conform  the  object  for  which  they  are  formed.  99  This  is 
94  Burland  v.  Earl  (1902),  AC  83. 
95  Smith  v.  Croft  (No.  2)  (1988)  Ch  114  at  167,  (1987)  3  All  ER  909  at  943. 
96  Smith  v.  Croft  (No.  2)  (1988)  Ch  114  at  170,  (1987)  3  All  ER  909  at  945;  See  also  Farrar  (above, 
note  7)  at  p  446;  Thorne  (above,  note  7)  at  pp  186,230-1;  Pennington  (above,  note  87)  at  pp  800-1; 
Conway  Mark,  "'Minority  Shareholder  Protection  and  the  Rule  in  Foss  v.  Harbottle:  Increasingly 
a  Foss  about  Nothing"  in  Companies  in  the  1990s,  edited  by  Gary  Slapper,  (1995),  London, 
Cavendish,  at  pp  3-4. 
97  Smith  v.  Croft  (No.  2)  (1988)  Ch  114  at  170,  (1987)  3  All  ER  909  at  945. 
98  "except  where  making  and  implementing  decision  on  an  issue  is  within  the  authority  of 
shareholder  meetings,  directors  of  a  company  possesses  all  necessary  powers  in  order  to  run  the 
company  affairs  providing  that  their  conducts  and  decisions  are  within  the  scope  of  stated 
object  of  that  company...  '  [Section  118  JSCAJ. 
99  As  well  as  object  clause  restriction,  corporate  capacity  is  also  restricted  by  natural  limitations, 
which  separates  them  from  individuals.  [Section  588  TC];  See  generally  Motamani  Tabatabaii 
Manoochehr,  "Legal  Personality",  in  Developments  of  Private  Law,  (1992/1372),  Edited  by 
81 to  prevent  such  persons  from  irrelevant  activities  and  to  allow  them  to  save  their 
resources  to  be  used  efficiently.  Also  in  the  interest  of  the  society,  this  facilitates 
specialization  and  functional  order,  as  with  it  not  every  legal  person  would  be  able  to 
perform  every  function.  '00  Obviously  companies  as  clear  instances  of  legal  persons  and 
in  conformity  with  the  law  have  certain  objects  specified  in  their  articles.  These  objects 
draw  the  framework  within  which  companies  can  take  decisions.  If  the  object  clause 
limits  the  object  of  a  company  to,  for  instance,  producing  carpet  and  to  take  every 
measure  in  that  respect,  the  company  cannot  switch  to  the  production  of,  and 
transactions  in  relation  to,  ceramic  unless  it  first  alters  its  objects  in  order  to  include 
new  objects.  Inconsistent  transactions  are  basically  void  and  produce  no  effect.  Equally 
true,  a  transaction  that  a  company  cannot  engage,  its  internal  organs  (meetings,  and 
board  of  directors)  cannot  engage  too'O'  and  a  third  party  who  is  a  contractual  party  to 
such  transaction  will  not  be  able  to  enforce  it  against  the  company.  "  Such  transactions 
give  every  shareholder  right  to  commence  personal  actions  against  the  wrongdoer 
company  and  its  controHers  and  in  the  exercise  of  such  right  it  makes  no  difference 
whether  the  ultra  vires  transaction  is  threatened  or  is  already  completed,  though,  a 
possible  order  of  the  court  may  differ. 
Katoozian  Naser,  Tehran,  University  of  Tehran  Publication,  pp  242-3;  Sotoodeh  Tehrani  Hasan, 
"Trade  Law",  (1996),  Tehran,  Dadgostar  Publication,  vol.  1  at  p  144;  Eskini  Rabiaa,  ""Trade  Law: 
Business  Corporations",  (2000),  Vol.  2,  Samt  Publication,  Tehran,  at  p  149. 
100  For  example,  a  registered  society  for  the  protection  of  animal  rights  is  not  of  capacity  to  take 
a  claim  to  the  courts  for  the  protection  of  human  rights. 
101  Section  8  JSCA  requires  companies  to  mention  expressly  the  object  of  the  company  as  a 
clause  in  their  articles  of  association  and  submit  the  articles  to  the  public  registrar  for  the 
purpose  of  registration.  Also  see  section  118  JSCA  (cited  above,  note  98). 
102  Motamani  Tabatabaii  (above,  note  99)  at  pp  225,243;  Sotoodeh  (above,  note  99)  at  p  149. 
82 11-2-3.  Special  majority 
The  constitution  often  requires  a  greater  majority  vote  for  making  a  collective  decision 
on  certain  important  issues  that  touch  more  or  less  the  core  basis  of  a  shareholder's 
agreement  with  company  and  its  other  members.  This  occurs  when  controllers  try  to 
change  terms  of  original  articles  through  later  constitutional  amendments.  However, 
not  every  change  is  considered  opportunistic.  When  circumstances  change, 
constitutional  rules  may  need  to  change  in  order  to  become  updated.  Nonetheless, 
controllers  can  also  change  them  even  though  there  is  no  or  little  change  of 
circumstances.  The  latter  is  often  the  case  where  the  controllers  attempt  to  engage  in 
opportunistic  constitutional  amendments.  Therefore,  a  balance  should  be  made 
between  the  changability  of  constitution  and  the  consideration  that  minority  rights 
need  to  be  protected  from  opportunistic  changes  to  the  constitution  which  can  be  made 
by  a  simple  majority  resolution.  The  greater  majority  requirement  can  offer  some 
safeguards  to  individual  shareholders  against  any  likely  attempts  of  majority 
shareholders  to  change  original  articles  opportunistically.  In  the  absence  of  it,  a 
majority  shareholder  could  easily  circumvent  important  elements  of  constitution 
through  changing  terms  of  the  original  contract.  Its  functioning  is  simply  to  require  a 
controlling  majority  to  obtain  minority  consent  in  certain  issues.  If  the  majority  fails  to 
do  so,  every  dissatisfied  shareholder  will  have  the  right  to  commence  legal  action  for 
an  order  of  the  court,  which  nullifies  majority  action.  Case  law  confirms  the  right  of  a 
minority  shareholder  to  protect  him/herself  in  such  cases.  It  is  clear  in  case  law  that 
majority  rule  does  not  prevent  an  individual  member  from  suing  if  the  transaction  in 
question  is  one  which  could  validly  be  done  or  sanctioned  only  by  a  special  majority 
resolution  otherwise,  a  company  would  be  allowed  to  act  in  breach  of  its  articles  by 
83 passing  an  ordinary  resolution  instead  of  a  special  one  in  matters  that  could  only  be 
done  or  sanctioned  by  the  latter.  "' 
The  size  of  a  higher  majority  vote  requirement  often  depends  on  shareholder  consent 
although  a  three  quarters  majority  seems  to  be  the  most  frequently  used  size. 
Companies  Act  1985  illustrates  the  range  of  issues  that  require  special  majority  vote. 
For  instance,  section  4  prescribes  a  special  majority  requirement  for  altering  the  objects 
of  company  and  section  9  (1)  requires  such  majority  for  altering  corporate  articles. 
Also,  section  28  (1)  necessitates  a  special  majority  for  changing  company  name  and 
sections  35  (3),  80  and  135  (1)  prescribe  such  majority  respectively  for  ratifying  ultra 
vires  acts  of  directors,  authorising  directors  to  allot  shares  and  reducing  corporate  share 
capital. 
Special  majority  exception  in  this  context  includes  not  only  a  greater  level  of  votes  but 
also  all  formalities  and  processes  associated  with  it  as  prescribed  by  the  constitution 
and  company  law.  104  In  James  v.  Buena  Ventura  Nitrate  Grounds  Syndicate  Ltd'O',  for 
example,  corporate  articles  prescribed  a  specified  method  for  issuing  new  shares. 
Although,  this  method  was  principally  alterable  through  altering  the  very  articles  of 
association  with  a  special  majority  resolution,  but  shareholders  adopted  a  different 
method  by  a  special  resolution  without  having  the  articles  altered  first.  Although  this 
resolution  was  passed  by  the  votes  of  a  greater  majority,  the  court  construed  it  to  be  an 
attempt  to  alter  articles  of  association  in  an  inappropriate  way.  'O'  Similarly,  when 
103  Cotter  v.  National  Union  of  Seamen  (1929),  2  Ch  58  per  Romer  J. 
104  Allen  v.  Gold  Reefs  of  West  Africa,  Limited,  (1900)  1  Ch  656  at  671  per  Lindley  MR. 
105  James  v.  Buena  Ventura  Nitrate  Grounds  Syndicate  Ltd.  (1896),  1  Ch.  456. 
106  Ibid.  See  also  Farrar  (above,  note  7)  at  pp  446-7. 
84 removal  of  a  director  required  alteration  of  articles,  it  would  seem  inappropriate  for 
shareholders  to  pass  simply  a  special  resolution  without  having  articles  altered  first.  "' 
Similar  safeguards  that  subjects  application  of  majority  rule  to  a  greater  majority 
requirement  can  be  found  in  Iranian  company  law.  In  particular,  issues  that  fall  within 
the  power  of  extraordinary  and  founder  meetings  can  be  taken  as  most  clear 
examples.  'O'  In  addition  to  these,  shareholders  in  ordinary  meetings  are  required  to 
pass  with  a  two-third-majority  of  votes  cast  any  resolution  that  seek  to  change 
shareholder  rights.  "' 
11.2.4.  Personal  rights 
Personal  rights  refer  to  the  rights  that  are  personal  in  the  sense  that  they  fall  into  the 
personal  pocket  of  every  shareholder.  A  shareholder,  needless  to  act  with  other 
shareholders,  is  theoretically  able  to  enforce  such  rights.  Personal  rights  in  its  wide 
application  can  constitute  a  major  limitation  on  the  scope  of  majority  rule  because  they 
generally  allow  shareholders  to  take  action  in  order  to  enforce  company  contract 
against  controllers.  Nonetheless,  the  impact  of  personal  rights  has  become  rather  trivial 
as  they  are  not  all  enforceable  by  a  shareholder  and  even  those  that  are  enforceable 
might  become  subject  to  the  majority  rule.  To  explain  why  this  is  so,  one  needs  to  grasp 
a  clear  understanding  of  the  nature  of  personal  rights  and  the  relationship  which  exists 
between  shareholders  and  companies  under  the  company  contract.  This  itself  depends 
on  making  distinction  between  company  contracts  and  other  contracts.  Unlike 
107  Shuttleworth  v.  Cox  Bros  &  Co  (Maidenhead)  Ltd,  and  Others,  (1927),  2  KB  9  at  p  21  per 
Scrutton  L.  J.;  see  also  for  a  similar  case  Bushell  v.  Faith  (1970),  1  All  ER  53. 
108  See  above,  notes  61-66. 
85 traditional  contracts,  company  contracts  do  not  allow  parties  to  enforce  outsider 
rights.  "O  This  means  that  a  company  is  entitled  as  against  its  members  to  enforce  and 
restrain  breaches  of  its  regulations...  and  that  shareholders  as  against  their  company 
can  enforce  and  restrain  breaches  of  such  regulations"'  and  that  shareholders  can 
enforce  the  contracts  made  inter  se  as  members  of  the  company.  "'  However, 
shareholders  can  only  enforce  rights  which  are  obtained  in  the  capacity  as  members.  "' 
To  enjoy  such  capacity  one  needs  to  enter  into  contract  with  company  and  its  members 
in  which  he  undertakes  with  respect  to  most  rights,  which  his  membership  carries,  to 
accept  as  binding  upon  him  the  exercise  of  his  corporate  rights  by  the  company.  "'  A 
company  member,  therefore,  obtains  two  types  of  rights,  which  arise  out  of  the 
company  contract,  those  of  personal  and  corporate.  '  16  Corporate  rights  are  those  that 
belong  to  shareholders  as  a  body  corporate'  17  and  its  attribution  to  shareholders  is  only 
for  the  reason  that  shareholders  are  given  power  to  apply  either  direct  or  indirect 
control  on  the  exercise  of  them  and  for  the  fact  that  they  (shareholders)  enjoy,  as 
residual  right  holders,  the  consequences  of  such  exercise  either  positively  (annual 
profits  given  to  shares  and  increase  in  their  market  value)  or  negatively  (loss  suffered 
by  the  company  that  reduces  the  share  price  or  expected  profits).  Internal  organs, 
109  See  section  93  JSCA. 
110  Wood  v.  Odessa  Waterworks  Co.,  (1889),  42  Ch.  D  636;  Ray  field  v.  Hands  and  Others, 
(1960),  Ch.  1;  Hickman  v.  Kent  or  Romney  Marsh  Sheepbreeders'  Association,  (1915),  1  Ch.  881; 
Re  Saul  D  Harrison  &  Sons  pIc  (1995),  1  BCLC  14  at  17. 
111  Borland's  Trustees  v.  Steel  Bros.  Ltd.,  (1901),  1  Ch  279. 
112  Wood  v.  Odessa  Waterworks  Co.,  (1889),  42  Ch.  D  636;  Johnson  v.  Lyttle's  Iron  Agency, 
(1877),  5  Ch.  D.  687. 
113  Ray  field  v.  Hands  and  Others,  (1960),  Ch.  1. 
114  Hickman  v.  Kent  or  Romney  Marsh  Sheepbreeders'  Association,  (1915),  1  Ch.  881; 
Shuttleworth  v.  Cox  Bros  &  Co  (Maidenhead)  Ltd,  and  Others,  (1927),  2  KB  9  at  p  21  per 
Scrutton  L.  J.;  Swabey  v.  Port  Darwin  Gold  Mining  Co.  1  Megone  385  Cited  in  Allen  v.  Gold 
Reefs  of  West  Africa,  Limited,  (1900)  1  Ch  656. 
115  Section  14  Companies  Act  1985. 
116  Palmer  Francis  Beaufort,  "Palmer's  Company  Law"',  (1976),  22nd  ed.,  Editted  by 
Schmitthoff  C.  M.,  London,  Stevens,  at  pp  597-603;  Pennington  (above,  note  87)  at  p  795. 
86 board  of  directors  and  general  meetings  of  shareholders  as  the  case  might  be,  represent 
the  company  in  the  exercise  of  them.  "'  Clear  examples  of  such  rights  are  right  to  enter 
into  transactions,  the  right  to  bring  proceedings,  the  right  to  make  resolutions,  the  right 
to  alter  articles  and  the  right  to  ratify  a  wrong  done  to  the  company. 
By  contrast,  personal  rights  belong  to  individual  shareholders  and  fall  outside  the 
powers  of  majority  shareholders.  As  personal  rights  originate  from  constitution,  they 
are  also  often  liable  to  change  through  procedures  prescribed  by  the  constitution.  It  is 
hardly  possible  to  enumerate  them,  but  familiar  instances  include  the  right  to  have 
information,  the  right  to  attend  at  meetings  and  vote,  "9  pre-emption  rights"',  the  right 
to  transfer  shares"',  the  right  to  share  in  profits,  and  the  right  to  share  in  capital  in  case 
of  dissolution. 
Personal  rights  may  derive  also  from  other  sources  such  as  statutes 
122 
and  separate 
shareholder  agreement.  "'  If  company  law  in  a  mandatory  fashion  confers  personal 
rights,  majority  rule  will  have  no  application  on  them  and  they  will  not  be  liable  to 
change  through  contract.  Similarly,  if  a  member  acquires  his  personal  rights  from  a 
separate  agreement,  his  rights  will  become  inviolable  and  will  be  safe  from  change 
through  contractual  mechanisms  and,  therefore,  such  rights  sit  out  of  the  ambit  of  the 
117  Greenhalgh  v.  Arderne  Cinemas  Ltd  (1950),  All  ELR  vol.  2,1120,  per  Evershed  MR. 
118  Hale  (above,  note  23)  at  p  224. 
119  Pender  v.  Lushington  (1877),  6  Ch.  D.  70. 
120  Greenhalgh  v.  Arderne  Cinemas  Ltd  (1950),  All  ELR  vol.  2  1120. 
121  Moffat  v.  Farquhar  (1878),  7  Ch.  D  591. 
122  For  example,  a  member  has  a  right  to  restrain  the  company  from  doing  ultra  vires  acts  [Sec. 
35  (2)  Companies  Act  1985];  He  has  right  not  to  have  his  financial  obligations  to  the  company 
increased  without  his  consent  [Sec  16(l)  Companies  Act  19851;  And  he  has  also  right  to  have 
company  operation  fairly  conducted.  [Sec.  459  Companies  Act  1985]. 
123  Pennington  (above,  note  87)  at  p  794. 
87 majority  rule.  124  Such  rights  must  be  distinguished  from  personal  rights  which 
originate  from  company  contract  in  the  sense  that  while  the  former  is  regarded 
absolute  the  latter  is  seen  changeable  through  majority  decision.  This  means,  it  is  not 
always  possible  for  a  shareholder  to  enforce  his  personal  rights  which  is  obtained 
under  company  contract.  Sometimes,  he  may  be  able  to  enforce  his  personal  rights,  but 
most  of  the  times  he  will  be  debarred  from  enforcing  his  constitutional  right  because  it 
is  possible  for  an  appropriate  majority  to  change  them.  As  Dixon  J  observed  'prima 
facie  rights  altogether  dependent  upon  articles  of  association  are  not  enduring  and 
indefeasible  but  are  liable  to  modification  or  destruction:  that  is,  if  and  when  it  is 
resolved  by  a  three-fourths  majority  that  the  articles  should  be  altered.  12'  The  company 
contract  is  designed  to  work  over  a  long  period  of  time  and  parties  to  it  'are  bound  up 
in  the  same  enterprise,  and  thus  have  to  do  business  with  each  other  over  a  long  period 
of  time"  126 
. 
Therefore,  they  are  interested  more  in  keeping  this  long-term  relationship 
than  to  put  an  end  to  it.  However,  in  the  long  run,  their  interests  and  needs  may 
change  with  a  change  of  circumstances  and  this  requires  rights  of  shareholders  to  be 
relative  rather  than  absolute.  This  further  follows  that  company  contract  should 
provide  some  reasonable  level  of  flexibility  so  that  it  can  adjust  and  modernise  itself  to 
changes.  Relativity  of  rights  under  company  contracts  means  that  a  shareholder"  s 
personal  rights  cannot  be  seen  in  isolation  but  only  in  relation  to  the  rights  enjoyed  by 
124  Swabey  v.  Port  Darwin  Gold  Mining  Co.  1  Megone  385  Cited  in  Allen  v.  Gold  Reefs  of  West 
Africa,  Limited,  (1900)  1  Ch  656;  Allen  case  Ibid.  at  p  688  per  Vaughan  Williams  and at  pp  673-4 
per  Lindeley  MR;  Shuttleworth  v.  Cox  Bros  &  Co  (Maidenhead)  Ltd,  and  Others,  (1927),  2  KB  9 
at  pp  21-22  per  Scrutton  Lj- 
125  Peter's  American  Delicacy  Co  Ltd  v.  Heath,  (1939),  61  CLR  457  (High  Court  of  Australia). 
126  Drury  R.  R.,  "The  Relative  Nature  of  A  Shareholder's  Right  to  Enforce  The  Company 
Contract",  (1986),  The  Cambridge  Law  journal,  42(2),  219,  Cambridge,  Cambridge  University 
Press,  at  p  222. 
88 other  members 
127 
regarding  ratification  of  violations  to  the  contract 
128 
.  regularising 
trivial  breaches  of  contracts  12'  and  altering  company  contract  by  a  special  majority.  "' 
Although,  a  shareholder  has  rights  in  respect  of  all  regulations  expressed  by  the 
constitution,  he  can  enforce  them  only  after  observation  of  other  members'  parallel 
rights.  "'  In  sum,  the  principle  is  constitutional  rights  are  enforceable  by  a  member  as 
far  as  they  are  not  changed  subject  to  observation  of  rights  enjoyed  by  other  members. 
It  is,  however,  not  very  certain  in  which  circumstances  other  members  have  such 
parallel  right.  Farrar  indicated  the  point  very  well  in  saying  "it  is  primarily  with  rights 
arising  from  articles  that  we  are  concerned,  for  that  is  the  grey  area  where  the  conflict 
between  shareholder  protection  and  the  majority  rule  is  most  acute'.  132  While  a 
shareholder  may  wish  to  pursue  the  company  for  ignoring  certain  terms  of  the 
company  constitution,  the  company  itself  through  the  mechanism  of  majority  rule  may 
want  to  ratify  such  unconstitutionality.  Therefore,  in  deciding  whether  or  not  to  pursue 
the  company  in  order  to  enforce  a  regulation  of  constitution,  a  shareholder  needs  to  see 
if  the  alleged  breach  is  the  one  which  can  be  ratified  or  regularised  by  other  members 
who  decide  through  majority  rule  in  shareholder  meetings  and  this  unfortunately  is 
127  Drury  lbid  at  p  224. 
128  Hogg  v.  Cramphorn  Ltd.,  (1967),  1  Ch  254  at  p  271-2;  North  West  Transportation  Ltd  v. 
Beatty  (1887)  12  App  Cas  589  (Privy  Council). 
129  Burland  v.  Earle  (1902),  AC  83,  PC,  p  93-94;  Mac  Dougall  v.  Gardiner  (1875),  1  Ch.  D.  13. 
130  Andrews  v.  Gas  Meter  Co.  (1897)  1  Ch.  361;  Pepe  v.  City  and  Suburban  Permanent  Building 
Society  (1893),  Ch.  311;  Botten  v.  City  and  Suburban  Permanent  Building  Society  (1895),  2  Ch. 
441;  Allen  v.  Gold  Reefs  of  West  Africa,  Limited,  (1900)  1  Ch  656  at  671  per  Lindley  MR;  Peter's 
American  Delicacy  Co  Ltd  v.  Heath,  (1939),  61  CLR  457  (High  Court  of  Australia). 
131  Maclntosh  Jeffrey  G,  "Minority  Shareholder  Rights  in  Canada  and  England:  1860-1987", 
(1989),  Osgoode  Hall  Law  Journal,  vol.  27,  No.  3,  Toronto,  Osgoode  Hall  Law  School,  at  p  604; 
Pennington  (above,  note  87)  at  p  795;  Sealy  Len,  ""Shareholders"  Remedies  in  the  Common  Law 
World",  (1997),  Company,  Financial  and  Insolvency  Law  Review,  173,  Oxford,  Mansfield  Press  at  p 
181. 
132  Farrar  (above,  note  7)  at  p  447. 
89 not  very  certain  under  the  current  company  law. 
133 
The  common  law  has  developed  an 
irregularity  rule  which  authorises  ratification  of  any  breach  of  trivial  terms  in 
constitution. 
134 
It  was  first  developed  by  Melish  L.  J.  in  Mac  Dougall  v.  Gardiner 
135 
and 
was  subsequently  followed  by  Lord  Davey  in  Burland  v.  Earle. 
136 
What  constitutes  a 
trivial  breach  cannot  be  answered  in  definite.  There  is  not  a  statutory  guideline  to 
separate  trivial  and  non-trivial  matters.  137  The  courts  tend  to  interpreat  triviality  in  the 
sense  of  any  unconstitutional  act  which  does  not  violate  shareholders'  membership 
rights"',  rights  that  offer  property  to  individual  shareholders.  "'  They  say  where  there 
is  not  a  clear  violation  to  such  rights,  any  breach  of  constitutional  rights  will  not  be 
personally  recoverable. 
140 
This  probably  was  the  main  reason  why  Russell  L.  J.  in 
133  Company  Law  Reform,  ""Modern  Company  Law  for  a  Competitive  Economy:  Completing 
the  Structure,  ",  (London,  DTI,  2000),  paras  5.64  and  5.73. 
134  Griffin  Stephen,  "Company  law:  Fundamental  Principles",  (1996),  2nd  ed.,  London,  Pitman, 
at  p  300;  Drury  (above,  note  126)  at  pp  224,237-244;  The  irregularity  rule  has  also  recently  been 
confirmed  by  the  Company  Law  Reform  Committee.  [Modem  Company  Law  for  a  Competitive 
Economy:  Final  Report,  (London,  DTI,  2001),  URN/942  &  URN/943,  para  7.34]. 
135  Mac  Dougall  v.  Gardiner  (1875),  1  Ch.  D.  13  per  Melish  L.  J. 
136  Burland  v.  Earle  (1902),  AC  83,  PC,  p  93-94  per  Lord  Davey. 
137  Sealy  L.  S.,  "'Problems  of  Standing,  Pleading  and  Proof  in  Corporate  Litigation",  in  Company 
Law  in  Change,  Editted  by  Ben  Pettet,  (1987),  London,  Stevens,  at  p  8;  Sealy  L.  S.,  "'Company  Law 
and  Commercial  Reality"',  (1984),  London,  Sweet  &  Maxwell,  at  p5  and  Sealy  Len  (1997)  (above, 
note  131)  at  p  181. 
138  See  instances  in  case  law  like:  the  right  of  a  member  to  have  his  vote  recorded  [Pender  v. 
Lushington  (1877),  6  Ch.  D.  701;  to  have  a  dividend  paid  in  cash  if  the  articles  so  specify  [Wood 
v.  Odessa  Waterworks  Co  (1889)  42  Ch  D  636];  to  enforce  a  declared  dividend  as  a  legal  debt 
[Mosely  v.  Koffyfontein  Mines  Ltd  (1904)  2  Ch  108,  CAJ;  to  have  the  articles  observed  if  they 
specify  a  particular  procedure  to  be  followed  in  particular  instance  [Edwards  v.  Halliwell  (1950) 
2  All  ER  10641;  See  also  Pennington  (2001),  (above,  note  87)  at  p  794;  Thorne  (above,  note  7)  at  p 
188. 
139  Pender  v.  Lushington  (1877),  6  Ch.  D.  70  jessel  MR. 
140  For  example,  a  member  does  not  have  a  right  to  have  a  poll  taken  [Mac  Dougall  v.  Gardiner 
(1875),  1  Ch.  D.  131;  nor  to  have  accounts  prepared  in  accordance  with  the  requirements  of 
Companies  Act  [Devlin  v.  Slough  Estates  Ltd  (1983)  BCLC  497];  nor  to  have  directors  retire  in 
accordance  with  the  articles  [Mozley  v.  Alston  (1847)  1  Ph  790];  See  also  Pennington  (2001), 
(above,  note  87)  at  p  794;  Thome  (above,  note  7)  at  p  188. 
90 Bamford  v.  Bamford  left  an  improperly  motivated  issue  of  shares  by  directors  for  the 
majority  to  decide. 
141 
Yet,  there  are  cases  in  common  law  which  can  hardly  be  reconciled  with  the  prevailing 
understanding  of  the  triviality  measure.  For  instance,  in  Edwards  v.  Halliwell  the 
primary  purpose  of  the  petitioners  (two  shareholders)  was  to  invalidate  an  ordinary 
resolution  that  was  taken  in  substitute  of  a  special  resolution,  something  which  seemed 
more  to  be  a  matter  of  procedure  rather  than  property  rights,  and  Jenkins  L.  J. 
dellivered  his  judgement  in  favour  of  the  petitioners  arguing  that  'it  seems  to  me  the 
rule  in  Foss  v.  Harbottle  has  no  application  at  all  for  the  individual  members  who  are 
suing,  not  in  the  right  of  the  union  but  in  their  own  right  to  protect  from  invasion  their 
,,  142 
own  individual  rights  as  members...  In  other  cases  where  a  denial  of  a  particular 
constitutional  procedure  could  entail  intervention  in  the  exercise  of  members'  voting 
right,  which  is  considered  as  a  clear  example  of  property  right,  the  courts  rejected  to 
view  such  denial  as  touching  any  element  of  property.  "'  In  sum,  the  measure  of 
irregularity  is  not  very  clear.  "'  While  some  constitutional  procedures  were  seen  as 
non-trivial  145 
,  some  others  were  considered  as  being  simply  trivial  matters  that  fall 
within  the  arnbit  of  the  majority  rule. 
146 
141  Bamford  v.  Bamford  (1970),  Ch  212,  (1969),  1  All  ER  969;  See  also  Hogg  v.  Gramphorn  Ltd. 
(1967),  1  Ch  254. 
142  Edwards  v.  Halliwell  (1950)  2  All  ER  1064. 
143  See  Mac  Dougall  v.  Gardiner  (1875),  1  Ch.  D-13. 
144  Sealy  Len  (1997)  (above,  note  131)  at  p  181;  Davies  (above,  note  10)  at  pp  449-45. 
145  Pender  v.  Lushington  (1877),  6  Ch  D  70;  James  v.  Buena  Ventura  Nitrate  Grounds  Syndicate 
Ltd.  (1896),  1  Ch.  456;  Edwards  v.  Halliwell  (1950),  2  All  ER  1064  per  Jenkins  L.  J.;  Cotter  v. 
National  Union  of  Seamen  (1929),  2  Ch  58. 
146  Mac  Dougall  v.  Gardiner  (1875),  1  Ch-D.  13;  Australian  Coal  &  Shale  Employees'  Federation 
v.  Smith  (1938)  38  SR  (N.  S.  W.  );  See  also  Griffin  (above,  note  134)  at  p  300. 
91 There  has  been  proposal  from  academics  of  English  company  law  who  by  implication 
speak  of  elimination  of  the  irregularity  rule.  They  say  it  ought  to  be  the  rule  that  every 
unconstitutional  act  could  give  personal  right  of  action  to  shareholders. 
14' 
An 
unconstitutional  act,  according  to  them,  is  not  simply  a  corporate  wrong  but  rather  is  a 
violation  to  individual  shareholders"  personal  right  because  it  is  a  breach  of  terms  of 
the  consttution  which  is  the  source  of  his  membership  contract  with  company  and 
other  shareholders.  148  Some  company  law  scholars,  too,  have  attempted  to  circumvent 
the  irregularity  rule.  The  latter  took  the  view  that  where  a  case  involves 
unconstitutional  acts,  shareholders  can  pursue  not  the  company  but  its  directors  for  a 
breach  of  contractual  duty.  According  to  this  theory,  a  contract  with  its  terms  found  in 
the  corporate  constitution  exists  between  members  and  directors.  By  accepting  his  post, 
a  director  assumes  an  express  duty  to  the  company  and  an  implied  duty  in  favour  of 
individual  shareholders  to  comply  with  the  rules  of  the  constitution.  149Likewise,  when 
a  shareholder  consents  to  the  constitution,  he,  in  fact,  consents  to  controllers  to  act 
according  to  the  rules  of  the  constitution  and  further  when  he  votes  in  meetings  to 
appoint  a  director,  his  vote  is  impliedly  subject  to  a  duty  of  the  prospective  director  in 
complying  with  constitutional  rules.  Therefore,  directors'  self-interested"'  as  well  as 
147  Wedderburn  (1957),  (above,  note  1)  at  p  206;  See  also  Sealy  (above,  note  8)  at  pp  483,493, 
498;  Rajak  Harry,  "Source  Book  of  Company  Law",  (1995),  Bristol,  Jordans,  at  pp  533-4;  Davies, 
P.  L.,  "'Gower's  Principles  of  Modern  Company  Law",  (1997)  6th  ed.,  London,  Sweet  &  Maxwell, 
at  pp  660-665,737. 
148  Sealy  (1987),  (above,  note  137)  at  p  8;  Sealy  (1984),  (above,  note  137)  at  p  5;  Pennington 
(above,  note  14),  at  pp  55-56;  Following  cases  in  common  law  may  support  this  view  too: 
Edwards  v.  Halliwell  (1950),  2  All  ER  1064  per  Jenkins  L.  J.;  James  v.  Buena  Ventura  Nitrate 
Grounds  Syndicate  Ltd.,  (1896),  1  Ch.  456;  Mac  Dougall  v.  Gardiner,  (1875),  1  Ch.  D.  13. 
149  Sterling  M.  J.,  "'The  Theory  and  Policy  of  Shareholder  Actions  in  Tort",  1987,  The  Modern 
Law  Review,  Vol.  50,468,  London,  England,  Stevens  &  Sons,  at  474. 
1,50  Re  a  Company  (1987),  BCLC  82  at  84;  see  also  Beck  Stanley  M.,  "The  Shareholders' 
Derivative  Action",  (1974),  52,  Canadian  Bar  Review,  159,  Toronto,  Carswell  for  the  Canadian  Bar 
Association,  at  pp  171-2. 
92 unconstitutional  transactions...  could  be  seen  as  violation  to  the  rights  of  both  the 
company  and  its  shareholders. 
These  proposals  are  advantageous  in  that  they  diminish  the  controversy  in  relation  to 
the  nature  and  scope  of  personal  rights  and  enable  minority  shareholders  to  insist  on 
compliance  by  controllers  with  their  personal  rights.  Nonetheless,  they  cause  difficulty 
in  that  they  can  widely  open  the  gate  for  shareholder  actions,  conferring  a  veto  power 
to  every  shareholder  against  the  rule  of  majority.  They  further,  allow  dual  actions  to 
proceed,  increase  the  level  of  overlap  between  personal  and  corporate  rights  and 
enable  every  unhappy  shareholder  to  initiate  opportunistic  and  disruptive 
litigations.  "' 
The  law  relating  to  the  personal  rights  has  recently  been  reviewed  by  the  Company 
Law  Reform  Committee  too.  The  Committee  confirmed  that  the  law  in  this  area  is 
uncertain  especially  because  it  fails  to  determine  what  rights  were  enjoyed  by  members 
personally  under  the  constitution.  It  proposed  that  the  current  uncertainty  could  be 
resolved  through  a  new  Act  that  states  all  constitutional  obligations  are  enforceable  by 
individual  members  unless  the  contrary  is  provided  in  the  constitution  or  the  alleged 
breach  concerns  "trivial  or  fruitless'  matters.  "'  Taking  into  consideration  the  "trivial  or 
fruitless'  exception  and  the  "no  reflective  loss  rule"  154 
,  it  also  regarded  as  immaterial 
151  Cotter  v.  National  Union  of  Seamen  (1929),  2  Ch  58;  Pender  v.  Lushington  (1877),  6  Ch.  D. 
70. 
152  Drury  (above,  note  126)  at  p  237;  Sterling  (above,  note  149)  at  pp  482-9. 
153  Company  Law  Reform,  "'Modem  Company  Law  for  a  Competitive  Economy:  Completing 
the  Structure",  (London,  DTI,  2000),  para  5.73. 
154  Johnson  v.  Gore  Wood  &  Co.  (2001),  1  All  ER  (HL),  481. 
93 concerns  about  increase  in  the  number  of  shareholder  opportunistic  actions  and  the 
possibility  of  double  recovery  which  can  result  from  this  proposal.  "' 
This  proposal,  however,  does  not  seem  to  be  capable  of  making  the  situation  in  respect 
of  members"  personal  rights  very  better,  as  it  mainly  reflects  the  current  state  of  the  law 
and  further  seems  to  be  rejected  by  the  British  government  because  it  is  not  included  in 
the  governments  newly  proposed  Companies  Bill. 
156 
As  in  English  company  law,  shareholder  rights  can  be  personal  or  corporate  in  Iranian 
company  law.  "'  Personal  rights  refer  to  the  rights  that  fall  into  personal  pocket  of 
every  shareholder.  They  may  derive  either  from  company  law  or  from  the  company 
contract.  To  enforce  such  rights,  a  shareholder,  needless  to  act  with  other  shareholders, 
is  able  to  take  personal  action  against  the  company.  Corporate  rights,  on  the  other 
hand,  refer  to  those  that  primarily  belong  to  the  company  itself  and  its  attribution  to 
shareholders  is  only  for  the  reason  that  shareholders  are  given  power  to  apply  either 
direct  or  indirect  control  on  the  exercise  of  them  and  for  the  fact  that  they 
(shareholders)  enjoy,  as  residual  right  holders,  the  consequences  of  such  exercise  either 
positively  (annual  profits  given  to  shares  and  increase  in  their  market  value)  or 
negatively  (loss  suffered  by  the  company  that  reduces  the  share  price  or  expected 
profits).  Since  these  belong  to  the  company,  the  company  itself  through  its  internal 
organs  make  relevant  decisions  and  exercise  them.  These  rights  might  relate  to  external 
affairs  of  the  company,  which  is  normally  conducted  by  the  board  of  directors. 
155  Company  Law  Reform,  "Modem  Company  Law  for  a  Competitive  Economy:  Final  Report", 
(London,  DTI,  2001),  URN/942  &  URN/943,  paras  7.34,7.51,  and  its  note  113. 
156  The  Companies  Bill,  (218-20  Jul  2006),  available  from  the  DTI  website  at  the  following 
address:  http:  //www.  publications-parliament.  uk/pa/pabills/200506/companies.  htm. 
94 Examples  of  such  rights  are  right  to  own  property,  right  to  conduct  its  own  business, 
right  to  enter  into  transactions,  right  to  ratify  voidable  transactions,  right  to  employ 
employees  and  right  to  take  legal  actions  to  the  courts  or  respond  to  actions  taken 
against  it.  They  may  also  relate  to  internal  affairs  of  the  company  for  exercising  of 
which  either  the  board  or  the  meetings  (depending  on  how  articles  and  company  law 
divide  powers  between  meetings  and  board  of  directors)  will  have  the  corresponding 
authority.  For  example,  it  is  within  the  authority  of  shareholders'  meetings  to  exercise 
the  right  of  the  company  to  make  resolutions,  to  change  its  articles,  to  empower 
directors  to  issue  new  shares,  preference  shares  and  debentures,  to  increase  or  decrease 
the  companys  capital,  to  appoint  or  dismiss  directors  and  to  relieve  faulty  directors 
from  personal  liability.  "'  Equally,  it  is  within  the  authority  of  the  board  of  directors  to 
exercise  a  company's  right  to  convene  meetings"',  to  reject  a  purported  transfer  of 
shares  in  private  companies"O,  and  to  ask  payment  in  respect  of  any  unpaid  amount  of 
shares  against  shareholders  in  the  manner  and  within  the  period  prescribed  by  the 
articles.  "'  When  a  right  is  identified  as  corporate,  a  shareholder  is  not  allowed  to 
enforce  it  on  his  own  initiative  and  he  is  subject  to  the  authority  of  the  relevant  internal 
organs  in  the  company.  It,  however,  does  not  mean  that  a  shareholder  is  disinterested 
in  respect  of  it.  He  is  personally  and  indirectly  interested,  but  this  personal  indirect 
interest  is  subject  to  the  interests  of  other  shareholders  that  are  reflected  through 
application  of  the  majority  rule  in  meetings  where  shareholders  are  required  to  act 
collectively  and  in  accord  with  the  company's  constitution  and  the  company  law.  "' 
157  Eskini  (above,  note  99)  at  p  78. 
158  See  sections  42,56,83,86,88,107/  108,116,157,161,164,185,188,189  JSCA. 
159  Sections  89,95  and  138  JSCA. 
160  Section  41  JSCA. 
161  See  sections  6,7(6),  8  (7),  9  (8  and  11),  13  (4  and  7),  33  JSCA. 
162  Section  86  JSCA. 
95 However  in  certain  exceptional  circumstances  company  law  permits  shareholders  to 
enforce  corporate  rights  on  behalf  and  for  the  benefit  of  the  company.  Two  examples  of 
such  statutory  permission  are:  first,  the  right  of  shareholders  to  call  shareholders" 
meeting  where  directors  and  inspectors  respectively  fail  to  convene  meetings"';  and 
second,  the  right  of  shareholders  to  take  corporate  action  to  the  courts  in  order  to  ask 
recovery  of  any  loss  suffered  by  the  company  due  to  commission  of  fault  on  the  part  of 
directors. 
164 
For  a  number  of  reasons,  personal  rights  in  the  Iranian  company  law  can  offer  more 
protection  to  minority  shareholders  compared  with  the  case  in  English  company  law. 
For  one,  certain  personal  rights  can  be  absolute  which  means  they  cannot  be  ignored 
by  a  majority  vote  of  shareholders.  This  is  explained  by  making  distinction  between 
personal  rights  that  are  absolute  and  personal  rights  that  are  relative.  Most  personal 
rights  are  relative  in  the  sense  that  they  are  changeable  within  the  framework  provided 
by  company  contract.  Yet,  they  are  enforceable  so  far  as  they  are  not  changed.  Except 
for  rights  that  are  linked  with  the  essence  of  the  company  contract  and  certain 
statutory  rights  that  are  mandatory"',  every  rights  deriving  from  shares  are  subject  to 
change  through  the  mechanism  of  majority  decision  and  company  law  prescribes  two 
different  procedures'  66  for  changing  rights  attached  to  ordinary  and  preference  shares. 
163  Section  95  JSCA- 
164  Section  276  JSCA- 
165  For  example,  right  to  have  information  (sections  139  and  220  JSCA),  right  to  have  the 
company's  nationality  unchanged  and  right  not  to  be  obliged  to  increase  one's  obligation 
without  his  consent  (section  94),  and  right  to  start  corporate  action  against  faulty  directors 
(sections  276  and  277  JSCA).  [See  generally  Ktoozian  Naser,  "'An  Introduction  to  The  Law", 
(1993),  Tehran,  University  of  Tehran  Publication,  at  No.  112;  Jafari  Langroodi  Mohamed  Jafar, 
"The  Force  of  Intent  in  Civil  Law",  (1975),  Doctoral  Thesis,  Tehran,  University  of  Tehran 
Publication,  No.  6481. 
166  Sections  42,83  and  93  JSCA- 
96 Personal  rights  can  be  absolute  when  they  are  linked  with  the  essence  of  the  company 
contract  which  means  they  are  to  be  observed  not  only  by  the  company  but  also  by  its 
members  and,  therefore,  it  is  not  even  possible  for  shareholders  to  contract  out  of  them. 
Iranian  law  provides  no  list  of  absolute  rights,  however,  it  offers  the  test  of  "link  with 
essential  requirements  of  the  contract"",  which  can  be  used  to  distinguish  absolute 
rights  from  those  of  relative.  According  to  this  test  when  personal  rights  are  direct 
consequence  or  principal  objective  of  creating  company  contracts  they  most  be  treated 
as  absolute. 
168  Clear  examples  are  membership  rightl 
69 
,  right  to  share  in  profits"'  and 
right  to  share  in  return  of  the  capital  when  the  company  is  dissolved.  "'  However,  there 
are  also  controversial  matters,  like  the  right  to  vote,  which  seem  difficult  to  be  covered 
by  the  mentioned  test.  Some  company  law  scholars  in  Iran  took  the  view  that  a 
statutory  listing  of  personal  rights  will  solve  the  controversy.  172  This  view  is  correct 
subject  to  its  plausibility,  as  in  practice  the  lawmakers  often  cannot  list  every  fact 
which  can  be  taken  as  being  under  the  realm  of  shareholder  rights.  In  the  absence  of  a 
statutory  list,  it  will  be  the  responsibility  of  the  courts  to  provide  clear  guidelines  in 
order  to  resolve  the  matter. 
For  another,  Iranian  company  law  offer  no  irregularity  rule  and  from  this  perspective 
there  has  not  been  made  any  distinction  between  trivial  and  non-trivial  irregularities. 
Articles  of  association  with  its  particular  features  constitutes  the  essential  contract 
167  Section  233  CA. 
168  Katoozian  Naser  "Civil  Code  in  its  Modern  Order",  (1999),  2nd  ed.,  Tehran,  Dadgostar 
Publication,  at  p  227. 
169  This  is  so  until  there  is  a  legal  cause  that  justifies  eviction  of  a  member  from  the  company. 
For  example,  in  circumstances  prescribed  in  sections  35  and  45  JSCA  a  shareholder  who  fails  to 
perform  his  duty  to  the  company  can  be  evicted.  [See  Eskini  (above,  note  99)  at  pp  81-821. 
170  Sections  90,239  and  240  JSCA. 
171  Sections  223  and  224  JSCA. 
97 between  the  company  and  its  shareholders  and  in  the  case  of  a  violation  by  the  former, 
the  latter  will  be  entitled  to  take  action  to  the  courts  in  order  to  restore  the  situation  or 
to  demand  damages  if  any.  Constitutional  rules  even  conferring  relative  rights  must  be 
respected  so  far  as  they  remain  unchanged. 
172  Eskini  (above,  note  99)  at  pp  78,206. 
98 Conclusion 
This  Chapter  examined  the  rule  of  majority  from  the  perspective  of  its  field  of 
application.  It  considered  two  factors;  i.  e.  legal  and  constitutional  rules.  The  former 
concerned  rules  which  derive  from  general  law  and  which  limit  companies  and  their 
majority  shareholders'  power  as  a  matter  of  public  order  and  regulation  rather  than 
being  a  matter  of  minority  protection.  It  was  made  clear  that  the  law  may  want  to 
regulate  corporate  activities,  as  such  activities  may  affect  not  only  corporate  members 
but  also  third  parties,  the  economy  and  the  society.  The  latter  concerned  rules  which 
derive  from  the  corporate  constitution,  and  which  regulate,  through  private 
contracting,  corporate  members'  relationship.  Some  constitutional  rules  divide 
corporate  power  between  shareholders  and  directors  thereby  extracting  certain  powers 
from  the  ambit  of  the  majority  rule,  vesting  them  in  directors.  This  can  benefit  the 
relationship  generally,  as  directors  are  often  equipped  with  the  required  skills  and 
knowledge  and  are  well  prepared  to  run  the  corporate  affairs  and  business,  in  contrast 
with  shareholders.  Also,  it  can  benefit  minority  shareholders  specially,  as  directors  are 
required  in  law  to  exercise  their  power  carefully,  disinterestedly,  independently  and 
impartially.  Some  constitutional  rules  which  accommodate  the  object  clause  into  the 
constitution  can  prohibit  corporations  and  their  controllers  from  engaging  in  ultra  vires 
activities.  This  can  benefit  minority  shareholders,  as  it  ensures  that  a  controlling 
majority  will  not  use  corporate  resources  for  activities  which  are  irrelevant  and 
unothorised.  Some  constitutional  rules  subject  a  majority  resolution  to  a  super  majority 
vote.  A  super  majority  vote  requirement  can  considerably  reduce  the  likelihood  of 
opportunistic  constitutional  amendments.  Lastly  constitutional  rules  confer  on  every 
99 corporate  member  personal  rights  which  can  be  enforced  against  the  rule  of  majority  in 
corporations. 
These  rules  are  important,  as  they  help  to  reduce  the  possibility  of  abuse  of  right  by 
controlling  shareholders.  They  do  so  by  drawing  the  framework  within  which  the  rule 
of  majority  works.  It  follows  that  a  majority  decision  could,  as  a  matter  of  principle, 
bind  minority  shareholders  only  if  it  is  taken  within  such  framework.  For  any  decision 
of  majority  shareholders  which  otherwise  is  taken,  a  minority  shareholder  will  have 
the  right  to  resist  against  it  and  to  take  action  to  the  courts.  Nonetheless,  a  major 
criticism  is  that  they  have  limited  capacity  to  curb  abuse  of  right  by  controllers.  They 
only  concern  cases  of  abuse  in  which  the  right  is  exercised  outside  its  field  whereas  an 
abuse  of  right  can  also  occur  where  it  is  exercised  within  its  field.  Take,  for  example, 
the  case  of  discriminatory  as  well  as  self-interested  resolutions  of  majority  shareholders 
on  issues  which  fall  both  constitutionally  and  in  law  within  the  power  of  majority 
shareholders.  Also  the  same  is  true  where  the  controlling  majority  excert  indirect 
control  (through  management)  over  company  affairs.  General  laws  and  constitutions 
rarely  address  such  abusive  behaviour.  Another  criticism  is  that  even  with  such  limited 
capacity  the  importance  of  such  rules  can  further  reduce  where  they  fail  to  provide  a 
clear  framework  for  the  majority  rule  and  where  they  authorise  out  of  field  exercise  of 
rights.  Take  for  example  the  case  of  personal  rights  particularly  where  they  derive  from 
the  constitution.  Such  rights  are  considered  relative  which  means  they  are  changeable 
by  an  appropriate  majority  vote.  Further  a  violation  to  some  of  them  is  considered  in 
the  light  of  the  irregularity  rule  ratifiable  by  a  majority  decision,  while  there  is  no  clear 
test  that  could  be  used  to  determine  precisely  violation  to  which  is,  or  violation  to 
which  is  not,  ratifiable.  Likewise,  the  object  clause  no  longer  constitutes  a  significant 
limitation  on  the  nile  of  majority.  Ultra  vires  transactions  following  the  Companies  Act 
100 1985  have  fallen  within  the  power  of  corporations  and  can  now  be  ratified  by  a  three- 
quarters  majority  vote.  A  ratification  of  an  ultra  vires  activity  can  further  cause  overlap 
between  corporate  and  personal  rights  because  such  issues  once  ratified  can  constitute 
a  violation  by  the  company  to  the  constitution  and  hereby  to  the  personal  rights  of  each 
shareholder. 
The  latter  criticism  seems  irrelevant  as  to  the  Iranian  company  law.  Under  the  current 
Iranian  laws,  all  constitutional  rules  are  considered  as  conferring  personal  rights  to 
shareholders  and  there  is  no  irregularity  rule.  Furthermore,  the  ultra  vires  doctrine  that 
imposes  a  major  limitation  on  the  power  of  controllers  still  persists  in  the  Iranian 
company  law. 
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Earlier  Chapters  considered  the  rule  of  majority  from  two  varying  aspects.  Chapter  one 
concerned  the  question  of  justification  and  sought  to  show  how  and  why  the  majority 
rule  is  justified.  Chapter  two  examined  two  factors  that  limit  the  rule  of  majority's  field 
of  application.  It  sought,  on  the  one  hand,  to  show  the  source  of  some  of  minority 
shareholders'  problems  with  the  majority  rule  and,  on  the  other  hand,  to  uncover  areas 
and  circumstances  within  which  an  abusive  exercise  of  right  by  majority  shareholders 
can  occur.  This  Chapter  examines  another  aspect  of  the  rule  of  majority;  i.  e.  the  one 
that  demonstrates  the  way  in  which  the  rule  of  majority  works.  This  aspect,  which  is 
linked  with  the  shareholder  voting,  explains  how  majority  shareholders  apply  control 
over  corporations.  The  right  to  vote  determines  whether  a  shareholder  is  in  the 
majority  camp  and  hence  holds  control  of  the  corporation  or  else  falls  in  the  minority 
group  who  is  subject  of  the  majority  control.  '  The  objective  is  to  show  how  the 
mechanism  of  majority  rule  can  generate  opportunity  for  majority  shareholders  to 
abuse  their  rights.  In  pursuit  of  such  objective,  I  raise  a  number  of  issues.  The  first  issue 
to  be  considered  is  that  of  different  share  structures  and  most  importantly  division 
between  ordinary  and  preference  shares.  '  Here,  the  gist  of  my  consideration  is  to 
explain  that  possessing  more  shares  does  not  necessarily  follow  control  of  companies 
and  hence  a  shareholder's  control  can  vary  depending  on  the  sort  of  shares  they 
I  Section  736  Companies  Act  (1985)  implies  that  if  one  or  few  shareholders  can  control  the 
composition  of  the  board  of  directors,  or  hold  more  than  half  in  nominal  value  of  the  equity 
share  capital  they  can  be  considered  as  having  majority  control.  See  also  sections  4,9,14,16, 
125,127  198,303,368,370,378  Companies  Act  1985. 
2  Buxbaum  Richard  M.,  "'The  Internal  Division  of  Powers  in  Corporate  Governance",  (1985), 
California  Law  Review,  No.  6,  vol.  73,  Berkeley,  Calif.,  University  of  California,  School  of 
102 possess.  Although  as  a  matter  of  principle  one"s  control  pursues  their  shareholdings, 
however,  this  is  only  a  default  principle  that  can  be  displaced  by  contracting.  '  The 
second  issue,  which  will  be  considered,  is  that  the  components  of  majority  and 
minority  may  also  vary  depending  on  different  issues  that  come  up  for  decision- 
making  in  shareholder  meetings.  While  a  shareholder  may  in  one  matter  be  in  the 
majority,  he  can  be  in  the  minority  group  when  voting  in  another  matter  and  this  can 
provide  some  protection  for  minority  shareholders.  The  third  issue  is  to  see  what  role 
shareholder  voting  can  play  in  corporations;  i.  e.  determining  whether  it  is  only  a 
device  used  for  filling  contractual  gaps  or  besides  it  facilitate  control  of  corporations  by 
shareholders  too.  The  fourth  issue  to  be  copnsidered  is  determing  whether 
shareholders  have  any  responsibility  once  voting  to  consider  interests  of  their  fellow 
minority  shareholders  and  finally  the  last  issue  is  whether  or  not  institutional 
shareholders  have  been  of  any  assistance  to  minority  shareholders. 
The  Chapter  intends  to  examine  the  mentioned  issues  in  the  light  of  English  and 
Iranian  company  laws  and  to  do  so,  thus,  it  divides  discussions  into  two  parts.  Much  of 
the  discussions  are  covered  in  the  English  part  as  they  relate  to  issues  which  are 
considered  indigenous  to  the  English  company  law.  In  relation  to  the  Iranian  part, 
because  the  law  as  a  consequence  of  adoption  resembles  the  English  law,  it  will  avoid 
discussing  issues  which  are  similar  and  covered  in  the  English  part.  A  brief  restatement 
of  similarities  and  a  relatively  longer  discussion  on  dissimilarities  that  exist  in  between 
the  two  systems  form  my  focal  endeavour  in  this  part. 
jurisprudence  at  p  1684;  Ferran  Eilis,  "Company  Law  and  Corporate  Finance",  (1999),  Oxford, 
Oxford  University  Press,  at  p  125. 
3  Section  370  (1,6)  Companies  Act  1985;  See  also  Ferran  (above,  note  2)  at  pp  125,320;  Birds  John 
Et.  Al.  (eds.  ),  "Boyle  &  Birds'Company  Law",  (1995),  3rd  ed.,  Jordans,  Bristol,  p  210. 
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111.1-1.  History  of  voting  rights 
The  history  of  evolution  of  voting  rights  in  companies  can  be  traced  back  to  the 
sixteenth  century  when  the  early  joint-stock  companies  in  England  were  granted  their 
corporate  charters.  4  Before,  companies  were  usually  small,  fan-dly-based  and  were 
considered  as  ordinary  partnership  which  worked  with  the  unanimity  rule.  '  They  were 
adequate  for  domestic  sectors  of  business  where  the  amount  of  capital  needed 
remained  small  and  environmental  changes  were  few.  As  companies  grew  in  size  and 
the  corporate  environment  and  industry  changed',  the  need  for  a  device,  and  use,  of  a 
new  business  vehicle  that  was  able  to  serve  globally  and  could  draw  its  needed  capital 
from  remarkably  wider  sources  became  urgent.  Joint  stock  companies  which  enjoyed 
separate  personality,  and  which  offered  limited  liability  and  worked  on  the  basis  of 
majority  rule  emerged  in  the  business  sector  to  address  the  needs  of  the  time  and  as  a 
result  the  existing  laws  had  to  change.  The  reform  in  laws  occurred  to  accommodate 
the  new  vehicle.  The  law  recognised  replacement  of  the  unlimited  liability  of  investors 
4  The  Russia  Company  was  perhaps  the  earliest  example  which  was  granted  its  charter  in  1555 
followed  by  foundation  of  the  English  East  India  Company  in  1600.  [See  Chaudhuri  K.  N.,  "The 
English  East  India  Company,  ",  (1965),  London,  Cass,  at  pp  3,261  See  also  Ratner  David  L.,  "The 
Government  of  Business  Corporations:  Critical  Reflections  on  the  Rule  of  One  Share,  One  Vote", 
Cornell  Law  Review,  (1970),  Number  1,  Vol.  56,  Cornell  University,  Cornell  Law  School,  at  p  1; 
Dunlavy  Colleen  A.  "'Corporate  Governance  in  Late  19th  Century  Europe  and  the  United  States, 
The  Case  of  Shareholder  Voting  Rights"  in  Comparative  Corporate  Governance-  The  State  of 
the  Art  and  emerging  Research  edited  by  Hopt  K.  J.,  Kanada  H,  Roe  M.  J.,  Wymeersch  E.  and 
Prigge  S.  (eds.  ),  (1998),  Oxford  University  Press,  at  pp  12-13. 
5  Dunlavy  lbid;  Carney  William  J.,  "'Fundamental  Corporate  Changes,  Minority  Shareholders, 
and  Business  Purposes",  (1980),  American  Bar  Foundation  Research  Journal,  Chicago,  American 
Bar  Foundation,  at  pp  69,77-97 
6  Mason  Edward  S.,  "'Introduction",  in  The  Corporation  in  Modem  Society,  Editted  by  Edward 
Sagendorph  Mason,  (1960),  Cambridge,  Mass,  at  p  1;  Minett  Steve,  "'Power,  Politics,  and 
Participation  in  the  Firm",  (1992),  Aldershot,  Avebury,  at  pp186-7;  Roe  Mark  J.,  "Strong 
104 with  a  new  limited  liability  principle  that  restricted  shareholder  liability  to  the  value  of 
their  shares!  Reform  in  the  corporate  decision-making  machinery  was  the  next  step 
which  was  taken  through  replacing  the  unanimity  rule  with  a  principle  of  the  so-called 
majority  rule  that  worked  on  the  basis  of  'one  share,  one  vote-.  '  These  replacements 
occurred  gradually  and  until  the  time  that  general  laws  allowed  public  to  incorporate 
companies  by  the  method  of  registration,  it  took  almost  three  centuries  for  them  to 
become  well  established.  ' 
As  to  the  majority  rule,  there  was  no  established  rule  with  respect  to  how  members 
will  vote  in  the  laws  relating  to  the  early  companies.  The  rules  applicable  to  voting 
were  differently  determined  by  the  source  that  had  granted  the  charters.  "  However, 
the  prevailing  practice  was  often  one  vote  for  every  shareholder  disregarding  the  size 
of  his/her  investment.  Shareholders  could  not  use  proxies  and  they  were  entitled  to 
one  vote  each  in  the  absence  of  explicit  arrangements  to  the  contrary  in  the  company"s 
charter  or  by-laws.  "  This  was  a  consequence  of  political  restrictions  which  were  often 
written  into  corporate  charters.  The  practice  aimed  at  safeguarding  individual 
Managers,  Weak  Owners:  The  Political  Roots  of  American  Corporate  Finance",  (1994),  Princeton 
University  Press,  at  pp  3-4. 
7  Limited  Liability  was  already  known  among,  and  used  by,  businessmen  through  inserting 
clauses  in  the  charters  in  eighteenth  century.  This  business  custom  was  subsequently  confirmed 
in  the  1911,  century  by  the  first  regulatory  Limited  Liability  Act  1855.  [See  Freedeman  Charles  E., 
"Joint-Stock  Enterprise  in  France:  From  Privileged  Company  to  Modem  Corporation",  (1979), 
Chapel  Hill,  University  of  North  Carolina  Press,  at  p5;  Posner  Richard  A.,  "'Economic  Analysis 
of  Law"',  (1992),  Boston,  London,  Little,  Brown,  at  p  392;  Farrar  John  H.,  "'Company  Law", 
(1985),  London,  Butterworths,  at  p  6;  Cheffins  Brian  R.,  "Minority  Shareholders  and  Corporate 
Governance,  ",  The  Company  Lawyer,  (2000),  Vol.  21,  No  2,  London,  Oyez  Publishing  Limited,  at 
p  4]. 
8  Hager  Mark  M.,  "Bodies  Politic:  The  Progressive  History  of  Organizational  'Real  Entity' 
Theory",  University  of  Pittsburgh  Law  Review,  (1989),  Vol.  50,  Pittsburgh,  at  pp  633-4. 
9  Ratner  (above,  note  4)  at  pp  7-9. 
10  Ratner  (above,  note  4)  at  pp  3-5;  Ferran  (above,  note  2)  at  pp  249-250. 
11  Ratner  (above,  note  4)  at  pp  3-5;  Dunlavy  (above,  note  4)  at  pp  12-13. 
105 shareholders  as  members  of  corporation"  rather  than  as  owners  of  a  portion  of  the 
corporate  capital  and  was  well  supported  by  the  Anglo-American  law.  As  shareholder 
voting  evolved  in  England,  a  new  practice  emerged  in  the  eighteenth  century  of  giving 
the  larger  shareholders  additional  votes.  This  development  towards  the  rule  of  "one 
share,  one  vote",  as  Dunlavy  explained,  was  put  to  use  in  the  late  18thcentury  in  the 
U.  S.,  Germany  and  France  too.  Since  then  the  general  direction  of  change  in  the 
nineteenth  century  in  all  the  four  countries  was  from  the  more  democratic  alternative 
in  the  political  sense,  towards  plutocratic  power  relations  in  which  each  share  carried  a 
vote.  "  This  practice  is  now  widely  accepted  and  normally  is  put  in  the  form  of  a 
default  rule  in  company  laws  of  most  countries. 
14 
111.1.2.  Share  structures  and  voting  rights 
It  is  said  that  the  division  of  share  caPital  into  different  classes  of  shares  first  occurred 
in  the  17th  century  England.  "  Even  with  such  background,  it  was  not  common  for 
companies  to  issue  different  classes.  Early  joint-stock  companies  usually  issued  only 
one  class  of  shares.  From  the  middle  19thcentury  onwards  and  in  the  light  of  general 
laws  regarding  incorporation  by  registration,  the  rise  of  small  investors  who  merely 
had  financial  motive  without  being  interested  in  control  increased  the  use  of  different 
class  of  shares.  However,  from  the  early  20th  century  there  has  been  a  counter-trend 
12  Ratner  (above,  note  4)  at  p  6. 
13  Dunlavy  (above,  note  4)  at  pp  12-21;  Ratner  (above,  note  4)  at  pp  44-46. 
14  Lowenstein  Louis,  "Shareholder  Voting  Rights:  A  Response  to  Sec.  Rule  19c-4  and  to 
Professor  Gilson",  (1989),  Columbia  Law  Review,  Vol.  89,  No.  5,  New  York,  Columbia 
University  Press,  at  p  982-3. 
15  Farrar  John  H.,  "Company  Law",  (1991),  London,  Butterworths,  at  p  221. 
106 towards  greater  simplicity  and  as  a  result  shares  tended  to  get  one  form  with  the  same 
liabilities  and  rights  attached.  16 
111.1.2.1.  Ordinary  shares  and  the  'one  share,  one  vote'  rule 
Although  companies,  as  a  matter  of  contract,  may  now  have  two  or  more  classes  of 
shares  17  with  different  rights  attached,  18  they  usually  issue  only  one  class  of  shares  with 
the  same  value,  rights  or  limitations  regarding  voting  right.  This  type  of  share  is  called 
ordinary  19  and  a  holder  of  it  has  principally  one  vote  for  each  share.  'O  As  ordinary 
shares  are  treated  equally,  they  can  encourage  corporate  financing.  In  the  abcense  of  it, 
investors  may  choose  not  to  take  their  capital  to  companies  where  there  is  too  much 
potential  for  risks.  The  equal  rights  attached  to  ordinary  shares,  however,  is  just  a 
default  rule  meaning  that  they  are  principally  given  equal  rights  and  limitations  except 
particular  rights  are  given  to  or  limitations  are  imposed  on  some  of  them  in  the 
constitution,  or  through  terms  of  issue  at  the  time  of  their  issuance,  or  at  any  later  time 
by  a  subsequent  alteration.  "  This  default  rule  has  two  main  limitations,  that  of 
preference  shares  and  that  of  conditioned  shares.  Preference  shares  are  considered  as 
16  Farrar  lbid,  at  pp  221-222. 
th  17  See  Morse  Geoffrey  &  Others  (eds.  ),  "Charlesworth  &  Morse  Company  Law",,  (1999),  16 
ed.,  London,  Sweet  &  Maxwell,  at  pp  177-8. 
18  There  may  be  different  justifications  to  issue  different  classes  of  shares  such  as  to  retain 
control  of  the  company,  to  induce  outsider  investment  and  to  raise  the  capital.  [See  Pennington, 
Robert  R.,  "'Company  law",  (2001),  8th  ed.,  London,  Butterworths,  p  239]. 
19  One  unique  feature  of  the  ordinary  shares  is  that  they  offer  no  fixed  return  to  their  holders. 
[See  Ferran  (above,  note  2)  at  p  3201. 
20  Section  370(6)  Companies  Act  1985  and  Art  54  Table  A;  See  also  MacNeil  lain,  ""An 
Introduction  to  The  Law  on  Financial  Investment",  (2005),  Hart  Publishing  Co.,  Oxford,  at  p 
259;  Ferran  (above,  note  2)  at  p  320;  Birds  Et.  Al.  (above,  note  2)  at  p  210;  Leader  Sheldon  &  Dine 
Janet,  "United  Kingdom",  in  The  Legal  Basis  of  Corporate  Governance  in  Publicly  Held  Corporations, 
Kluwer  Law  International,  (1998),  219  at  p  233. 
21  Ferran  (above,  note  2)  at  pp  139,330;  Birds  Et.  Al.  (above,  note  2)  at  p  210. 
107 exception  to  the  default  rule  of  equality  of  shares.  22  Unlike  ordinary  shares,  this  type  of 
shares  is  usually  given  fixed  financial  returns.  "A  holder  of  such  shares  does  not  have 
to  be  very  watchful  of  company  operation.  24  However,  in  exchange  for  having  such 
financial  privilege,  preferred  shareholders  have  no  right  to  vote  25  except  in  certain 
circumstances.  26  If  a  company  seeks  to  issue  preference  shares,  its  power  to  issue  must 
be  expressed  in  its  articles  of  association  otherwise  any  existing  shareholder  has  right 
to  prevent  the  company  by  taking  action  to  the  courts.  "  Conditioned  shares,  on  the 
other  hand,  are  in  fact  ordinary  shares  with  certain  previliges  or  limitations.  "  They  are 
issued  mostly  in  the  form  of  weighted  or  enhanced",  restricted"  and  non-voting 
shares.  "  The  first;  namely,  shares  with  enhanced  voting  rights";  may  be  issued  to 
attract  investment  or  to  induce  persons  with  good  business  ideas  to  enter  into 
companies.  It  is  also  used  to  preserve  control  of  the  company  in  the  hands  of  a  few 
persons  who  may  not  have  sufficient  investment  in  order  to  obtain  or  keep  control  of 
22  Andrews  v.  Gas  Meter  Co.  (1897),  1  Ch.  361,  CA;  Campbell  v.  Rofe  (1933),  AC  98;  British  and 
American  Trustee  and  Finance  Corporation  v.  Couper  (1894)  AC  399,  HL,  416  per  lord 
Macanghten;  See  also  Ferran  (above,  note  2)  at  pp  319-320. 
23  Ferran  (above,  note  2)  at  p  320;  Farrar  (above,  note  15)  at  pp  225-6;  Morse  &  Others  (above, 
note  17)  at  p  178. 
24  Preference  shares  have  this  feature  as  well  as  certain  other  features  in  common  with 
debentures.  They  both  normally  carry  a  fixed  rate  of  financial  returns  and  prioretise  their 
holders  over  ordinary  shareholders.  Also  they  both  offer  restricted  voting  rights  though 
debentures  normally  lack  voting  rights.  [See  Farrar  (above,  note  15)  at  p  226;  Birds  Et.  Al. 
(above,  note  2)  at  p  219]. 
25  Buxbaum  (above,  note  3)  at  p  1684. 
26  For  example,  when  decision  is  made  regarding  rights  attached  to  preference  shares  and 
when  financial  return  in  respect  of  such  shares  is  overdue  and  outstanding,  holders  of  such 
shares  will  have  voting  right.  [See  Ferran  (above,  note  2)  at  p  245,330;  Birds  Et.  Al.  (above,  note 
3)  at  p  214;  Morse  Et.  Al.  (above,  note  17)  at  p  178]. 
27  Section  35(2,3)  Companies  Act  1985  and  section  108  Companies  Act  1989.  [See  also  North 
West  Transportation  Co  Ltd.  v.  Beatty,  (1887),  12  App  CAS  589;  generally  see  Morse  &  Others 
(above,  note  17)  at  p  178. 
28  Birds  Et.  Al.  (above,  note  3)  at  p  210;  Buxbaum  (above,  note  2)  at  p  1693-4;  Leader  &  Dine 
(above,  note  20)  at  p  232. 
29  Art  (2),  Table  A,  Companies  Act  1985. 
30  Ibid. 
31  Section  454  Companies  Act  1985. 
32  Art  2  and  54  Table  A,  Companies  Act  1985. 
108 the  company.  "  It  is,  however,  not  very  popular  among  companies,  as  it  often  serve  to 
displace  the  normal  majority  rule  which  is  based  on  the  'one  share,  one  vote'  principle. 
The  second;  i.  e.  shares  with  restricted  voting  rights;  is  normaRy  intended  to  confine 
the  role  of  large  investors  in  companies.  Using  this  method,  companies  issue  shares 
with  voting  rights  of  either  certain  shares,  or  even  all  shares,  being  restricted  to  a 
maximum  level.  "  The  method  is,  however,  uncommon  among  companies.  There  are 
instances  in  case  law  that  show  corporate  investors  tend  to  resist  against  such 
restrictions,  by  making  formal  share  transfers  to  their  nominees  and  dummies.  "  It  can 
also  discourage  investment  in  companies  because  potential  investors  may  simply 
decide  not  to  invest  in  a  company  that  gives  inadequate  weight  to  the  investment.  36 
The  third;  namely,  non-voting  shares;  is  uncommon  too  for  the  same  reason.  "  It 
usually  offers  interest  a  few  percentages  above  the  market  rate  aiming  to  attract 
outsider  investors  who  may  be  interested  more  in  financial  aspect  of  investment  than 
in  control.  "  It  affects  application  of  the  majority  rule  and  is  often  considered  as  a 
negative  factor  especially  for  public  companies  that  seek  to  find  a  good  position  in  the 
stock  exchange  markets.  Although  the  London  Stock  Exchange  allows  listing  of  non- 
voting  shares,  it  never  recommends  such  shares  and  requires  that  they  must  be  clearly 
33  Bushell  v.  Faith  (1970),  1  All  ER  53,  per  Thomas  J. 
34  Articles  of  association  may  confine  voting  rights  of  shares,  for  example,  to  one  vote  per  10 
shares  and  according  to  Table  (A)  Art  (2)  Companies  Act  1985  companies  may  by  ordinary 
resolution  issue  restricted  or  enhanced  voting  shares. 
35  Moffat  v.  Farquhar  [(1878),  7  Ch.  D  591,  per  Malins  V  C;  Pender  v.  Lushington,  (1877),  6  Ch  D 
70. 
36  Ferran  (above,  note  2)  at  p  246;  Lee  Hazen  Thomas,  "Silencing  the  Shareholders'  Voice", 
North  Carolina  Law  Review,  (2002),  Vol.  80,  Chapel  Hill,  North  Carolina  Law  Review  Association, 
at  p  1917;  Lowenstein  (above,  note  14)  at  p  982. 
37  Buxbaum  (above,  note  3)  at  p  1716. 
38  Pennington  (above,  note  18)  at  p  239;  Morse  &  Others  (above,  note  17)  at  p  184. 
109 designated  as  voteless  share.  '9  Non-voting  shares  also  limit  the  exercise  of 
shareholders'  participatory  rights  in  companies",  an  outcome  which  is  not  only 
dangerous  in  the  relationship  between  company  members  and  controllers  but  also  is 
detrimental  to  the  company  sector  and  the  economy  at  large.  Voting  right  is 
importantly  designed  for  ensuring  that  controllers  are  not  abusing  their  powers  and  it 
is  important,  too,  for  the  society  that  controllers  are  answerable  not  simply  to 
thernselves.  Shareholders  with  full  voting  power  can  help  the  industry  to  work 
41 
efficiently  while  non-  voting  shares  act  quite  the  opposite.  Some  company  law 
41 
scholars  have  recently  sought  for  their  legal  eradication. 
111.1.2.2.  Challenge  to  the  "one  share,  one  vote'  rule 
Political  thinkers  have  recently  chalanged  the  'one  share,  one  vote"  rule  for  its 
capability  to  encourage  inequality  among  corporate  members  and  for  its  propensity  to 
subject  implementation  of  any  influence  in  companies  to  the  size  of  members" 
financing.  43  Seen  from  political  viewpoint,  the  "one  share,  one  vote'  rule,  unlike  its 
44 
egalitarian  face,  is  liable  to  encourage  inequality  among  corporate  memebers.  The 
view  seeks  for  replacing  the  'one  share,  one  vote'  rule,  which  allegedly  is  the  source  of 
39  Listing  Rules,  Chapter  13,  Appendix  1,  para.  2;  See  also  Ferran  (above,  note  2)  at  p  246;  Farrar 
(above,  note  15)  at  p  225;  Birds  Et.  Al.  (above,  note  3)  at  p  213;  Morse  &  Others  (above,  note  17) 
at  p  1841. 
40  Buxbaum  (above,  note  3)  at  p  1684;  Lee  Hazen  (above,  note  36)  at  p  1919-23. 
41  Lowenstein  (above,  note  14)  at  pp  1004-8. 
42  Leader  &  Dine  (above,  note  20)  at  p  233. 
43  Ratner  (above,  note  4)  at  pp  33-38. 
44  Dahl  Robert  A.,  "A  Preface  to  Economic  Democracy",  (1985),  Berkeley,  University  of 
California,  at  pp  75-82;  Walzer  Michael,  "Spheres  of  justice:  a  Defence  of  Pluralism  and 
Equality",  (1983),  Oxford,  Robertson,  at  pp  293-4;  Gewirth  Alan,  "Community  of  Rights", 
(1996),  Chicago,  London,  University  of  Chicago  Press,  at  pp  262,266,285;  Ratner  (above,  note  4) 
at  pp  45-46. 
110 inequality,  with  the  original  democratic  rule  of  "one  man,  one  vote/.  45  This  will  not 
sustain,  it  argues,  any  harm  to  substantial  investors  since  they  will  still  receive  more 
profit  for  their  larger  investment.  46  The  "one  share,  one  vote'  rule,  it  further  argues,  can 
cause  fractions  in  companies  which  could  mean  disintegration  of  shareholders  and 
formation  of  groups  with  varying  interests,  something  which  is  not  efficient.  In  the 
absence  of  it,  companies  can  work  much  better  to  achieve  their  goals.  " 
The  economists  and  contractarians'  response  to  the  challenge  is  two  fold.  One  takes 
consideration  of  the  purpose  that  caused  evolution  of  voting  in  companies  and 
suggests  that  the  political  viewpoint  falls  largely  in  contradiction  with  historical  facts. 
Lowenstein,  for  example,  upholds  the  "one  share,  one  vote'  rule  arguing  that  'not  only 
did  it  survive  for  three  generations,  but  almost  no  one  tried  to  fiddle  with 
itt.  48 
The 
other  takes  the  efficiency  argument  and  maintains  that  any  departure  from  the  "one 
share,  one  vote'  rule  will  result  in  discrimination  between  shareholders  based  on  the 
size  of  their  investment  which  is  further  to  discourage  the  flow  of  the  public  financing 
in  companies  and  this  is  not  efficient. 
49 
45  Dahl  Ibid  at  pp  75-82;  Walzer  Ibid  at  pp  293-4;  Gewirth  Ibid  at  pp  262,266,285;  Ratner 
(above,  note  4)  at  pp  45-46. 
46  Dahl  (above,  note  44)  at  pp  75-82;  Walzer  (above,  note  44)  at  pp  293-4;  Gewirth  (above,  note 
44)  at  pp  262,266,285. 
47  See  Ratner  (above,  note  4)  at  pp  35-38. 
48  Lowenstein  (above,  note  14)  at  pp  983-4;  see  also  Jensen  C.  Michel  and  Meckling  William  H. 
"Corporate  Governance  and  Economic  Democracy:  An  Attack  on  Freedom",  in  Proceedings  of 
Corporate  Governance:  A  Difinitive  Exploration  of  Issues  Edited  by  C.  J.  Huizenga,  UCLA 
Extension,  (1983),  at  pp  1-6  available  at  Social  Science  Research  Network  (SSRN),  Electronic 
Library  at:  http:  //papers.  ssrn-com/ABSTRACT  ID=  321521. 
49  See  Posner  (above,  note  7)  at  pp  3,392;  Cheffins  Brian  R,  "'Company  Law:  Theory  Structure 
And  Operation",  (1997),  Oxford,  Clarendon  Press,  at  pp  7,41;  Schwarts  Alan  and  Scott  Robert 
E.,  "Contract  Theory  and  The  Limits  of  Contract  Law",  Yale  Law  journal,  (2003),  vol.  113,  New 
Haven,  Conn.,  Yale  Law  journal  Co.,  Yale  University,  School  of  Law,  at  pp  3-6;  Farrar  (above, 
note  15)  at  pp  6-7. 
III No  doubt  the  'one  share,  one  vote'  is  not  a  perfect  rule.  Most  people  would  accept  that 
the  rule  is  capable  in  the  strict  political  sense  of  encouraging  inequality  among 
corporate  members.  However,  they  would  also  accept  that  this  is  simply  an  inevitable 
incident  of  the  "one  share,  one  vote'  rule  which  primarily  evolved  in  companies  to 
enable  them  act  effectively  and  efficiently.  'o  Further,  it  is  not  equality  among  members 
based  on  their  personality,  but  rather  equality  among  members  based  on  the  size  of 
their  investment  that  matters  very  much  in  companies.  The  solution  to  remedy  its 
imperfection  cannot,  therefore,  be  to  replace  it  with  rules  that  give  vote  to  all 
shareholders  equally  or  permit  application  of  graduate  voting  mechanism.  "  Instead,  a 
device  should  be  designed  to  prevent  controlling  members  from  abuse. 
111.1.3.  Variable  nature  of  majority  and  minority 
Of  the  implications  of  the  exercise  of  voting  right  in  meetings  is  that  the  nature  of 
majority  and  minority  may  vary  depending  on  different  issues  which  come  up  for 
decision-making  in  shareholder  meeting.  A  shareholder  may  in  one  case  be  in  the 
majority  camp  meanwhile  he  may  fall  within  the  minority  camp  when  voting  in 
another  case.  If  votes  were  always  given  honestly  in  the  best  interest  of  the  company 
and  companies  had  only  large  size,  the  variable  nature  could  have  ensured  rights  and 
interests  of  every  shareholder  in  companies.  However,  current  company  law  allows 
shareholders  to  pursue  their  personal  interests  and  permits  companies  to  be 
incorporated  with  different  size.  These  bring  about  consequences.  When  companies  are 
small,  nature  of  majority  and  minority  groups  almost  always  remain  the  same.  Using 
50  See  Ratner  (above,  note  4)  at  p  23. 
112 his  voting  power,  a  majority  shareholder  can  control  the  company  no  matter  what 
issue  is  going  to  be  decided  by  shareholders  in  general  meetings.  In  such  context,  a 
dissenting  minority  may  have  no  choice  except  to  continue  in  a  long-term  relationship 
with  the  controlling  shareholders  without  hoping  that  his  position  may  change 
through  the  normal  democratic  way  of  voice.  Likely  limitations  on  share  transfers  that 
prevent  minority  shareholders  from  selling  their  shares  plus  outsiders'  reluctance  to 
buy  such  shares  can  make  the  way  of  exit  too  costly  and  prejudicial. 
The  issue  in  large  companies  differs  very  much.  Large  companies  often  raise  their 
needed  capital  from  small  investment  of  a  remarkably  large  number  of  investors  who 
may  have  invested,  in  sum,  a  quite  large  amount  of  money  in  different  companies.  But 
in  a  given  company,  the  amount  of  their  investment  is  often  very  little.  Hence,  such 
companies  often  lack  a  permanent  and  stable  majority  who  provide  substantial  part  of 
the  company's  financial  resource  and  who  can  control  the  company.  Instead,  the  nature 
of  majority  and  minority  will  change  depending  on  the  varying  issues  coming  up  for 
collective  decision-making  in  shareholders'  meetings.  Although  this  variable  nature 
may  reduce  the  possibility  of  majority  abuse  to  some  extent,  it  never  eliminates  it. 
Dispersion  of  the  shareholdings  in  large  companies  sometimes  only  reduces  the 
number  of  votes  required  of  shareholders  in  order  to  seize  corporate  control.  Given  the 
collective  action  problem  and  the  apathetic  attitude  of  widely  dispersed  shareholders", 
a  shareholder  who  possesses,  let's  say,  fifteen  percent  shareholding  in  a  large 
51  A  method  of  voting  mostly  exercised  in  18th  and  19th  centuries  in  which  every  share 
primarily  gave  one  vote,  but  there  was  a  maximum  limit  in  the  articles  of  association  that 
limited  number  of  votes  attached  to  shares  [See  Dunlavy  (above,  note  4)  at  pp  20-301. 
52  Gower  L.  C.  B.,  Gower's  Principles  of  Modem  Company  Law",  4th  ed.,  London,  (1979), 
Stevens,  at  pp  553-4;  Posner  (above,  note  7)  at  pp  409-411. 
113 corporation  is  perhaps  able  to  exercise  effective  control  over  the  variable  issues.  53 
Furthermore,  institutional  shareholders  which  possess  substantial  investment  in  large 
companies  can  now  reorganise  dispersed  shareholdingS54  and  overcome  the  collective 
action  problem  which  further  means  the  nature  of  majority  and  minority  can  become 
stabilised  even  in  large  companies.  55  These  observations  raise  the  question  of  abuse  of 
power  not  only  in  private  but  also  in  public  companies  to  which  company  law  should 
offer  response. 
111.1.4.  The  role  of  voting  in  corporate  context 
Whether  or  not  the  shareholder  voting  plays  any  controlling  role  in  the  Anglo- 
American  model  corporations  has  been  a  matter  of  interesting  controversy  among 
company  law  scholars.  The  controversy  stems  from  the  fact  that  while  in  theory 
shareholders  as  owners  of  corporate  shares  can  control  such  corporations,  they  have 
been  in  practice  for  a  number  of  reasons  unable  to  do  so.  This  caused  development  of  a 
theory  that  denies  the  idea  of  shareholder  control  and  views  the  right  to  vote  as  being  a 
mechanism  merely  suitable  for  filling  contractual  gaps.  A  reduced  version  of  this 
53  Cubbin  John  and  Leech  Denis,  ""The  Effect  of  Shareholding  Dispersion  on  the  Degree  of 
Control  in  British  Companies:  Theory  and  Measurement",  The  Economic  journal,  (1983),  Vol. 
93,351-369,  London,  New  York,  Macmillan,  at  p  363. 
54  Black  Bernard  S.,  "Shareholder  Passivity  Re-Examined",  (Dec-1990),  Michigan  Law  Review, 
Vol.  89,520  Ann  Arbor,  Mich.,  University  of  Michigan,  Department  of  Law,  at  p  567. 
55  In  an  empirical  research  carried  out  in  1984,  it  became  evident  that  owing  to  the  increasing 
volume  of  the  contractual  savings  mainly  in  the  hands  of  insurance  companies  and  pension 
funds  since  1945,  there  has  been  a  sharp  increase  in  the  percentage  of  shares  held  by 
institutional  shareholders  and  a  sharp  decrease  in  the  level  of  individual  holdings  in  listed 
companies  in  the  United  Kingdom.  [See  Farrar  John  H.  and  Russell  Mark,  "The  Impact  of 
Institutional  Investment  on  Company  Law",  (1984),  The  Company  Lawyer,  No.  5,  London, 
Oyez  Publishing  Limited,  at  p  1071;  The  findings  of  this  research  was  also  confirmed  by  the 
Hampel  Committee's  investigation  for  the  review  of  company  law  which  found  institutions 
during  the  1980s  and  1990s  as  holding  approximately  80  percent  of  shares  in  the  listed  UK 
companies.  [Hampel  Committee,  "The  Combined  Code:  A  Practical  Guide",  (October  1999), 
114 theory  views  shareholder  voting  as  a  device  primarily  designed  to  allow  shareholder 
control,  but  it  also  adds  that  current  corporate  context  has  made  this  function 
impossible.  The  conventional  view,  on  the  other  hand,  regards  shareholder  control  as 
being  the  most  important  attribute  of  the  right  to  vote  and  seeks  to  defeat  through  a 
number  of  ways  shareholder  inactivism  which  currently  exists  in  English  large 
corporations.  Although  this  controversy  concerns  the  most  the 
shareholder  /management  relationship,  it  can  be  pertinent  as  to  the  majority/  minority 
conflict  too,  as  it  is  the  claim  of  the  first  theory  that  the  abcense  of  shareholder  control 
is  to  mean  elimination  of  majority  abuse  which  forms  a  great  protection  to  minority 
shareholders.  In  sum,  there  are  two  main  theories: 
111.1.4.1.  Contractarian  theory 
Contractarian.  theory  is  charactrised  by  its  focus  on  managerial  control.  A  leading 
example  is  the  theory  of  separation  of  ownership  and  control  which  was  developed  by 
the  two  American  professors,  Adolf  A.  Berle  and  Gardiner  C  Means,  in  the  early  20th 
century,  and  which  views  shareholders  as  beneficiaries  for  whom  managerial  powers 
are  held  in  trust.  56  The  origin  of  the  theory,  which  is  sometimes  named  as  the  'trust 
theory",  goes  back  into  the  middle  nineteenth  century  when  common  law  judges 
started  to  hear  minority  allegations  against  corporate  directors  using  the 
beneficiary/  trustee  relationship  argument.  57  In  this  analysis,  although  shareholder 
London,  UK];  see  also  Ferran  (above,  note  2)  at  p  241;  similar  trend  can  be  found  in  the  US  too. 
[Black  (above,  note  54)  at  p  570;  Ratner  (above,  note  4)  at  p  26]. 
56  Berle  Adolf  A.  and  Means  Gardiner  C.,  "The  Modem  Corporation  and  Private  Property", 
Revised  edition,  (1968),  New  York,  Macmillan,  at  p  245;  Berle  Adolf  A.,  "Corporate  Powers  as 
Powers  in  Trust",  (1931),  44,  Harvard  Law  Review,  1049  Cambridge,  Mass,  Harvard  Law 
Review  Association,  at  1073. 
57  Smith  D.  Gordon,  "The  Shareholder  Primacy  Norm",  (1998),  The  Journal  of  Corporation  Law, 
Iowa  City,  University  of  Iowa,  College  of  Law,  at  pp  303-306. 
115 voting  is  primarily  a  device  to  be  used  for  controlling  managerial  misbehaviours, 
however,  the  proxy  mechanism  and  the  collective  action  problem  make  it  useless  and 
impossible.  "  Shareholder  control  no  longer  functions  in  large  corporations.  Instead, 
professional  managers,  as  a  neutral  technocracy,  would  run  the  corporation  better  and 
would  make  important  corporate  decisions  benefiting  all  interested  groups  and  the 
society  not  merely  shareholders.  "  Two  factors  contributed  to  make  this  theory  very 
influential.  Firstly,  in  the  light  of  the  real  entity  theory,  companies  have  been 
recognised  as  having  separate  corporate  personality,  a  major  development  that  caused 
an  extensive  realization  that  possessing  shares  in  a  company  does  not  follow 
possession  of  the  company.  'O  Secondly,  industrialisation  of  the  economy"  plus  a  rapid 
rise  of  small  investors  who  were  more  interested  in  financial  return  than  contro162 
caused  a  gradual  separation  of  shareholder  ownership  right  from  control  and  a 
relocation  of  the  latter  in  hands  of  managers.  " 
In  this  category  sits  also  the  new  contractual  theory  64  which  was  developed  in  the  late 
20th  century  and  which  argues  that  shareholder  control  is  impossible  because  of  the 
collective  action  problem.  Shareholders  have  lost  their  controlling  power  not  only 
58  Berle  &  Means  (above,  note  56)  at  pp  71-82,129-131. 
59  Berle  &  Means  (above,  note  56)  at  pp  301,312-312. 
60  Hager  (above,  note  8)  at  pp  633-4;  See  also  Hill,  "Visions  and  Revisions  of  the  Shareholder", 
The  American  Journal  of  Comparative  Law,  (2000),  Vol.  48,  Berkeley,  Ca.,  American  Association  for 
the  Comparative  Study  of  Law,  at  p  44. 
61  Minett  (above,  note  6)  at  pp  186-187. 
62  Farrar  (above,  note  15)  at  pp  221-2. 
63  Berle  and  Means  (above,  note  56)  at  p  245. 
64  Also  known  as  Chicago  School,  Contractarians,  the  Law  and  Economic  Theory;  Neo-Classic 
Theory  and  Nexus  of  Contracts  Theory.  [See  generally  Mayson  Stephan,  French  Derek  and 
Ryan  Christopher,  "Mayson,  French  &  Ryan  on  Company  Law"',  (2001),  18til  ed.,  London, 
Blackstone,  at  pp  371. 
116 because  it  is  impossible  6'  but  also  because  it  is  unnecessary  and  perhaps  sometimes 
problematiC66  ,  as  shareholders  do  not  have  necessary  managerial  skills  to  control 
corporations  . 
6'  The  main  role  for  shareholder  voting  is  to  fill  gaps  in  company 
contracts  . 
6'  The  theory  differs  slightly  from  the  separation  of  ownership  and  control 
theory  in  that  the  latter  views  controlling  function  necessary  but  impossible. 
One  of  the  important  properties  of  the  contractarian  theories,  it  is  claimed,  is  the 
elimination  of  any  likelihood  of  majority  abuse  against  minority  shareholders.  Since 
shareholders  are  no  longer  able  to  control  companies  there  will  be  no  more  minority 
oppression.  69  In  the  abcense  of  shareholder  control,  professional  managers  who  can 
strike  a  fair  balance  between  majority/  minority  interests  will  control  corporations. 
Managerial  control  may  make  corporations  liable  to  mismanagement  but,  as  the  theory 
argues,  this  should  not  cause  much  concern  because  mismanagement  is incurred  by  all 
shareholders  equally  and  further  because  market  forces  can  effectively  control  it.  In  a 
market  economy,  market  forces  especially  through  market  for  securities,  managerial 
services  and  corporate  control,  prevent  management  from  abuse.  "  Moreover  the 
65  Easterbrook  Frank  H.  and  Fischel  Daniel  R.,  "Voting  in  Corporate  Law"",  The  Journal  of  Law 
and  Economics,  (1983),  Chicago,  University  of  Chicago  Law  School,  at  pp  401-2;  see  also  Posner 
(above,  note  7)  at  pp  409-411;  Farrar  (above,  note  15)  at  p  318. 
66  "Shareholders'  participation  in  control  of  the  company  may  expose  the  firm  to  an 
uncompensated  risk  of  making  inconsistent  or  illogical  decisions".  [Easterbrook  and  Fischel 
(above,  note  65)  at  pp  404-5,408-101;  See  also  Manne  Henry,  "'Some  Theoretical  Aspects  of  Share 
Voting  in  the  Economics  of  Legal  Relationships",  Columbia  Law  Review,  New  York,  Columbia 
University  Press,  (1964),  Vol.  64,1427. 
67  Manne  Ibid.;  See  also  Farrar  (above,  note  15)  at  pp  3-7;  Posner  (above,  note  7)  at  pp  14,409- 
411;  Easterbrook  and  Fischel  (above,  note  65)  at  p  401. 
68  Farrar  (above,  note  15)  at  p  318;  Easterbrook  &  Fischel  (above,  note  65)  at  pp  401-3;  Posner 
(above,  note  7)  at  pp  409-411. 
69  See  generally  Hill  (above,  note  60)  at  pp  57-8  and  also  Hill  Jenniffer,  "Public  Beginnings, 
Private  Ends-Should  Corporate  Law  Privilege  the  Interests  of  Shareholders?  ",  in  International 
Corporate  Law,  Edited  by  Fiona  Macmillan,  Vol.  1,  (2000)  Oxford,  Hart,  at  p  22. 
70  Schwarts  &  Scott  (above,  note  49)  at  pp  11-16;  Stedman  Graham  &  Jones  Janet, 
"Shareholders'  Agreement",  (1998),  3rd  Ed.,  London,  Sweet  &  Maxwell,  at  p  1;  Keenan  Denis  & 
117 plenitude  of  firms  makes  it  possible  for  investors  to  diversify  their  portfolios,  obtaining 
returns  at  lower  total  risk.  "  After  all,  the  way  of  exit  is  always  open  to  a  dissatisfied 
shareholder  who  can  rationally  choose  to  disinvest.  " 
The  contractarian  theories  can  be  criticised  on  two  grounds.  Firstly,  exiting  from  the 
company  either  through  a  share  sale  in  the  market  or  through  a  buy  out  order  granted 
by  the  courts  may  not  always  be  a  result  of  rational  reaction  of  shareholders  to 
managerial  abuse,  particularly  for  those  who  wish  to  stay  in  the  company  and  fight  to 
clear  corruptions  up.  "  Further,  these  theories,  which  much  rely  on  exit  rather  than 
voice,  can  encourage  short-termism  among  corporate  investors,  something  that  is  not 
efficient.  74  Secondly,  the  mismanagement  problem  which  is  pretended  to  be  trivial  in 
these  theories  can  cause  very  much  more  serious  problems.  Market  forces  can  act 
imperfectly  when  market  conditions  are  incompetitive.  Where  a  company  dominates  a 
market  which  is  difficult  to  enter  it  can  survive  even  performing  inefficient.  This 
follows  that  an  uncompetitive  market  will  not  quickly  convert  inefficiency  into 
insolvency  and  consequently  corporate  management  in  such  conditions  would  be  able 
Bisacre  Josephine,  -  Company  Law",  (1999),  1111,  ed.,  London,  Financial  Times/Pitman 
Publishing,  at  p  255;  Easterbrook  &  Fischel  (above,  note  65)  at  396-7,  Ferran  (above,  note  2)  at  p 
244. 
71  Easterbrook  &  Fischel  (above,  note  65)  at  p  401. 
72  Easterbrook  &  Fischel  (above,  note  65)  at  p  420;  Manne  H.  G.,  "Mergers  and  the  Market  for 
Corporate  Control",  (1965),  73,  The  Journal  of  Political  Economy,  110,  Chicago,  University  of 
Chicago  Press  and  Manne  H.  G.,  "'Our  Two  Corporation  Systems",  (1967),  53,  Virginia  Law 
Review,  259,  Charlottesville,  Va.,  Virginia  Law  Review  Association;  Gilson  Ronald  J.,  "'A 
Structural  Approach  to  Corporations:  The  Case  Against  Defensive  Tactics  in  Tender  Offers", 
(1980-1)  33  Stanford  Law  Review,  819,  Stanford,  Calif.,  Stanford  University,  School  of  Law;  Fischel 
Daniel  R,  "Efficient  Capital  Market  Theory,  the  Market  for  Corporate  Control  and  the 
Regulation  of  Cash  Tender  Offers",  (1978),  57,  Texas  Law  Review,  1,  Austin,  Texas  Law  Review 
Association  Quoted  in  Mitchell  Charles,  "Shareholders'  Claims  for  Reflective  Loss",  (2004),  The 
Law  Quarterly  Reviczv,  Vol.  120,457  London,  Stevens  and  Sons,  at  483-4. 
73  Deakin  Simon,  Ferran  Eilis  and  Nolan  Richard,  "Shareholders'  Rights  and  Remedies:  An 
Overview",  (1997),  Company,  Financial  and  Insolvency  Law  Review,  162,  Oxford,  Mansfield  Press, 
at  p  164. 
118 to  serve  for  their  own  interests.  75  Market  forces  also  provide  most  of  the  times  a  costly 
and  imperfect  way  to  discipline  wayward  managers.  The  reason  as  Black  explained  is 
that  they  often  work  through  the  takeover  mechanism  which  usually  involve  kicking 
out  old  managers  while  for  companies  with  competent  managers  who  just  need  closer 
oversight,  this  is  disproportionate  to  the  problem  and  adds  large  disruption  and 
transaction  CoStS. 
76  Further,  managerial  control  cannot  guarantee  the  use  of  corporate 
resources  only  for  meeting  the  shareholder  interest  objective  in  corporations  and  the 
company  law  has  often  limited  capacity  to  curb  managerial  misbehaviours.  " 
Mismanagement,  however,  is  largely  reduced  through  shareholder  control  which  is 
exerted  by  voting  in  corporate  meetings.  78 
111.1.4.2.  The  conventional  theory 
The  conventional  theory  which  is  the  common  approach  among  scholars  of  law  and 
political  theorists  suggests  that  significance  of  the  right  to  vote  encompasses  two 
functions  of  filling  contractual  gaps  as  well  as  control.  It  is  true  that  shareholders 
74  Ferran  (above,  note  2)  at  p  241. 
75  See  Parkinson  J.  E.,  "'Corporate  Power  and  Responsibility",  (1993),  Oxford,  Clarendon  Press; 
New  York,  Oxford  University  Press,  at  p  114;  See  also  Bebchuk  Lucian  Arye,  "The  Case  for 
Empowering  Shareholders",  (Last  revision:  Apr-2003),  pp  14-16,50,63,  recently  titled  as  "The 
Case  for  Increasing  Shareholder  Power",  (2005),  Harvard  Law  Review,  Vol.  118,  at  pp  833-917, 
Cambridge,  Mass.,  Harvard  Law  Review  Publishing  Association. 
76  See  Black  (above,  note  54)  at  p  522. 
77  Cheffins  Brian  R.,  "Corporate  Law  and  Ownership  Structure:  A  Darwinian  Link?  ", 
University  of  Cambridge,  (2002),  available  at  Social  Science  Research  Network  (SSRN), 
Electronic  Library  at  http:  //ssrn.  com/abstract=317661,  at  pp  27-37;  Bebchuk  (above,  note  75)  at 
p  63;  Roe  Mark  J.,  "'Corporate  Law's  Limits"',  Columbia  University,  (2002),  at  p  10  also  available 
at  Social  Science  Research  Network  Electronic  Library  http:  //papers.  ssrn.  com/abstract=260582; 
Roe  Mark  J.,  "The  Shareholder  Wealth  Maximisation.  Norm  and  Industrial  Organization", 
(2001),  Harvard  Law  School,  p  3,  Social  Science  Research  Network  (SSRN),  Electronic  Library  at 
www.  ssrn.  com  (Working  Paper  No  019  ID  282703);  Stout  Lynn  A.,  "'Bad  and  Not-So-Bad 
Arguments  for  Shareholder  Primacy"",  (2002),  Southern  California  Law  Review,  Vol.  75,1189,  also 
available  in  Social  Science  Research  Network  (SSRN),  Electronic  Library  at  www.  ssrn.  com, 
(Research  paper  No.  25  ID  331464)  at  p  1199;  Bebchuk  (2003),  (above,  note  75)  at  pp  14-16,50,63. 
78  Cheffins  (above,  note  77);  Roe  (2002),  (above,  note  77)  at  pp  10-17. 
119 through  the  mechanism  of  voting  make  rules  for  unexpected  and  unpredicted 
circumstances,  but  this  is  only  one  of  the  functions  of  the  right  to  vote.  The  other 
function  which  is  perhaps  more  significant  is  the  one  by  which  shareholders  control 
their  companies.  A  number  of  arguments  have  been  brought  for  this  theory.  Scholars 
who  view  corporations  politically  argue  that  voting  is  a  way  by  which  citizens 
(shareholders)  exercise  control  over  decisions  and  conducts  of  leaders  (management)  in 
the  corporate  cornmunity.  "  Shareholders  should  be  able  to  control  corporate 
management  in  order  to  ensure  that  managers  pursue  the  shareholder  interest 
objective.  'O  These  scholars  go  along  with  ideas  advanced  by  the  contractarian  theory  in 
that  they  both  generally  see  the  majority  of  shareholders  as  Persons  whose  interests  are 
pre-eminent  in  companies.  "  However  they  fall  apart  in  that  political  theorists  unlike 
the  latter  know  controlling  function  for  shareholder  voting.  Those  who  view 
corporations  from  legal  perspective  argue  that  shareholder  control  is  in  fact  a  non- 
separable  part  of  every  relationship  which  involves  a  person  who  entrusts  his  money 
to  the  care  of  another  person.  "  They  add  that  market  forces  may  not  adequately 
prevent  managerial  misbehaviours  and  company  law  is  deficient  too..  83  Therefore, 
79  See  generally  Ferran  (above,  note  2)  at  p  246;  Hill  (2000),  (above,  note  60)  at  pp  52-53. 
80  Buxbaurn  (above,  note  3)  at  p  1671;  Selznick  Philip,  "Law,  Society,  and  Industrial  Justice", 
Russell  Sage  Foundation,  (1969),  at  p  259;  Brewster  Kigman,  "The  Corporation  and  Economic 
Federalism",  in  The  Corporation  in  Modern  Society,  edited  by  Edward  Sagendorph  Mason  (ed.  ), 
(1960),  5,  Cambridge,  Mass  at  72;  Mason  (above,  note  7)  at  p1l;  Villiers  Charlotte,  "'European 
Company  Law-Towards  Democracy?  ",  European  Business  law  Library,  (1997),  Aldershot, 
Ashgate,  pp  197-205;  Pound  John,  "'The  Rise  of  The  Political  Model  of  Corporate  Governance 
and  Corporate  Control",  (1993),  New  York  University  Law  Review,  vol.  68,1003  at  pp  1007-1013, 
New  York,  New  York  University  School  of  Law;  See  Latham  Earl,  "The  Body  Politic  of  The 
Corporation"",  in  Thc  Corporation  in  Modern  Society,  edited  by  Edward  Sagendorph  Mason  (ed.  ), 
(1960),  5,  Cambridge,  Mass,  pp  218-220;  Bottomley  Stephen,  "From  Contractualism  to 
Constitutionalism:  A  Framework  for  Corporate  Governance",  (1997),  Sydney  Law  Review,  vol.  19, 
277,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Sydney,  Sydney,  at  pp  288-298. 
81  See  Hill,  "Visions  and  Revisions  of  the  Shareholder",  (above,  note  60)  at  p  54. 
82  Lowenstein  (above,  note  14)  at  pp  983-4;  Ferran  (above,  note  2)  at  p  239. 
83  Parkinson  (above,  note  75)  at  p  114;  Bebchuk  (above,  note  75)  at  pp  14-16,50,63;  Black 
(above,  note  54)  at  p  522;  Ferran  (above,  note  2)  at  p  241;  Cheffins  (above,  note  77)  at  pp  27-37. 
120 there  should  be  a  monitoring  mechanism  inside  the  company  to  allow  members  watch 
activities  of  directorS84  and  shareholder  voting  functions  to  that  effect.  "  In  addition  to 
these,  they  also  say  even  from  the  perspective  of  contractarians  the  main  mechanism 
by  which  market  forces  discipline  management  is  through  market  for  control  and 
takeover  mechanism  which  heavily  rely  on  the  idea  of  shareholder  control.  86  they  also 
add  that  shareholder  control  is  not  impossible  because  apathy  is  not  a  natural 
automatic  reaction  of  shareholders  and  might  be  defeated  by  the  growth  in  the  size  of 
ones'  shareholding.  87  Shareholder  control  can  encourage  public  financing  in 
corporations  because  it  signals  the  potential  investors  that  they  will  be  given  control 
based  on  the  size  of  their  investment.  " 
111.1.4.3.  Comment 
No  doubt,  it  is  fundamental  to  any  principal/agent  relationship  that  the  former  must 
have  power  to  control  activities  of  the  latter.  In  the  absence  of  such  control,  agents 
could  engage  in  self  serving  activities  which  impose  costs  on  principal.  This  is  also  true 
about  corporations  in  which  management  in  the  absence  of  shareholder  control  could 
easily  engage  themselves  in  activities  which  are  either  poor  or  self-serving.  However, 
84  See  Black  (above,  note  54)  at  pp  523,531,532,566;  Buxbaum  (above,  note  3)  at  p  1683;  Roe 
(2001),  (above,  note  77)  at  p  10;  See  also  Bebchuk  (above,  note  75)  at  p  63;  Cheffins  (above,  note 
77)  at  pp  27-37. 
85  Arguments  for  shareholder  control  may  differ.  Some  argue  that  shareholders  have 
controlling  right  because  they  are  owners.  [See  Birds  Et.  Al.  (above,  note  2)  at  pp  209,214,368; 
Lee  Hazen  (above,  note  36)  at  pp  1900,1910;  From  Case  Law  see  also  Burland  v.  Earle,  (1902), 
AC  83;  North  West  Transportation  Co  Ltd.  v.  Beatty,  (1887),  12  App  CAS  589;  Pender  v. 
Lushington,  (1877),  6  Ch.  D.  70;  Some,  on  the  other  hand,  argue  that  a  share  is  only  an 
instrument  by  which  a  holder  participates  in  determining  what  forms  general  interests  of  the 
company.  [See  Leader  &  Dine  (above,  note  20)  at  p  2301.  From  Case  Law  see  also  Prudential 
Assurance  Co  Ltd  v.  Newman  Industries  LTD.  and  others  (No.  2)  (1981),  Ch  257. 
86  Buxbaum  (above,  note  3)  at  p  1672. 
87  Black  (above,  note  54)  at  p  585. 
88  See  Lowenstein  (above,  note  14)  at  pp  983,1008;  Lee  Hazen  (above,  note  36)  at  p  1917-23; 
Ferran  (above,  note  2)  at  p  246. 
121 when  a  relationship  involves  not  the  principal/agent  but  rather  groups  of 
shareholders,  one  can  remain  sceptical  about  the  benefits  of  the  shareholder  control 
because  it  is  possible  that  one  group,  often  the  one  that  have  majority  of  votes,  abuses 
its  discretional  power  to  prioretise  systematically  its  interests  over  that  of  the  other 
groups.  This  possibility  which  associates  with  the  shareholder  control  along  with  the 
collective  action  problem  have  brought  the  contractarians  into  the  view  that 
shareholder  control  is  generally  problematic  and  should  be  replaced  by  managerial 
control.  89  Yet,  there  are  good  reasons  that  indicate  the  advantages  of  exercising  control 
by  majority  shareholders  even  with  the  possibility  of  abuse  of  rights  can  outweigh 
those  of  taking  control  away  from  shareholders.  If  shareholder  control  is  lost,  the  right 
to  participate  in  the  debate  and  discussions  in  meetings  will  be  lost  too,  which  could 
further  mean  a  complete  lack  of  information  for  shareholders.  This  provides 
opportunity  for  dishonest  and  negligent  management  to  extract  easily  for  themselves 
corporate  gains.  With  the  majority  control,  however,  not  only  management  would  be 
monitored,  but  also  minority  shareholders  through  attending  at  meetings  will  find 
opportunity  to  have  access  to  information  needed  in  order  to  assess  controllers' 
behaviours.  Oppression  by  the  majority  which  can  arise  from  shareholder  control 
causes  little  concern  compared  with  the  likelihood  of  mismanagement  which  associates 
with  managerial  control  and  might,  to  a  great  extent,  be  overcome  by  the  unfairly 
prejudicial  remedy  provided  by  s  459  Companies  Act  1985-'0 
89  'mismanagement  is  less  serious  than  unfairly  conduct  to  shareholders.  Mismanagement  is 
not  in  the  managers  self  interest.  It  is  in  fact  very  much  contrary  with  their  self  interest,  as  it  will 
lead  eventually  to  the  bankruptcy  of  the  firm  and  the  managers'  future  employment  prospects, 
as  a  result  of  the  competition  of  better  managed  rivals'.  [Posner  (above,  note  7)  at  p  410]. 
90  Black  (1990),  (above,  note  54)  at  p  552;  Roe  (2002),  (above,  note  77)  at  p  10;  Roe  (2001),  (above, 
note  77)  at  p  3;  Bebchuk  Lucian  Arye,  "Limiting  Contractual  Freedom  in  Corporate  Law:  The 
Desirable  Constraints  on  Charter  Amendments"',  Harvard  Law  Review,  (1989),  Vol.  102, 
Cambridge,  Mass.,  Harvard  Law  Review  Publishing  Association,  at  pp  1830-1;  Jensen  & 
122 111.1.5.  Freedom  of  voting  and  imposition  of  legal  duty 
Traditionally  speaking,  a  share  was  seen  as  a  piece  of  property  and  the  voting  right 
attached  to  it  was  also  considered  as  an  incident  to  such  property  right  which  allowed 
shareholders  to  exercise  it  free  of  duty.  9'  Once  voting,  corporate  shareholders  could 
expect  personal  benefits  and  further  could  consult  with  their  personal  interests.  "  There 
was  no  obligation  on  a  shareholder  of  company  to  give  his  vote  with  a  view  to  what 
other  persons  may  consider  to  be  for  the  interests  of  the  company.  As  a  result,  a 
shareholder  who  possessed  majority  of  shares  was  able  to  make  whatever  decision  he 
pleased  even  though  those  decisions  were  quite  incompatible  with  minority 
shareholders"  interest  or  even  harmful  to  it.  Thus,  voting  right  was  capable  to  provide 
controlling  members  abusive  opportunities.  " 
This  fashion  gradually  changed  with  increasing  concern  on  the  part  of  the  courts  and 
legislators  for  the  protection  of  minority  shareholders  and,  as  a  consequence,  the 
exercise  of  voting  right  was  transformed  slowly  over  time  from  being  a  simple  matter 
of  right  into  a  rather  complicated  mixture  of  right  and  duty.  The  first  step  was  taken  by 
Lindley  M.  R.  who  developed  in  Allen  v.  Gold  Reefs  of  West  Africa  Limited  a  rule  that 
Meckling  (above,  note  48)  at  pp  1-6;  Cheffins  (above,  note  77)  at  pp  30-37;  Stout  (above,  note  77) 
at  p  1199. 
91  Burland  v.  Earle,  (1902),  AC  83;  Northwest  Transportation  Co  Ltd.  v.  Beatty,  (1887),  12  App 
CAS  589;  Pender  v.  Lushington,  (1877),  6  Ch.  D.  70;  See  also  generally  Maclntosh  for  a  review  of 
the  courts'  view.  [Maclntosh  Jeffrey  G.,  "Minority  Shareholder  Rights  in  Canada  and  England: 
1860-1987",  (1989),  Osgoode  Hall  Law  journal,  vol.  27,  No.  3,  Toronto,  Osgoode  Hall  Law  School, 
at  p  602]. 
92  Burland  v.  Earle,  (1902),  AC  83;  North  West  Transportation  Co  Ltd.  v.  Beatty,  (1887),  12  App 
CAS  589. 
93  The  ownership  approach  has  attracted  supports  from  current  company  law  scholars  too.  See 
Ferran  (1999),  (above,  note  2)  at  p  247;  Birds  Et.  Al.  (above,  note  3)  at  pp  209,214,368;  Lee 
Hazen  (above,  note  36)  at  pp  1900,1910;  Bebchuk  (2003),  (above,  note  75)  at  p  15. 
123 subjected  the  exercise  of  voting  right  to  consideration  of  interests  of  the  company  as  a 
whole.  As  he  put  it: 
...  the  power  conferred  to  the  majority  shareholders  must,  like  all  other  powers,  be 
exercised  subject  to  those  general  principles  of  law  and  equity  which  are  applicable  to 
all  powers  conferred  on  majorities  and  enabling  them  to  bind  minorities.  It  must  be 
exercised,  not  only  in  the  manner  required  by  law,  but  also  bona  fide  for  the  benefit  of  the  company  as  a  whole  and  it  must  not  be  exceeded.  //94 
Fifty  years  later,  Evershed  M.  R  in  Greenhalgh  v.  Arderne  Cinemas"  interpreated  the 
measure  of  'the  interests  of  the  company  as  a  whole'  introduced  by  the  Allen  case  as 
being  the  interests  of  company  shareholders  generally.  He  further  offered  the  famous 
'an  individual  hypothetical  mernber'  formula  that  required  taking  the  case  of  such 
member  and  asking  'whether  what  is  proposed  is,  in  the  honest  opinion  of  those  who 
voted  in  its  favour,  for  that  person's  benefit.  96  However,  the  new  rule  had  two  not  very 
compatible  elements  of  "bona  fide"  and  "benefit  of  the  company  as  a  whole".  While  the 
element  of  'bona  fide'  was  a  subjective  measure9',  the  "benefit  of  the  company  as  a 
whole'  was  seen  objectively  and  this  could  mean  misapplication  of  the  new  rule  by  the 
courts.  "  It  could  also  mean  while  a  decision  of  majority  may  in  fact  be  for  the  benefit  of 
shareholders,  it  may  be  set  aside  merely  because  it  is  taken  by  the  majority  who  voted 
mala  fide.  Also,  it  could  cover  only  formal  discriminations.  In  other  words,  a  decision 
that  affected  every  shareholder  formally  equal  but  treated  them  informally  unequal 
could  remain  untouched.  In  Allen  case,  for  example,  though  the  court  was  persuaded 
94  Allen  v.  Gold  Reefs  of  West  Africa,  Limited  (1900),  1  Ch.  656  per  Lindley  M.  R.  at  p  671. 
95  (1950)  2  All  E.  R.  1120  per  Evershed  M.  R.  at  1126. 
96  Greenhalgh  v.  Arderne  Cinemas  LTD,  (1950)  2  All  E.  R.  1120  per  Evershed  M.  R.  at  1126. 
97  Shuttleworth  v.  Cox  Bros  &  Co  (Maidenhead)  Ltd,  and  Others,  (1927),  2  KB  9  at  pp  20-23  per 
Scrutton  LJ.  This  decision  has  been  latter  supported  by  Greenhalgh  v.  Arderne  Cinemas  LTD, 
(1950)  2  All  E.  R.  1120;  For  a  contrary  judgement  see  Dafen  Tinplate  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Lianelly  Steel 
Co.,  (1920),  2  Ch.  124  which  viewed  the  test  in  Allen  case  as  objective  one. 
98  Maclntosh  (above,  note  91)  at  pp  612-4;  MacNeil  2005  (above,  note  20)  at  p  261. 
124 that  the  amendment  to  the  articles  was  aimed  at  and  actually  affected  only  a  single 
shareholder,  it  dismissed  the  case  on  the  ground  that  the  amendment  treated  all 
shareholders  formally  equal.  '9  Considering  the  fact  that  majority  and  minority  interests 
can  differ  largely  and  that  different  classes  of  shareholders  may  exist  in  corporations, 
the  test  of  "an  individual  hypothetical  member'  could  not  help  the  courts  because  it 
was  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  isolate  such  a  member  and  ask  if  the  change  was  for 
that  member's  benefit.  'Oo 
Later  developments,  to  some  extent,  remedied  the  above  said  difficulties.  The  Ebrahitiii 
v.  Westbourne  Galleries  Ltd.  case  observed  equitable  considerations  in  substitute  of  legal 
rights  of  company  members  and  allowed  an  oppressed  minority  shareholder  to  free 
himself  of  a  closed  and  unfair  company  relationship  by  asking  a  winding  up  remedy.  'O' 
A  shareholder  was  no  longer  required  to  surrender  to  a  majority  decision  which  was 
taken  honestly  for  the  benefit  of  the  company  but  ignoring  at  the  same  time  his 
legitimate  expectations.  The  Ebrahimi  case,  therefore,  extended  the  scope  of  the  duty  of 
majority  shareholders  from  mere  consideration  of  interests  of  the  company  to  the 
legitimate  expectations  of  individual  shareholders  inside  the  company  and  to  the  cases 
involving  informal  discrimination.  The  introduction  of  section  459  Companies  Act  1985 
strengthened  this  trend  towards  imposing  duty  on  majority  shareholders  and  extended 
99  See  Lindley  MR  arguing  that  "the  altered  articles  applied  to  all  holders  of  fully  paid  shares, 
and  made  no  distinction  between  them.  The  directors  cannot  be  charged  with  bad  faith'.  [Allen 
v.  Gold  Reefs  of  West  Africa,  Limited  (1900),  1  Ch.  656  per  Lindley  M.  R.  at  p  675];  See  also 
generally  Maclntosh  (above,  note  91)  at  pp  608-614. 
100  "the  very  subject  matter  involves  a  conflict  of  interests  and  advantages.  To  say  the 
shareholders  forming  the  majority  must  consider  the  advantages  of  the  company  as  a  whole  in 
relation  to  such  a  question  seems  inappropriate,  in  net  meaningless,  and  at  all  events  starts  an 
impossible  inquiry".  [Peters  American  Delicacy  Co  Ltd  v.  Heath,  (1939),  61  CLR  457  at  4811. 
101  Ebrahimi  v.  Westbourne  Galleries  Ltd.  (1973),  AC  360;  See  also  Clemens  v.  Clemens,  (1976), 
2  All  ER  268,  and  Insolvency  Act  1986,  s  122  (1). 
125 the  scope  of  available  remedies  from  winding  up  to  a  range  of  alternatives  listed  in 
section  461  Companies  Act  1985.  These  remedies  will  fully  be  discussed  later  in 
Chapter  five  and  thus  I  wiR  avoid  bringing  any  more  discussion  of  them  here. 
111-1.6.  Relevance  of  institutional  shareholders 
The  central  argument  I  have  taken  about  shareholder/  management  relationship  has 
been  to  defend  shareholder  control  which  can  effectively  function  to  align  wayward 
management.  I  also  explained  that  control  by  shareholders  even  with  the  possibility  of 
majority  abuse  is  yet  advantegous  to  minority  shareholders.  However,  as  shareholders 
in  English  large  corporations  have  tended  to  be  small  and  unorganised,  control  by 
shareholders  could  have  served  little  use.  "'  Potentially,  the  growing  size  of 
institutional  investment  made  it  possible  for  the  shareholder  control  to  function 
effectively.  "'  Institutional  shareholders  could  have  direct  influence  on  management 
preventing  them  from  shirking  responsibilities  and  manipulating  company  assets.  104 
Nonetheless,  things  did  not  go  as  expected.  'O'  Institutional  shareholders"  response  to 
the  controlling  capacity  they  had  was  odd,  unpredictable  and  disappointing 
particularly  for  those  who  hoped  a  quick  change  in  the  current  corporate  governance 
arrangement.  As  empirical  research  suggested  and  many  writers  indicated, 
institutional  shareholders  have  tended  in  practice  to  influence  the  management 
102  MacNeil  (2005),  (above,  note  20)  at  p  268. 
103  See  above,  at  note  55. 
104  Black  (above,  note  54)  at  pp  570-575,585-594;  Ferran  (above,  note  2)  at  pp  241-244;  Birds  Et. 
Al.  (above,  note  2)  at  pp  345-246;  Mayson  Et.  Al.  (above,  note  64)  at  p  440. 
105  For  an  opposing  view  see  Farrar  who  took  the  view  that  institutions'  capability  to  control 
companies  might  change  nothing  for  minority  shareholders  because  institutions  may  merely 
provide  another  example  of  a  power  bloc  within  a  company  and  this  is  nothing  remarkable. 
[Farrar  (above,  note  15)  at  p  5991. 
126 through  informal  dialogue  instead  of  formal  exercising  of  voting  rights.  106  Although 
they  often  have  sufficient  votes  to  control  companies,  they  have  rarely  used  their 
votes.  'O'  Instead,  they  have  tended  to  influence  the  management  through  behind  scene 
negotiation'"  and  once  negotiation  is  found  unworking,  they  often  want  to  sell  their 
shares  and  relocate  their  funds  elsewhere  which  is  more  profitable  and  hospitable.  "' 
Institutional  shareholders,  it  is  suggested,  only  seek  to  obtain  financial  return  on  their 
financing  and  as  a  natural  reaction  they  do  not  care  about  control.  Most  of  these 
institutions  are  formed  with  a  financial  motive  only.  'They  do  not  consider  themselves 
as  managers  in  the  business  world.  They  view  themselves  (and  it  appears  they  actually 
are),  as  financial  institutions  that  invest  and  manage  funds  for  the  benefit  of  smaller 
passive  investors".  "O  They  also  do  not  want  to  "damage  the  company's  share  price  that 
could  result  from  a  head  to  head  public  confrontation  between  them  and  the 
management'.  "'  The  prime  duty  of  institutional  shareholders  is  to  pursue  the  benefits 
of  their  own  beneficiaries  who  simply  want  the  highest  returns  and  that  may  require 
them  to  avoid  risk.  Therefore,  neither  institutional  shareholders  nor  their  investors  and 
beneficiaries  care  about  ups  and  falls  of  their  investee  company.  In  addition  to  these, 
106  Ferran  (above,  note  2)  at  pp  241-245,248;  Birds  Et.  Al.  (above,  note  2)  at  pp  345-346;  Farrar 
(above,  note  15)  at  p  594;  Black  (above,  note  54)  at  pp  591-594;  Ratner  (above,  note  4)  at  p  26. 
107  As  Boyle  and  Birds  pointed  out  "'...  it  is  much  more  common  for  a  prestigious  institution  to 
raise  a  matter  "behind  the  scenes'  by  approaching  the  chairman  of  the  board  or  other  senior 
executive  directly.  "  [Birds  Et.  Al.  (above,  note  2)  at  pp  347,3881. 
108  This  behaviour  is  analogous  to  the  democratic  strategy  that  influence  on  the  government 
may  be  exerted  more  by  discussion  and  lobbying  than  by  general  election.  [Pound  (above,  note 
81)  at  1003;  Mayson  Et.  Al.  (above,  note  64)  at  p  440]. 
109  Cubbin  and  Leech  (above,  note  53)  at  p  363. 
110  Birds  Et.  Al.  (above,  note  2)  at  pp  345-7;  See  also  Mayson  Et.  Al.  (above,  note  64)  at  p  440; 
Easterbrook  &  Fischel  (above,  note  65)  at  pp  425-426;  Miles  Lilian  and  Proctor  Giles, 
"Unresponsive  Shareholders  in  Public  Companies:  Dial  "'M"  for  Motivate?  ",  The  Company 
Lawyer,  (2000),  Vol.  21,  No.  5,  London,  Oyez  Publishing  Limited,  at  p  143. 
111  Ferran  (above,  note  2)  at  p  245. 
127 they  have  no  duty  to  exert  any  active  involvement  in  control  of  their  investee 
companies.  "' 
As  institutional  shareholders  have  been  passive,  some  political  and  economic  theorists 
have  taken  the  view  that  the  prevailing  passivity  of  institutions  that  makes  either  the 
very  exercise  of  shareholder  control  obsolete  or  the  proper  functioning  of  it  faulty 
cannot  be  cured.  They  both  emphasise  on  the  elimination  of  institutions"  right  to  vote. 
Nonetheless,  while  political  thinkers  want  this  in  the  interest  of  the  proper  functioning 
of  the  shareholder  control  mechanism'  13 
,  economists'  intention  is  to  allow  the  specialist 
management  seize  control  of  companies.  '  14  These  proposals  have  attracted  little 
support  in  the  current  English  company  law  and  among  legal  scholars.  "'  Considering 
the  significant  benefits  which  associate  with  the  shareholder  control  and  looking  at  the 
potential  ability  of  institutions  to  exercise  control,  they  have  taken  the  view  that 
institutional  passivity  can  be  cured  with  policies  taken  by  regulators  that  encourage 
activism  among  institutions.  These  policies  can  take  one  of  the  following  two  forms: 
112  Mayson  Et.  Al.  (above,  note  64)  at  p  440;  Smith  T.  A.,  ""Institutions  and  Entrepreneurs  in 
American  Corporate  Finance,  "',  (1997),  85  Calif.  L  Rev.  1,  Berkeley,  Calif.,  University  of  California, 
School  of  Jurisprudence;  Birds  Et.  Al.  (above,  note  2)  at  pp  345-6;  Ratner  (above,  note  4)  at  p  26. 
113  For  example,  Ratner  argues  that  institutional  shareholders'  passivity  has  caused  a  gap  in  the 
market  for  managerial  services  because  with  passive  functioning  of  institutions  managers 
would  be  able  to  be  re-elected  with  the  opposition  of  dispersed  individual  shareholders.  [Ratner 
lbid]. 
114  Easterbrook  &  Fischel  (above,  note  65)  at  pp  403,426;  For  a  detailed  discussion  about 
different  sorts  of  proposals  for  limiting  or  abolishing  voting  rights  of  institutional  shareholders 
see  Farrar  (above,  note  15)  at  pp  603-4. 
115  Company  Law  Reform,  "'Modem  Company  Law  for  a  Competitive  Economy:  Final  Report", 
(London,  DTI,  2001),  URN/942  &  URN/943,  paras  1.52,1.56-1-57,3.51;  Nolan  RC,  "'Indirect 
Invetors:  A  Greater  Say  in  The  Company?  ",  (2003),  3  Journal  of  Corporate  Law  Studies,  73,  at  pp 
73-7. 
128 111.1.6.1.  Imposition  of  legal  duty 
Some  company  law  scholars  proposed  that  the  law  should  increase  responsibilities  of 
institutional  shareholders  and  in  particular  make  them  use  their  voting  power  on  an 
informed  basis.  Proponents  of  this  view  believe  that  institutional  participation  will  add 
value  to  companies  because  it  may  positively  influence  the  management  by  suggesting 
efficiency  enhancing  proposals.  "'  Also,  institutional  participation  can  encourage 
accountability  among  managers  helping  achievement  of  efficiency  in  companies  which 
further  improves  market  competitiveness  for  managerial  services.  "' 
While  the  very  issue  of  the  increased  responsibility  is  a  commonplace  matter,  in 
determining  what  source  supply  such  responsibility  views  differ  among  the 
proponents  of  this  view.  To  some,  it  is  a  matter  of  the  relationship  between 
institutional  shareholders,  other  interested  groups,  and  investee  companies.  By  buying 
shares,  institutional  shareholders  assume  duty  to  show  active  participation  in  control 
of  their  investee  company  because  their  conduct  may  have  impact  on  other  interest 
groups.  118  To  some  others,  it  is  a  matter  of  the  relationship  between  institutional 
shareholders  and  their  beneficiaries  as  indirect  investors.  '  According  to  this 
argument,  voting  rights  of  institutional  shareholders  originally  belong  to  their 
116  See  Bebchuk  (above,  note  75)  at  pp  47-63. 
117  See  generally  Ferran  (above,  note  2)  at  pp  248-9. 
118  "...  Given  that  the  arrival  or  departure  of  an  institution  as  shareholder  may  substantially 
affect  share  prices,  It  is  not  surprising  that  it  has  been  argued  that  the  institutions  have  a  duty 
not  to  sell  their  holdings  if  dissatisfaction  with  management  arise,  but  to  stay  on  and  work  to 
remedy  any  wrongs.  A  controlling  shareholder  has  responsibility  to  the  other  shareholders, 
employees  and  even  consumers...  "  [Farrar  (above,  note  15)  at  pp  599-600];  See  also  Black 
(above,  note  54)  at  p  572;  Moody  P.  E.,  "A  More  Active  Role  for  Institutional  Investors",  (1979), 
Vic  Barker,  February  1979,  at  p  49. 
119  Nolan  (above,  note  115)  at  p  73;  MacNeil  2005  (above,  note  20)  at  pp  259-260. 
129 beneficiaries  to  whom  institutional  shareholders  have  duty  to  exercise  actively  rather 
than  to  stay  passive  or  simply  exit  from  the  company.  "' 
Company  law  currently  knows  no  duty  of  the  sort  suggested  by  the  two  above- 
mentioned  propositions.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  now  a  setteled  issue  that  shareholder 
voting  is  a  free  mechanism  121  that  allows  shareholders  to  choose  between  voting  and 
failing  to  vote  absolutely  free  of  duty.  "'  Shares  and  their  attached  voting  rights  are 
seen  as  property  of  shareholders.  There  is  no  obligation  on  corporate  shareholders  to 
vote  with  a  view  to  what  other  persons  may  consider  to  be  in  the  interests  of  the 
company. 
12' 
Although,  the  Allen  case' 
24 
imposes  some  duty  on  majority  shareholders,  it 
never  compels  the  majority  to  participate  and  vote.  Nor,  it  requires  the  majority  to 
disregard  of  their  personal  interests.  "'  Furthermore,  Imposition  of  any  legal  duty  on 
institutional  shareholders  "would  constitute  an  unwarranted  fetter  on  the  institution-s 
freedom  to  manoeuvre' 
126 
and,  as  Ferran  observed,  it  is  very  likely  that  as  a  result  of 
such  duty  imposition,  institutional  shareholders  adopt  a  "box-ficking'  behaviour 
because  a  discharge  of  any  such  duty  requires  institutions  to  be  informed  when  they 
are  voting  and  this  might  be  very  difficult  and  costly  to  ask  them  search  for 
information.  127  On  the  other  hand,  although  institutional  shareholders  have  duty  to  act 
120  Curzan  Myron  P.  &  Pelesh  Mark  L.,  ""Revitalizing  Corporate  Democracy:  Control  of 
Investment  Managers'  Voting  on  Social  Responsibility  Proxy  Issues",  (1980),  Harvard  Law 
Review,  670,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  Harvard  Law  Review  Publishing  Association,  at  p  694;  MacNeil 
2005  (above,  note  20)  at  pp  259-261. 
121  Burland  v.  Earle,  (1902),  A.  C.  83;  North  West  Transportation  Co  Ltd.  v.  Beatty,  (1887),  12 
App.  CAS.  589. 
122  See  Burland  v.  Earle,  (1902),  AC  83;  Northwest  Transportation  Co  Ltd.  v.  Beatty,  (1887),  12 
App  CAS.  589;  Pender  v.  Lushington,  (1877),  6  Ch.  D.  70. 
123  Pender  v.  Lushington,  (1877),  6  Ch.  D.  70. 
124  Allen  v.  Gold  Reefs  of  West  Africa,  Limited  (1900),  1  Ch.  656  per  Lindley  M.  R.  at  p  671. 
125  See  above,  at  IV.  1.5. 
126  Farrar  (above,  note  15)  at  p  599. 
127  Ferran  (above,  note  2)  at  pp  248-9. 
130 for  the  benefit  of  their  beneficiaries,  but  this  is  a  duty  to  be  exercised  in  a  general  sense 
without  prescribing  the  ways  in  which  this  duty  might  be  discharged  and  yet 
institutional  shareholders  remain  the  final  judge  of  their  preferred  way  of  conduct  in 
their  investee  companies.  Also,  'the  person  entitled  to  vote  is  the  registered  owner  of  a 
share  and  company  law  prohibits  the  interests  of  any  other  persons  being  recorded  in  a 
company's  register  of  shareholders'.  "'  Company  law,  therefore,  clearly  rejects  the  idea 
that  institutions  act  as  intermediary  and  hence  their  right  to  vote  should  be  passed  to 
their  beneficiaries  as  indirect  investors.  129 
The  debate  over  whether  or  not  to  impose  a  statutory  duty  on  institutional 
shareholders  is  also  manifested  in  recent  attempts  of  the  British  government  to  refonn 
company  law.  In  1999,  the  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry  (DTI)  which  was 
authorised  to  review  company  law  took  the  view  that  it  is  probably  better  to  impose  a 
statutory  duty  on  institutional  shareholders  and  proposed  that  'it  may  take  legislative 
steps  to  oblige  the  institutions  to  make  use  of  their  votes'.  "O  The  view  was  later  put  by 
the  government  in  the  form  of  a  clause  in  the  proposed  Companies  Bill  which 
conferred  a  reserve  power  to  the  Treasury  or  the  Secretary  of  State  to  mandate 
disclosure  of  voting  by  institutional  investors.  "'  Subsequently,  however,  the 
mentioned  clause  was  eliminated  from  the  Bill  and  now  the  Companies  Act  2006 
includes  only  a  much  more  relaxed  duty  which  generally  requires  persons  who  hold 
128  MacNeil  (2005),  (above,  note  20)  at  p  260;  see  also  Nolan  (above,  note  115)  at  pp  73-80. 
129  Section  360,  Companies  Act  1985  and  Regulation  5  Table  A  in  the  Companies  (Tables  A-F), 
(Sl  1985/805). 
130  DTI,  Consultation  Paper,  "'Company  General  Meetings  and  Shareholders  Communication", 
(1999)  at  13.23. 
131  The  Companies  Bill  (108-16  May  2006)  Volume  11,  Clause  876,  available  from  the  DTI 
website  at  the  following  address: 
http:  //www.  publications.  parliament.  uk/pa/pabills/200506/companies.  htm. 
131 shares  on  behalf  of  others  to  inform  companies  of  the  way  they  have  exercised  their 
voting  rights.  "' 
111.1.6.2.  Self-regulation 
Successive  review  committees  of  the  Combined  Code  on  corporate  governance  and 
their  supporters  argue  that  institutional  passivity  is  best  remedied  through  adoption  of 
some  non-statutory  regulations  and  self-regulatory  rules  of  conduct  rather  than  by 
imposing  some  legal  duty.  From  this  perspective,  Combined  Code  and  regulations  of 
the  like  are  products  of  shortcomings  of  the  existing  market-directed  and  company  law 
developed  control  mechanisms  on  managerial  misbehaviours.  By  drafting  some  non- 
statutory  but  standardized  regulations  in  respect  of  corporate  governance  issues,  the 
drafters  focused  attention  to  raise  the  corporate  governance  culture  in  the  hope  that 
companies,  shareholders  and  directors  will  gradually  adopt  the  proposed  models  at 
Wiii. 
133 
The  Combined  Code  in  particular  targets  public  listed  companies  exclusively  and  is 
generally  divided  into  two  sections.  The  first  section  relates  to  companies  as  it  seeks  to 
propose  companies  certain  solutions  to  publicly  expressed  concerns  about  the  role  of 
directors,  their  remuneration,  reappointment  and  accountability  and  the  issue  of  audit. 
In  particular,  it  requires  company  boards  to  ensure  that  their  companies  listen  to 
shareholders'  views  and  concerns.  134  The  second  section  relates  to  the  institutional 
shareholders  and  very  gently  recommends  them  to  "enter  into  a  dialogue  with 
132  Companies  Act  2006,  sections  152-153. 
133  The  Combined  Code,  (2003),  preamble,  Para  5. 
134  The  Combined  Code,  (2003),  Section  1,  Para  D  1. 
132 companies  based  on  the  mutual  understanding  of  objectives".  "'  In  this  section,  the 
policy  of  the  Combined  Code  is  to  encourage  activism  among  the  institutional 
shareholders,  aiming  importantly  to  improve  managerial  behaviour  through 
persuading  institutional  shareholders  to  use  their  voting  power  responsibly.  "'  The 
Code  has  deliberately  chosen  institutional  shareholders  as  it  is  sufficiently  clear  from 
its  background  that  the  majority  of  80  percent  of  shareholders  in  listed  companies 
including  overseas  companies  are  institutional  in  nature  and  hence  any  discussion  of 
the  role  of  shareholders  must  focus  on  the  institutions"'  (pension  funds,  insurance 
companies,  and  investment  trusts  and  other  collective  investment  vehicles  as  defined 
by  the  Institutional  Shareholders  Committee'  38). 
While  regulations  of  the  first  section  are  sanctioned  by  the  Listing  Rules"9,  no  statutory 
rule  mandates  regulations  of  the  second  section.  Listing  rules  only  govern  the  conduct 
of  companies  that  wish  their  shares  to  be  listed  in  the  London  Stock  Exchange  (LSE). 
They  are  not  concerned  with  the  way  shareholders  of  such  companies  conduct  in  their 
135  The  Combined  Code,  (2003),  Section  2,  Para  E  1. 
136  The  Combined  Code,  (2003),  Section  2,  Para  E  3;  the  same  was  also  stated  in  the  Hampel 
Committee's  report:  "they  (institutional  shareholders)  have  a  responsibility  to  make  considered 
use  of  their  votes  that  they  should  be  ready  to  enter  into  a  dialogue  with  companies  based  on 
the  mutual  understanding  of  objectives  and  they  should  give  due  weight  to  all  relevant  factors". 
[Hampel  Committee,  "'The  Combined  Code:  A  Practical  Guide",  (October  1999)]. 
137  Dignam  Alan,  "'A  Principled  Approach  to  Self-Regulation?  The  report  of  The  Hampel 
Committee  on  Corporate  Governance"',  (1998),  The  Company  Lawyer,  19  (5)  140,  London,  Oyez 
Publishing  Limited,  at  pp  147-148;  see  also  above,  at  note  55. 
138  The  Responsibilities  of  Institutional  Shareholders  and  Agents  -  Statements  of  Principles, 
available  at  the  following  website:  www.  Investmentuk.  org.  uk  /press. 
139  Although  adoption  of  the  proposed  solutions  of  the  Code  is  entirely  voluntary,  compliance 
of  regulations  of  this  part  is  given  some  level  of  command  through  the  mechanism  of  the  so- 
called  'comply  or  explain'  in  the  Listing  Rules.  [see  The  Combined  Code,  (2003),  preamble  Para 
4  and  9;  Draper  Michael  G,  Partner,  Brown  Turner  Kenneth,  "'Corporate  Governance",  Law 
Socicty's  Gazette,  (1992),  vol.  89,  No  26,  p  25]  As  this  research  is  primarily  concerned  to  the 
second  section,  any  further  discussion  in  relation  to  the  first  part  of  the  Code  goes  beyond  the 
patience  of  the  research  and  has  to  be  traced  elsewhere. 
133 portfolio  company.  140  Such  conduct  principally  and  as  far  as  it  does  not  go  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  company  law  is  considered  to  be  forming  part  of  shareholders'  right  of 
property  and  freedom.  However,  it  is  always  possible  for  shareholders  to  regulate  the 
way  they  conduct.  This  is  the  case  for  institutional  shareholders  as  their  conduct  is 
governed  on  a  self-regulatory  basis  by  the  regulations  designed  by  the  Institutional 
Shareholders  Committee,  which  is  comprised  of  representatives  from  Association  of 
British  Insurers,  Association  of  Investment  Trust  Companies,  National  Association  of 
Pension  Funds  and  Investment  Management  Association.  In  pursuance  to  the 
Combined  Code,  it  sets  out  principles  of  best  practice  for  institutional  shareholders  in 
relation  to  their  responsibilities  in  respect  of  investee  companies  and  generally  requires 
such  institutions  to  adopt  the  policy  of  activism  and  provide  a  clear  and  publicly 
accessible  statement  on  such  policy  and  on  how  they  will  discharge  their 
responsibilities. 
141 
140  MacNeil,  lain,  "Competition  and  Convergence  in  Corporate  Regulation:  The  Case  of 
Overseas  Listed  Companies",  available  at  The  Social  Science  Research  Network  website  in  the 
following  address:  www.  ssm.  com,  Corporate  Law  &  Governance  Working  Paper  Series, 
autumn  2001  (SSRN  ID  278508  code  010812600.  pdo. 
141  The  Responsibilities  of  Institutional  Shareholders  and  Agents,  (above,  note  138). 
134 111.2.  The  case  of  Iran 
This  part  is  about,  from  the  Iranian  company  law  viewpoint,  examination  of  how  the 
rule  of  majority  works  in  joint  stock  companies.  The  examination,  as  we  have  earlier 
seen,  concerns  the  mechanism  of  shareholder  voting  and  my  intention  is  to  show  how 
opportunistically  it  can  be  used  by  the  majority  against  minority  shareholders.  One 
important  point  to  consider  is  that  Iranian  company  law  on  this  matter  is  considerably 
similar  to  the  English  company  law.  It  was  submitted  in  Chapter  one  that  the  idea  of 
modem  company  which  enjoys  separate  personality  and  works  with  the  majority  rule 
was  imported  from  the  European  model  to  the  Iranian  trade  law.  Iranian  context  was 
not  ready  to  allow  evolution  of  the  majority  rule  based  on  voting  mechanism  and 
hence  no  effort  on  the  part  of  academics  was  made  in  order  to  theorise  and 
institutionalize  such  idea  in  business  vehicles.  In  the  early  twentieth  century,  however, 
the  Iranian  government  rapidly  decided  to  westernise  the  economy  and  law  by 
referring  to  the  European  countries'  eonomies  and  laws  and  such  westernisation 
included  business  vehicles  and  company  law  too.  As  a  result,  company  law  was 
adopted  on  the  model  of  European  countries'  laws.  Adoption  allowed  Iranian 
company  law  to  assimilate,  in  great  part,  many  of  the  ideas  and  mechanisms  which 
existed  in  the  English  company  law  and,  thus,  many  of  the  issues  about  voting 
mechanism  that  I  have  discussed  earlier  in  the  English  part  can  be  raised  and  answered 
similarly.  These  aside,  there  are  also  some  divergence  between  the  two  company  laws 
on  this  matter.  To  avoid  unnecessary  repetition  of  discussion,  my  intention  in  this  part 
is  to  entinciate  similarities  and  dissimilarities  of  the  two  systems. 
135 There  are  inevitable  similarities  between  Iranian  and  English  company  laws  about 
shares  and  voting  mechanism.  For  one,  corporate  shares  can  be  classified  into  two 
categories  of  ordinary  and  preference  shares"',  as  can  be  divided  so  in  English 
company  law.  For  another,  Iranian  companies,  like  their  English  counterparts  enjoy  the 
rule  of  majority"'  that  works  on  the  basis  of  'one  share,  one  vote. 
144 
Further,  both  the 
majority  rule  and  the  rule  of  'one  share,  one  vote"  are  like  the  English  model  default 
rules  and  have  contractual  nature.  145  Similarly,  nature  of  majority  and  minority  can  in 
theory  and  in  law  compose  of  varying  elements  depending  on  different  issues  which 
come  up  for  collectiove  decision-making  in  shareholder  meetings.  In  addition  to  these, 
Iranian  and  English  company  laws  have  approached  similarly  on  the  shareholder 
voting  and  its  limits.  It  is  now  a  setteled  issue  in  Iranian  law,  as  it  is  in  its  English 
counterpart,  that  voting  is  right  and  not  duty  and  hence  shareholders  have  discretion 
to  exercise  it  freely.  146  At  the  same  time,  they  commonly  put  similar  limitation  on 
controlling  shareholders  when  they  take  corporate  decisions.  As  the  exercise  of 
majority  right  in  English  company  law  is  subject  to  observation  of  the  equal  treatment 
142  Section  24  JSCA  and  its  note  2. 
143  Sections  86,87,88  and  103  JSCA. 
144  Sotoodeh  Tehrani  Hasan,  ""Trade  Law",  (1997),  Tehran,  Dehkhoda  Publication,  vol.  2,  at  pp 
121,124;  Hoseingoli  Katebi,  "Trade  Law"'  (1994),  6th  ed.,  Vol.  2,  Tehran,  Ganjedanesh 
Publication,  at  p  79;  Azami  Zangeneh  Abdolmajid,  "'Commercial  Law"  (1974),  4th  ed.,  Tehran, 
University  of  Tehran  Publication,  at  p  119;  Erfani  Mahmood,  "Abuse  of  Job  and  Power  in  the 
Law  of  Iran",  Comparative  Law  Institution  Monthly  (1981),  No  7,  University  of  Tehran  Publication, 
Tehran,  at  pp  148-231;  Seghari  Mansoor,  "'Definition  of  Business  Corporation",  in  Private  Law 
Developments,  Edited  by  Katoozian  Naser  (1993),  Tehran  University  Publications,  at  p  199; 
Eskini  Rabiaa,  "Trade  Law:  Business  Corporations"  (2000),  Vol.  2,  Samt  Publication,  Tehran,  at 
p  78. 
145  "Shareholders'  meetings  are  formed  by  gathering  of  shareholders.  Rules  relevant  to  quorum 
and  required  votes  for  taking  collective  decisions  are  determined  in  the  company's  articles  of 
association  unless  where  the  Act  prescribes  a  particular  method"  [Section  72  JSCAJ;  Ebadi 
Mohammad  Ali,  "Trade  Law",  (1972),  Chehr  Publication  Co.,  Tehran,  at  pp  96-99;  Sotoodeh 
(above,  note  144)  at  p  119;  Eskini  (above,  note  144)  at  p  83. 
146  Sotoodeh  (above,  note  144)  at  pp  117-118. 
136 141  rule  established  in  the  Allen  case  ,  Iranian  company  law  offers  an  equality  principle 
which  compels  controllers  to  treat  shareholders  equally.  The  principle  which  works  in 
default  of  a  contrary  shareholder  agreement  is  understood  by  implication  from  the 
meaning  of  a  number  of  sections  in  the  JSCA. 
14' 
Lastly,  in  both  systems  voting 
functions  the  same;  to  fill  contractual  gaps  and  to  control  companies. 
Similarities  aside,  Iranian  company  law  has  diverged  from  the  English  model  in  certain 
areas.  To  begin  with,  while  decisively  important  for  financing  English  companies, 
private  institutions  in  the  English  sense;  i.  e.  institutional  shareholders;  do  not  exist  in 
Iran,  as  most  financial  institutions  including  banks  and  insurance  companies  are  state 
controlled.  Few  private  institutions,  which  have  succeeded  to  obtain  licence  from  the 
state  in  order  to  offer  financial  services,  play  little  role  in  Iranian  corporations.  They 
often  either  do  not  want  to  invest  in  large  corporations  or  even  if  they  want  they  will 
face  prohibition.  Financing  large  corporations,  which  are  often  dominated  by  the  state 
and  its  dependant  organisations,  can  politically  and  economically  be  too  risky.  Large 
scale  projects  and  main  industries  too  most  of  the  times  fall  within  the  state 
monopoly.  149  As  a  result,  institutional  shareholders  are  almost  absent  in  the  Iranian 
corporate  sector.  Unlike  institutions,  individual  investors  seem  interested  to  invest 
147  See  this  Chapter  (above,  para  111.1.5). 
148  See  sections  32,33,42,75,93,99,148,166,168,189,  and  264  (1)  JSCA. 
149  Large  corporations  which  are  under  state  control  suffer  from  unsuccessful  management 
while  enjoying  rent  from  their  monopolies.  Private  sector,  on  the  other  hand,  is  liable  to  risks 
caused  by  political  instability  which  emerged  after  the  Iranian  revolution  of  1979,  in  particular 
the  risks  of  nationalisation  and  confiscation.  [See  Jalah  Naini,  Ahmad  R.,  "Capital  Accumulation 
and  Economic  Growth  in  Iran:  Past  Experience  and  Future  Prospects",  Iranian  Studies,  Volume 
38,  number  1,91,  March  (2005);  Saeidi,  Ali  A.,  "Charismatic  Political  Authority  and  Populist 
Economics  in  Post-Revolutionary  Iran",  Third  World  Quarterly,  (2001),  Vol  22,  No  2,219-236,  at 
pp  221-21. 
137 money  in  large  corporations  which  are  controlled  by  the  government,  as  such 
companies  are  liable  to  less  political  and  economic  risks.  "' 
Corporations  in  Iran  and  England  have  also  diverged  on  the  issue  of 
variability  /stability  of  the  nature  of  majority  rule.  While  large  companies  in  England 
may  have  majority  rule  made  up  of  varying  elements,  Iranian  companies  whether  large 
or  small  are  normally  controlled  by  one  or  few  dominant  shareholders  who  can  stablise 
the  majority  nature  in  every  issue  that  comes  up  for  appropriate  majority  resolution  in 
shareholder  meetings.  This  divergence  is  a  consequence  of  differing  governance 
structures  which  exist  in  Iranian  and  English  companies.  "' 
Another  divergence  is  that  the  issue  of  shareholder  control  has  never  been 
controversial  in  the  Iranian  company  law.  As  Iranian  corporations  enjoy  a  concentrated 
shareholding  structure,  shareholder  control  has  always  been  relevant  both  in  theory 
and  in  practice.  As  a  consequence,  most  difficulties  which  stem  from  the  collective 
action  in  the  English  large  companies  have  been  absent  in  the  Iranian  corporations. 
As  a  further  source  of  divergence,  Iranian  company  law,  unlike  its  English  counterpart, 
seems  to  be  unfriendly  as  to  non-voting  shares  or  insertion  of  a  clause  in  the  corporate 
articles  which  deny  voting  right  for  a  group  of  shares.  Although  company  statutes 
especially  the  JSCA  stipulate  no  clear  prohibition,  it  is  a  conventional  view  among 
150  Such  corporations  were  often  backed  up  by  the  governmental  support  which  could  largely 
minimize  economical  and  political  risks  to  individual  financing. 
151  See  Chapter  one  (above,  para  1.2). 
138 Iranian  scholars  that  non-voting  shares  has  no  place  in  Iranian  companies.  152  Using  the 
logic  of  section  75  JSCA,  which  states  in  a  mandatory  fashion  that  every  share  must 
have  at  least  one  vote  153 
,  they  maintain  that  right  to  vote  is  fundamental  to  the  essence 
of  company  contract  and  any  violation  of  it  makes  the  very  contract  void.  The  reason  as 
they  say  is  that  non-voting  share  is  to  mean  separation  of  ownership  from  control, 
something  which  makes  the  contract  too  risky  and  which  is  undesirable  in  law  and 
prohibited  in  Islam.  They  also  argue  that  non-voting  share  is  in  nature  debentures,  as 
they  both  do  not  allow  holders  to  participate  in  control  of  companies. 
154 
They, 
however,  add  that  while  it  is  not  possible  to  issue  non-voting  shares,  exercise  of  voting 
right  can  be  subjected  through  limitations  inserted  in  articles..  and  it  is  further 
possible  to  a  shareholder  to  transact  their  right  in  return  for  consideration. 
156 
As  I 
explained  earlier  in  Chapter  one,  of  the  main  reasons  upon  which  Iranian  law  adopted 
the  European  model  rather  than  the  Anglo-Americn  model  was  the  formers  capability 
for  being  adjusted  as  to  accommodate  traditional  contracts  which  focused  on 
concentration  of  ownership  and  control. 
157 
Yet,  for  a  number  of  good  reasons  one  can  remain  sceptical  as  to  the  force  of  the 
conventional  view.  For  one,  the  invoked  provision  is  only  relevant  to  the  founders 
meeting  and  cannot  be  used  to  establish  such  conclusion  in  respect  of  other  meetings. 
152  Sotoodeh  (above,  note  144)  at  pp  114-119;  Erfani  Mahmood,  ""Trade  Law",  (1999),  Jehade 
Daneshgahi  Institute  Publication  (Majed),  Tehran,  Vol.  2,  at  p  68;  Ebadi  (above  note  159)  at  pp 
96-99. 
153  "...  In  founders'  meeting,  every  subscriber  and  founder  has  right  to  attend  and  every  share 
will  have  one  vote.  "  [Note  under  Section  75  JSCAJ. 
154  Sotoodeh  (above,  note  144)  at  p  118. 
155  Ebadi  (above  note  145)  at  pp  96-99;  Rastiin  Mansoor,  "Commercial  Law",  (1975),  University 
of  Tehran  Publications,  Tehran,  3rd  ed.,  at  p  118. 
156  Eskini  (above,  note  144)  at  p  85. 
157  See  Chapter  one,  (above,  para  1.2). 
139 For  another,  the  language  and  wording  of  the  relevant  statutes  in  respect  of 
extraordinary  and  ordinary  meetings  imply  that  a  company  may  issue  non-voting 
shares.  158  Further,  regulatory  rules  which  exist  in  Tehran  Stock  Exchnge  (TSE)  listings 
suggest  that  it  is  possible  for  companies  to  issue  non-voting  shares.  15'  Also  non-voting 
shares  diverge  from  debenture,  as  they  enjoy  participatory  right  and  for  example  allow 
their  holders  to  attend  meetings  and  get  access  to  the  information  in  relation  to  the 
affairs  of  the  company.  Too,  while  it  is  possible  to  transact  voting  right,  it  is  not  very 
certain  why  it  is  not  possible  to  allow  such  transaction  to  take  place  at  the  very 
beginning  where  an  issuing  company  seeks  to  issue  non-voting  shares.  In  addition  to 
these,  a  non-voting  shareholder  will  always  have  power  to  transfer  its  shares  to  likely 
buyers  and  more  importantly  such  shareholder  is  able  to  enforce  corporate  rights 
against  faulty  directors,  as  are  voting  shareholders.  "' 
158  For  example  sections  84  and  87  (JSCA)  while  providing  the  requirement  of  quorum  for  a 
formally  valid  meeting  of  ordinary  and  extra  ordinary  indicate  that  for  such  meetings 
participation  of  those  shareholders  who  have  voting  rights  is  necessary.  This  language  connotes 
two  meanings.  The  direct  meaning  is  the  one,  which  is  understood  by  the  literal  wording.  And 
the  indirect  one  that  suggests  participation  of  those  who  lack  voting  right  is  not  necessary  for 
such  meetings. 
159  One  of  the  requirements  for  shares  of  public  companies  to  be  allowed  for  listing  in  the 
Tehran  Stock  Exchange  is  to  bear  voting  right.  If  it  were  legally  impossible  to  issue  non-voting 
shares,  providing  such  requirement  would  seem  absurd.  [See  TSE  Listing  Rules  available  in 
Farsi  at  the  following  website:  http:  //www.  irbourse.  com/FForms/gavanin/Section4.  aspx#Bl]. 
160  Section  276  JSCA. 
140 111-3.  Conclusion 
This  Chapter  considered  the  nature  of  the  majority  rule.  It  concerned  reviewing  the 
relevance  of  voting  mechanism  in  the  majority/  minority  shareholder  relationship.  It 
sought  to  demonstrate  and  examine  the  mechanism  through  which  the  majority  rule 
works  whereby  to  show  how  the  rule  can  opportunistically  be  used  by  the  controlling 
shareholders  and  how  effective  company  laws  or  other  elements  in  the  two  systems 
have  curbed  such  abusive  behaviour.  It  was  made  clear  that  the  majority  rule,  which 
allows  majority  shareholders  to  exert  control  in  corporations,  works  through  the 
mechanism  of  voting.  As  shareholders  vote  in  shareholder  meetings,  they  apply 
control  over  corporate  affairs  too.  Nonetheless,  not  every  shareholder  holds  and  exerts 
the  same  control.  The  degree  of  shareholder  control  can  differ  depending  on  the 
number  of  votes  a  shareholder  may  have.  Thus,  voting  can  affect  the  nature  of  the 
majority  rule.  As  the  principle  of  majority  rule  in  corporations  relies  on  the  'one  share, 
one  vote"  rule,  the  resault  is  those  who  possess  more  shares  will  have  more  control. 
This  is  to  mean  as  much  as  control  depends  on  voting,  voting  itself  depends  on  share 
ownership.  In  the  normal  course  of  arrangements  every  share  endows  one  vote  to  its 
holder  and  this  is  to  mean  that  principally  it  is  the  size  of  shareholder  investment  that 
determines  how  much  control  a  shareholder  might  have  and  exercise  although  this  is  a 
default  rule  that  can  be  displaced  through  contract. 
Voting  can  also  affect  the  nature  of  majority  rule  where  shareholders  vote  in  respect  of 
differing  issues.  A  change  of  the  subject  issue  which  is  to  be  decided  in  shareholder 
meeting  may  give  rise  to  a  former  majority  composed  of  certain  shareholders  becomes 
subsequently  substituted  by  a  new  majority  with  different  components.  In  other 
words,  the  nature  of  majority  rule  is  variable.  Nevertheless,  in  reality  the  nature  of  the 
141 rule  can  often  vary  in  companies  which  rely  on  external  financing  and  which  lack 
presence  of  one  or  few  controlling  shareholders.  In  such  companies,  the  variable  nature 
of  majority  rule  can  offer  some  safeguard  to  small  shareholders,  as  no  shareholder 
possesses  corporate  shares  enough  to  exerct  control  over  different  affairs.  Where 
corporations  have  a  majority  group,  which  can  be  made  up  of  the  same  elements  for 
every  issue  raised  at  shareholder  meetings,  such  safeguard  is  absent.  For  such 
corporations,  the  nature  of  the  rule  remains  almost  always  stable.  A  corollary  is  that 
while  corporations  of  the  first  category  are  exposed  to  less  majority/  minority  conflict, 
their  counterparts  in  the  second  category  can  be  liable  to  that  conflict  more.  Yet,  the 
variable  nature  of  majority  rule,  which  occurs  in  corporations  of  the  former  category, 
can  never  eliminate  the  conflict.  Sometimes  one  or  few  active  but  relatively  small 
shareholders  can  yet  control  companies  not  because  they  have  sufficient  fifty  percent 
shareholding  but  rather  because  in  such  cases  dispersed  shareholding  plus  collective 
action  problem  contribute  to  reduce  the  degree  and  amount  of  shareholding  one  needs 
to  exert  de  facto  control. 
The  mere  fact  that  one  or  few  shareholders  exert  control  in  corporations,  using  the 
majority  rule  is  not  bad  at  all.  In  fact,  such  control,  as  we  have  earlier  seen,  is  desirable 
and  necessay.  "  What  raises  concern  is  only  abuse  of  control  which  can  occur  where 
those  who  possess  majority  of  shares  and  exert  de  jure  control,  or  else  where  those  who 
control  companies  de  facto,  use  their  voting  rights  opportunistically.  In  pursuit  of 
private  benefits,  such  persons  may  sacrifice  minority  interests  when  voting  in 
shareholder  meetings.  Voting  is  principally  regarded  in  law  as  right  that  leaves 
161  See  this  Chapter  above  at  111.1  . 4.3  and  Chapter  one  above. 
142 shareholders  with  freedom  in  the  exercise  of  it.  It  carries  no  duty  which  could  instruct 
shareholders  in  respect  of  how  to  vote  and  this  could  mean  every  shareholder  while 
voting  can  consult  with  their  personal  interests  and  can  further  ignore  interests  of  their 
fellow  shareholders.  Thus,  it  is  the  shareholder  control  plus  absolute  freedom  in  the 
exercise  of  it  that  can  generate  risk  and  raise  concern  for  minority  protection.  To 
address  such  concern,  both  private  contracting  and  company  law  could  be  relevant.  As 
to  the  former,  it  was  made  clear  that  contract  parties  have  always  the  choice  to  displace 
the  rule  or  put  on  it  some  limitation  that  deviates  the  'one  share,  one  vote  rule'. 
Nonetheless,  as  any  such  limitation  can  affect  majority  shareholders  sharply,  they  are 
in  practice  uncommon  among  shareholders.  As  to  the  latter,  both  English  and  Iranian 
company  laws  impose  legal  duty  on  controlling  shareholders  which  requires  them 
exercise  rights  non-discriminatory.  Nonetheless,  the  function  of  such  duty  as  to 
preserving  minority  interests  is  limited  as  it  currently  covers  only  obvious 
discriminations  and,  as  a  result,  many  cases  which  involve  informal  discrimination  can 
escape  prosecution. 
As  institutional  shareholders  have  been  substantial  investors  in  English  corporations,  I 
considered  in  this  Chapter  the  relevance  of  their  financing  as  to  the  majority/  minority 
conflict.  I  wanted  to  see  whether  the  potential  controlling  power,  which  is  held  by  such 
shareholders,  could  do  anything  remarkable  as  to  protecting  minority  rights.  No 
doubt,  they  are  important  as  to  the  shareholder/  management  conflict.  As  shareholder 
control  is  often  lost  and  mismanagement  persists  in  English  large  corporations,  they 
could  serve  to  enable  shareholder  control  hereby  to  curb  mismanagement.  My 
investigation,  however,  showed  that  they  have  been  passive  in  practice.  This  means 
they  actually  changed  nothing  important  in  the  shareholder/  management  conflict, 
because  they  tended  not  to  use  their  voting  rights  against  management.  As  to  the 
143 majority/  minority  conflict,  too,  they  have  done  nothing  because  they  do  not  want  to 
get  involved  in  control  of  corporations.  Even  if  they  wanted  to  get  some  involvement, 
they  could  have  changed  nothing  in  the  interest  of  minority  shareholders,  as  they 
could  only  form  another  example  of  a  power  bloc  in  corporations. 
144 Chapter  IV:  Relevance  of  directors'  role 
Chapters  one  to  three  concerned  reviewing  the  majority  rule  as  being  a  direct  control 
device.  They  sought  to  show  how  majority  shareholders  could  make  a  direct  use  of  the 
rule  in  order  to  take  self-interested  and  opportunistic  resolutions  against  minority 
shareholders.  This  aside,  another  aspect  of  the  majority  rule  which  requires 
consideration  is  the  one  that  allows  majority  shareholders  to  exert  indirect  control  over 
corporations.  Such  control  is  often  exerted  through  corporate  directors  who  are 
principally  appointed  and  monitored  by  majority  shareholders.  While  being  under 
such  control,  directors  are  required  in  law  to  take  impartial  decisions  and  regard 
matters  which  best  benefit  the  company  as  a  whole  rather  than  only  the  majority 
shareholders.  They  therefore  can  be  a  device  which  empowers  majority  control  or  else 
a  device  which  reduces  the  likelihood  of  abuse  by  majority  shareholders.  Thus, 
directors'  role  is  important  for  the  purpose  of  my  discussion  as  it  shows  how  directors 
can  be  either  a  hinder  or  a  help  as  to  minority  protection.  This  Chapter  seeks  to 
demonstrate  and  examine  from  such  aspect  the  corporate  directors'  role  as  to  the 
majority/  minority  conflict.  It  concerns,  in  particular,  consideration  of  directors"  duties 
both  on  matters  of  substance  and  enforcement.  Corporate  directors,  it  is  said,  can  play 
some  role  in  n-d-nimising  the  possibility  Of  majority  abuse.  They  exercise  certain  key 
corporate  powers  which  otherwise  would  have  fallen  within  the  authority  of  majority 
shareholders.  Unlike  shareholders,  they  assume  duties  imposed  by  law  which  require 
them  to  act  carefully,  impartially  and  loyally  when  they  exercise  such  powers.  ' 
I  Section  309(2)  Companies  Act  1985  provides  that  directors'  duty  is  owed  only  to  the  company 
and  not  its  shareholders  or  any  other  interested  groups,  though  the  matters  to  which  they  are  to 
145 Company  law  also  offer  internal  mechanisms  of  control  which  enable  shareholders  to 
enforce  these  legally  imposed  duties  of  directors.  Thus,  they  are  much  more  likely, 
contrast  to  majority  shareholders,  to  exercise  corporate  power  in  a  manner  which  is  for 
the  benefit  of  the  company  and  its  shareholders  generally.  However,  there  are  reasons 
both  in  respect  of  the  contents  of  director  duties  and  about  the  currently  existing 
enforcement  mechanisms  that  suggest  their  role  is  not  very  remarkable  as  to  resolving 
majority/  minority  conflicts  and  can  sometimes  be  problematic.  I  say  problematic 
because  an  amalgamation  of  malfunctioning  which  stems  from  substance  and 
enforcement  of  directors'  duties  has  enabled  directors  to  commit,  in  different  ways  and 
varying  degrees,  mismanagement  in  both  English  and  Iranian  companies.  To  address 
maters  of  substance,  I  must  examine  law  relevant  to  liability  of  directors  which  is  most 
reflected  in  directors'  legally  imposed  duties  of  fiduciary  and  care  and  which  I  examine 
them  first.  Then,  I  will  address  matters  of  enforcement,  which  concern  internal  control 
mechanisms  that  currently  exist  in  company  laws  of  England  and  Iran.  Divergence  in 
corporate  governance  structures  and  the  role  of  market  in  aligning  wayward  directors 
are  also  pertinent  issues  which  will  be  discussed  afterwards. 
have  regard  in  the  performance  of  their  functions  include  the  interests  of  the  companies' 
employees  in  general,  as  well  as  the  interests  of  its  members.  [See  section  309(l)  Companies  Act 
19851. 
146 IV.  1.  The  case  of  England 
IV.  1.1.  Matters  of  substance 
The  touchstone  argument  here  is  that  while  on  the  one  hand  exercise  of  corporate 
power  by  directors  can  be  beneficial  to  minority  shareholders,  it  can,  on  the  other  hand, 
be  disadvantageous  especially  because  directors  are  liable  to  mismanagement, 
something  that  affects  every  shareholder.  The  absence  of  mismanagement  is  efficient 
and  desirable  because  it  allows  companies  to  attract  more  investment  and  to  allocate 
those  investments  to  their  optimum  use  with  minimum  possible  costs.  However, 
mismanagement  can  reduce  the  extent  to  which  companies  can  work  efficiently  both  ex 
ante  and  ex  post.  At  the  initial  financing  stage,  it  reduces  the  extent  to  which  investors 
are  ready  to  provide  finance  for  the  use  of  corporations.  When  financing  is  complete,  it 
reduces  the  size  of  corporate  funds  that  otherwise  would  be  available  to  corporations 
to  put  into  business  and  to  make  profit.  Mismanagement  has  recently  been  an  issue  of 
public  concern  in  the  England.  In  the  early  1990s,  millions  of  pounds  of  investors' 
money  were  lost  in  unsuccessful  public  companies  that  went  insolvent  unexpectedly. 
In  most  cases  that  were  investigated,  mismanagement  (managerial  indirect  stealing 
and  poor  performance)  was  identified  as  a  prime  cause  of  these  failures.  '  Several 
review  committees  emerged  in  the  1990s  and  early  2000s  in  the  England  to  address  the 
2  See  generally  Smerdon,  Richard,  "A  Practical  Guide  to  Corporate  Governance",  (1998),  Sweet 
&  Maxwell,  London,  at  pp  37,52;  Cheffins,  Brian  R.,  "Current  Trends  in  Corporate  Governance: 
Going  from  London  to  Milan  via  Toronto",  Duke  Journal  of  Comparative  &  International  Law, 
(1999),  Vol.  10,  No.  5,  at  pp  16-17. 
3  Cheffins,  Ibid. 
147 issue  of  mismanagement  in  public  listed  companies.  4  Yet  they  did  not  succeed  in 
solving  the  problem  and  thus  mismanagement  continues  to  survive  in  corporations. 
Mismanagement  is  a  matter  of  principal/agent  relationship.  Managers,  as  agents,  are 
employed  by  companies  to  direct  the  business  of  the  principal.  Companies  and  their 
investors  need  managements"  specialised  skills  to  produce  returns  on  their  investment. 
Managers,  on  the  other  hand,  need  investors'  funds  since  they  either  do  not  have 
enough  money  of  their  own  or  want  to  cash  out  their  investment  and  exit.  This 
principal/agent  relationship  is  normally  put  in  the  form  of  a  service  contract  whose 
rules  as  well  as  the  rules  of  company  constitutions  determine  the  purpose  and  extent  of 
power  conferred  to  management.  But  contracts  cannot  be  completely  certain, 
addressing  every  existing  and  future  contingency  ex  ante.  Many  important  governance 
and  business  issues  may  thus  occur  all  the  way  through  the  life  of  companies  that 
require  ex  post  decision-making.  Company  investors  may  often  find  it  impractical  or 
unprofessional  to  take  such  decisions  and  may  want  to  vest  discretion  to  make  such 
decisions  in  management.  Thus,  they  often  prefer  to  draft  their  contract  with  some 
degree  of  uncertainty  in  the  hope  that  future  events  will  go  right  with  loyal  and  careful 
management  and  that  the  law  will  be  able  to  address  likely  future  deviations  of 
management.  This  hope,  however,  is  sometimes  disappointed.  Once  in  power, 
management  may  want  either  to  pursue  self-interested  projects  or  may  simply  pay 
inadequate  attention  to  the  affairs  and  business  of  their  companies. 
4  See  the  successive  reports  of  The  Cadbury  and  Hampel  committees  in  1990s  (Cadbury 
Committee,  "Internal  control  and  financial  reporting:  draft  guidance  for  directors  of  listed 
companies  developed  in  response  to  the  recommendations  of  the  Cadbury  Committee",  1994, 
Institute  of  Chartered  Accountants  in  England  and  Wales,  London;  Hampel  Committee,  "The 
Combined  Code:  A  Practical  Guide",  October-1999,  London,  UK)  and  the  latest  report  of  Mr 
148 Mismanagement  often  occurs  when  managers  run  the  affairs  and  business  of  their 
company  poorly  or  self-interestedly.  It  can  be  defined  as  a  decision  taken  or 
misconduct  implemented  by  directors  that  involves  negligence.  Broadly  defined 
nusmanagement  can  cover  any  negligent  behaviour.  In  a  narrow  sense  and  seen  from 
the  perspective  of  possible  recovery,  however,  it  only  covers  negligent  behaviours  of 
directors  that  constitute  breach  of  duty.  A  negligent  act  is  not  necessarily  a  source  of 
liability.  That  is  to  say,  not  any  negligence  is  pursuable  in  law.  While  serious 
mismanagement  confers  on  the  affected  company  the  right  to  hold  the  negligent 
director  liable,  mere  mismanagement  though  involving  negligence  has  no  such  effect. 
Two  divisions,  therefore,  can  be  identified:  one,  between  fine  management  and 
mismanagement  generally,  and  the  other,  between  serious  and  mere  mismanagement. 
The  first  division  is  commonly  used  in  civil  and  common-law  jurisdictions  when 
dealing  with  matters  of  liability  of  corporate  directors  for  negligence.  However,  the 
second  seems  to  be  unique  to  the  common  law. 
The  division  between  serious  mismanagement,  on  the  one  hand,  and  mere 
mismanagement,  on  the  other  hand,  has  been  repeatedly  recognised  by  the  English 
courts.  '  A  company  director  is  held  liable  for  the  former,  while  he  is  seen  free  from 
liability  for  the  latter.  '  In  response  to  a  bad  business  decision,  either  there  is  a  breach  of 
Derek  Higgs  and  Mr  Robert  Smith  (The  Combined  Code  on  Corporate  Governance"  published 
on  January  2003). 
5  Thomas  Giblin  v.  John  Franklin  McMullen  (1868),  LR  2PC  317;  Re  City  Equitable  Fire  and 
Insurance  Co.  Ltd  (1925)  Ch  407;  Lagunas  Nitrate  Company  v.  Lagunas  Syndicate  (1899)  2  Ch 
392;  The  Overend  &  Gurney  Company  v.  Thomas  Jones  Gibb  and  John  Darby  Gibb  (1872)  LR  5 
HL  480. 
6  See  generally  Trebilcock,  M.  J.,  "Liability  of  Company  Directors  for  Negligence",  Modern  Law 
Review,  (1969),  32,499,  London,  Stevens  &  Sons;  Finch,  Vanessa,  "'Company  Directors:  Who 
149 duty  giving  the  company  the  right  to  pursue  its  negligent  director  for  the  recovery  of 
loss  suffered,  7  or  there  is  a  mere  mismanagement  for  which  the  law  offers  no  response 
and,  as  a  result,  for  which  the  courts  abdicate  their  jurisdiction  in  favour  of  the 
companies'  own  internal  forum.  ' 
Serious  mismanagement,  therefore,  involves  either  a  breach  of  duty  of  care  or  a  breach 
of  fiduciary  duty  and  I  examine  each  in  the  following  discussions. 
W.  M.  A.  Duty  of  care 
The  duty  of  care  of  corporate  directors  is  a  mechanism  devised  by  company  law  to 
address  the  issue  of  liability  of  corporate  directors  for  honest  n-dsmanagement.  It  is  in 
fact  an  example  of  the  duty  of  care  imposed  through  the  tort  law  under  the  general 
heading  of  negligence-9  This  duty  builds  on  moral  and  policy  considerations.  These 
considerations  suggest  that  'if  a  person  undertakes  a  role  whose  performance  involves 
Cares  About  Skill  and  Care?  ",  (1992),  55:  2,  Modern  Law  Review,  179,  at  p  187-9;  Griffin,  Stephen, 
"'Negligent  Mismanagement  as  Unfairly  Prejudicial  Conduct"',  (1992),  The  Law  Quarterly  Review, 
Vol.  108,389,  London,  Stevens  and  Sons,  at  pp  390-392;  Arsalidou,  Demetra,  "Objectivity  vs 
Flexibility  in  Civil  Law  jurisdictions  and  The  Possible  Introduction  of  The  Business  Judgement 
Rule  in  English  Law"',  (2003),  Company  Lawyer,  24  (8),  228,  London,  Oyez  Publishing  Limited,  at 
p  230;  Wedderbum,  "Minority  Shareholders  and  Directors"  Duties",  (1978),  41  Modern  Law 
Review  569;  Hagland  Gary,  "Company  Law  -  Turnbull  in  FSA  Perspective",  2001,  Informa 
Publishing  Group  Ltd.,  CM  13.8  368. 
7  Re  City  Equitable  Fire  and  Insurance  Co.  Ltd  (1925)  Ch  407;  Lagunas  Nitrate  Company  v. 
Lagunas  Syndicate  (1899)  2  Ch  392;  Bamford  v.  Bamford,  (1970),  LR  Ch  P  212;  Re  Cardiff 
Savings  Bank  (1892)  2  Ch  100;  Norman  &  Anor  v.  Theodore  Goddard  &  Others  (1992),  BCC,  p 
14  per  Hoffman  J;  Atwool  v.  Merryweather  (1867),  LR  5  Eq  464n;  Menier  v.  Hooper's  Telegraph 
Works  (1874),  9  Ch  App  350;  Dafn  Tinplate  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Llanelly  Steel  Co.  (1920)  2  Ch.  124; 
Edwards  v.  Halliwell  (1950),  2  All  ER  1064;  Daniels  v.  Daniels,  (1978),  Ch  406;  Prudential 
Assurance  Co  Ltd.  v.  Newman  Industries  Ltd.  (No.  2),  (1981),  Ch  257;  Estmanco  (Kilner  House) 
Ltd  v.  Greater  London  Council  (1982)  1WLR  2. 
8  Pavlides  v.  Jensen,  (1956),  Ch  565;  Turquand  v.  Marshall,  (1868-69),  (L  R),  4  Ch  App  376  at  p 
386. 
9  Worthington,  Sarah,  "Reforming  Directors'  Duties",  64:  3,  Modern  Law  Review,  439  (2001), 
Blackwell  Publishers,  Oxford,  at  p  449. 
150 the  risk  of  injury  to  others,  he  is  under  a  duty  to  perform  functions  of  that  role 
carefully'.  10 
In  company  law,  contents  of  the  duty  of  care  may  differ  from  that  imposed  under  the 
general  law  on  other  persons.  While  tort  law  may  require  persons  to  take  as  much  care 
as  can  be  reasonably  expected  of  them,  company  law  allows  directors  to  take  risks.  The 
roots  of  this  difference  go  back  to  traditional  case  law  where  judges  often  emphasised 
that  different  classes  of  persons  may  assume  substantively  different  duties  of  care.  As 
Romer  J,  for  example,  emphasized,  people  may  assume  different  degree  of  duty  of  care 
depending  on  their  class.  "  It  follows  that  there  is  not  one  and  the  same  duty  for  all 
people.  A  traditional  example  is  the  case  for  directors  and  trustees.  While  a  trustee  is 
required  to  avoid  risks,  "  directors  are  encouraged  to  take  risks,  as  taking  commercial 
risks  in  corporations  is  seen  not  only  desirable  but  also  necessary.  "  Yet,  it  is  not  very 
certain  where  the  line  is  to  be  drawn  between  the  degree  of  care  required  for  a  director 
and  that  required  for  a  trustee,  given  that  there  are  also  some  authorities  that  require 
the  same  degree  of  duty  from  both  directors  and  trustees.  14 
10  Eisenberg,  Melvin  Aron,  "'The  Duty  of  Care  and  The  Business  judgement  Rule  in  American 
Corporate  Law",  (1997),  Company  Financial  and  Insolvency  Law  Review,  185  Oxford,  Mansfield 
Press,  at  p  186. 
11  Lagunas  Nitrate  Company  v.  Lagunas  Syndicate  (1899),  2  Ch  392  at  394  per  Romer  J. 
12  In  Sheffield  and  South  Yorkshire  Permanent  Building  Society  v  Aizlewood  (1890)  44  Ch  D 
412,  for  example,  it  was  held  that  directors  are  not  trustees  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  word  but 
are  "commercial  men  managing  a  business  for  the  benefit  of  themselves  and  the  other 
members";  See  also  Re  City  Equitable  Fire  and  Insurance  Co.  Ltd  (1925)  Ch  407. 
13  it  is  desirable  because  that  is  very  likely  to  enhance  corporate  gains.  It  is  also  necessary 
because  business  circumstances  are  not  entirely  certain  and  as  a  result  managing  affairs  of  a 
business  corporation  often  involves  dealing  with  great  commercial  risks. 
14  Charitable  Corporation  v.  Sutton,  (1742),  2  Atk.  400  at  p  405-406  per  Lord  Hardwicke. 
151 The  question  of  how  successful  company  law  has  been  in  addressing  the  issue  of 
honest  mismanagement  is  to  be  considered  in  the  light  of  its  favoured  standard  of  duty 
of  care.  To  explain,  it  is  possible,  for  example,  to  have  a  negligent  director  exempted 
from  liability  if  in  a  given  case  the  judge  takes  as  a  standard  someone  with  the  same 
competence  as  that  of  the  defendant.  A  similar  director  in  like  circumstances  may 
assume  liability  for  the  same  sort  of  negligence  if  the  judge  takes  as  a  standard  a 
hypothetical  reasonable  person  with  a  minimum  level  of  competence.  Sometimes  the 
judges  might  simply  want  to  consider  themselves  as  the  model  of  practice  for  the 
assessment  of  a  defendant  directors  performance  and  that  may  clearly  produce 
different  results. 
15 
IV.  1.1.  A.  l.  Subjective  standard 
The  subjective  standard  emerged  more  than  a  century  ago  when  certain  judges  decided 
not  to  hold  negligent  directors  responsible  for  what  was  beyond  the  directors'  own 
capabilities.  16  The  argument  was  simple.  As  supporters  claimed,  it  is  the  purpose  of 
law  to  require  directors  to  do  their  best  when  they  manage  affairs  of  companies.  If  this 
is  true,  then  the  law  should  be  drafted  in  a  fashion  that  requires  exemption  of  a 
director  from  liability  when  his  behaviour  matches  his  own  potentials.  Imposition  of 
liability  on  directors  beyond  their  own  potential  is  both  unfair  and  useless.  'If  the 
defendant  was  incapable  of  doing  more  than  she  did,  then  the  threat  of  liability  cannot 
15  This  third  possibility  was  soon  rejected  by  the  case  law  for  obvious  reasons.  It  would  require 
the  courts  to  take  the  management  of  companies  which  obviously  falls  in  serious  contradiction 
to  the  traditional  attitude  of  the  courts  and  the  logic  behind  it  that  suggests  the  courts  should 
not  take  the  management  of  companies.  [The  Overend  &  Gurney  Company  v.  Thomas  Jones 
Gibb  and  John  Darby  Gibb  (1872)  LR  5  HL  480  per  Lord  Hatherley;  Turquand  v.  Marshall  (1968- 
69),  L.  R.  Ch.  App.  Vol.  4,  p  386. 
16  Lagunas  Nitrate  Company  v.  Lagunas  Syndicate  (1899)  2  Ch.  392,435. 
152 change  that".  "  Moreover,  a  subjective  measure  could  seem  to  appropriate  mostly  with 
the  picture  of  corporate  directors"  positions  under  the  traditional  company  law  that 
regards  it  as  a  non-professional  post.  "  The  roots  of  such  an  attitude  lie  in  the  treatment 
of  directors  by  the  early  courts  as  trustees.  "  Like  trustees,  directors  were  expected  to 
show  no  more  than  that  reasonably  expected  of  non-professionals  and  ordinary 
persons.  'O  An  early  example  in  British  case  law  can  be  found  in  the  case  of  Lagunas 
Nitrate  Co.  v.  Lagunas  Syndicate.  "  This  attitude  was  followed  by  later  decisions  that 
constitute  the  basis  of  modem  law  on  directors'  duty  of  care.  " 
The  subjective  measure  was  graded  very  poorly  by  many  commentators"  and  was 
later  reconsidered  by  the  case  law.  Critics  highlighted  several  shortfalls.  It  was  thought 
to  be  too  liberal  in  the  sense  that  it  makes  it  too  easy  for  negligent  directors  to  escape 
liability.  The  measure  further  was  very  likely  to  increase  uncertainty  associated  with 
rules  relating  to  liability  of  directors.  It  could  create  no  bottom  line  below  which  a 
17  It  would  be  unfair  because  it  would  simply  ignore  individuals'  potentials  and  entail  blaming 
directors  for  behaviours  which  they  were  unable  to  avoid.  [See  Riley  C.  A.,  "The  Company 
Director's  Duty  of  care  and  Skill:  The  Case  for  an  Onerous  But  Subjective  Standard"',  (Sep-1999), 
The  Modern  Law  Review,  vol.  62,697,  London,  England,  Stevens  &  Sons,  at  p  7111. 
18  As  the  Law  Commission  pointed  out  'directors  do  not  require  particular  skills  to  discharge 
their  duties.  A  company  might  appoint  a  person  as  a  director  for  some  attribute  he  possesses, 
knowing  that  he  lacks  skill  in  business  matters.  The  Law  Commission  (LAW  COM  No  261)  and 
The  Scottish  Law  Commission  (SCOT  LAW  COM  No  173),  "Company  Directors:  Regulating 
Conflicts  of  Interests  and  Formulating  a  Statement  of  Duties",  September  1999,  Part  5,  at  p  481. 
19  See  Lord  Hardwicke  in  Charitable  Corporation  v.  Sutton  who  opined  that  "(directors)  may  be 
guilty  of  acts  of  commission  or  omission,  of  malfeasance  or  non-feasance  ...  By  accepting  a  trust 
of  this  sort,  a  person  is  obliged  to  execute  it  with  fidelity  and  reasonable  diligence;  and  it  is  no 
excuse  to  say  that  they  had  no  benefit  from  it,  but  that  it  was  merely  honorary;  and  therefore, 
they  are  within  the  case  of  common  trustees'.  [(1742)  2  Atk.  400  at  p  405-406  per  Lord 
Hardwicke]. 
20  Finch  (above,  note  6)  at  p  200. 
21  Lagunas  Nitrate  Company  v.  Lagunas  Syndicate  (1899)  2  Ch.  392,435  per  Lindley  M.  R. 
22  Re  City  Equitable  Fire  and  Insurance  Co.  Ltd  (1925)  Ch  407. 
23  Trebilcock  (above,  note  6)  at  pp  97-112;  Hemraj,  Mohammed  B.,  "'The  Business  Judgement 
Rule  in  Corporate  Law",  (2004),  International  Company  and  Commercial  Law  Review,  15  (6),  192, 
153 particular  behaviour  could  definitely  be  identified  as  negligent.  With  it,  one  could  no 
longer  use  a  single  rule  of  liability.  Instead,  there  would  be  thousands  of  individual 
rules  of  liability  relative  to  the  number  of  existing  and  future  directors,  'arguably  no 
14 
standard  at  all".  It  also  would  probably  encourage  professionals  to  leave  the  field  to 
be  occupied  by  amateurs.  "  Moreover,  'a  subjective  standard  would  be  out  of  line  with 
the  duties  generally  imposed  on  persons  who  agree  to  provide  services  and  would  also 
be  out  of  step  with  many  other  jurisdictions  such  as  Australia,  Canada,  Germany  and 
the  USA  that  require  directors  to  act  as  reasonable,  competent  businessmen'.  26 
Yet,  one  may  defend  a  subjective  measure  taking  the  argument  that  it  is  very  likely  to 
increase  the  number  of  persons  who  are  ready  to  accept  directorial  office  and  take  the 
risk  of  making  business  decisions  in  companies.  But  this  is  to  be  rejected  too  since  the 
mentioned  increase  could  hardly  count  as  value  where  mainly  incompetent  individuals 
would  be  encouraged. 
IV.  1.1.  A.  2.  Objective  standard 
The  objective  standard  was  in  fact  a  product  of  inadequacies  associated  with  the 
subjective  measure.  "  According  to  this  standard,  directors"  performance  should  be 
assessed  using  the  likely  performance  of  an  ordinary  man.  This  was  first  recognised  by 
London,  UK,  Sweet  &  Maxwell,  at  pp  195-6,207;  Bourne,  Nicholas,  "Directors'  Duty  of  Care  and 
Skill",  (June-1999),  Business  Law  Review,  London,  Butterworths,  154-155. 
24  Mackenzie,  Allan  L.,  ""A  Company  Director's  Obligations  of  Care  and  Skill"',  (1982),  Journal  of 
Business  Law,  460,  at  p  461. 
25  This  is  because,  supposedly,  the  idea  advanced  by  such  a  measure  is  to  treat  professionals 
more  tightly  since  they  are  more  competent  and  have  more  qualifications  and  experiences.  By 
contrast,  a  director  who  is  less  competent  is  also  less  likely  to  face  liability.  [Mackenzie  Ibid  at  p 
4691. 
26  The  Law  Commission  (above,  note  18)  at  p  48. 
154 Foster  J  in  the  case  of  Dorchester  Finance  Co.  v  Stebbing.  2'  Foster  J  was  ignorant  of  the 
nature  of  the  duties  undertaken  by  directors  in  a  given  case  and  limited  the  application 
of  the  objective  measure  to  the  duty  of  care  as  distinguished  from  the  duty  of  skill. 
Later  decisions  rejected  the  attempted  distinction  and  took  consideration  of  the  very 
duties  undertaken  by  an  alleged  negligent  director.  A  clear  illustrative  case  in  this 
respect  is  the  Norman  &  Anor  v.  Theodore  Goddard  &  Others  in  which  Hoffman  J  opined 
that  a  judge  should  take  consideration  of  the  type  and  nature  of  duties  undertaken  by 
him/her  and  compare  their  performance  with  that  expected  of  a  reasonable  person.  " 
However,  the  proposed  objective  measure  was  criticised  from  two  dimensions.  One 
concerned  the  charge  that  while  management  of  modem  corporations  is  a  profession 
with  more  vigorous  obligations  attached,  the  objective  standard  simply  treats  them  as 
amateurs  . 
30  'Many  areas  of  business  do  require  specialized  skills  and  knowledge 
beyond  those  possessed  by  the  layman'.  "  Public  expectation  now  requires  corporate 
directors  not  only  to  meet  a  minimum  degree  of  relevant  knowledge,  skills  and 
experience,  but  also  to  possess  a  greater  degree  of  competence  and  to  act 
professionally.  32  This  charge,  although  correct  in  its  premise,  fails  to  regard  the  fact  that 
not  every  director  performs  the  same  function.  In  fact,  a  single  objective  standard  that 
27  For  arguments  against  an  objective  test  and  in  favour  of  having  a  subjective  one,  see  Riley 
(above,  note  17)  at  pp,  709-720. 
28  Dorchester  Finance  Co.  v  Stebbing  (1989),  BCLC,  498. 
29  Norman  &  Anor  v.  Theodore  Goddard  &  Others  (1992),  BCC,  p  14  per  Hoffman  J. 
Subsequently  followed  by  Hart  J.  in  Re  Landhurst  Leasing  pIc,  Secretary  of  State  for  Trade  and 
Industry  v.  Ball  and  Others  (1999)  1  BCLC  286,344;  See  also  The  Law  Commission,  (above,  note 
18),  at  p  48. 
30  The  Company  Law  Review  Steering  Group,  "'Modem  Company  Law:  Final  Report",  (2001), 
Vol.  1,  pp  31,33. 
31  The  Law  Commission,  (above,  note  18),  at  p  48. 
32  See  generally  Parkinson,  J.  E.,  "'Corporate  Power  and  Responsibility",  1993,  Oxford, 
Clarendon  Press;  New  York,  Oxford  University  Press,  at  pp  101-6,248;  Deakin,  Simon  and 
155 is  common  to  every  corporate  director  may  be  impractical  and  may  raise  unfair 
consequences.  " 
The  other  criticism  argues  that  an  objective  measure  does  not  aHow  the  courts  to  assess 
managerial  performance  in  the  light  of  their  actual  competence.  "It  would  ignore  the 
special  qualifications  that  a  director  has,  even  if  they  were  the  reason  why  the  company 
appointed  him".  "  This  was  problematic  especially  in  cases  where  managerial 
competence  exceeded  the  minimum  required  by  the  objective  measure,  in  the  sense 
that  highly  competent  and  professional  but  negligent  directors  could  escape  liability 
simply  because  they  could  meet  the  minimum  requirement  prescribed  by  the  objective 
measure. 
35 
Instead  of  a  single  objective  standard,  some  suggested  a  number  of  different  standards, 
each  applying  to  directors  of  the  same  area  of  expertise.  36  'Thus,  within  the  area  of 
professed  or  inferred  competence  of  each  director,  an  objective  standard  of  care  would 
Ferran,  Ellis  and  Nolan,  Richard,  "Shareholders'  Rights  and  Remedies:  An  Overview",  (1997), 
Company  Financial  and  Insolvency  Law  Review,  163,  Oxford,  Mansfield  Press,  at  pp  165-166. 
33  It  is  too  hard,  if  not  impossible,  to  design  a  comprehensive  measure  that  could  cover  all 
directors  and  require  them  to  meet  the  same  minimum  standard  of  behaviour.  Even  if  that 
could  practically  be  overcome,  it  would  seem  unfair  to  expect  every  director  to  have  equal 
knowledge  and  experience  of  every  aspect  of  the  company's  operations.  [See  generally 
Mackenzie  (above,  note  24)  at  p  468;  Sealy,  Len,  ""Reforming  the  Law  on  Directors'  Duties", 
(1991),  The  Company  Lawyer,  vol.  12,  No.  9,177;  Trebilcock  (above,  note  6)  at  pp  509-10;  Davies 
P.  L.,  Gower  and  Davies'  Principles  of  Modern  Company  Law,  Chapter  16,  at  p  435,  London, 
Sweet  &  Maxwell,  (2003),  7th  ed.,  at  p  435;  Worthington  (above,  note  9)  at  p  449;  The  Law 
Commission,  (above,  note  18),  at  p  48]. 
34  The  Law  Commission,  (above,  note  18),  at  p  50. 
35  In  cases  where  managerial  competence  falls  below  the  minimum  required  by  the  objective 
measure,  the  problem  is  less  serious  because  the  British  lawmaker  deliberately  sought  to  level 
tip  managerial  accountability  in  companies.  [See  The  Law  Commission,  (above,  note  18),  at  p 
50]. 
36  See  Trebilcock,  (above,  note  6),  at  511;  Mackenzie,  (above,  note  24),  at  p  470. 
156 be  applied'.  37  But  this,  too,  might  fail,  as  there  might  sometimes  not  be  a  match 
between  a  professed  or  inferred  area  and  the  actual  role  that  a  particular  director  plays 
in  a  given  company.  "The  mere  fact  that  an  individual  possesses  knowledge,  experience 
or  qualifications  would  not  be  relevant  where  these  are  not  reasonably  to  be  expected 
in  their  directorial  role'.  "  A  better  formula  is,  perhaps,  the  one  that  regards  reasonable 
skill  and  care  to  be  expected  of  directors  who  perform  within  the  same  functional 
class. 
'9 
IV.  1.1.  A.  3.  Objective/subjective  standard 
The  downsides  associated  with  both  a  single  objective  standard  and  a  single  subjective 
standard  led  the  Parliament  to  formulate  a  new  measure  of  assessment  of  directorial 
performance  in  1986.  The  formula  sets  out  the  standard  on  an  objective  /subjective 
combination  basis.  It  is  reflected  in  the  section  214  Insolvency  Act  1986  40  that  is 
primarily  concerned  with  liability  of  negligent  directors  for  wrongful  trading  in 
insolvency  proceedings  but  can  be  extended  to  their  liability  in  other  negligent  cases 
through  analogy. 
41 
The  new  formula  enabled  the  courts  to  discover  the  level  of  reasonable  care  and  skill 
expected  of  a  given  director  using  the  functions  assigned  to  them  as  guideline.  This 
37  Trebilcock,  (above,  note  6),  at  511. 
38  Finch  (above,  note  6)  at  p  203;  As  Finch  put  it,  a  director  must  show  the  skill  and  care  that 
can  be  expected  of  a  reasonable  director  doing  "their  kind  of  role  in  their  kind  of  company' 
[Finch,  lbid];  See  also  Davies  (above,  note  5)  at  p  435;  Boyle  (1992)  (above,  note  13)  at  p  7. 
39  Finch,  (above,  note  6),  at  p  203;  Davies  (above,  note  33)  at  p  435;  Boyle,  Anthony,  "The 
Common  Law  Duty  of  Care  and  Enforcement  under  S.  459",  (1996),  Company  Lawyer,  17  (3),  83, 
at  p  7. 
40  Section  214  (4)  Insolvency  Act  1986. 
41  Finch  (above,  note  6)  at  p  201;  Davies  (above,  note  33)  at  pp  432-3;  Boyle  (1996)  (above,  note 
39);  The  Law  Commission,  (above,  note  18),  at  pp  48-9. 
157 guideline  can  help  the  standard  to  more  closely  approach  the  factual  situation  of  each 
defendant  director.  However,  the  wording  of  the  section  suggested  that  a  negligent 
director,  whose  skill  and  experience  sits  below  the  minimum  required  by  the  objective 
measure,  can  escape  liability  because,  to  establish  liability  for  negligent  directors,  it 
was  equally  a  requirement  that  the  courts  should  consider  their  knowledge  and  skill.  '2 
In  the  light  of  case  law,  observations  made  by  critics  and  recommendations  delivered 
by  the  Law  Commission,  "  the  government  is  now  seeking  to  address  the  above- 
mentioned  shortfall. 
44 
Yet  one  may  object  to  the  proposed  formulation,  taking  the  view  that  such  formulation 
would  put  directors  in  a  dilemma.  How  could  directors,  he  asks,  be  motivated  to  serve 
their  companies,  while  they  are  always  liable  to  attribution  of  liability  for  behaviours 
they  have  had  no  control  over  theM?  4'  However,  the  objection  must  be  rejected  for  a 
number  of  good  reasons.  For  one,  the  law  wants  to  encourage  competent  persons  who 
are  most  likely  to  take  reasonable  commercial  risks  rather  than  every  ambitious  and 
incompetent,  but  opportunist,  person  who  may  either  want  to  shirk  duties  or  gamble 
with  shareholders  money  in  corporations  . 
4'  For  another,  personal  competence  of  a 
given  director  is  not  something  completely  beyond  his/her  control.  A  director  is  often 
42  Bourne  (above,  note  23)  at  pp  154-155. 
43  The  Law  Commission,  (above,  note  18),  at  p  49. 
44  Part  B  section  5,  Company  Law  Reform,  White  Paper,  March  2005,  CM6456  available  at  the 
Department  of  Trade  and  Industry's  website  in  the  following  address: 
http:  //www.  dti-gov.  uk/cld/4.  pdf. 
45  Riley,  (above,  note  17),  at  pp  709-12. 
46  This  mixture  formulation  is  a  deliberative  choice  made  by  the  English  company  law  that  was 
concerned  about  the  dramatic  rise  in  the  number  of  mismanagement  cases  and  hence  sought  to 
discourage  incompetent  persons  and  to  level  up  "with  greater  awareness,  the  responsibilities  of 
directors'.  [The  Law  Commission,  (above,  note  18),  at  p  49].  Besides,  the  existence  of  a  market  in 
directors  &  officers  liability  insurance  can  eliminate  or  at  least  reduce  the  threat  of  being 
personally  responsible  for  taking  negligent  corporate  decisions.  [The  Law  Commission,  Ibid.  ]. 
158 aware  of  his  capabilities  at  the  very  beginning  of  his  selection,  and  can  choose  not  to 
nominate  himself  for  the  post  if  he  finds  himself  unfit  for  it.  When  he  irresponsibly 
insists  on  taking  the  post  by  asserting  that  he  has  the  expertise  the  company  is  seeking 
and  takes,  or  assists  the  board  to  take,  some  bad  business  decision,  the  argument  that 
the  alleged  behaviour  was  beyond  his  control  does  seem  rather  unsatisfactory.  " 
W.  M.  B.  Fiduciary  duty 
IV.  1.1.  B.  1.  Background 
Directors,  as  agents,  are  employed  by  companies  to  direct  their  business.  Once  in 
power,  they  may  want  either  to  pursue  self-interested  projects  or  may  simply  pay 
inadequate  attention  to  the  affairs  and  business  of  their  companies.  They  normally 
assume  directorial  posts  for  reasons  of  personal  benefit  rather  than  for  some 
philanthropic  purposes.  Thus,  in  cases  of  conflict  of  interests,  they  might  prioritise 
their  own  benefits  over  those  of  their  companies.  By  imposition  of  fiduciary  duty, 
company  law  wants  directors  to  act  with  good  faith  and  in  the  honest  belief  that  they 
are  acting  in  the  best  interest  of  their  companies  rather  than  their  owns  . 
48  It  is 
necessary,  however,  as  Davies  pointed  out,  to  bear  in  mind  that  "a  person  who  is 
fiduciary  and  who  acts  negligently  does  not,  without  more,  commit  a  breach  of 
47  Davies,  (above,  note  33),  at  pp  433-4;  Lord  Hope  of  Craighead,  "The  Duties  of  a  Director", 
Company  Lawyer,  (2000),  21(2),  49-50. 
48  For  fiduciary  duty  see  Re  Smith  &  Fawcett  (1942),  Ch  302,  at  304  per  Lord  Green  MR;  see  also 
Aberdeen  Railway  Co  v.  Blaikie  Bros.  (1854),  1  Macq.  H.  L.  461  at  471  per  Lord  Granworth;  Regal 
(Hastings)  Ltd.  v.  Gulliver  (1942),  All  ER  378;  Cook  v.  Deeks  (1916),  1  AC  554;  Percival  v. 
Wright  (1902),  Ch  421;  Hogg  v.  Cramphorn  (1967),  Ch  254;  Isle  of  Wight  v.  Tahourdin,  (1883), 
25,  Ch  D,  320;  Haward  Smith  Ltd.  v.  Ampol  Ltd.  (1974),  AC  821;  Multinational  Gas  and 
Petrochemical  Co.  v.  Multinational  Gas  and  Petrochemical  Services  Ltd.,  (1983),  Ch  258;  Lonrho 
Ltd.  v.  Shell  Petroleum  Co.  Ltd.,  (1980),  1  WLR  627  at  p  634,  (1980)  QB  358;  West  Mercia  Safety 
Wear  Ltd.  v.  Dodd,  (1988),  BCLC  250;  Also  see  Companies  Act  1985  ss  309,317,346,72"/. 
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. 
49For  that  to  occur,  the  alleged  act  must  have  not  only  the  attribute  of 
negligence,  but  also  that  of  bad  faith  and  disloyalty.  However,  directors"  duty  is  only  to 
act  according  to  what  they,  themselves,  regard  as  being  the  best  interest  of  company.  it 
follows  that  their  duty  is  assessed  subjectively.  In  other  words,  they  will  not  be  held 
responsible  for  a  mal-identification  of  the  best  interest  of  the  company  if  they  honestly 
believed  it  to  enhance  company  interests. 
As  well  as  preventing  directors  from  self-interested  behaviours,  fiduciary  duty  requires 
directors  to  avoid  pursuing  interests  of  any  specific  interested  group  but  shareholders 
within  the  corporate  constituency.  Company  law  is  traditionally  described  as 
'shareholder-centred'  or  based  on  a  norm  of  shareholder  primacy.  50  This  means  that 
companies  are  incorporated  and  work  to  further  only  shareholders'  wealth.  The  most 
direct  manifestation  of  the  norm  is  the  law  relating  to  fiduciary  duty.  "  Directors  as 
people  who  make  most  decisions  in  companies  have  a  fiduciary  duty  to  make  decisions 
that  are  in  the  best  interests  of  their  company"  and  for  a  business  company  this  means 
only  the  financial  interests  of  the  company  shareholders.  "  In  practice,  the  norm  was 
tended  to  be  construed  by  the  case  law  rather  narrowly  only  to  cover  the  interests  of 
49  Davies,  (above,  note  33),  at  p  435. 
50  Mayson  Stephan,  French  Derek  and  Ryan  Christopher,  "Mayson,  French  &  Ryan  on 
Company  Law"'  (2001),  18th  ed.,  London,  Blackstone,  at  p  13;  Roe,  Mark  J.,  "The  Shareholder 
Wealth  Maximization  Norm  and  Industrial  Organisation"",  'Harvard  Law  School',  (2001), 
available  at  Social  Science  Research  Network  (SSRN),  Electronic  Library  at: 
http:  /  /papers 
-  ssrn.  com  /  abstractid  =282703,  at  p  3;  Smith  D.  Gordon,  "'The  Shareholder 
Primacy  Norm",  (1998),  The  journal  of  Corporation  Law,  Iowa  City,  University  of  Iowa,  College 
of  Law,  at  pp  297-303;  See  also  Hill  Jeniffer,  "Visions  and  Revisions  of  the  Shareholder",  The 
American  journal  of  Comparative  Law,  (2000),  Vol.  48,  Berkeley,  Ca.,  American  Association  for 
the  Comparative  Study  of  Law,  at  p  43;  Hill  Jenniffer,  "'Public  Beginnings,  Private  Ends-Should 
Corporate  Law  Privilege  the  Interests  of  Shareholders?  ",  International  Corporate  Law,  Edited 
by  Fiona  Macmillan,  Vol.  1,  (2000)  Oxford,  Hart,  at  p  20. 
51  Smith  (above,  note  50)  at  p  278;  Ferran  Eilis,  "Company  Law  and  Corporate  Finance"',  (1999), 
Oxford,  Oxford  University  Press,  at  p  134. 
52  Companies  Act  1985  Sec.  309(2). 
160 the  majority  shareholders  as  against  minority  shareholders  as  well  as  other  non- 
shareholder  participants  in  corporate  commonwealth  . 
54  MS 
traditional  tendency  was 
also  recognised  by  many  of  the  company  law  scholars. 
55 
Traditional  tendency  aside,  modern  English  company  law  also  tends  towards 
appreciation  of  the  shareholder  primacy  norm.  For  example,  company  law  reviewers  in 
their  report  ruled  out  any  task  for  company  law  which  requires  redistribution  and 
reallocation  of  corporate  benefits  between  different  participants  in  the  economy  on 
grounds  of  fairness,  social  justice  or  any  similar  criteria.  "  This  shareholder  centred 
focus  can  also  be  traced  in  statutory  provisions  regarding  directors'  duties  in 
Companies  Act  1985.  For  example,  section  309(l)  requires  directors  of  companies  to 
regard  employee  as  well  as  shareholder  interests.  "  Although,  a  company  director  has  a 
duty  to  consider  interests  of  employees,  nonetheless,  the  mentioned  duty  does  not  give 
employees  legal  right  to  enforce  it  against  directors.  Employees'  interest  is  seen  as  a 
matter  of  general  concern"  and  as  Goddard  explained  it  signals  that  in  company  law 
the  stakeholder  debate  is  viewed  as  being  an  aspect  of  directorial  decision-making 
rather  than  something  that  can  provide  certain  protection  or  voice  for  non-shareholder 
53  Ferran  (above,  note  51)  at  pp  125-6. 
54  Leader,  Sheldon,  "'Private  Property  and  Corporate  Governance:  Part  1:  Defining  the  Interests" 
in  Kluwer  Law  International,  Editted  by  Fiona  Macmillan,  (1995),  94,  Patfield,  London  at  p  94- 
96;  Smith  (above,  note  50)  at  p  279. 
55  Gower  L.  C.  B.,  "'Gower's  Principles  of  Modem  Company  Law",  4th  ed.,  London,  (1979), 
Stevens,  at  pp  553-4;  See  also  Manne  Henry,  "'Some  Theoretical  Aspects  of  Share  Voting  in  the 
Economics  of  Legal  Relationships",  Columbia  Law  Review,  New  York,  Columbia  University 
Press,  1964,  Vol.  64,1427;  Farrar  John  H.,  "Company  Law",  1985,  London,  Butterworths,  at  p 
266. 
56  Modern  Company  Law  for  a  Competitive  Economy:  The  Strategic  Framework,  (London,  DTI, 
1998),  para  2.5;  See  also  Mayson  Et  Al.  (above,  note  50)  at  p  12. 
57  Section  3090)  Companies  Act  1985. 
58  Mayson  Et  Al.  (above,  note  50)  at  p  13. 
161 constituencies.  '9  Unlike  employees,  shareholders  whose  interest  must  be  regarded  by 
corporate  directors  receive  full  protection  in  law.  They  have  legal  right  to  enforce 
directors'  duty.  60  In  addition  to  this,  only  shareholders  have  right  to  dismiss  directors 
from  the  office  6'  and  further  only  they  can  take  petition  to  the  court  for  a  relief  under  s 
62  459  if  the  conduct  of  the  company  affairs  is  unfairly  prejudicial  to  their  interests.  In 
one  exceptional  occasion  where  the  company  is  insolvent,  however,  law  allows 
directors  to  disregard  shareholder  interest  in  favour  of  creditors.  In  such  case  directors 
must  prioritise  interests  of  company  creditors  over  those  of  shareholders.  63 
However,  companies  can  affect  not  only  a  number  of  shareholder  and  non-shareholder 
groupS64  but  also  nearly  every  aspect  of  people"s  life 
. 
6'  They  produce  food  and  supply 
energy,  fuel,  light,  shelter  and  many  other  products  on  which  the  lives  of  most  citizens 
59  Goddard  Robert,  "Modernising  Company  Law"":  The  Government's  White  Paper",  Modern 
Law  Review,  (2003)  66  (3),  London,  Stevens  &  Sons,  at  p  415. 
60  Section  309(2)  Companies  Act  1985. 
61  Section  303,  CA  1985. 
62  Section  459,  CA  1985;  See  also  generally  Mayson  Et  Al.  (above,  note  50)  at  p  13;  Roe  (above, 
note  50)  at  p3. 
63  Section  214  Insolvency  Act  1986.  This  duty  towards  creditors'  interests  has  recently  been 
extended  by  common  law  from  actual  insolvency  cases  to  cases  where  director  could 
reasonably  knew  or  should  have  known  that  the  company  will  face  insolvency.  See 
Multinational  Gas  and  Petrochemical  Co.  v.  Multinational  Gas  and  Petrochemical  Services  Ltd., 
(1983),  Ch  258;  Lonrho  Ltd.  v.  Shell  Petroleum  Co.  Ltd.,  (1980),  1  WLR  627  at  p  634;  West  Mercia 
Safety  Wear  Ltd.  v.  Dodd,  (1988),  BCLC  250;  Yukong  Ltd.  v.  Rendsburg  Investments 
Corporation,  (No.  2),  1998,1  WLR  249;  See  generally  Mayson  Et  Al.  (above,  note  50)  at  pp  514- 
516,744;  Ferran  (above,  note  51)  at  pp  481-4. 
64  Lee  Hazen  Thomas,  "'Silencing  the  Shareholders'  Voice",  North  Carolina  Law  Review,  (2002), 
Vol.  80,  Chapel  Hill,  North  Carolina  Law  Review  Association,  at  p  1899;  Ratner  David  L.,  "The 
Government  of  Business  Corporations:  Critical  Reflections  on  the  Rule  of  One  Share,  One  Vote", 
Cornell  Law  Review,  (1970),  Number  1,  Vol.  56,  Cornell  University,  Cornell  Law  School,  at  p  1. 
65  "Our  style  of  life  is  largely  determined  by  the  activities  and  style  of  business;  and  the  style  of 
business  is  largely  determined  by  the  activities  and  style  of  our  companies".  [Confederation  of 
British  Industry,  "The  Responsibilities  of  the  British  Public  Company:  Final  Report  of  the 
Companv  Affairs  Committee  of  the  Confederation  of  British  Industry",  London,  Confederation 
of  British  lndustrv,  1973,  at  p  8]. 
162 66  depend.  They  can  also  affect  the  government  through  influencing  important  issues 
like  production,  investment  and  employment  that  are  matters  of  public  concern  and 
that  are  subject  of  governmental  policies.  67  The  public,  the  government  and  many 
interest  groups  that  are  affected  by,  or  have  interest  in,  corporations  could  be 
disappointed  and  perhaps  injured  if  corporations  only  focussed  on  maximizing 
majority  shareholder  wealth.  Hence,  overtime  the  traditional  view  of  the  shareholder 
primacy  norm  has  gradually  evolved  into  a  subsequent  recognition  by  the  courts  that 
the  concept  of  shareholder  interest  includes  those  of  majority  as  well  as  minority 
shareholders.  Upon  such  evolution,  the  courts  required  directors  to  act  in  the  interest 
of  all  shareholders  not  just  the  majority.  68  This  was,  in  fact,  a  product  of  gradual 
rethinking  about  corporate  existence  and  objective.  On  the  one  hand,  evolution  of  the 
real  entity  theory,  which  recognised  separate  personality  and  interest  for  corporations, 
helped  the  courts  to  see  companies  as  entities  that  are  separated  from  their  component 
shareholders.  "  On  the  other  hand,  expansion  of  the  idea  of  democracy  in  companies, 
which  extended  the  concept  of  constituency,  plus  a  raise  of  doubts  that  undermined 
traditional  justifications  for  legitimacy  of  private  power  70  contributed  to  question  about 
accuracy  of  the  traditional  theory.  The  main  question,  from  this  perspective,  for  many 
scholars  in  company  law  arena  became  whose  interest  must  be  paramount  in 
66  Mason  Edward  S.,  "Introduction".  in  The  Corporation  in  Modern  Society,  Editted  by  Edward 
Sagendorph  Mason,  1960,  Cambridge,  Mass,  at  pI 
67  Parkinson  (above,  note  32)  at  pp  8-9,19. 
68  Smith  (above,  note  50)  at  p  279;  Hale  Christopher,  "'What's  Right  With  the  Rule  in  Foss  v 
Harbottle?  ",  (1997),  Company  Financial  and  Insolvency  Law  Review,  219,  Oxford,  Mansfield 
Press. 
69  Hager  Mark  M.,  "'Bodies  Politic:  The  Progressive  History  of  Organizational  'Real  Entity' 
Theory"',  University  of  Pittsburgh  Law  Review,  (1989),  Vol.  50,  Pittsburgh,  at  p  633-4;  Ferran 
(above,  note  51)  at  p  134. 
70  Parkinson  (above,  note  32)  at  pp  1,9;  Norwits  T.  S.,  "The  Metaphysics  of  Time:  a  Radical 
Corporate  Vision",  Greens  Business  Law  Bulletin,  1991,46,377,  Edinbourgh,  W.  Green  &  Son 
Ltd.,  at  p  387. 
163 companies?  Generally  speaking,  law,  economic,  and  political  scholars  on  this  question 
have  been  grouped  into  two  main  camps,  the  shareholder  primacy  camp  and  the 
stakeholder  camp. 
IV.  1.1.  B.  2.  Shareholder  primacy  theories 
To  justify  shareholder  primacy  norm,  scholars  in  this  camp  often  support  a 
contractarian  view  in  which  shareholders  are  seen  as  either  owners  of  or  beneficiaries 
in  or  residual  claimants  in  companies.  Hence,  three  different  contract-based  theories 
can  be  characterized  a  major  common  feature  of  them  is  the  shareholder  wealth 
maximization  norm.  According  to  these  theories  restricting  company  management  to 
the  single  objective  of  maximizing  shareholder  wealth  is  the  most  efficient  means  of 
using  companies  to  increase  the  wealth  of  society  as  a  whole.  71 
The  first,  the  "shareholder-owner'  theory,  which  was  the  prevailing  theory  in  19th 
century"  and  which  was  based  on  the  concept  of  agency,  assumed  a  principal/agent 
relationship  between  shareholders  as  owner  and  directors  as  agents.  73  according  to  it, 
directors  were  required  to  perform  the  will  of  shareholders  and  to  further  their 
74 
interests  and  shareholders  had  a  formal  right  to  control  the  directors.  A  recent 
example  for  this  is  the  Noble  Prize-wining  economist,  Milton  Friedman,  who  argued 
71  Easterbrook  Frank  H.  and  Fischel  Daniel  R.,  "'The  Economic  Structure  of  Corporate  Law", 
(1991),  Cambridge,  Mass.  London,  Harvard  University  Press,  at  p  38. 
72  Hill,  "Visions  and  Revisions  of  the  Shareholder",  (above,  note  50)  at  p  42. 
73  Lee  Hazen  (above,  note  64)  at  p  1900. 
74  See  Hill  "Visions  and  Revisions  of  the  Shareholder",  (above,  note  50)  at  p  42;  Hill,  "Public 
Beginnings,  Pri\,  ate  Ends",  (above,  note  50)  at  p  21. 
164 that  because  shareholders  of  corporations  are  "'the  owners  of  the  business"  the  only 
"social  responsibility  of  business  is  to  increase  its  profits".  " 
The  second,  the  -shareholder-beneficiary'  theory  which  was  introduced  in  the  early  20th 
century  and  which  relied  on  the  concept  of  trust,  assumed  that  shareholders  are  not 
owner  but  beneficiaries  for  whom  managerial  powers  are  held  in  truSt.  76  Recognition  of 
corporations  as  separated  bodies  77 
/  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  gradual  separation  of 
shareholders'  right  of  ownership  from  their  controlling  power  7'  and  a  relocation  of  the 
latter  in  hands  of  managers  79  which  occurred  due  to  the  industrialisation  of  the 
economy,  "  on  the  other  hand,  contributed  to  make  the  traditional  view  of  ownership- 
based  shareholder  primacy  defunct.  Nonetheless,  shareholder  primacy  norm  itself  has 
never  been  abolished.  In  fact  it  has  been  redecorated  by  the  theory  in  a  new  form  of  a 
beneficiary-based  analysis.  "  In  this  analysis,  although  shareholders  had  already 
abandoned  their  controlling  power  in  favour  of  directors,  they  remained  the  only 
financial  beneficiaries  of  the  company's  activities. 
75  See  Milton  Friedman,  "The  Social  Responsibility  of  Business  Is  to  Increase  Its  Profits",  New 
York  Times  Magazine,  Sept.  13,1970,  at  32-33,122-126,  quoted  in  Stout  Lynn  A.,  "Bad  and  Not- 
So-Bad  Arguments  for  Shareholder  Primacy"',  (2002),  Southern  California  Law  Review,  Vol.  75, 
1189,  at  p  1190-1. 
76  Berle  Adolf  A.,  "'Corporate  Powers  as  Powers  in  Trust"",  (1931),  44,  Harvard  Law  Review, 
1049,  Cambridge,  Mass,  Harvard  Law  Review  Association,  at  1073. 
77  Hager  (above,  note  69)  at  pp  633-4;  Hill  ""Visions  and  Revisions  of  the  Shareholder"',  (above, 
note  50)  at  p  44. 
78  Berle  Adolf  A.  and  Means  Gardiner  C.,  "The  Modern  Corporation  and  Private  Property", 
(Revised  edition,  1968),  New  York,  Macmillan,  at  p  245. 
79  This  was  allagedly  a  consequence  of  collective  action  problem  and  the  use  of  proxy 
machinery  by  managers.  [Berle  &  Means  Ibid,  at  pp  71-82,129-131  J. 
80  Minett  Ste\'e,  "Power,  Politics,  and  Participation  in  the  Firm",  (1992),  Aldershot,  Avebury,  at 
pp  186-187. 
81  Hill,  "Visions  and  Revisions  of  the  Shareholder"',  (above,  note  50)  at  p  44. 
165 The  third,  the  new  contractual  theory,  which  was  developed  in  the  late  20th  century, 
sees  a  company  as  a  larger  container  for  a  nexus  of  contracts  among  the  resource 
providers  (employees,  directors,  engineers,  shareholders,  suppliers,  etc.  )  in  the 
company.  "  A  famous  example  of  this  theory  is  the  argument  presented  by  Easterbrook 
and  Fischel  who  claim  while  shareholders  may  not  be  the  owners  of  the  corporation, 
they  are  at  least  its  sole  residual  claimants.  In  contrast  to  other  interest  groups  in  the 
company,  shareholders  rely  on  an  implicit  contract  that  entitles  them  to  whatever 
remains  after  the  firm  has  met  its  explicit  obligations  and  paid  its  fixed  claims.  Hence,  a 
company  has  to  be  directed  in  a  manner,  which  maxin-dzes  shareholders"  interests,  but 
it  is  not  for  they  are  the  owners  or  beneficiaries.  It  is  for  they  are  the  residual  claimants. 
As  shareholders  are  the  sole  residual  risk  and  profit  bearers,  firms  should  be  run  with 
an  eye  towards  maximizing  their  wealth.  "  Although  directors'  duty  is  to  shareholders, 
the  latter  almost  ceases  his  controlling  power  because  it  is  seen  as  not  only  impossible 
but  also  unnecessary  and  perhaps  sometimes  problematic. 
Shareholder  primacy  theories  have  substantive  deficiencies.  To  begin  with, 
shareholders  do  not,  in  fact,  own  the  corporation.  Rather,  they  only  own  a  type  of 
corporate  security  which  is  called  stock.  Therefore,  it  is  misleading  to  use  the  language 
of  ownership  to  explain  the  relationship  between  a  company  and  its  shareholders. 
Likewise,  shareholders  are  not  simply  beneficiaries  in  a  trust  analysis.  They  own  shares 
in  the  company  which  gives  them  rights  and  power  to  have  the  corporation  directed  in 
82  Easterbrook  Frank  H.  and  Fischel  Daniel  R.,  ""Voting  in  Corporate  Law"',  The  journal  of  Law 
and  Economics,  (1983),  Chicago,  University  of  Chicago  Law  School,  at  p  401;  Farrar  (above,  note 
55)  at  pp  3-6;  Posner  Richard  A.,  "Economic  Analysis  of  Law",  (1992),  Boston,  London,  Little, 
Brown,  at  pp  14,409-411;  Cheffins  Brian  R,  "Company  Law:  Theory  Structure  And  Operation", 
(1997),  Oxford,  Clarendon  Press,  at  p  41. 
166 their  interests.  Shareholders  further  do  not  appear  to  be  the  only  residual  claimants  M 
the  company.  In  reality,  they  are  only  one  of  several  groups  that  can  be  described  as 
residual  claimants.  84  Also  from  corporate  finance  perspective,  share  capital  no  longer 
play  a  unique  role  in  contemporary  large  corporations  given  that  many  companies 
now  prefer  to  afford  their  needed  capital  through  intra  group  loans  and  debt  sources. 
Besides,  concepts  of  debt  and  equity  have  become  increasingly  ambiguous  considering 
that  preference  shares,  while  classified  as  equity,  are  often  functionally  equivalent  to 
debt.  " 
In  addition  to  these,  shareholder  primacy  theories  seem  deficient  on  the  basis  that  they 
ignore  the  decisive  role  that  other  participants  can  play  in  the  success  of  companies.  If 
corporations  are  viewed  as  teamwork  vehicles,  then  it  must  be  accepted  that  corporate 
directors  should  give  regards  to  interests  of  all  participants.  " 
IV.  1.1.  B.  3.  Stakeholder  theories 
Stakeholder  theories  can  be  seen  as  a  product  of  viewing  corporations  from  a  political 
perspective  87  According  to  them,  a  corporation  like  any  entity  composed  of  individuals 
83  Easterbrook  &  Fischel  (above,  note  82)  at  p  403;  Farrar  John  H.,  "'Company  Law",  (1991), 
London,  Butterworths,  at  pp  224-5. 
84  "When  the  firm  is  doing  well,  for  example,  employees  receive  raises  and  enjoy  greater  job 
security,  managers  get  use  of  a  company  jet,  and  bondholders  enjoy  increased  protection  from 
corporate  insolvency.  Conversely  these  groups  suffer  along  with  shareholders  when  times  are 
bad,  as  employees  face  reductions  in  force,  managers  are  told  to  fly  coach,  and  debt  holders  face 
increased  risk"'.  [Stout  (above,  note  75)  at  pp  1190-11951. 
85  Hill,  "Visions  and  Revisions  of  the  Shareholder",  (above,  note  50)  at  pp  22-23. 
86  See  Blair  Margaret  M.  and  Stout  Lynn  A.,  "A  Team  Production  Theory  of  Corporate  Law", 
(1999),  Virginia  Law  Review,  85,247,  Charlottesville,  Va.,  Virginia  Law  Review  Association,  at  p 
247;  Stout  (above,  note  75)  at  p  1195. 
87  Buxbaum  Richard  M.,  "The  Internal  Division  of  Powers  in  Corporate  Governance",  (1985), 
California  Law  Review,  No.  6,  vol.  73,  Berkeley,  Calif.,  University  of  California,  School  of 
jurisprudence  at  p  1671;  Selznick  Philip,  "'Law,  Society,  and  Industrial  justice",  Russell  Sage 
Foundation,  (1969),  at  p  259. 
167 should  be  governed  by  a  democratic  majority  rule.  "  They,  however,  vary  depending 
either  upon  whom  they  count  to  be  citizens  in  corporate  constituency  or  in  whose 
interest  corporate  power  is  to  serve.  "  Both  variables  suggest  a  two-sided 
categorisation.  On  the  one  side,  there  are  theories  that  emphasise  on  the  application  of 
the  idea  of  democracy  in  order  to:  activate  shareholder  participatory  right;  impose 
some  checks  on  the  power  of  controllers,  increase  the  level  of  accountability  of 
managers;  and  strike  balance  in  decision-making.  They  all  argue  against  expansion  of 
the  corporate  constituency  and  do  not  recognise  any  duty  for  companies  to  give  regard 
to  the  interests  of  the  community  at  large.  'O  They  differ  not  very  much  from  contractual 
theories  as  they  see  only  a  single  constituency  of  shareholders  whose  interests  are  pre- 
eminent.  9'  On  the  other  side,  there  are  theories  that  want  to  extend  groups  whose 
interest  must  be  observed  by  the  company  management.  Only  these  latter  theories  can 
be  named  as  stakeholder  theories  because  only  they  consider  interests  of  other  affected 
groups  and  they  do  so  in  two  ways.  They  either  assume  a  duty  for  companies  to 
consider  interests  of  the  community  at  large"  or  extend  the  concept  of  citizenship 
within  the  corporate  constituency. 
93 
88  See  generally  Buxbaum  Ibid;  Mason  (above,  note  66)  at  p  1-5;  Pound  John,  ""The  Rise  of  The 
Political  Model  of  Corporate  Governance  and  Corporate  Control",  (1993),  New  York  University 
Law  Review,  vol.  68,1003  at  pp  1007-1013,  New  York,  New  York  University  School  of  Law; 
Latham  Earl,  "The  Body  Politic  of  The  Corporation",  in  The  Corporation  in  Modem  Society 
edited  by  Edward  Sagendorph  Mason  (ed.  ),  (1960),  5,  Cambridge,  Mass,  pp  218-220;  Bottomley 
Stephen,  "From  Contractualism  to  Constitutionalism:  A  Framework  for  Corporate 
Governance"',  (1997),  Sydney  Law  Review,  vol.  19,277,  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Sydney, 
Sydney,  at  pp  288-291;  Brewster  Kigman,  "'The  Corporation  and  Economic  Federalism",  in  The 
Corporation  in  Modern  Society  edited  by  Edward  Sagendorph  Mason  (ed.  ),  (1960),  5, 
Cambridge,  Mass  at  72;  Villiers  Charlotte,  "'European  Company  Law-Towards  Democracy?  ", 
European  Business  law  Library,  (1997),  Aldershot,  Ashgate,  pp  197-205;  Hill,  "'Visions  and 
Revisions  of  the  Shareholder"',  (above,  note  50)  at  pp  51-57. 
89  Hill  Ibid.  at  p  54;  Mason  (above,  note  66). 
90  Buxbaum  (above,  note  87);  Pound  (above,  note  88);  Bottomley  (above,  note  88)  at  p  277. 
91  Hill,  "Visions  and  Revisions  of  the  Shareholder",  (above,  note  50)  at  p  54. 
92  Norwits  (above,  note  70)  at  p  387;  Dodd  Merrick  E.,  "For  Whom  Are  Corporate  Managers 
Trustees"',  (1932),  45,  Harvard  Law  Review,  1145  Cambridge,  Mass,  Harvard  Law  Review 
168 The  stakeholder  theory  can  itself  be  categorised  into  two  sub-branches  depending  on 
the  extent  to  which  they  expand  constituency.  One  that  is  known  as  the  Industrial 
Democracy  only  seeks  to  include  employee  interests.  This  is  not  for  employees  have 
some  sort  of  ownership  right,  but  for  they  are  subjects  of  authority  and  that  in 
democracy  collective  decisions  should  be  based  on  and  conducted  in  accordance  with 
the  interests  of  those  who  are  affected,  in  particular,  those  who  are  the  subject  of  the 
authority.  94  Employee  involvement  was  also  defended  using  the  ownership  argument. 
In  this  view,  corporate  constituency  includes  persons  who  have  contributed  inputs  in 
the  company  coffer  and  such  input  may  be  either  human  or  finance  capital.  As  both 
shareholders  and  employees  bear  the  risk  of  investment  in  companies,  they  should  be 
given  equal  weight.  " 
The  other  makes  further  extension  and  takes  into  account  interests  of  wider 
constituency  including  consumers,  suppliers,  creditors,  directors,  environmental 
groups,  local  communities,  and  the  society  at  large.  It  views  corporations  as  entities 
that  have  social  responsibility  to  regard  interests  of  other  stakeholders.  As  citizens 
Association,  at  pp  1148,1149;  Mason  (above,  note  66)  at  pp  4  -5;  Selznick  (above,  note  87)  at  p 
259;  Parkinson  (above,  note  32  at  pp  1,9. 
93  See  Villiers  (above,  note  88)  at  pp  197-205;  Brewster  (above,  note  88)  at  p  72;  Hill,  "Visions 
and  Revisions  of  the  Shareholder""  (above,  note  50)  at  p  54. 
94  Villiers  (above,  note  88)  at  pp  197-223;  Stone  Kathrine  Van  Wezel,  ""Labour  Markets, 
Employment  Contracts,  and  Corporate  Change",  in  McCahery  Joseph,  Picciotto  Sol  and  Scott 
Colin  (ed.  ),  Clarendon  Press,  Oxford,  (1993),  p  61  at  92-93;  Dahl  Robert  A.,  "A  Preface  to 
Economic  Democracy",  (1985),  Berkeley,  University  of  California,  at  pp  75-82;  Walzer  Michael, 
"Spheres  of  justice:  A  Defence  of  Pluralism  and  Equality",  1983,  Oxford,  Robertson,  at  pp  293-4; 
Gewirth  Alan,  "Community  of  Rights",  (1996),  Chicago,  London,  University  of  Chicago  Press, 
at  p  262,266,285;  Ratner  (above,  note  64)  at  pp  260-285;  Pateman  Carol,  ""Participation  and 
Democratic  Theory",  (1970),  London,  Cambridge  U-P,  at  pp  42-45;  Macpherson  C.  B.,  "The  Life 
and  Time  of  Liberal  Democracy",  (1977),  Oxford,  Oxford  University  Press,  at  pp  93-100. 
95  Blair  Margaret  M.,  "Ownership  and  Control:  Rethinking  Corporate  Governance  for  the 
Twentv  First  Century",  Washington  Brooking  Institute,  (1995),  at  p  239. 
169 enjoy  rights  against  abuse  of  power  by  public  bodies,  they  also  have  such  rights  against 
ý11  96 
abuse  of  power  by  private  institutions. 
Stakeholder  theories  have  also  been  defended  using  the  so-called  'team  production 
argument.  According  to  this  argument,  stakeholder  involvement  will  promote 
efficiency  by  encouraging  all  interested  groups  to  participate  actively  in  the  corporate 
field.  Shareholders  alone  cannot  make  a  firm  work.  Corporate  production  is  dependant 
on  inputs  from  a  number  of  different  groups.  Suppliers,  creditors,  employees, 
managers,  and  even  local  community  often  must  make  contributions  in  order  for  an 
enterprise  to  succeed.  Therefore,  from  an  efficiency  perspective,  the  ideal  rule  of 
corporate  governance  is  to  require  corporate  directors  to  regard  the  interests  of  all 
groups  participating  in  the  process  of  production  which  is  in  the  long  run  beneficial  to 
shareholders 
too.  97 
Stakeholder  theories  suffer  from  major  difficulties  too.  For  one,  they  are  not  very 
compatible  with  the  apolitical  sphere  of  companies  whose  main  objective  is  suggested 
to  be  maximising  shareholder  wealth  rather  than  distribution  of  fairness  and  social 
justice.  While  citizens  in  societies  "have  diverse  values  and  objectives  which  have  to  be 
96  Sheikh  Saleem  and  Chatterjee  S.  K.,  "'Perspective  on  Corporate  Governance",  in  'Corporate 
Governance  and  Corporate  Control'  edited  by  Sheikh  Saleem  and  Rees  William  (ed.  ), 
Cavendish  Publishing  Ltd.,  London,  (1995),  pp  36-37,55-56;  Sheikh  Saleem  and  Rees  William, 
"Corporate  Governance  and  Corporate  Control-Self-Regulation  or  Statutory  Codification?  ",  in 
'Corporate  Governance  and  Corporate  Control'  edited  by  Sheikh  Saleem  and  Rees  William 
(ed.  ),  Cavendish  Publishing  Ltd.,  London,  (1995),  pp  365-366;  Tromans  Stephen,  "Directors' 
Responsibilities  and  Shareholders'  Wishes-2",  (Jan  1998),  148(l),  21,  New  Law  journal 
Practitioner,  London,  Butterworths,  at  pp  21-22. 
97  See  Blair  &  Stout  (above,  note  86)  at  247;  Stout  (above,  note  75)  at  p  1195;  See  also  Bowels  and 
Gintis,  "'A  Political  and  Economic  Case  for  the  Democratic  Enterprise"  in  The  Idea  of 
Democracy  edited  by  David  Copp,  Jean  Hampton  and  John  E.  Roemer  (eds.  ),  (1993),  375, 
Cambridge,  Cambridge  University  Press,  at  pp  390-392;  Villiers  (above,  note  88)  at  p  203. 
170 balanced  against  one  another,  an  association  is  a  group  in  which  all  members  pursue 
one  or  more  of  the  same  objectives,  the  objectives  which  state  the  association's  reason 
for  existence'.  "  Restricting  company  managements  to  the  single  objective  of 
maximizing  shareholder  wealth  can  serve  as  the  most  efficient  means  of  using 
companies  to  increase  the  welfare  and  wealth  of  people  in  societies.  "  For  another, 
stakeholder  theories  can  impose  on  companies  too  much  agency  costs.  Through 
recognising  an  excessive  role  of  balancer  for  directors  and  by  eliminating  the 
monitoring  role  of  shareholders",  they  allow  corporate  directors  to  pursue  their 
personal  interests  under  the  shelter  of  the  corporate  or  stakeholder  interest.  Thus,  even 
though  stakeholder  theories  offer  some  benefits,  the  risks  associated  with  them  often 
outweigh  those  of  its  benefits  even  for  a  minority  shareholder.  "' 
IV.  1.1.  B.  4.  Recent  developments 
The  goverrunent  recently  took  the  view  that  both  the  shareholder  and  stakeholder 
theories  are  important  and  influential  to  corporate  success  and  they  should  be  in  some 
way  reconciled.  'O'  One  way  to  do  such  reconciliation,  it  states,  is  to  see  corporate 
interests  objectively  rather  than  from  the  angle  of  its  shareholders  and  that  requires 
98  Leader  Sheldon,  "'Participation  and  Property  Rights",  (1999),  21,  journal  of  Business  Ethics, 
Kluwer  Academic  Publishers,  at  p  102-7;  See  also  Hager  (above,  note  69)  at  pp  650-653. 
99  Easterbrook  and  Fischel  (above,  note  71)  at  p  38;  Jensen  C.  Michel  and  Meckling  William  H. 
"Corporate  Governance  and  'Economic  Democracy:  An  Attack  on  Freedom",  in  Proceedings  of 
Corporate  Governance:  A  Definitive  Exploration  of  the  Issues  edited  by  Huizenga  C.  J.,  UCLA 
Extension,  (1983),  at  pp  8-9  available  at  Social  Science  Research  Network  (SSRN),  Electronic 
Library  at:  http:  //papers.  ssrn.  com/ABSTRACT  ID=  321521;  Mayson  Et.  Al.  (2001),  (above, 
note  50)  at  pp  13-14. 
100  Roe,  Mark  J.,  "Corporate  Law's  Limits",  Columbia  University,  (2002),  at  pp  10-17  available 
at  Social  Science  Research  Network  Electronic  Library  at 
http:  //papers-ssrn.  com/abstract=260582. 
10  1  Stou  t  (above,  note  75),  at  p  1199;  Roe  (above,  note  50)  at  p  3;  Ferran  (above,  note  51)  at  p  125. 
102  Modernising  Company  Law:  White  Paper,  (London,  DTI,  2002),  Cm  5553,  Volume  1,  para 
3.3;  See  also  Companies  Bill,  Schedule  2  (2)  in  Modernising  Company  Law:  White  Paper, 
(London,  DTI,  2002),  Cm  5553,  Volume  11  at  p  112. companies  to  operate  with  a  wider  view  to  the  collective  interests  of  shareholders 
which  may  include  fostering  the  relationships  with  employees,  customers  and 
suppliers,  maintaining  corporate  business  reputation  and  observing  impacts  on  the 
community  and  working  envirorurnent.  10'  This,  nevertheless,  is  not  to  mean  that 
companies  should  consider  a  wider  constituency  or  make  moral  or  political  judgement 
about  how  just  or  fair  allocation  of  benefits  might  be.  It  is  rather  to  confirm  that 
directors  should  manage  corporate  resources  with  a  view  to  maximize  shareholder 
wealth  and  welfare  which  may  require  consideration  of  interests  of  minority 
shareholders  as  well  as  those  of  many  non-shareholder  groups.  104  This  approach  can 
offer  a  double  advantage.  On  the  one  hand,  by  preserving  the  shareholder  primacy 
norm  it  reduces  the  agency  cost,  which  can  otherwise  arise.  On  the  other  hand,  by 
looking  objectively  at  the  very  company  interests,  it  allows  interests  of  minority 
shareholders  and  other  non-member  groups  to  be  heard  within  the  scope  of  directors' 
fiduciary  duty  in  companies. 
W.  M.  C.  Impunity  for  mere  mismanagement 
Principally,  negligent  directors  are  granted  exemption  when  their  alleged  negligence 
falls  within  the  category  of  mere  mismanagement.  The  term  "mere  mismanagement' 
refers  to  situations  in  which  a  company  director  acts  negligently  and  the  company 
suffers  loss  due  to  it,  but  the  amount  of  negligence  associated  with  his  action  does  not 
reach  the  level  of  liability,  i.  e.  breach  of  duty  of  care  and  fiduciary.  Authorities  suggest 
103  Modern  Company  Law  for  a  Competitive  Economy:  Final  Report,  (London,  DTI,  2001), 
URN/942  &  URN/943,  para  3.8  and  Modem  Company  Law  for  a  Competitive  Economy: 
Developing  the  Framework  (London,  DTI,  2000),  paras  2.19-2-20  and  3.18-3.28;  see  also  Leader 
(above,  note  98)  at  pp  102-7;  Goddard  (above,  note  59)  at  p  402. 
104  Modern  Company  Law  for  a  Competitive  Economy,  "The  Strategic  Framework",  (London, 
DTI,  1999),  at  2.4;  Goddard  (above,  note  59)  at  pp  405,415. 
172 two  lines  of  arguments  for  not  making  directors  liable  for  committing  of  mere 
negligence.  The  first  line  lays  emphasis  on  the  consideration  that  there  is  no  merit  for 
the  courts  to  review  quality  of  management  in  companies.  The  second  line  rests  on  the 
assumption  that  it  is  not  possible  to  guard  directors  from  falling  into  errors  of 
judgements.  A  mixture  of  these  two  has  caused  the  courts  to  feel  reluctant  to  deal  with 
cases  involving  committing  of  mismanagement  by  directors  unless  the  alleged 
negligence  is  serious  enough  to  constitute  breach  of  duty.  "' 
W.  M.  C.  1.  Poor  quality  management 
British  courts  have  repeatedly  declared  that  it  is  not  for  the  courts  to  take  the 
management  of  business  in  corporations  and  they  will  not  review  the  quality  of 
management  in  companies.  'O'  They  have  taken  the  view  that  it  would  be  wrong  "to 
substitute  [their]  opinion  for  that  of  the  management,  or  indeed  to  question  the 
correctness  of  the  management's  decision 
...  if  bona  fide  arrived  at". 
107 
They  have 
emphasised  that  "mere  imprudence  or  want  of  judgment  would  not  in  itself  make  a 
director  liable-.  'O'  Instead,  they  put  the  blame  on  the  shareholders  of  such  companies 
and  argue  that  because  directors  are  not  required  to  qualify  for  the  office,  it  will  not  be 
fair  to  hold  them  responsible  for  what  they  did  without  having  particular  expertise.  '09 
They  do  not  need  to  possess  special  qualifications  to  be  appointed  and  given 
105  Howard  Smith  Ltd.  v.  Ampol  Petroleum  Ltd.  [1974]  AC  821,832  (PQ  Re  Smith  &  Fawcett 
Ltd  [1942]  Ch.  304;  Re  Tottenham  Hotspur  p1c.  [1994],  BCLC  655,660;  Runciman  v.  Walter 
Runciman  p1c.  [1992]  BCLC  1084;  and  Devlin  v.  Slough  Estates  Ltd.  and  Others  [1983]  BCLC 
497,504  per  Dillon  June;  See  also  generally  Cheffins  (above,  note  82)  at  p  644. 
106  See  generally  Mackenzie  (above,  note  24)  at  pp  460-3;  Trebilcock  (above,  note  6)  at  pp  502-4. 
107  Howard  Smith  Ltd  v.  Ampol  Petroleum  Ltd.  [1974]  AC  821,832  (PC). 
108  Lagunas  Nitrate  Company  v.  Lagunas  Syndicate  (1899),  2  Ch  392  at  394  per  Romer  J.;  see 
also  Marzetti's  Case  1880  28  WR  541,543  per  Brett  L.  J. 
173 responsibility  as  director  of  business  corporations.  This  is  a  matter  of  shareholder 
concern  only.  The  only  thing  that  the  law  requires  of  a  corporate  director  is  to  have  "the 
general  knowledge,  skill  and  experience  that  may  reasonably  be  expected  of  him.  "' 
A  director,  further,  is  allowed  not  to  fully  allocate  his  time  to  managing  affairs  of  the 
company  unless  otherwise  is  expressly  stated  in  the  company  constitution  or,  in  the 
case  of  an  executive  director,  in  his  contract  for  service.  "'  A  corollary  of  not  being 
required  to  have  special  expertise  and  being  allowed  to  show  low  personal 
involvement  is  that  directors  are  seen  as  people  who  can  delegate  matters  to  one  of  the 
company's  employees.  Likewise,  a  director  can  extensively  trust  to  the  information, 
advice  and  performance  provided  by  the  delegates  and  other  company  officials.  While 
so  trusting,  a  director  can  leave  the  company  in  order  to  accept  other  roles  elsewhere, 
even  a  directorship  in  a  competing  company,  112  and  he  will  not  be  responsible  for  the 
mistakes  that  other  officials  commit.  "'  To  make  things  worse,  the  law  imposes  little 
limitation  on  directors  as  to  their  ability  to  delegate  responsibilities.  Case  law  has 
109  Turquand  v.  Marshall  (1968-69),  L.  R.  Ch.  App.  Vol.  4,  p  386  per  Hatherley  LC;  Re  Elgindata 
Ltd.  (1991),  BCLC  959  at  994;  Re  Forest  of  Dean  Coal  Mining  Co.  (1878)  10  Ch  D  450,451-455  per 
Jessel  MR. 
110  Section  214  (4a)  Insolvency  Act  1986;  In  Re  Denham  &  Co,  plaintiffs  took  action  against  a 
negligent  director  on  the  ground  that  he  had  failed  to  detect  manipulation  of  the  company's 
accounts  by  the  chairman  of  directors  and  Chitty  J  relieved  the  alleged  director  from  liability 
because 'he  (director)  was  a  country  gentleman  and  not  a  skilled  accountant'.  [Re  Denham  &  Co 
(1884),  25  Ch  D  752  at  767]  See  also  Re  Brazilian  Rubber  Plantations  &  Estates  Ltd.,  (1911)  1  Ch 
425  at  437. 
Ill  Re  Forest  of  Dean  Coal  Mining  Co.  (1878)  10  Ch  D  450,452  per  Jessel  MR.;  Re  Brazilian 
Rubber  Plantations  &  Estates  Ltd.,  (1911)  1  Ch  425;  Re  Denham  &  Co  (1884),  25  Ch  D  752  at  767; 
Re  Marquise  of  Bute  (1892)  2  Ch  100;  Re  City  Equitable  Fire  and  Insurance  Co.  Ltd  (1925)  Ch 
407at  p  423;  However,  recent  authorities  tend  to  construe  this  statement  as  relevant  only  in 
respect  of  non-executive  directors.  [See  for  example  Re  Cardiff  Savings  Bank  (1892)  2  Ch  100  at 
pp  105-71. 
112  Bell  v.  Lever  Bros.  (1932)  AC  161. 
113  Dovey  v.  Cory  1901  AC  477,486;  Bishopsgate  Investment  Management  Ltd  v.  Maxwell  (No 
2)  (1993)  BCLC  1282;  Re  Denham,  &  Co  (1884),  25  Ch  D  752;  Re  City  Equitable  Fire  and 
174 drawn  the  bottom  line  at  the  level  of  total  abrogation  of  responsibility.  It  follows  that 
while  delegation  and  reliance  on  others  are  widely  seen  as  acceptable,  the  only 
limitation  is  that  overall  responsibility  of  a  director  is  not  delegable.  "'  The  Law 
Conunission  in  its  recent  review  of  directors"  duties  confirmed  this  too.  "' 
However,  this  line  of  argument  fails  to  consider  that  there  is  no  such  link  to  connect  the 
issue  of  liability  for  negligence  and  the  issue  of  shareholders'  choice.  On  the  one  hand, 
a  choice  of  poor  quality  directors  by  shareholders  could  mean  that  an  appointed 
director  will  commit  mistakes.  On  the  other,  their  choice  of  good  quality  directors 
could  mean  that  directors  will  never  commit  mistakes.  Further,  the  question  of  whether 
a  nominee  director  is  in  truth  competent  enough  to  take  the  office  is  not  often  clear  at 
the  very  outset  and  is  seen  to  be  one  of  asymmetric  information.  As  Riley  pointed  out, 
/a  company  likely  knows  much  less  about  a  prospective  director"s  competence  than 
does  that  director  himself.  This  makes  it  difficult  for  the  company  to  discriminate 
between  good  and  bad  directors'.  116  Also  the  fact  that,  in  law,  possession  of  general 
knowledge,  skill  and  experience  is  required  of  directors  ought  not  to  mean  that 
unskilled  directors  can  take  decisions  on  issues  that  require  special  knowledge  and 
expertise.  A  director  who  accepts  the  office  undertakes  implicitly  also  to  take  informed 
decisions  even  where  his  contract  permits  him  not  to  attend  regularly  or  where  he 
lacks  ffie  required  expertise. 
117 
Insurance  Co.  Ltd  (1925)  Ch  407at  p  423;  Norman  &  Anor  v.  Theodore  Goddard  &  Others, 
(1992),  BCC,  p  14. 
114  Unreported,  applied  by  Jonathan  Parker  J.  in  Re  Barings  p1c.  (No  5)  [199911  BCLC  433,  at  p 
487;  See  also  Re  Westmid  Packing  Services  Ltd  v.  Griffiths  [1998]  2  All  ER  124,  per  Lord  Woolf 
MR. 
115  The  Law  Commission  (above,  note  18)  at  p  55. 
116  See  Riley  (above,  note  17)  at  pp  712-3;  Davies  (above,  note  33)  at  pp  433-4. 
117  Lord  Hope  of  Craighead  (above,  note  47). 
175 IV.  1.1.  C.  2.  Errors  of  judgements 
The  second  line  of  argument  seeks  to  free  directors  from  liability  for  any  committing  of 
errors  of  judgement.  According  to  it,  directors  will  not  be  held  responsible  for  errors  of 
judgement  when  they  make  business  decisions  in  good  faith.  The  argument  relies  on 
the  policy  consideration  that  since  directors  often  must  necessarily  make  judgements  in 
uncertain  business  circumstances  and  on  the  basis  of  incomplete  information,  it  will 
not  be  fair  to  blame  them  for  their  errors  of  judgement  and  for  taking  decisions  that 
subsequently  turn  out  to  be  bad.  Although  decision-making  in  such  circumstances  is 
risky,  taking  risky  decisions  is  seen  as  desirable  because  they  are  likely  to  produce 
greater  value  for  companies  and  it  is  upon  such  considerations  that  shareholders 
choose  to  invest  in  companies.  "'  English  courts  have  also  made  it  clear  that  they  will 
not  hold  directors  liable  simply  because  directors'  activities  have  resulted  in  loss  to  the 
company.  "9  Directors  are  not  "guarantors  of  a  company's  success'  and  hence  they  'are 
not  liable  for  mere  errors  of  judgements'.  "O  Thus,  the  gist  of  the  errors  of  judgements 
shelter,  which  is  sometimes  described  as  being  a  'necessary  recognition  of  human 
fallibility',  121  is  to  provide  a  safe  harbour  for  directors  of  companies  when  they  make 
honest  business  judgements,  hereby  further  to  stimulate  directorial  initiative  and  risk- 
taking  in  companies.  "' 
118  Eisenberg  (above,  note  10)  at  p  195;  Arsalidou  (above,  note  6)  at  p  232. 
119  Davies  (above,  note  33)  at  p  436;  Hagland  (above,  note  6);  Stapledon  G  P,  "Mismanagement 
and  The  Unfair  Prejudice  Provision",  Company  Lawyer,  (1993),  14  (5),  94-97. 
120  Re  City  Equitable  Fire  and  Insurance  Co.  Ltd  (1925)  Ch  407  at  408  per  Romer  J. 
121  Arsht,  Samuel  S.,  "The  Business  Judgement  Rule  Revisited"',  (1979),  Hofstra  Law  Review,  Vol. 
8,93,  Hempstead,  N.  Y.,  Hofstra  University  School  of  Law,  at  p  99. 
122  Eisenberg  (above,  note  10)  at  p  191;  Tunc,  Andre,  "The  Judge  and  The  Businessman",  (1986), 
Law  Qtiarterly  Review,  102  (Oct),  549-554,  London,  Stevens  and  Sons;  Arsht  (above,  note  121)  at  p 
99;  Branson,  Douglas  M.,  "The  Rule  That  Is  Not  a  Rule-The  Business  Judgement  Rule"',  (2002), 
176 The  rules  relevant  to  the  errors  of  judgement  are  found  in  case  law.  "'  The  courts  have 
frequently  taken  the  view  that  it  is  not  for  the  judges  to  take  the  place  of  directors  and 
make  business  judgements  in  companies.  A  court  determines  questions  of  law,  not 
matters  of  business  judgement.  "'  As  Lord  Greene  MR  in  Re  Smith  &  Fawcett  Ltd. 
observed,  'they  (directors)  must  exercise  their  discretion  bona  fide  in  what  they 
consider  -  not  what  a  court  may  consider  -  to  be  in  the  interests  of  the  company...  """ 
Similarly  in  Richard  Brady  Franks  Ltd  v.  Price,  Latham  Lj  in  relation  to  a  person 
challenging  an  action  of  directors  said  that  "(The  plaintiff)  must  show  that  they  (the 
directors)  did  not  honestly  act  for  what  they  regarded  as  the  benefit  of  the  company  ...  it 
is  not  for  a  court  to  determine  whether  or  not  the  action  of  directors  was  wise".  "' 
This  non-interventionist  attitude  of  the  courts  has  led  the  judges  to  become  excessively 
unhelpful  in  respect  of  mismanagement  cases.  "'  How  bad,  stupid  and  harmful  a 
director's  business  judgement  has  been  does  not  matter  before  the  courts  where  the 
judgement  complained  of  constitutes  no  breach  of  duty,  though  involving 
negligence.  "' 
Valparaiso  University  Law  Review,  vol.  36,631,  Valparaiso,  Ind.,  Valparaiso  University  School  of 
Law,  at  pp  632,636;  Parkinson  (above,  note  32)  at  p  109. 
123  Hemraj  (above,  note  23)  at  p  192;  Tunc  (above,  note  122)  at  pp  549-554. 
124  Carlen  v.  Drury,  (1812),  1  Ves.  &B  154  p  158  per  Lord  Eldon. 
125  Re  Smith  &  Fawcett  Ltd.  (1942)  1  All  ER  542  at  543-4. 
126  Richard  Brady  Franks  Ltd  v.  Price  (1937),  58  CLR  p  136;  See  also  Howard  Smith  Ltd  v. 
Ampol  Petroleum  (1974),  AC  832. 
127  Sealy,  L.  S.,  "Problems  of  Standing,  Pleading  and  Proof  in  Corporate  Litigation",  in  Company 
Law  in  Change,  Edited  by  Ben  Pettet,  (1987),  London,  Stevens,  at  p  4. 
128  Worthington  (above,  note  9)  at  p  450. 
177 Other  common  law  jurisdictions  also  offer  protection  in  cases  of  errors  of  judgment  to 
their  corporate  directors.  In  the  United  States  and  Australia,  for  example,  there  is  either 
a  common  law  rule  or  a  statutory  provision  serving  as  a  presumption  that  in  making  a 
bad  business  decision,  directors  assume  no  responsibility  unless  the  plaintiff  shows 
that  they  acted  either  with  mala  fide  in  what  was  not  in  the  best  interest  of  the 
company  or  they  acted  on  an  uninformed  basis  without  seeking  further  enquiry.  "' 
When  "conditions  of  the  business  judgement  rule  are  satisfied  then  the  quality  of  a 
director's  or  officer's  decision  will  be  reviewed,  not  to  determine  whether  the  decision 
was  reasonable,  but  only  under  a  much  more  limited  standard  ... 
(which)  is  that  the 
decision  must  be  rational,  or  must  have  a  rational  basis,  or  the  like'  130  and  the  measure 
of  irrationality  is  often  taken  to  mean  gross  negligence.  "'  As  a  result,  a  director  is 
entitled  to  make  unreasonable  or  even  stupid  decisions  as  long  as  his  judgement  is  not 
wholly  irrational.  "' 
Using  the  American  and  Australian  experience,  133  some  English  company  law  scholars 
have  suggested  that  it  seems  good  for  English  company  law  to  develop  a  statutory 
129  To  reduce  the  likelihood  that  directors  escape  liability  unjustifiably,  they  make  a  clear 
distinction  between  the  process  of  decision  taking  and  the  substance  of  managerial  decisions, 
suggesting  that  directors  will  be  given  protection  only  on  the  latter  ground.  [See  generally 
references  cited  below,  note  1331 
130  Eisenberg  (above,  note  10)  at  pp  188-9;  American  Law  Institute's  Principles  of  Corporate 
Governance,  para  4.01  (c)  (3). 
131  See,  for  example,  in  Shamrock  Holdings  v.  Polaroid  Corp.,  judge  Berger  held  that  for  an 
uninformed  decision  of  the  board  to  go  outside  the  protection  of  the  business  judgement  rule,  it 
requires  lack  of  information  to  be  so  extreme  as  to  reflect  gross  negligence  on  the  part  of 
directors.  [Del.  Ch.  Civil  Actions  Nos.  10,075  and  10,079,  January  6,19891. 
132  Tunc  (above,  note  122);  Duesenberg  Richard  W,  "Duty  of  Care,  Duty  of  Loyalty  and  the 
Business  judgement  Rule  in  American  Courts",  (1997),  Company  Financial  and  Insolvency  Law 
Review,  Oxford,  Mansfield  Press,  201-202;  Hemraj  Mohammad  B,  "Company  Directors:  The 
Defence  of  Business  Judgement  Rule",  (2003),  Company  Lawyer,  24  (7),  218-219,  London,  Oyez 
Publishing  Limited;  Hemraj  (2004),  (above,  note  23)  at  p  196. 
133  For  further  study  of  American  and  Australian  corporate  laws  on  business  judgement  rule 
see  generallN,  Eisenberg  (above,  note  10)  at  p  185;  Stout  Lynn  A.,  "In  Prise  of  Procedure:  An 
178 business  judgement  rule  similar  to  that  existing  in  the  US  and  Australia.  134  The  Law 
Commission  rejected  this  proposition,  taking  the  view  that  English  company  law 
enjoys  an  already  existing  implied  business  judgement  rule  to  be  found  in  the  courts 
reluctance  to  review  management  decisions  which  were  made  bona  fide  for  the  best 
interest  of  the  company,  and  that  this  explains  why  there  is  no  need  to  codify  it,  as  this 
rule  'is  best  left  to  be  developed  by  the  courts.  "'  Further,  there  might  also  be  a  danger 
that  such  a  presumptive  rule  might  unduly  disable  the  courts  from  imposition  of 
liability  on  negligent  directors  where,  considering  every  circumstance,  they  should 
have  been  found  liable.  136 
IV.  1.2.  Matters  of  enforcement:  internal  control 
Speaking  generally,  company  law  offers  two  mechanisms  to  help  shareholders  bring 
back  in  line  wayward  directors.  One  is  the  enforcement  by  majority  mechanism  which 
empowers  majority  shareholders  to  apply  indirect  control  over  activities  of  directors. 
The  other  is  the  enforcement  by  minority  mechanism  that  allows  in  certain  exceptional 
cases  minority  shareholders  to  outflank  the  rule  of  majority  and  to  bring  allegations 
against  wrongdoer  directors. 
Economic  and  Behavioural  Defense  of  Smith  v.  Van  Gorkom  and  the  Business  Judgement 
Rule"',  (2001)  at  pp  2,11  [Research  Paper  No  01-21  available  on  the  Social  Science  Research 
Network  Electronic  Paper  Collection  at  http:  //papers.  ssm.  com/abstract=  2909381;  Arsht 
(above,  note  121)  at  p  93;  Hemraj  (2003),  (above,  note  132)  at  p  218;  Hemraj  (2004),  (above,  note 
23)  at  p  192;  Tunc  (above,  note  122)  at  pp  549-554;  Kearney,  Mark  A.,  "'The  Evolving  Standard  of 
Scrutiny  Applied  to  Directors"  Decisions",  (1995),  Butterworths  Journal  of  International  Banking  & 
Financial  Law,  10  (1),  30,  London,  Butterworths. 
134  See  Parkinson  (above,  note  32)  at  pp  110-113;  Deakin,  Ferran  and  Nolan  (above,  note  32)  at 
pp  165-166;  Finch  (above,  note  6)  at  p  189. 
135  Law  Commission  (above,  note  18)  p  53;  The  Government  has  also  confirmed  this  view  and 
therefore  no  statutory  business  judgment  rule  has  been  drafted  in  the  proposed  white  paper. 
[Companv  Law  Reform,  White  Paper,  March  2005,  CM6456  available  at  the  Department  of 
Trade  and  Industry's  website  in  the  following  address:  http:  //www.  dti.  gov.  uk/cld/4.  pdfl. 
136  Da,,,,  ies  (above,  note  33)  at  p  437;  Arsalidou  (above,  note  6)  at  pp  232-3. 
179 IV.  1.2.1.  Enforcement  by  majority  shareholders 
As  a  general  principle  enforcement  of  directors'  duties  rests  on  majority  shareholders. 
They  enforce  directors"  duties  mainly  through  pursuing  negligent  directors  and 
through  rejecting  ratification  of  their  breach  of  duties.  Under  the  current  case  law, 
breach  of  directors'  duties  except  in  few  situations  where  the  wrongdoing  amounts  to 
fraud  is  seen  as  ratifiable.  "'  This  means  a  wronged  company  through  majority  decision 
in  shareholder  meeting  can  choose  not  to  pursue  wrongdoer  directors  in  breach  of  duty 
cases.  This  enforcement  machinery,  which  relies  on  shareholder  democracy,  works  on 
the  assumption  that  shareholders  have  the  ability  to  exercise  their  powers  in  general 
meetings.  If  they  find  directors  guilty  of  breach  of  duties,  they  will  have  ability  to 
resolve  to  prosecute  negligent  directors  for  the  recovery  of  every  loss  suffered  by  the 
company.  They  also  have  power  to  appoint  directors  to  or  remove  them  from  office 
and  can  limit  or  reshape  directors'  powers  into  a  narrowly  prescribed  scope.  In  reality, 
however,  this  mechanism  of  internal  control  has  evidenced  to  be  unreliable.  In  small 
companies,  often  the  same  people  play  both  controlling  and  directorial  roles.  They 
usually  share  the  running  of  the  business  as  well  as  controlling  its  affairs  and  this 
makes  it  quite  unlikely  that  they  pursue  themselves.  Even  if  some  of  them  (normally  a 
minority  shareholder)  want  to  pursue,  the  existence  of  a  concentrated  shareholding 
pattern,  which  gives  the  wrongdoer  director/  majority  almost  absolute  right  to  help 
himself  through  ratification  would  ensure  that  except  in  very  clear  cases  of  fraud  no 
action  would  commence  against  wrongdoer  directors.  "'  In  the  case  of  large  companies, 
as  they  tend  to  have  publicly  dispersed  shareholders  there  is  little  incentive  for 
180 shareholders  to  attend  in  meetings  and  vote.  Each  individual  shareholder's  vote  is 
unlikely  to  carry  sufficient  weight  and  collective  action  is  difficult  when  shareholders 
are  dispersed.  "'  The  collective  action  problem  would  give  wrongdoer  directors 
protection  against  any  probable  attack  by  shareholders.  140  Even  if  there  were  no 
collective  action  problem  directors  would  still  often  be  able  to  retain  control  of  large 
corporations  because  they  have  control  over  information  and  agenda  of  meetings  and 
the  proxy  mechanism  and  because  they  are  clever  and  prudent  enough  to  propose 
motions  that  will  be  accepted  by  the  shareholders.  "'  The  growing  size  of  institutional 
investment  in  English  large  companies  made  it  possible  for  institutional  shareholders 
to  control  enough  shares  in  order  to  overcome  the  collective  action  problem  and  to 
exercise  effective  control  on  management.  Nonetheless,  such  shareholders  have 
evidenced  in  practice  to  be  rather  passive  having  no  or  little  interest  to  fight  with 
management.  142  In  such  context,  therefore,  enforcement  by  majority  will  often  be 
ineffective  unless  dispersed  shareholders  are  well  informed,  closely  knit  and  well 
organised.  143  That  is  why  some  opined  that  "what  is  necessary  in  the  interests  of 
shareholders  is  not  participatory  shareholder  democracy,  but  machinery  for 
discouraging  management  from  deflecting  too  much  of  the  firms'  net  income  from  the 
shareholders  to  itself'.  144 
137  Bamford  &  Others  v.  Bamford  &  Others  (1970),  L.  R.  Ch.,  212;  Hogg  v.  Cramphorn  Ltd.  & 
Others,  (1967),  LR  Ch,  254. 
138  Farrar  (1991),  (above,  note  83)  at  p  442;  Parkinson  (above  note  32)  at  p  248. 
139  Birds  John  Et.  Al.  (eds.  ),  "'Boyle  &  Birds'  Company  Law",  (1995),  3rd  ed.,  jordans,  Bristol,  at 
p  347. 
140  Parkinson  (above,  note  32)  at  pp  240,248;  Farrar  (1991),  (  above  note  83)  at  p  442. 
141  Cubbin  John  and  Leech  Denis,  ""The  Effect  of  Shareholding  Dispersion  on  the  Degree  of 
Control  in  British  Companies:  Theory  and  Measurement",  The  Economic  Journal,  (1983),  Vol. 
93,351-369,  London,  New  York,  Macmillan,  at  p  363;  Farrar  (1985)  (above,  note  55)  at  p  266; 
Parkinson  (above,  note  32)  at  pp  160,165,237. 
142  See  below,  Chapter  three  at  111.1.6. 
143  Gower  (above,  note  55)  at  p  554. 
144  Posner  (above,  note  82)  at  p  41. 
181 IV.  1.2.2.  Enforcement  by  minority  shareholders 
As  a  matter  of  exception  minority  shareholders  can  enforce  directors'  duties  in  few 
cases.  English  company  law  has  devised  the  machinery  of  derivative  action  which 
empowers  minority  shareholders  to  enforce  directors'  duties  in  appropriate 
circumstances  where  "fraud  on  minority  shareholder'  is  involved.  Such  machinery 
which  faRs  beyond  the  majority  power  can,  to  some  degree,  protect  minority  rights  and 
discourage  mismanagement.  The  derivative  machinery  will  be  examined  in  details  in 
Chapter  five  and  I  do  not  intend  to  repeat  that  examination.  For  the  purpose  of  my 
discussion  here  it  seems  sufficient  only  to  clarify  briefly  reasons  which  can  convince  a 
minority  shareholder  not  to  use  the  machinery  in  practice.  To  begin  with,  although 
collective  action  problem  is  absent,  a  minority  shareholder  may  have  no  incentive  to 
commence  the  action  considering  his  trivial  investment.  Further,  the  costs  of  taking 
action  can  outweigh  the  probable  benefits  which  may  ensue  from  a  successful 
derivative  action  for  a  minority  shareholder.  145  In  addition  to  these,  lack  of  information 
and  prospect  of  sharing  the  benefits  achieved  by  a  minority  shareholders  efforts  with 
non-active  shareholders  can  ensure  that  no  derivative  action  will  be  taken  to  the 
courts. 
146  After  all,  even  if  a  minority  shareholder  decides  to  pursue  negligent  directors, 
technical  obstacles  which  the  rule  in  Foss  v.  Harbottle  creates  in  his  path  plus  legal 
uncertainty  which  associates  with  the  definition  of  fraud  discourage  him. 
145  Reisberg  Arad,  "'Derivative  Actions  and  The  Funding  Problem:  The  Way  Forward", 
Forthcoming  Journal  of  Business  Law,  (2006),  Working  Paper  Presented  at  the  Society  of  Legal 
Scholars  Annual  Conference  (Strathclyde  /Sep  2005),  at  pp  1-4. 
146  Parkinson  (above,  note  32)  at  pp  241-3;  Farrar  (1991),  (above,  note  83)  at  p  442;  Pettet  Ben, 
"Company  Law"',  (2000),  Harlow,  Longman,  at  pp  235,240. 
182 IV-1-3.  External  control:  market  constraints 
As  English  corporations 
147 
tend  to  lack  presence  of  a  controlling  shareholder 
148 
,  they 
rely  more  on  market  constraints  than  shareholder  control  in  controlling 
nusmanagement.  Market  constraints  can  discourage  mismanagement  in  various  ways. 
One  is  the  way  of  market  for  capital.  As  controllers  do  not  have  enough  money  of  their 
own  or  want  to  cash  out  their  investment  and  exit,  they,  therefore,  have  to  search  for 
external  financing  to  cover  their  financial  shortfall.  They  may  not,  however,  be 
successful,  unless  they  accept  finance  from  expensive  sources  because  agency  costs 
signal  to  finance  providers  that  financing  in  such  corporation  will  be  very  risky. 
Another  way  is  the  market  for  products.  Expensive  finance  will  mean  a  rise  in 
production  costs  and  is  normally  reflected  in  the  price  of  goods  and  services  that  a 
company  produces.  As  a  result,  the  company  may  lose  the  market  for  its  products,  as 
costumers  will  buy  elsewhere  at  a  less  expensive  rate,  and  if  things  continue  this  way, 
the  company  is  very  likely  to  face  insolvency.  A  further  way  is  market  for  corporate 
control,  which  is  also  called  'take  over'  mechanism.  Inefficient  management  is  quite 
likely  to  result  in  loss  to  the  company  that  may  further  result  in  shareholders  to  opt  for 
selling  their  shares  with  the  effect  of  reducing  the  market  value  of  company's  shares  on 
the  one  hand  and  a  lack  of  desire  on  the  part  of  finance  providers  to  buy  such  shares  on 
the  other  hand.  Yet,  a  possible  scenario  is  the  case  of  one  or  more  large  finance 
providers  who  might  want  to  buy  the  company's  shares  hereby  to  obtain  its  control 
147  See  Chapter  I  (above,  at  1.2.  ) 
148  See  generally  Shleifer,  Andrei  and  Vishny,  Robert  W.,  ""A  Survey  of  Corporate 
Governance",  The  journal  of  Finance,  (June  1997),  Vol.  Lll,  No.  2,  at  p  754;  MacNeil  lain, 
""Adaptation  and  Convergence  in  Corporate  Governance:  The  Case  of  Chinese  Listed 
Companies",  (2002),  journal  of  Corporate  Law  Studies,  vol.  2,  part  2,289,  at  pp  291-297,  Hart 
Publishing;  Cheffins  (above,  note  2)  at  p  7;  Cheffins  Brian  R.,  "Corporate  Law  and  Ownership 
Structure:  A  Darwinian  Link?  ",  University  of  Cambridge,  (2002),  Cambridge,  UK,  available  at 
183 and  to  replace  the  management  with  a  new  team  of  managers  who  run  the  company 
more  efficiently.  Lastly,  market  for  managerial  services  will  serve  to  discourage 
mismanagement  because  if  managers  act  dishonestly  or  negligently,  they  will  be 
replaced  by  those  who  can  perform  more  efficiently,  as  companies  will  reject  to  employ 
bad  managers  or  if  in  office  will  remove  bad  incumbent  managers. 
Yet,  market  constraints  do  not  eliminate  mismanagement  for  a  number  of  reasons, 
though  they  reduce  it.  For  one,  the  control  of  market  forces  relies  on  a  presupposition 
that  there  exists  perfect  competition  in  the  market.  If  that  is  taken  away,  they  do  not 
function  properly.  Individuals  may  not  always  have  full  knowledge  of  all  relevant 
facts.  In  fact,  some  may  enjoy  informational  advantages  over  others  due  to  many 
reasons  including  possession  of  control  of  substantial  means  of  production,  wealth,  key 
posts  and  private  relation  with  politicians.  This  may  mean  corporate  manager  can 
work  inefficiently  while  misrepresenting  affairs  of  their  corporations.  This  further 
means  they  can  attract  external  finance,  as  finance  providers  may  not  be  able  to  realise 
the  truth  about  the  company"s  real  financial  and  business  position,  and  they  can 
continue  office  as  shareholders  may  simply  be  unable  to  control  them  due  to  their  lack 
of  information  or  organisation.  For  another,  market  for  products  effectively 
discourages  n-dsmanagement  where  production  capital  is  floating  because  supposedly 
managers  must  obtain  their  needed  production  capital  at  a  competitive  rate  from  the 
market  every  minute  and  thus  there  will  remain  nothing  for  them  to  appropriate 
personally.  But,  where  production  capital  is  sunk,  it  might  not  affect  so  and  managers 
Social  Science  Research  Network  (SSRN),  Electronic  Library  at 
http:  //ssrn.  com/abstract=317661;  See  also  Chapter  one  (above,  at  1.2). 
184 would  be  able  to  extract  private  benefits  from  the  corporate  funds,  as  they  would  no 
longer  need  to  search  for  production  capital. 
185 IV.  2.  The  case  of  Iran 
Unlike  its  English  counterpart,  Iranian  law,  as  other  civil  law  jurisdictions  14',  does  not 
recognise  the  division  between  serious  and  mere  mismanagement  and  hence  the 
Iranian  courts  hear  allegations  which  involve  mere  mismanagement.  The  company  law 
makes  directors  liable  for  conu-nitting  any  fault  in  the  management  of  the  company. 
The  concept  of  fault  is  very  wide,  covering  any  mistake  or  error  either  in  respect  of 
procedures  necessary  for  making  business  decisions  or  in  relation  to  the  very  decisions 
and,  principally,  every  fault,  which  causes  damage,  is  a  source  of  liability.  It  covers 
both  intentional  and  non-intentional  violation  to  the  rules  of  law,  articles  of  association, 
and  appropriate  resolutions  of  meetings.  "O  It  is  further  inclusive  of  honest/careless 
behaviours  and  any  dishonest  disregard  of  the  company  interests,  which  can  expose 
directors  to  civil  liability  and  even  sometimes,  when  conditions  subsist,  to  criminal 
liability. 
Although  Iranian  company  law  Goint  Stock  Companies  Act  and  Trade  Act)  includes  no 
statute  law  which  either  expressly  or  by  implication  imposes  a  duty  on  directors  to 
regard  the  best  interest  of  the  company,  assumption  of  such  duty  by  directors  can  by 
analogy  inferred  from  general  principles  of  agency  law  which  are  most  manifested  in 
section  667  of  the  Iranian  Civil  Code.  According  to  the  section  667  "a  representative 
149  For  French  company  law  position  on  the  issue  of  mismanagement  see  Tunc  (above,  note 
122)  at  pp  554-5;  Arsalidou  (above,  note  6)  at  p  228;  For  the  same  position  in  Iranian  company 
law  see  section  51  Trade  Code  1931  (hereafter  is  cited  TC),  sections  614,615,631,663,667,951 
and  953  Civil  Code  1925  (hereafter  is  cited  CC)  and  in  particular  section  276  Joint-Stock 
Companies  Act  1967  (hereafter  is  cited  JSCA)  which  hold  directors  liable  for  breach  of  statutes 
and  articles  and  for  committing  any  fault  which  entails  damages  to  the  company. 
150  Sections  142  and  276  JSCA. 
186 must  consider  the  best  interests  of  the  principal  and  in  the  exercise  of  his/her  powers 
must  not  exceed  of  what  has  been  expressly  delegated  by  contract  or  deemed  to  have 
been  conferred  by  implication  of  the  custom".  Nonetheless,  it  is  necessary  to  bear  in 
mind  that  not  any  disregard  of  company  interest  makes  directors  personally  liable.  To 
hold  a  director  liable  for  failing  to  regard  company  interests/  the  wronged  company 
should  principally  show  that  such  director's  failure  has  entailed  to  fault.  The  principle 
aside,  company  law  lists  certain  examples  of  such  disregard  by  directors  which  are  by 
expression  considered  fault.  Sections  129,130,131  JSCA,  for  instance,  refer  to 
circumstances  in  which  a  wrongdoer  director  is  personally  interested  in  corporate 
transactions  or  sets  up  his/her  personal  business  through  which  he/she  competes  with 
the  business  of  the  corporation. 
Principally,  Iranian  law  regards  corporate  directors  as  agents  whose  activities  are 
deemed  for  the  account  of  their  principal  corporations  and  hence  such  activities  create 
no  effect  either  positively  (rights)  or  negatively  (duties)  for  directors  personally. 
However,  in  the  exercise  of  powers  which  the  company  entrusts  to  him  a  director 
might  assume  personal  liability  when  he  conu-nits  fault.  For  that  to  occur,  a  director 
must  do  something  which  can  reasonably  attribute  causation  of  damages  incurred  by 
the  company  to  his  conducts  and  that  thing  is  fault.  "'  As  defined  by  the  CA,  fault 
exists  where  a  person  commits  an  act  or  acts  to  which  he,  either  by  contract"'  or  by 
151  Sections  666  and  331  CC. 
152  Section  220  CC  provides  that:  "'A  contract  binds  the  parties  to  perform  duties  not  only  in 
respect  of  what  mentioned  by  the  parties  expressly  in  the  contract  but  also  in  respect  of  what 
derives  from  the  custom  and  the  statutes  as  a  result  of  that  contract.  "  This  has  been  further 
emphasised  by  sections  225,344  and  356  CC. 
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,  is  forbidden  to  do  and  also  where  such  person  forbears  to  act 
where  he  is  either  by  contract  or  by  standards  of  custom,  under  a  duty  to  act  in  order  to 
protect,  manage  or  take  care  in  relation  to  someone  else's  rights  and  property. 
154 
The 
test  for  measuring  such  person's  conduct  is  to  compare  his  conduct  with  that  of  a 
hypothetical  reasonable  person  who  does  the  same  sort  of  functions  and  which  is 
viewed  by  the  courts  in  the  light  of  the  same  external  circumstances  in  which  he 
acted.  155  A  director's  discretion  to  make  business  decisions  forms  only  one  factor 
among  factors  the  courts  wiH  take  into  account  when  deciding  whether  a  director  has 
acted  negligently  or  not.  "'  Another  important  factor  is  to  view  the  nature  of  directors' 
duty  in  relation  to  managing  affairs  of  the  company.  A  director's  contract  normally 
consists  of  duties  both  to  ensure  certain  results  and  to  try  to  achieve  certain  goals. 
Directors'  duty  to  obey  rules  of  articles,  resolutions  of  meetings  and  rules  of  law  in 
managing  company  affairs  forms  clear  examples  as  to  the  former.  In  such  matters,  they 
are  required  to  ensure  that  they  will  comply  with  legal  as  well  as  constitutional  rules 
all  the  times  and  it  would  not  be  accepted  from  them  as  an  excuse  to  say  that  we  tried 
not  to  violate  these  rules  but  we  could  not  avoid.  Directors'  duty  to  manage  the 
business  of  the  company  successfully  constitutes  a  clear  example  for  the  latter. 
Directors  owe  duty  to  the  company  to  manage  the  company  business  with  reasonable 
diligence  and  they  discharge  such  duty  if  they  make  their  honest  effort  which  meets 
153  In  tort  context,  where  there  is  no  contractual  relationship  between  the  wrongdoer  and  the 
wronged  person,  a  person  is  held  responsible  if  he  damages  rights  and  property  of  another 
person  either  directly  or  through  indirect  causation.  [Sections  301-337  CC]. 
154  Sections  951,952  and  953  CC. 
155  See  Katoozian  Naser,  "Liability  in  Torts  and  Civil  Liability",  (1997),  Tehran,  University  of 
Tehran  Publication,  at  No.  105;  Katoozian  Naser  "Civil  Code  in  its  Modem  Law  Order",  (1999), 
2nd  ed.,  Tehran,  Dadgostar  Publication,  at  p  575. 
156  For  German  company  law  position  see  Hopt  Klaus  J.,  "Shareholder  Rights  and  Remedies:  A 
View  From  Germany  and  The  Continent",  (1998),  Company  Financial  and  Insolvency  Law 
Review,  261,  Oxford,  Mansfield  Press,  at  265-266;  Arsalidou  (above,  note  6)  at  p  228. 
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Accordingly,  once  managing  the  corporate  business  a  director 
does  not  guarantee  good  results.  Instead,  his  duty  is  to  apply  reasonable  effort  to 
secure  good  results  for  the  company  and,  therefore,  he  will  not  be  held  liable  if  he  took 
a  honest  decision  and  complied  with  the  necessary  care  which  can  be  expected  from  a 
reasonable  director  in  the  same  circumstances.  158 
Under  the  current  Iranian  law,  enforcement  of  directors'  duties  falls  principally  within 
the  power  of  shareholders  who  act  through  meetings.  If  directors  commit  fault,  it  is  up 
to  shareholders  to  decide  through  majority  resolution  to  prosecute  the  wrongdoer 
director  or  to  ratify  the  wrongdoing  and  relieve  him/her  from  liability.  This  power  of 
meeting  can  be  inferred  by  implication  from  the  meaning  of  a  number  of  sections  in  the 
JSCA  which  suggest  that  shareholders  in  the  ordinary  meeting  control  directors" 
activities.  "'  Shareholders'  discretion  to  decide  between  prosecution  and  ratification  in 
respect  of  a  negligent  director  is  considered  absolute  and,  unlike  English  shareholders" 
ratification  power,  this  discretion  has  not  been  subjected  to  any  exception.  160 
Considering  the  share  ownership  pattern  which  prevails  among  Iranian  corporations, 
this  controlling  power  is  capable  of  preventing  directors  effectively  from 
mismanagement,  as  most  companies,  whether  large  or  small,  have  one  or  few 
shareholders  who  are  able  to  control  the  corporation. 
161 
157  Katoozian  (1997),  (above,  note  155)  at  Nos.  43,164  and  165;  Jafaritabar  Hasan  "Civil 
Liability  of  Physicians",  (2004),  available  at  http:  /  /www.  dadgostary-tehran.  ir/  main.  asp. 
158  Katoozian  (1999),  (above,  note  155)  at  pp  441-2;  Katoozian  Naser  "Specific  Contracts",  vol.  4., 
1994,  Tehran,  Behnashr  Publication,  at  p  103;  Katoozian  Naser,  "'General  Principles  of 
Contracts"',  Vol.  1,  (1995),  Tehran,  Dadgostar  Publication,  at  p  327. 
159  Sections  86,89,106  (2),  116,138,148,149,151,152,232  JSCA. 
160  Under  the  English  company  law  transactions  that  constitute  fraud  upon  the  minority  cannot 
be  ratified  by  a  majority  resolution. 
189 Yet,  the  reality  suggest  otherwise.  In  small  companies,  this  controlling  power  can  be 
unsafe  for  the  purpose  of  minority  rights.  Normally  in  such  companies  both  the 
wrongdoer  directors  and  the  controlling  shareholders  are  the  same  and  as  a  result  it 
seems  very  unlikely  that  the  majority  shareholders  commence  any  action  against 
wrongdoer  directors.  As  to  large  companies,  the  controlling  power,  which  rests  in  the 
dominant  shareholder  who  is  often  the  government,  is  not  utilised  effectively  and 
therefore  mismanagement  persists  for  a  number  of  reasons.  For  one,  managerial  team 
which  is  appointed  by  the  government  is  not  often  very  familiar  with  matters  of 
business.  As  employees  of  the  government,  they  have  little  incentive  and  required 
skills  to  run  the  business  in  such  corporations.  For  another,  because  of  its  bureaucratic 
nature,  the  government  is  often  unable  to  exercise  effective  control  in  such 
corporations. 
As  a  matter  of  exception,  Iranian  company  law  empowers  minority  shareholders  in 
certain  circumstances  in  which  managements"  activities  constitute  fault  to  initiate 
corporate  action  against  wrongdoer  directors.  "'  Shareholders  who  own  at  least  one 
fifth  of  the  corporate  shares  are  given  statutory  right  to  pursue  wrongdoer  directors 
who  cause  damage  to  the  company.  I  will  study  this  power  in  details  later  in  Chapter 
five  where  derivative  action  will  be  examined.  For  the  purpose  of  my  discussion  here  it 
is  useful  only  to  know  that  the  power  does  not  form  a  very  remarkable  protection  for 
minority  shareholders  as  company  law  allows  majority  shareholders  to  block  minority 
actions  through  ratification  of  managements  faults.  "' 
161  See  Chapter  one  (above,  at  1-2). 
162  Section  276  JSCA. 
190 Internal  controls  aside,  mismanagement  can  further  persist  in  Iranian  corporations 
because  of  the  weak  and  deficient  functioning  of  the  market  constraints.  As 
corporations  rely  more  on  internal  finance,  the  existence  of  an  unresponsive  market  for 
capital  will  not  constitute  a  threat  to  inefficient  corporations.  Market  for  products  too 
has  little  impact  on  such  corporations,  as  they  often  enjoy  monopolies.  Finally,  the 
government  which  is  often  a  dominant  shareholder  in  Iranian  large  corporations  is 
very  unlikely  to  refer  to  the  market  for  managerial  services.  In  such  corporations, 
managerial  team  is  often  composed  of  persons  who  are  employees  of  the  government 
and  who  are  disciplined,  in  case  of  failure,  through  administrative  regulations  and 
sometimes  when  conditions  exist  through  law  relevant  to  civil  and  criminal  liability 
rather  than  market.  In  a  context  like  Iran  in  which  business  is  mainly  conducted 
through  either  closely  held  firms  or  state-owned  associations,  and  competitive 
constraints  are  to  a  great  extent  absent,  and  financial  market  is  yet  under  developed, 
and  share  transactions  are  relatively  uncon-Lmon,  management  will  have  more  free 
room  to  commit  mismanagement. 
163  See  Chapter  five  (below,  at  V.  2.2.4) 
191 IV.  3.  Conclusion 
In  this  Chapter  I  considered  the  role  of  corporate  directors  in  the  majority  /minority 
relationship.  In  this  consideration,  I  challenged  the  claim  that  states  directors  play  a 
remarkable  role  in  reducing  the  majority/  minority  conflict.  Accordingly,  the  merit  of 
the  claim,  it  is  suggested,  should  be  subjected  to  directors"  accountability  before 
companies  and  shareholders.  Strong  but  unaccountable  directors  can  commit 
mismanagement  which  is  perhaps  more  problematic  compared  with  dangers 
associated  with  the  majority  rule  for  minority  shareholders.  It  was  also  explained  that 
such  accountability  would  not  be  reached  unless  three  conditions  are  met.  First, 
company  law  should  ensure  that  its  designed  mechanisms  of  directors"  duties  are 
sufficiently  inclusive  in  respect  of  directors"  negligence  so  that  mismanagement  is 
discouraged.  Second,  company  law  should  also  ensure  that  suitable  and  practicable 
mechanisms  of  internal  control  which  enable  principally  majority  shareholders  and,  in 
appropriate  circumstances,  minority  shareholders  to  enforce  directors'  duties  exist  in 
corporations.  Third,  the  law  and  policy  makers  should  design  relevant  regulations  that 
enable  the  market  to  serve  through  its  competitive  constraints  in  order  to  curb 
mismanagement  effectively. 
English  company  law  has  not  met  the  first  condition  yet.  As  regards  the  duty  of  care, 
there  are  good  reasons  to  believe  that  the  rules  of  liability  and  those  of  exemption  from 
liability  for  corporate  directors  are  not  sufficiently  certain  and  are  improperly 
balanced.  For  one,  the  law  fails  to  provide  guidelines  to  determine  what  sort  of  conduct 
192 associated  with  negligence  should  count  as  reasonable  or  unreasonable. 
164 
Decided 
cases  that  only  reflect  the  intuition  of  particular  judges  also  have  a  limited  capacity  to 
make  this  clear.  In  fact,  from  established  cases  of  breach  of  duties  to  clear  cases  of  mere 
negligence  there  is  a  very  large  grey  area  of  disagreement  among  the  courts  in 
understanding,  and  upon  such  understanding  in  the  discovery,  of  managerial 
negligence  in  companies"';  this  makes  the  division  hard  to  exercise  and  largely 
susceptible  to  misunderstanding,  disagreement  and  misapplication.  166  Where  the  law 
offers  a  not  very  clear  guideline  to  allow  people  to  make  an  appropriate  distinction, 
uncertainty  may  serve  to  further  the  position  of  negligent  directors,  as  they  are  often 
able  to  make  commercial  excuses  to  justify  their  actions  in  doubtful  areas,  and  even 
when  they  have  no  such  ability  and  as  a  consequence  shareholders  may  want  to  choose 
to  take  action,  the  uncertainty  of  the  law,  the  threat  of  reputational  damage  to  the 
company  and  the  prospect  of  the  costs  of  pursuing  the  wrongdoer  director  wiR 
disappoint  them  in  doing  so.  For  another,  the  question  of  whether  the  law  has  struck  a 
good  balance  can  be  answered  in  the  negative,  when  one  takes  into  consideration  the 
tendency  of  current  company  law  to  favour  managers  excessively.  The  law  permits  any 
negligence  short  of  breach  of  duty,  no  matter  how  foolish  and  damaging,  to  occur.  The 
law  also  allows  incompetent  persons  to  take  management  of  corporations.  In  addition, 
the  law  assesses  negligent  directors'  activities  with  a  general  standard  of  behaviour 
that  requires  simple  compliance  with  the  standard  of  performance  of  ordinary  persons 
164  Worthington  (above,  note  9)  at  p  449. 
165  Law  formulates  the  measure  of  duty  of  care  in  a  generalised  fashion  in  the  hope  that  the 
courts  would  apply  it  coherently.  However,  since  the  courts"  judgements  are  always  fact- 
specific,  it  is  always  possible  that  they  may  fall  into  disagreement  when  dealing  with  similar 
facts  and  they  can  further  differentiate  even  between  cases  that  share  most  of  their  facts.  A 
further  difficulty  is  that  it  is  hardly  possible,  if  not  impossible,  to  classify  corporate  directors 
into  one  and  the  same  class  with  uniform  code  of  practice. 
193 rather  than  professionals.  Of  course,  this  arrangement  would  tend  to  greatly  encourage 
many  persons,  no  matter  how  inexperienced,  to  accept  office  and  take  business  risks 
and  attracts  complete  support  from  existing  English  directors.  "'  But,  such  arrangement 
would  also  seem  no  longer  desirable  for  companies  and  their  shareholders,  as  it  fails  to 
deter  directors  from  mismanagement  and  allows  them  to  shirk  their  responsibilities  or 
to  negligently  cause  companies  to  suffer  considerable  loss.  "' 
As  regards  the  fiduciary  duty,  the  mechanism  is  not  very  reliable  as  the  duty  enjoys  a 
subjective  standard  which  requires  directors  only  to  act  according  to  what  they, 
themselves,  regard  it  to  be  the  best  interest  of  companies.  Furthermore,  recent  attempts 
that  have  been  made  in  order  to  accommodate  non-shareholder  groups'  interest  within 
the  scope  of  fiduciary  duty  of  corporate  directors  have  the  potential  that  negligent 
directors  under  the  label  of  corporate  interests  pursue  self-interested  objectives  more. 
In  contrast,  Iranian  company  law  imposes  stricter  as  well  as  higher  levels  of  liability  on 
corporate  directors.  It  does  not  know  any  division  between  different  sorts  of  negligence 
and  as  the  concept  of  fault  is  inclusive  of  any  negligent  behaviour,  it  offers  no 
systematic  exemption  from  liability  to  corporate  directors  for  mere  mismanagement. 
Also,  it  does  not  know  any  division  between  duties  of  care  and  fiduciary  of  corporate 
directors  and  the  concept  of  fault,  which  is  assessed  objectively,  can  include  both. 
166  Griffin,  Stephen,  "Negligent  Mismanagement  as  Unfairly  Prejudicial  Conduct",  (1992),  The 
Law  Qtiarterly  Review,  Vol.  108,389,  London,  Stevens  and  Sons,  at  pp  390-392. 
167  Directors  have  evidenced  that  they  are  happy  with  the  scheme  of  the  current  law  on 
directors'  liability.  This  is  implicitly  understood  from  the  reasoning  of  the  Law  Commission  in 
refusing  to  recommend  a  statutory  business  judgement  rule.  [The  Law  Commission  (above, 
note  18)  at  p  531. 
194 Further,  directors'  duty  only  accommodates  interests  of  company  shareholders  as 
against  non-shareholder  groups  and,  therefore,  there  is  no  or  little  possibility  that 
directors  could  pursue  interests  other  than  those  of  the  company. 
As  regards  the  second  condition,  both  the  English  and  Iranian  company  law  allow  the 
use  of  the  two  internal  control  mechanisms  (i.  e.  enforcement  by  majority  shareholders 
and  enforcement  by  minority  shareholders)  in  respect  of  directors'  duties.  Yet,  as  a 
consequence  of  the  varying  models  of  corporate  governance  which  exist  in  the  two 
systems  each  has  been  strong  only  in  one  of  the  two  existing  mechanisms.  In  the  case  of 
England,  as  company  shares  tend  to  be  publicly  dispersed  in  large  companies, 
enforcement  by  majority  shareholders  serves  little  function.  Here,  company  law  should 
probably  adopt  policies  which  encourage  shareholder  organisation  and  activism.  "' 
Instead,  enforcement  by  minority  shareholder  mechanism  functions  more  effectively  as 
majority  shareholders  have  no  power  to  stop  it.  Nonetheless,  certain  practical  obstacles 
plus  some  level  of  information  asymmetry  and  heavy  costs  of  legal  proceeding 
associate  with  this  mechanism  which  require  the  English  lawmaker  to  review  law  in 
this  respect.  For  Iran,  the  converse  is  true.  Companies  rely  more  on  enforcement  by 
majority  than  by  minority  shareholders  because  company  shares  tend  to  be 
concentrated  and  further  because  majority  shareholders  have  always  had  power  to 
stop  minority  action  when  the  case  involves  fault  of  directors.  Yet  enforcement  by 
majority  has  been  either  problematic  in  the  case  of  small  companies  or  weak  in  the  case 
of  large  companies  because  in  the  former  case  often  the  controlling  majority  and  the 
168  Arsalidou,  Demetra,  "The  Impact  of  Modem  Influences  on  The  Traditional  Duties  of  Care, 
Skill  and  Diligence  of  Directors"',  (2001),  Kluwer  Law  International,  The  Hague/  London/  Boston, 
at  p  173;  Arsalidou  (2003)  (above,  note  6)  at  p  232. 
195 wrongdoer  directors  have  been  the  same  people  and  in  the  case  of  large  companies 
control  by  government  has  evidenced  to  be  deficient. 
Lastly,  while  external  control  over  directors"  activities  in  English  corporations  is  strong, 
it  serves  very  weak  in  the  case  of  Iranian  corporations.  As  the  economy  in  the  former 
rely  hugely  on  market,  relevant  regulations  which  encourage  competitiveness  in  the 
market  and  require  higher  level  of  disclose  of  information  are  enacted  to  enable  market 
constraints  in  order  to  curb  mismanagement  effectively.  By  contrast,  Iranian  economy 
which  is  greately  directed  by  the  government  and  in  part  by  the  market  often  enjoys 
regulations  which  discourage  competitiveness  in  the  market  and  which  call  for  sub 
standard  disclosure  of  information  requirement.  Internal  financing  makes  the  threat  of 
market  for  capital  trivial  and  further  it,  in  conjunction  with  concessions  and 
monopolies  which  are  enjoyed  by  the  state-owned  corporations,  helps  to  reduce  the 
threat  of  market  for  products.  Also,  appointment  of  management  in  large  corporations 
which  constantly  occur  outside  the  market  negates  the  threat  of  market  for  managerial 
services. 
169  Nolan  R.  C.,  "'Indirect  Invetors:  A  Greater  Say  in  The  Company?  ",  (2003),  3  journal  of 
Corporate  Law  Studies,  73,  at  pp  73-7. 
196 Chapter  V:  Legal  constraints  on  majority  rule 
Previous  Chapters  were  dedicated  to  examining  from  several  aspects  the  rule  of 
majority  and  its  consequences  in  the  majority/  minority  relationship  in  companies.  It 
has  become  clear  in  this  examination  that  while  the  rule  is  generally  and  both  in  theory 
and  practice  appreciated  by,  and  advantageous  to,  corporations  and  their  shareholders, 
in  some  circumstances  it  can  generate  unjust  harm  to  interests  of  minority 
shareholders.  Such  harm  can  stem  not  from  a  mere  commercial  failure  to  which  every 
shareholder  by  his  contract  surrenders  but  rather  from  what  is  called  abuse  of  rights 
that  often  comprises  of  certain  sinister  and  vicious  attempts  of  controflers  who  either 
intentionally  or  recklessly  fail  to  regard  minority  interests.  The  contract,  which  mainly 
regulates  this  relationship,  is  unable  to  avoid  such  harm.  Contractual  safeguards 
simply  lack  the  capability  to  curb  controllers'  abuse.  General  laws  which  regulate 
corporate  activities  have  also  limited  capacity  to  curb  such  abuse  because  abuse  of 
right  often  occurs  within  the  ambit  of  contract  and  general  law.  Further,  the 
shareholder  voting  with  which  the  majority  rule  works  can  be  exercised  abusively.  It 
bears  with  it  no  duty  that  could  dictate  majority  shareholders  once  voting  to  regard 
minority  interests  and  the  constraint  imposed  by  the  company  law  that  requires 
shareholders  to  avoid  discrimination  can  only  cover  clear  cases  of  discrimination. 
Lastly,  directors  under  different  circumastances  can  facilitate  either  mismanagement  or 
majority  abuse  and  disciplines  of  the  market  also  seem  either  irrelevant  or  trivial  as  to 
addressing  the  question  of  majority  abuse.  An  interesting  question  which  is  to  be 
addressed  and  which  is  the  subject  of  my  consideration  in  this  Chapter  is  whether  the 
law  has  been  responsive  about  the  issue  of  abuse  of  right  by  majority  shareholders  and 
if  so  how  has  it  been  successful?  The  Chapter,  therefore,  concerns  reviewing  the  rules 
197 and  mechanisms  which  are  devised  by  the  lawmaker  with  the  intention  to  protect 
rights  and  interests  of  minority  shareholders.  The  Chapter  is  divided  into  two  parts. 
Part  one  considers  the  issue  in  the  English  company  law  and  part  two  relates  to  the 
Iranian  company  law.  As  the  legal  constraints  in  English  company  law  comprise  of 
common  law  and  statutory  constraints,  a  subdivision  is  made  in  part  one.  Common 
law  constraints  constitute  the  first  subdivision  which  specifically  targets  the 
mechanism  of  derivative  action.  As  the  other  common  law  constraint;  i.  e.  "bona  fide 
for  the  benefit  of  the  company  as  a  whole,  '  was  fully  discussed  earlier  in  Chapter  three, 
I  avoid  repeating  that  discussion  here.  Statutory  constraints  which  form  the  second 
subdivision  concern  the  two  statutory  remedies  of  'winding  up'  and  "unfairly 
prejudicial  conduct'.  In  part  two,  I  review  several  mechanisms  which  exist  in  the 
current  Iranian  laws  and  which  offer  some  protection  to  minority  shareholders  against 
abuse  of  right  by  the  majority  shareholders.  These  include  the  'no  abuse  of  right' 
principle,  right  to  convene  shareholder  meeting,  cumulative  voting,  disinterested 
ratification,  and  the  shareholder  action. 
As  the  purpose  of  this  Chapter  is  to  explain  intervention  of  the  law  in  the 
majority/  minority  relationship  in  order  to  curb  the  possibility  of  majority  abuse  of 
right,  two  preliminary  issues  must  be  addressed  before  I  could  commence  the 
discussion.  The  first  issue,  to  be  considered,  is  to  see  whether  or  not  corporate 
members  need  the  help  of  the  company  law  at  all?  To  answer  this  question  approaches 
differ.  The  economic  school  and  new  contractarians  have  taken  the  view  that  company 
contract  is  merely  premised  on  freedom  of  contract  for  its  creation  and  continuity,  as 
198 are  other  private  contracts.  '  By  using  the  contract  system,  company  law  in  every 
market  economy  should  aim  to  reach  efficiency  and  it  will  not  be  achieved  unless 
parties  are  allowed  to  use  their  freedom  to  choose  any  arrangement  they  wish. 
2 
Companies  are  totally  private  organisations  that  need  no  support  of  company  law' 
which  may  only  provide  some  voluntary  standard  form  contracts  in  order  to  help 
4  parties  avoid  costly  process  of  renegotiations  and  rewriting.  Early  manifestation  of 
this  approach  can  be  traced  back  in  the  words  of  Adam  Smith,  the  18thcentury  Scottish 
economist,  who  viewed  'the  object  of  the  public  works  and  institutions  [as  being]  to 
facilitate  conunerce  in  general".  More  recently,  it  was  reflected  in  the  Company  Law 
Review  Steering  Group's  report  where  it  explained  the  purpose  in  setting  out 
proposals  for  company  law  reform  as  being  facilitation  of  the  commerce. 
In  this  model,  minority  shareholder's  interests  are  adequately  preserved  through  the 
system  of  market  self-regulation,  especially  the  markets  for  securities,  managerial 
1  Easterbrook  Frank  H.  and  Fischel  Daniel  R.,  "Voting  in  Corporate  Law",  The  Journal  of  Law  and 
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London,  Oyez  Publishing  Limited,  at  pp  20-21;  Cheffins  (above,  note  3)  at  pp  7,26-31. 
5  Smith  Adam,  "An  Inquiry  into  the  Nature  and  Causes  of  the  Wealth  of  the  Nations",  (1776), 
Vol.  2,  Book  V,  Chapter  1,  Part  III,  at  p  731,  London,  Printed  for  W.  Strahan  and  T.  Cadell. 
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their  firms  public,  adopt  whatever  corporate  governance  arrangements  which  are  most 
efficient.  If  they  do  not,  the  company  will  be  penalised  in  the  capital  market  through 
being  faced  with  higher  production  costs  and  may  eventually  become  insolvent  as 
customers  buy  elsewhere.  '  At  the  midstream  stage,  too,  controllers  have  generally  no 
incentive  to  use  their  power  in  a  way  which  is  inefficient.  '  In  addition,  legal  constraints 
may  simply  impose  additional  cost  on  contractual  parties  who  may  feel  better  off 
settling  their  issue  privately.  'O  After  all,  the  way  of  exit  is  always  open  to  small 
shareholders  who  would  be  able  rationally  to  choose  to  disinvest.  " 
The  theory,  however,  justifies  the  use  of  legal  constraints  on  two  limited  grounds.  One 
is  the  case  of  close  corporations  where  a  controlling  majority  is  present  and  an  open 
market  for  shares  is  absent.  12  The  other  concerns  large  corporations  where  mandatory 
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company  operation  on  third  parties  or  on  the  society.  " 
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others.  It  prevents  investors  from  calculating  the  right  share  price  at  IPO  stage  and 
instances  of  investors  being  defrauded  would  discourage  investment.  "  The  inefficiency 
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24  relationship.  In  such  contexts,  they  function  to  restrict  ex  post  opportunism. 
The  second  issue  to  be  addressed  is  to  determine  how  much  and  what  type  of  company 
law  intervention  is  justified?  Company  contracts,  no  doubt,  need  the  help  of  the  law  at 
least  because  of  their  incompleteness  which  cannot  be  avoided  as  a  consequence  of 
25  living  a  long  life  in  a  dynamic  ever-changing  environment.  Incomplete  contracts  may 
cause  party  disputes  which  can  waste  public  budget26  and,  therefore,  lawmakers  have 
incentive  to  provide  legal  rules  for  contingencies  that  contracts  fail  either  to  anticipate 
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shareholders,  and  facilitate  contractuall  efficiency.  "  However,  in  certain  circumstances, 
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at  Social  Science  Research  Network  (SSRN),  Electronic  Library  at 
http:  //ssrn.  com/abstract=317661,  p  23;  Roe,  Mark  J.,  ""The  Shareholder  Wealth  Maximization 
Norm  and  Industrial  Organisation"",  'Harvard  Law  School',  (2001),  available  at  Social  Science 
Research  Network  (SSRN),  Electronic  Library  at:  http:  //papers.  ssrn.  com/abstractid  =282703,  at 
p  2. 
204 protections.  Less  mandatory  measures  in  such  society  command  the  greatest  because 
33  they  reflect  social  values  and  prevailing  moral  judgements.  Likewise,  for  nations  with 
competitive  market  lower  levels  of  mandatory  measures  compared  to  that  of  a 
monopolist  one  may  suffice  because  a  competitive  economy  through  market  forces,  can 
remedy,  to  a  greater  extent,  the  flaws  of  private  ordering.  14  On  the  other  hand,  if  much 
of  a  nation-s  industry  is  monopolistically  organised  and  its  company  sector  has  a 
concentrated  shareholding  pattern,  pursuing  the  mere  efficiency  objective  would 
maximise  the  profit  of  the  monopolist  majority.  As  a  result,  there  may  be  greater  need 
to  develop  wider  levels  of  mandatory  interference. 
33  Mayson  Et.  Al.  (above,  note  18)  at  p  34. 
34  Coffee  (1989),  (above,  note  17)  at  p  1691;  Brudney  (above,  note  17)  at  p  1444. 
205 V.  1.  The  case  of  England 
As  legal  constraints  on  majority  rule  in  current  English  corporation  law  consist  of  case 
law  and  statutory  law,  it  would  seem  better  in  the  interest  of  simplicity  and  deep 
understanding  to  examine  each  in  a  separate  section.  Thus,  this  part  is  divided  into  two 
sections,  common  law  constraints  and  statutory  constraints. 
V.  1.1.  Common  law  constraints 
There  are  two  constraints  in  common  law  which  have  been  developed  over  time  by  the 
judges  primarily  to  protect  rights  of  minority  shareholders  against  abuse  of  corporate 
power  by  a  controlling  majority.  One  concerns  with  the  'bona  fide  for  the  benefit  of  the 
company  as  a  whole'  restriction  which  was  created  in  the  Allen  case"  and  which 
constitutes  an  important  constraint  on  the  power  of  majority  shareholders.  This 
constraint  was  discussed  elsewhere  36  and,  therefore,  I  reject  repeating  that  discussion 
here.  The  other  relates  to  the  so-called  "fraud  on  a  minority  shareholder'  restriction 
which  is  known  as  a  major  exception  to  the  rule  in  Foss  case  and  which  enables  a 
minority  shareholder  to  take  corporate  claims  using  the  derivative  form  of  action.  This 
constraint  is  the  subject  of  my  consideration  here. 
V.  1.1.1.  Derivative  action 
Principally,  when  corporations  are  wronged  they,  rather  than  their  shareholders, 
prosecute  wrongdoers.  They  commence  such  prosecution  normaRy  through  their 
35  Allen  v.  Gold  Reefs  of  West  Africa,  Limited  (1900),  1  Ch.  656  per  Lindley  M.  R.  at  p  671. 
36  See  Chapter  three  (above,  at  111.1.5). 
206 representatives.  It  is,  however,  very  unlikely  that  a  prosecution  is  commenced  where 
corporate  representatives  and  wrongdoers  are  one  and  the  same.  The  derivative  action 
has  been  designed  by  the  case  law,  using  rules  of  equity,  to  allow  shareholders  to 
initiate  such  prosecution  where  the  company,  itself,  fails  to  do  so.  "  In  continental 
countries  that  follow  civil  law  system,  the  court,  in  case  of  oppression  of  a  minority  by 
the  majority,  can  always  fall  back,  as  a  remedy  of  the  last  resort,  on  the  general  "abuse 
of  rights"'  (abus  de  droit)  rule.  Common  law  system  lacks  such  a  general  rule.  " 
Instead,  it  has  designed  equitable  rules  to  remedy  the  flaw  in  specific  occasions  and  the 
derivative  action  is  considered  one  of  those.  '9  Such  action  is  called  'derivative'  because 
the  cause  of  action  derives  from  a  right  that  belongs  to  the  company  rather  than  the 
plaintiff  shareholder  . 
40  For  the  same  reason,  the  probable  remedy  which  will  be  given 
in  a  successful  derivative  action  is  a  corporate  one  rather  than  personal. 
The  derivative  action  is  exceptional  which  means  it  is  not  always  open  to  shareholders 
to  initiate  derivative  actions.  A  minority  plaintiff  must  show  that  he  has  already  tried 
37  Atwool  v.  Merryweather  (1867),  LIZ  5  Eq  464n;  Menier  v.  Hooper's  Telegraph  Works  (1874),  9 
Ch  App  350;  Dafn  Tinplate  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Llanelly  Steel  Co.  (1920)  2  Ch.  124;  Edwards  v.  Halliwell 
(1950),  2  All  ER  1064;  Daniels  v.  Daniels,  (1978),  Ch  406;  Prudential  Assurance  Co  Ltd.  v. 
Newman  Industries  Ltd.  (No.  2),  (1981),  Ch  257;  Estmanco  (Kilner  House)  Ltd  v.  Greater 
London  Council  (1982)  1WLR  2. 
38  Hahlo  H.  R.,  Farrar  John  H.,  "Hahlo's  Cases  and  Materials  on  Company  Law,  ",  (1987),  3rd  ed 
London,  Sweet  &  Maxwell,  at  p  477;  Cutteridge  H.  C.,  "Abuse  of  Rights"",  (1935),  5  The  Cambridge 
Law  journal,  22;  Bolgar  Vera,  "Abuse  of  Rights  in  France,  Germany,  and  Switzerland:  Asurvay  of 
a  Recent  Chapter  in  Legal  Doctrine"',  (1975),  35  Louisiana  Law  Review,  1015;  Byers  Michael, 
"'Abuse  of  Rights:  An  Old  Principle,  A  New  Age"",  (2002),  McGill  Law  journal,  Vol.  47,389. 
39  Hale  Christopher,  "'What's  Right  With  the  Rule  in  Foss  v.  Harbottle?  ",  (1997),  Company 
Financial  and  Insolvency  Law  Review,  Oxford,  Mansfield  Press,  at  p  219;  Wedderburn  K.  W., 
"Shareholder's  Rights  and  the  Rule  in  Foss  v.  Harbottle",  (1957),  Cambridge  Law  journal,  196, 
Cambridge  University  Press,  Cambridge,  UK  at  pp  203-206;  Hager  Mark  M.,  "Bodies  Politic: 
The  Progressive  History  of  Organizational  "Real  Entity'  Theory"',  University  of  Pittsburgh  Law 
Review,  (1989),  Vol.  50,  Pittsburgh,  at  pp  633-4. 
40  Pettet  Ben,  "'Company  Law",  (2001),  Harlow,  Longman,  at  p  235;  Reisberg  Arad,  "Indemnity 
Cost  Orders  Under  s  459  Petition?  "  (2004),  The  Company  Lawyer,  vol.  25,  No.  4  116,  London, 
Ovez  Publishing  Limited,  p  118  at  note  4;  Hale  (above,  note  39)  at  pp  222-4. 
207 any  other  possible  internal  ways  for  the  purpose  of  remedying  the  wrong  done  to  the 
company,  but  his  efforts  has  been  suppressed  by  the  controlling  wrongdoers.  "  As  a 
result,  if  a  minority  shareholder  has  yet  options  other  than  taking  a  legal  action,  his 
derivative  action  will  not  be  heard.  Where  his  only  option  is  taking  a  derivative  action, 
he  must  show  that  the  case  involves  'fraud  on  a  minority  shareholder"  -  As  the  case  law 
suggests  the  term  'fraud  on  a  minority  shareholder'  refers  to  a  situation  where  a 
wrongful  conduct  against  company  amounts  to  fraud  and  the  wrongdoers  who  are  in 
control  of  the  company  do  not  want  to  allow  an  action  to  proceed  . 
4' 
Thus,  two 
prerequisites,  those  of  fraud  and  wrongdoer  control,  must  be  shown  before  the  courts 
in  order  to  allow  a  derivative  action. 
V.  1.1.1.1.  Prerequisites  of  a  derivative  action 
1)  Fraud 
The  term  'fraud'  is  too  wide,  complex,  and  indefinite  and  is  capable  of  covering  many 
quite  different  sorts  of  failures 
. 
43  There  is  not  any  well-established  definition  of  fraud  to 
assist  those  involved  in  the  process.  It  has  been  described  in  certain  cases  and  by  some 
academics,  for  example,  as  not  just  in  the  traditional  common  law  sense,  which  was 
41  Wedderburn  K.  W.,  ""Shareholder's  Rights  and  the  Rule  in  Foss  v.  Harbottle",  (1958), 
Cambridge  Law  journal,  97,  Cambridge,  Cambridge  University  Press,  at  pp  95-7;  Griffin  Stephen, 
"Company  law:  Fundamental  Principles"',  (1996),  2nd  ed.,  London,  Pitman,  at  pp  300-2;  Thorne 
James  (ed.  ),  "'Butterworth's  Company  Law  Guide"',  (1995),  Butterworths,  London,  UK,  at  p  187. 
42  As  the  loss  in  a  'fraud  on  a  minority'  case  is  always  suffered  directly  by  the  wronged 
company  rather  than  its  shareholders,  it  seems  more  pertinent  if  the  mechanism  is  retermed  as 
'fraud  on  the  company'.  See  Wedderburn  (1958),  (above,  note  41)  at  p  93;  Farrar  John  H., 
"'Company  Law",  (1991),  London,  Butterworths,  at  p  449;  Griffin  (above,  note  41)  at  p  302;  Sealy 
L.  S.,  "'Cases  and  Materials  in  Company  Law",  (1996),  Sixth  Edition,  London,  Butterworths,  at 
pp  497-8. 
43  Sealy  (2001),  (above,  note  30)  at  p  498,  para  "'Note";  Conway  Mark,  "Minority  Shareholder 
Protection  and  the  Rule  in  Foss  v.  Harbottle:  Increasingly  a  Foss  about  Nothing"  in  Companies  in 
thc  1990s,  edited  by  Gary  Slapper,  (1995),  London,  Cavendish,  at  pp  3-6. 
208 limited  to  the  cases  of  appropriation  of  company  assets,  but  also  in  the  wider  equitable 
sense  covering  an  abuse  or  misuse  of  power.  "  Yet  such  description  only  provides  a 
general  picture  and  hence  a  discovery  of  the  meaning  of  fraud  will  depend  the  most  on 
case  law  which  stretches  back  over  150  years.  The  concept  of  fraud,  therefore,  can  only 
be  understood  through  a  case-by-case  study.  4'  This  is  in  part  due  to  the  courts' 
reluctance  to  theorise  the  concept  of  fraud  4'  and  in  part  is  resulted  from  the  very 
method  of  the  common  law  system  that  tends  to  work  without  a  firm  definition" 
believing  that  any  firm  definition  may  prevent  the  judiciary  from  tracing  new  and 
developing  forms  of  fraud.  " 
There  are  two  approaches  in  the  case  law  as  to  how  to  identify  fraud.  One  regards 
fraud  in  the  nature  of  certain  wrongdoings  rather  than  the  state  of  mind  of  the 
wrongdoers  . 
4' 
This  approach,  which  has  substantial  support  among  academics 
t0050' 
often  limits  the  scope  of  fraud  to  cases  in  which  directors  breach  their  fiduciary  duty  to 
the  company  or  fail  to  exercise  proper  care  and  as  a  result  of  such  failure  they  get 
unduly  enriched.  The  approach  classifies  wrongdoings  into  two  categories  of  ratifiable, 
44  Estmanco  (Kilner  House)  Ltd  v.  Greater  London  Council  (1982)  IWLR  2  per  Megarry  VC;  See 
also  Wedderburn  (1958),  (above,  note  41)  at  p  96;  Farrar  (1991),  (above,  note  42)  at  p  449;  Griffin 
(above,  note  41)  at  p  302;  Thorne  (above,  note  41)  at  p  186;  Stedman  &  Jones  (above,  note  7)  at  p 
77. 
45  Pettet  (above,  note  40)  at  p  232;  Stedman  &  Jones  (above,  note  7)  at  pp  77-8;  Conway  (above, 
note  43)  at  pp  4-6. 
46  Pettet  (above,  note  40)  at  p  231. 
47  Sealy  L.  S.  and  Hooley  R.  J.  A.,  "'Text  and  Materials  in  Commercial  Law",  (1994),  London, 
Butterworths,  at  pI 
48  Estmanco  (Kilner  House)  Ltd  v.  Greater  London  Council  (1982)  1WLR  2  per  Megarry  V-C. 
49  Atwool  v.  Merryweather  (1867),  LR  5  Eq  464  n;  Menier  v.  Hooper's  Telegraph  Works  (1874), 
9  Ch  App  350;  Burland  v.  Earl  (1902)  AC  83;  Daniels  v.  Daniels,  (1978),  Ch  406. 
50  Wedderburn  (1958),  (above,  note  41)  at  pp  96-7;  Parkinson  (above,  note  19)  at  pp  247-254; 
Farrar  (1991),  (above,  note  42)  at  p  449;  Griffin  (above,  note  41)  at  pp  301-4;  Ferran  Eilis, 
"'Company  Law  and  Corporate  Finance",  (1999),  Oxford,  Oxford  University  Press,  at  p  148; 
Pettet  (above,  note  40),  at  p  232;  Thorne  (above,  note  41)  at  p  186;  Stedman  &  Jones  (above,  note 
7)  at  pp  77-8. 
209 which  is  not  fraud,  and  non-ratifiable  which  is  fraud  and  which  allows  derivative 
action.  Well-known  instances  of  fraud  according  to  this  approach  are  mala  fide 
deflecting  of  corporate  assets,  taking  corporate  profits  and  advantages  at  the  expense 
of  minority  shareholders"  and  bona  fide  negligence  amounting  to  a  benefit  obtained 
by  wrongdoers  at  the  company's  expense.  "  Proceedings  based  on  breach  of  duties  and 
mere  negligence  in  which  wrongdoers  were  not  benefited  personally  have  been 
expressly  excluded  from  the  concept  of  fraud.  "  This  approach  is  advantageous  in  the 
sense  that  its  measure  can  provide  a  bottom  line  from  which  one  can  distinguish  fraud 
from  other  wrongdoings  which  in  turn  will  result,  to  some  extent,  in  more  certainty  for 
those  involved  in  such  cases.  54  It  is  also  advantageous  in  that  it  relieves  the  courts  from 
taking  a  subjective  investigation  into  the  state  of  mind  of  the  controlling  wrongdoers.  " 
However,  one  important  difficulty  of  the  approach  is  that  it  classifies  certain  not  very 
interrelated  conducts  in  the  same  category  as  fraud.  Put  it  simply,  it  remains  unclear, 
after  all.  that  whether  the  test  is  deflecting  corporate  assets  or  failure  to  exercise  proper 
care  and  in  the  latter  case  why  a  self-benefiting  from  the  wrongdoing  should  make  a 
difference.  56  Another  difficulty  is  that  identification  of  any  fraud  requires  separate 
examination  of  every  act  and,  therefore,  there  may  be  as  many  frauds  as  there  are  acts. 
51  Atwool  v.  Merryweather  (1867),  LR  5  Eq  464  n;  Menier  v.  Hooper's  Telegraph  Works  (1874), 
9  Ch  App  350;  Burland  v.  Earl  (1902)  AC  83. 
52  Daniels  v.  Daniels,  (1978),  Ch  406. 
53  Pavlides  v.  Jensen,  (1956),  Ch  565;  Turquand  v.  Marshall,  (1868-69),  (L  R),  4  Ch  App  376  at  p 
386;  Bamford  v.  Bamford,  (1970)  Ch.  212. 
54  Ferran  (above,  note  50)  at  p  150. 
55  Ferran  Ibid. 
56  Prudential  Assurance  Co  Ltd.  %,.  Newman  Industries  Ltd.  (No.  2),  (1981),  Ch  257  per  Vinelott 
J;  See  also  Hale  (above,  note  39)  at  p  224. 
210 As  a  consequence,  this  approach  never  settles  the  difficult  issue  of  separating  ratifiable 
and  non-ratifiable  wrongs. 
57 
The  other  approach  views  fraud  not  in  the  nature  of  the  wrong  but  in  the  motive  of  the 
wrongdoers  and  in  the  manner  in  which  they  have  used  their  voting  rights  to  prevent  a 
corporate  action  being  taken.  It  maintains  that  the  courts  should  be  able  to  interfere  in 
the  majority/  minority  relationship  whenever  the  justice  of  the  case  requires,  otherwise 
no  shareholder  decision  could  ever  be  a  fraud  because  shareholders  are  free  to  vote 
whether  they  are  interested  in  the  transaction  in  question  or  not.  "  Thus,  wherever 
justice  requires,  the  courts  should  disregard  votes  cast  or  capable  of  being  cast  by 
shareholders  who  have  an  interest  conflicting  with  that  of  the  company.  As  a  result, 
only  a  disinterested  majority  resolution  can  be  authorised  by  the  courts.  59 
Although  this  approach  tries  to  avoid  conceptual  difficulties  and  practical  limits  of  the 
fraud  exception  and  provides  a  wide  jurisdiction  for  the  courts  to  hear  minority 
57  This  also  resulted  in  delivery  of  inconsistent  judgements  in  case  law.  See  for  instance 
Prudential  Assurance  Co  Ltd.  v.  Newman  Industries  Ltd.  (No.  2),  (1981),  Ch  257;  Daniels  v. 
Daniels,  (1978),  Ch  406;  Pavlides  v.  Jensen,  (1956),  Ch  565;  Hogg  v.  Gramphom  Ltd.  (1967),  1  Ch 
254;  Bamford  v.  Bamford  (1970),  Ch  212,  (1969),  1  All  ER  969;  Re  a  Company  (1987)  BCLC  82  at 
84  per  Hoffman  J;  Estmanco  (killner  House)  Ltd.  v.  Greater  London  Council,  (1982),  1  All  ER 
437  per  Megarry  VC;  Dafen  Tinplate  Co  Ltd.  v.  Llanelly  steel  Co.  (1907)LTD,  (1920),  2  Ch.  124. 
58  Prudential  Assurance  Co  Ltd.  v.  Newman  Industries  Ltd.  LTD.  and  Others  (No.  2)  (1981),  Ch 
257  per  Vinelott  J.;  Among  academics  see  Beck  Stanley  M.,  "An  Analysis  of  Foss  v.  Harbottle",  J. 
S.  Ziegel  (ed.  )  Studies  in  Canadian  Company  Law,  (1967),  Toronto,  Butterworths;  Beck  Stanley  M., 
"The  Shareholders'  Derivative  Action"',  (1974),  The  Canadian  Bar  Review,  Vol.  LII,  No.  2,159, 
Carswell  for  the  Canadian  Bar  Association,  Toronto. 
59  Baxter  Colin,  "The  True  Spirit  of  Foss  v  Harbottle",  Northern  Ireland  Legal  Quarterly,  (1987), 
Vol.  38,  No.  1,  Stevens  &  Sons,  Belfast,  at  pp  6-8,45;  This  was  also  recommended  by  the  British 
government  in  its  recent  company  law  reform.  [Modem  Company  Law  for  a  Competitive 
Economy:  Final  Report,  (London,  DTI,  2001),  URN/942  &  URN/943,  Para  7.54  at  p  168]. 
211 allegations,  its  proposed  measure  seems  contrary  with  the  decided  cases.  'O  It  is  also 
inconsistent  with  the  traditional  approach  of  the  common  law  that  views  right  to  vote 
as  a  piece  of  property.  "  Moreover,  it  is  unworkable  especially  in  large  companies 
because  most  of  the  times  it  leaves  untouched  fraudulent  activities  of  controllers  who 
have  the  support  of  disinterested  but  unorganised  and  uninformed  shareholders.  "  The 
measure  of  justice  of  the  case  further  lacks  an  objective  and  workable  test"  and  seems 
like  a  double-edged  sword.  For,  justice  requires  not  only  minority  rights  but  also  the 
corresponding  rights  of  the  majority.  Therefore,  justice  by  itself  gives  nothing.  64 
2)  Wrongdoer  control 
The  wrongdoer  control  element,  which  is  essential  to  a  derivative  action,  can  be 
defined  as  an  abuse  of  voting  right  by  one  or  few  shareholders  who  are  the  very 
wrongdoers  and  in  control  of  corporation.  Control  might  simply  be  de  jure  which  arises 
where  a  wrongdoer  possesses  at  least  fifty  one  percent  of  voting  shares  in  the  wronged 
company.  "  The  de  jure  control  is  often  found  in  small  companies  where  one  or  few 
shareholders  possess  over  fifty  percent  shareholdings.  In  a  more  complicated  case, 
control  might  be  de  facto  which  means  the  wrongdoer  is  in  a  position  in  the  company 
that  can  influence  the  results  of  meetings,  though  having  less  than  fifty  percent 
shareholdings.  Such  position  which  is  normally  created  in  large  companies  can  be 
60  See  cases  sited  above,  notes  60,64;  see  also  Davies,  Paul  L.,  "Gower's  Principles  of  Modern 
Company  Law",  (1997),  6th  ed.,  at  p  646,  Sweet  &  Maxwell,  London,  UK;  Ferran  (above,  note  53) 
at  p  149. 
61  Ferran  Ibid  at  pp  149-150;  Baxter  (above,  note  59)  at  p  8. 
62  Parkinson  (above,  note  19)  at  p  256. 
63  Parkinson  (above,  note  19)  at  pp  255-6;  Farrar  (1991),  (above,  note  42)  at  p  445. 
64  See  Estmanco  (Kilner  House)  Ltd  v  Greater  London  Council  (1982)  1WLR  2  per  Megarry  VC; 
see  also  Griffin  (above,  note  41)  at  pp  301,304-5. 
65  Pavlides  v.  Jensen,  (1956),  Ch  565  AT  577  PER  Danckwerts  J. 
212 obtained  as  a  consequence  of  several  factors.  66  In  Prudential  Assurance  Co  Ltd.  v. 
Newman  Industries  Ltd  (No  2)67 
,  the  Court  of  Appeal  observed  that  control  embraces  a 
broad  spectrum  extending  from  an  overall  absolute  majority  of  votes  at  one  end  to  a 
majority  of  votes  at  the  other  end  made  up  of  those  likely  to  be  cast  by  the  delinquent 
himself  plus  those  voting  with  him  as  a  result  of  influence  or  apathy. 
Both  types  of  control  have  advantages  as  well  as  disadvantages.  As  the  de  jure  control 
is  identified  with  formal  ownership  of  shares,  it  is  capable  to  offer  a  definite  test  to  be 
used  for  the  purpose  of  fraud  identification.  It,  however,  fails  to  cover  cases  in  which  a 
wrongdoer  has  de  facto  control  or  through  its  nominees  and  dummies  controls  the 
wronged  company.  6'  The  de  facto  control,  on  the  other  hand,  is  capable  to  cover 
shortcomings  of  the  de  jure  control",  however,  it  fails  to  provide  a  bottom  line  in  order 
to  define  what  the  control  is.  It  can  also  require  the  courts  to  fall  into  an  uneasy 
investigation  in  the  voters'  state  of  minds  in  order  to  determine  whether  they  have 
voted  independently,  disinterestedly  and  on  an  informed  basis  or  not.  'O 
66  Hirt  Hans-Christoph,  "'In  What  Circumstances  Should  Breaches  of  Directors'  Duties  Give 
Rise  to  a  Remedy  under  ss.  459-461  of  the  Companies  Act  1985?  "'  (2003),  The  Company  Lawyer, 
Vol.  24,  No.  4,100,  London,  Oyez  Publishing  Limited,  at  p  107;  See  Griffin  (above,  note  41)  at  p 
305;  See  also  Farrar  (1991),  (above,  note  42)  at  p  578;  Parkinson  (above,  note  19)  at  p  248. 
67  (1982),  Ch  204,  CA. 
68  Pavlides  v.  Jensen,  (1956),  Ch  565  per  Danckwerts  J;  Millers  (Invercargill)  Ltd.  v.  Maddams 
(1938),  N.  Z.  L.  R.  490  per  Myers  C.  J.;  See  also  Wedderburn  (1958),  (above,  note  41)  at  p  94; 
Sterling  M.  J.,  "The  Theory  and  Policy  of  Shareholder  Actions  in  Tort",  (1987),  The  Modern  Law 
Review,  Vol.  50,468,  London,  England,  Stevens  &  Sons,  at  pp  479-  480;  Law  Commission, 
Consultation  paper,  No  142,  Para  1.7;  Law  Commission,  Shareholder  Remedies,  (1997),  No  246, 
p  2. 
69  Prudential  Assurance  Co  Ltd.  v.  Newman  Industries  Ltd  (No  2),  (1982),  Ch  204,  CA  per 
Vinelott  J. 
70  Griffin  (above,  note  41)  at  p  305. 
213 For  the  purpose  of  fraud,  current  company  law  tends  to  reject  the  idea  of  de  facto 
control.  "  Nonetheless,  section  459  which  will  be  discussed  in  the  following  section 
now  permits  a  member  of  a  company  to  bring  action  in  his  personal  capacity  against 
wrongdoers  who  have  defacto  control  of  the  company.  " 
V.  1.1.1.2.  Disinterested  majority  requirement 
The  disinterested  majority  requirement  concerns  with  a  situation  in  which  an  alleged 
fraud  occurs  against  a  group  of  minority  shareholders  who  then  fall  in  disagreement  in 
respect  of  whether  or  not  to  pursue  the  wrongdoers.  This  requirement  which  was 
introduced  by  Knox  j  in  the  Smith  v.  Croft  case  denies  a  rninority  plaintiff  any 
derivative  remedy  where  the  majority  inside  the  minority  do  not  wish  the  proceeding 
to  continue.  'The  usual  reason  in  practice  for  wanting  to  abandon  such  an  action  is  that 
there  is  far  more  to  lose  financially  by  prosecuting  the  right  to  redress  than  by 
abandoning  or  not  pursuing  it'.  "  Where,  for  example,  the  would-be  defendants  are  the 
main  providers  of  the  corporate  assets,  to  sue  them  might  result  in  their  exit  thus 
jeopardising  the  company  and  its  shareholders  in  the  whole.  74 
Disinterested  majority  measure  is,  however,  liable  to  certain  criticisms.  It  is  suggested 
that  it  can  stifle  through  creating  an  adapted  version  of  majority  rule  the  use  of 
derivative  action  which  was  primarily  designed  to  provide  minority  shareholders 
71  See  the  arguments  of  the  Court  of  Appeal  in  Prudential  Assurance  Co  Ltd.  v.  Newman 
Industries  Ltd.  (No  2),  [(1982),  Ch  204,  CA.;  See  also  Wedderburn  (1957),  (above,  note  39)  at  p 
194;  Miles  and  Proctor,  (above,  note  12)  at  p  142;  Cheffins  (above,  note  12)  at  p  41. 
72  Re  RA  Noble  &  Sons  (Clothing)  Ltd.,  (1983),  BCLC  273  at  p  287  per  Nourse  J. 
73  Smith  v.  Croft  (No  2),  (1988),  Ch  114  per  Knox  J;  See  also  Taylor  v.  National  Union  of 
Mineworkers,  (1985),  BCLC  237. 
74  Thorne  (above,  note  41)  at  p  187;  Ferran  (above,  note  50)  at  pp  152-3. 
214 some  protection  against  controllers'  abuse  in  corporations.  "  It  is,  also,  difficult  to  use 
as  it  can  require  the  courts  to  fall  into  a  subjective  investigation  into  the  mind  of  voters 
in  order  to  discover  that  they  were  in  fact  disinterested  or  not. 
Leaming  from  the  experience  of  the  American  courtS76  ,a  theory  has  been  developed  by 
some  English  company  lawyers  of  replacing  the  disinterested  majority  measure  with 
views  of  other  independent  corporate  organs  in  appropriate  cases.  "  According  to  this 
theory,  if  in  a  given  case  an  independent  sub-committee  has  already  been  formed  by 
the  board  of  directors  to  do  enquiries  about  aRegations  that  institute  the  substance  of 
minority  claims,  the  views  of  such  committee  may  worth  enough  to  block  the 
derivative  proceeding.  Members  of  such  sub-conu-nittee  are  often  non-executive 
directors  with  much  less  likelihood  of  being  involved  in  the  wrongdoing  or  being 
under  the  influence  of  the  very  board.  "  However,  this  theory  can  worsen  the 
circumstances  for  minority  shareholders.  The  views  of  a  sub-conu-nittee  may  simply 
serve  to  block  minority  claims  and  further  it  may  signal  potential  plaintiffs  that  it  is 
better  not  take  wrongdoings  in  companies  seriously  and  perhaps  it  is  even  wise  to 
allow  them  to  proceed. 
V.  1.1.1.3.  Proposed  reform  as  to  the  derivative  action 
In  1996,  the  Law  Conu-nission  was  authorised  to  review  and  identify  shortcomings  of 
the  shareholder  protection  mechanisms  which  already  existed  in  company  law.  One  of 
75  Pettet  (2001),  (above,  note  40)  at  p  240. 
76  See  Zapata  Corp  v.  Maldonado  in  which  the  Delaware  Supreme  Court  gave  regard  to  the 
views  of  the  sub-committee  of  the  board  and  as  a  result  struck  out  the  action  brought  by  the 
minority  shareholder.  [430  A  2d  779  (1981)  quoted  in  Pettet  (above,  note  40)  at  pp  239-240. 
77  Pettet  Ibid. 
78  Pettet  Ibid. 
215 the  reviewed  mechanisms  that  focused  attention  of  the  Commission  was  the  derivative 
action.  The  Commission  noticed  that  the  scheme  of  the  law  relevant  to  derivative 
action  is  currently  deficient  mainly  because  of  its  inaccessibility.  79  The  law  in  this  area 
is  dense  and  hidden  in  a  labyrinth  of  over  150-year  legal  proceedings  which  are  at 
times  incoherent.  "  It  fails  to  cover  breach  of  duties  of  care  and  fiduciary  and 
negligence  and  further  qualifies  commencement  of  a  derivative  action  to  two  difficult 
to  prove  prerequisites.  "  Inspired  by  recent  developments  which  occurred  in  respect  of 
derivative  action  in  other  commonwealth  countries  such  as  Canada"  and  New 
Zealand",  the  Law  Commission  recommended  that  derivative  action  should  be  put  in 
a  statutory  footing  and  be  made  available  to  shareholders  under  much  more  certain 
and  easily  accessible  and  provable  circumstances.  In  its  view,  such  circ-umstances  will 
be  created  if  the  government  considers  a  reform  of  the  law  which  covers  the  following 
issues: 
79  Law  Commission,  (above,  note  68)  at  p  71;  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry"s  Consultation 
Paper,  "Modern  Company  Law  for  a  Competitive  Economy",  Summary  of  Responses  Received 
to  The  DTI,  (1998),  p  12. 
80  Law  Commission,  (above,  note  68)  at  p  71;  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry's  Consultation 
Paper  Ibid. 
81  See  generally  Conway  (above,  note  43);  Boyle  A.  J.  "The  Derivative  Action  in  Company 
Law",  (1969),  Journal  of  Business  Law,  London,  Stevens,  at  p  120;  Poole  Jill  and  Roberts  Pauline, 
"'Shareholder  Remedies-Corporate  Wrongs  and  the  Derivative  Action"',  (1999),  Journal  of 
Business  Law,  London,  Stevens,  at  p  99;  Farrar  (1991),  (above,  note  42)  at  p  453. 
82  Statutory  derivative  action  subject  of  Canada  Business  Corporation  Act  (1985),  s.  239;  For 
further  study  of  the  Canadian  statutory  derivative  action  see  Miles  Lilian,  "Reforming  The 
Common  Law  Derivative  Action:  A  Bird's  Eye  View",  Business  Law  Review,  (July  1999),  180, 
London,  Butterworths,  at  p  181;  Cheffins  Brian  R.,  "'Reforming  the  Derivative  Action:  The 
Canadian  Experience  and  British  Prospects",  (1997),  Company,  Financial  and  Insolvency  Law 
Revicw,  Vol.  1  (2),  227-260,  Oxford,  Mansfield  Press;  MacIntosh  Jeffrey  G,  "Minority  Shareholder 
Rights  in  Canada  and  England:  1860-1987"",  (1989),  Osgoode  Hall  Law  journal,  vol.  27,  No.  3, 
Toronto,  Osgoode  Hall  Law  School,  at  pp  636-640;  Beck  (1974),  (above,  note  58). 
83  Companies  Act  1993,  s.  165  (New  Zealand);  For  further  study  of  the  statutory  derivative 
action  in  New  Zealand  see  Watson  Susan  M.,  ""A  Matter  of  Balance:  The  Statutory  Derivative 
Action  in  New  Zealand",  (1998),  Company  Lawyer,  19  (8),  236;  Fitzsimons,  Peter,  "The 
216 1)  Derivative  action  should  be  limited  to  action  against  directors  and  should  not  cover 
actions  against  third  parties  or  breach  of  duties  by  officers  and  employees  unless 
directors  are  implicated  in  the  wrongdoing.  The  rationale  was  twofold.  On  the  one 
hand,  it  could  avoid  excessive  shareholder  interference  and  allows  directors  to  deal 
with  such  actions  as  matters  of  management.  On  the  other  hand,  it  could  ensure  that 
there  will  be  no  more  confusion  and  overlap  in  the  use  of  the  unfairly  prejudicial  and 
the  derivative  remedies  as  to  addressing  the  majority  /minority  conflict,  as  such 
conflicts  should  fall  only  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  former  remedy.  " 
2)  Derivative  actions  should  be  available  to  shareholders  for  breach  of  director"s  duties 
of  care  and  fiduciary  and  should  also  extend  to  negligence  cases"  where  directors  were 
not  benefited  personally  because  while  we  accept  investors  take  the  risk  of  mistake  by 
managers  it  does  not  mean  that  they  have  to  accept  that  directors  will  fail  to  comply 
with  their  duties. 
86 
3)  Derivative  actions  should  be  subject  to  a  28  days  notice  given  by  the  plaintiff  to  the 
wronged  company  followed  by  taking  action  by  such  plaintiff  for  a  leave  of  the  court 
allowing  the  plaintiff  to  continue  his  action  against  the  alleged  wrongdoer  director.  A 
notice  requirement,  would  allow  the  company  to  decide  whether  to  bring  the 
Companies  Act  1993:  A  New  Approach  to  Shareholder  Litigation  in  New  Zealand"',  (1997), 
Company  Lawyer,  18  (10),  306;  Roberts  and  Pool  (above,  note  81). 
84  Section  459  Companies  Act  1985. 
85  The  same  Commission  later  when  reviewing  the  law  relevant  to  directors'  duties  in  1999 
implicitly  revised  this  recommendation.  [See  Chapter  Four  (above,  at  IV.  1.1-C-2,  para  note  1331. 
86  For  a  similar  view  see  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry's  Consultation  Paper  (above,  note 
79)  at  pp  45,46  and  Modern  Company  Law  for  a  Competitive  Economy:  Final  Report  (above, 
note  59),  para  7.46  at  p  165. 
217 proceeding  itself  or  else  to  provide  a  proper  answer  hereby  to  make  the  use  of  a 
derivative  action  unnecessary. 
4)  Derivative  actions  should  be  subject  to  the  discretion  of  the  courts  that,  in  substitute 
of  the  management,  will  make  appropriate  decision  either  to  allow  or  to  reject  a 
derivative  action  and  in  doing  so  they  should  consider  all  circumstances  including  the 
good  faith  of  the  plaintiff,  the  interests  of  the  company,  whether  the  wrong  has  been 
ratified  by  the  company,  whether  the  company  has  resolved  not  to  pursue  the 
wrongdoer,  the  views  of  an  independent  organ  and  the  availability  of  alternative 
remedies  and  the  like. 
87 
The  Law  Commission  pronounced  its  recommendations  facilitative  to  derivative 
actions,  as  they  will  remove  the  common  law  basis  for  such  an  action  and  relieve  a 
minority  shareholder  from  the  burden  of  having  to  show  difficult  to  prove 
prerequisites  of  fraud  and  wrongdoer  control.  They  will  also  entail  certainty,  as  a 
minority  shareholder  will  be  able  to  identify  circumstances  in  which  it  is  very  likely 
that  a  derivative  action  will  succeed.  They  also  curb  opportunistic  use  of  the  derivative 
mechanism,  as  the  decision  to  grant  leave  falls  ultimately  within  the  discretion  of  the 
courts. 
The  Companies  Act  2006  has  placed,  as  recommended  by  the  Law  Conu-nission,  the 
derivative  action  on  a  statutory  form.  "  Excluding  the  28  days  notice  requirement,  it 
includes  all  the  other  recommendations  of  the  Law  Conu-nission  in  this  area. 
87  Law  Commission  (above,  note  68)  at  pp  77-85. 
88  The  Companies  Act  2006,  sections  260-264. 
218 Accordingly,  the  Act  restricts  the  use  of  derivative  action  to  cases  where  the  cause  of 
action  arises  from  directors"  breach  of  duties  extending  to  their  negligence  and  where 
the  action  is  against  the  wrongdoer  director  or  other  persons  who  hold  assets  that  are 
the  subject  of  the  derivative  action  and  confers  discretion  on  the  courts  to  decide 
whether  to  allow  or  reject  such  action  after  consideration  of  every  relevant 
circumstance. 
Whether  a  statutory  derivative  action,  as  recommended  by  the  Law  Commission  and 
introduced  by  the  Act,  is  capable  to  meet  its  declared  objectives  must  be  seen  in  the 
light  of  future  court  experience  and  hence  cannot  be  answered  with  precision  at  this 
stage.  Nonetheless,  from  a  theoretical  perspective  and  in  the  light  of  past  experience 
one  can  raise  reasonable  doubts  about  the  likelihood  of  reaching  those  objectives.  Take, 
for  example,  certainty  which  appears  to  be  the  most  important  argument  in  the  Law 
Commission's  theory.  The  theory  can  generate  uncertainty  as  to  derivative  action  for  a 
number  of  reasons.  For  one,  it  does  not  require  the  courts  to  entertain  such  actions 
while  conferring  a  wide  discretion  on  them  to  choose  after  considering  varying  factors 
either  to  allow  or  to  reject  a  derivative  action.  "  For  another,  where  conflicting  factors 
are  present,  which  factor  is  to  be  prioritised  is  not  determined.  Also,  while  the  courts 
will  have  discretion  to  review  an  authorisation  or  ratification  of  the  wrong  and  a 
corporate  decision  which  rejects  Pursuing  the  wrongdoer'O,  nonetheless,  the  law  does 
89  Section  263  (3). 
90  Section  263  (2,3). 
219 not  offer  guidelines  as  to  determining  when  and  under  what  circumstances  such 
factors  will  not  bar  the  continuation  of  a  derivative  action.  " 
There  are  also  concems  about  how  should  the  courts  make  use  of  or  assess  some  of  the 
stated  factors.  For  example,  the  proposed  derivative  action  requires  the  courts  to 
regard  whether  the  wrong  in  question  could  be  ratified  by  the  company,  while  it  fails 
to  determine  what  sort  of  wrongs  can  be  ratified.  Another  example  is  where  it  refers 
the  courts  to  consider  views  of  directors  or  an  independnt  organ  within  the  company. 
As  to  the  views  of  directors,  given  that  such  views  can  be  tainted  wih  bad  faith  on  the 
part  of  directors,  it  is  not  determined  how  should  the  courts  make  a  distinction 
between  views  of  directors  which  are  truly  genuine  and  those  that  are  not 
So. 
92 
The 
same  criticism  can  be  brought  as  to  the  views  of  an  independent  organ  plus  there  is  no 
guideline  to  show  what  can  be  considered  as  an  independent  organ  and  further  how 
such  organs  perform  thir  role.  " 
In  addition  to  these,  discretion  of  the  courts  in  authorising  or  rejecting  derivative 
actions  and  in  reviewing  ratifications  could  mean  to  put  the  power  to  take  corporate 
decisions  into  the  hands  of  an  inappropriate  organ.  To  ask  the  courts  to  take  such 
decisions  is,  in  fact,  to  ask  them  to  take  the  management  of  companies.  " 
91  Garcia  John  "'The  Law  Commission's  Investigation  into  Director'  Duties",  (1998),  Company 
Lawyer,  19  (9),  279-281;  Roberts  and  Pool  (above,  note  81)  at  p  104;  Miles  (above,  note  82)  at  pp 
182-3. 
92  Roberts  and  Pool  (above,  note  81)  at  p  108. 
93  Miles  (above,  note  82)  at  p  183. 
94  Hale  (above,  note  39)  at  p  225. 
220 V.  1.2.  Statutory  constraints 
Substantive  and  procedural  difficulties  which  associate  with  taking  a  derivative  action, 
its  insufficient  jurisdiction  and  the  fact  that  common  law  offers  no  "abuse  of  rights" 
principle  in  the  model  of  civil  law  jurisdictions  have  contributed  to  convince  the 
Parliament  to  take  statutory  steps  in  order  to  protect  minority  shareholders  against  the 
15  likelihood  of  abuse  of  rights  by  majority  shareholders.  To  this  end,  the  Parliament 
made  use  of  the  equity  principles  and  the  idea  was  to  enable  the  courts  to  remedy 
abusive  conducts  of  majority  shareholders  which  under  the  traditional  common  law 
often  fell  short  of  the  concept  of  actual  illegality.  96  This  way  of  relaxation  of  rigidity  of 
the  law  is  a  product  of  English  legal  history  that  has  survived  the  amalgamation  of  the 
courts  of  conunon  law  and  equity  in  order  to  ensure  justice.  "  While  the  courts  of 
common  law  had  to  observe  only  legal  rights,  courts  of  equity  could  dispense  with 
legal  rights  in  the  interests  of  general  principles  of  company  law  and  equity.  "  The 
equity  principles  could  subject  the  exercise  of  legal  rights  to  equitable  considerations 
where  certain  conditions  existed"  and,  accordingly,  the  Parliament  introduced  two 
mechanisms  of  'just  and  equitable  winding  up'  and  "unfairly  prejudicial  conduct", 
respectively  subjects  of  sections  122  (1)  g  Insolvency  Act  1986  and  459  Companies  Act 
1985  which  are  the  focus  of  my  consideration  in  this  section. 
95  See  generally  Farrar  (above,  note  42)  at  p  454;  Maclntosh  (above,  note  82)  at  p  615;  Clark 
Bryan,  "Unfairly  Prejudicial  Conduct:  A  Pathway  Through  the  Maze",  Company  Lawyer,  (2001), 
22  (6),  170,  London,  Oyez  Publishing  Limited. 
96  Pettet  (above,  note  40)  at  p  246 
97  Compared  with  the  way  through  which  the  laws  of  the  civil  law  jurisdictions  address  the 
issue  of  majority  abuse,  this,  can  be  seen  as  being  only  a  different  way  of  doing  the  same  thing. 
[O'Neill  and  another  v.  Phillips  and  Others,  (1999),  2  All  ER  961,  HL  at  969  per  Lord  Hoffmann]. 
98  Hahlo  and  Farrar,  (above,  note  38)  at  p  477;  Hale  (above,  note  39)  at  219. 
99  Ebrahimi  v.  Westbourne  Galleries  Ltd.  (1973),  A.  C.  360  at  379  per  Lord  Wilberforce. 
221 V.  1.2.1.  just  and  Equitable  Winding  up 
The  purpose  of  the  just  and  equitable  winding  up  is  to  enable  an  oppressed 
shareholder  to  take  action  to  the  courts  for  a  winding  up  remedy  on  equitable  grounds. 
The  remedy  originally  relied  on  case  law  in  which  earlier  judges  had  created  a 
jurisdiction  for  themselves  to  wind  companies  up  on  equitable  grounds,  as  they  did  so 
in  respect  of  partnerships.  '00  Later,  it  was  put  into  a  statutory  footing  by  the  Insolvency 
Act  1986  which  offers  no  definition  of  it  and  which  gives  a  wide  discretion  to  the  courts 
in  the  exercise  of  it.  101  The  lawmaker  thought  that  a  formal  definition  not  only  is 
impossible  but  also  could  be  wholly  undesirable.  'O'  Nevertheless,  the  case  law  has 
provided  some  guidelines  as  to  showing  under  what  circumstances  an  equitable 
winding  up  remedy  can  be  given.  According  to  it,  equitable  considerations  may  come 
to  play  whenever  the  relationship  between  two  people  is  of  personal  character  mainly 
based  on  verbal  trust.  'O'  Such  relationship  is  normally  found  in  small  companies  which 
enjoy  a  quasi  partnership  character.  In  such  companies,  shareholders'  relationship  can 
go  beyond  the  written  articles  of  association  and  include  their  legitimate 
expectations. 
104 
Accordingly,  the  remedy  has  been  given  a  very  limited  scope,  being 
most  suitable  for  deadlock  situations"'  where,  for  instance,  a  company  is  essentially  an 
incorporated  partnership,  involving  two  partners  with  equal  shareholdings,  and  thus 
100  Re  Yenidje  Tobacco  Company  (1916),  2  Ch  426,  Per  Lord  Cozens  Hardy  MR;  Loch  and 
Another  Appellants  v.  John  Blackwood,  Limited  Respondents  (1924),  A.  C.  783;  Re  Davis  and 
Collett,  Limited  (1935),  Ch.  693;  See  generally  Pettet  (above,  note  40). 
101  See  Insolvency  Act  1986,  Section  122  (1):  "'A  company  may  be  wound  up  by  the  court  if- 
(g)  The  court  is  of  the  opinion  that  it  is  just  and  equitable  that  the  company  should  be  wound 
up. 
102  Ebrahimi  v.  Westbourne  Galleries  Ltd.  (1973),  A.  C.  360  at  379  per  Lord  Wilberforce;  see  also 
Farrar  (1991),  (above,  note  42)  at  pp  454-457. 
103  Ebrahimi  v.  Westboume  Galleries  Ltd.  (1973),  A.  C.  360  at  379  per  Lord  Wilberforce; 
Clemens  v.  Clemens,  (1976),  2  All  ER  268(Ch  D). 
104  MacIntosh  (above,  note  82)  at  pp  616-617. 
105  Re  Yenidje  Tobacco  Company,  (1916),  2  Ch  426,  Per  Lord  Cozens  Hardy  MR. 
222 dependent  on  mutual  confidence,  but  has  ceased  to  operate  properly  owing  to  an 
unsolvable  disagreement  between  the  partners.  'O'  Yet  deadlock  is  by  no  means  a 
requirement  and  a  mere  break  of  trust  may  suffice. 
107 
A  familiar  example  is  the  case  of 
exclusion  from  the  management  in  which  a  member  who  legitimately  expects  to 
continue  the  office  might  lose  his  trust  owing  to  an  unfair  dismissal  on  the  part  of  those 
in  control.  'O' 
One  important  implication  of  the  case  law  guidelines  is  to  make  it  clear  that  equitable 
remedies  such  as  winding  up  have  little  relevance  to  the  large  companies  because  such 
companies  often  lack  a  quasi  partnership  character.  "' 
A  relevant  issue  is  to  determine  whether  the  remedy  works  on  the  basis  of  a  no  fault 
divorce  or  a  minority  plaintiff  is  required  to  show  a  fault  of  controllers?  There  are  two 
approaches  both  in  case  law  and  between  company  law  scholars.  One  argues  that  a 
minority  shareholder  is  required  to  prove  some  fault  of  the  defendant  majority.  "'  The 
proponents  of  this  approach  seek,  by  analogy,  to  extend  to  the  just  and  equitable 
winding  up  remedy  the  principles  which  are  primarily  relevant  to  the  unfairly 
106  Re  RA  Noble  &  Sons  (Clothing)  Ltd.,  (1983),  BCLC,  p  273. 
107  Loch  and  Another  Appellants  v.  John  Blackwood,  Limited  Respondents,  (1924),  A.  C.  783;  Re 
Davis  and  Collett,  Limited,  (1935),  Ch.  693;  Re  RA  Noble  &  Sons  Ibid.;  See  also  Farrar  (1991), 
(above,  note  42)  at  p  458. 
108  Pettet  (above,  note  40)  at  p  246. 
109  Acton  Stephen,  "Just  and  Equitable  Winding  Up:  The  Strange  Case  of  the  Disappearing 
jurisdiction",  Company  Lawyer,  (2001),  22(5),  134,  London,  Oyez  Publishing  Limited,  at  135. 
110  Clark  (2001),  (above,  note  95)  at  pp  173-4;  Clark  Bryan,  "Unfairly  Prejudicial  Conduct",  Scots 
Law  Time,  (1999),  38,321,  Edinburgh,  W.  Green  &  Son  Ltd,  at  324;  Clark  Bryan,  "Just  and 
Equitable  Winding  Up:  Wound  Up",  Scots  Law  Time,  (2001),  12,108,  Edinburgh,  W.  Green  &  Son 
Ltd,  at  pp  110-111  - 
223 prejudicial  remedy.  "'  The  Re  Guidezone  Ltd.  case'12  is  a  common  law  support  for  this 
approach.  The  case  involved  a  break  of  relationship  between  company  partners  and 
Jonathan  Parker  J.  who  was  asked  for  an  equitable  remedy  rejected  the  case  taking  the 
view  that  the  defendant  majority  had  acted  in  a  manner  which  equity  would  not 
regard  as  a  breach  of  good  faith.  "'  According  to  him,  equitable  remedies  should  not 
enable  a  member  to  escape  from  consequences  of  a  valid  bargain;  otherwise  they  will 
produce  commercial  uncertainty  and  would  fundamentally  contradict  the  sanctity  of 
contract  principle.  "' 
The  other  approach  rejects  any  extension  of  some  sort  of  fault  requirement  to  the  just 
and  equitable  winding  up  remedy  and  suggests  that  this  remedy  has  a  wide 
jurisdiction  which  can  be  resorted  on  a  no  fault  divorce  basis.  "'  It  relies on  the  Ebrahimi 
v.  Westbourne  Galleries  Ltd.  case"'  which  involved  a  private  corporation  with  three 
shareholder/  director  members.  They  were  entitled  to  profits  of  the  business  which 
were  distributed  among  them  in  the  form  of  remuneration.  Two  of  them,  a  father  and 
son,  who  held  a  majority  of  shares,  removed  the  plaintiff  from  the  office  and  Lord 
111  These  principles  which  were  announced  by  Lord  Hoffman  in  the  ONeill  case  (O'Neill  and 
Another  v.  Phillips  and  Others,  (1999),  2  All  ER  961),  will  be  later  discussed  in  the  following 
section.  See  below  at  V.  1.2.2. 
112  Re  Guidezone  Ltd  (2002),  2  BCLC  321. 
113  Re  Guidezone  Ltd.,  Ibid. 
114  Law  Commission  (above,  note  68)  at  3.66;  O'Neill  and  Another  v  Phillips  and  Others,  (1999), 
2  All  ER  HL  961  at  968  per  Lord  Hoffman  J;  Ebrahimi  v.  Westbourne  Galleries  Ltd.  (1973),  A.  C. 
360  at  379  per  Lord  Wilberforce;  See  also  Clark,  (2001),  (above,  note  110)  at  p  111. 
115  Acton  (2001),  (above,  note  109)  at  pp  134-137;  Conway  (above,  note  43)  at  pp  17-18;  Poole  Jill 
and  Roberts  Pauline  "Shareholder  Remedies-Efficient  Litigation  and  the  Unfair  Prejudice 
Remedy"',  (1999),  The  Journal  of  Business  Law,  London,  Stevens,  at  p  57;  Boyle  A.  J.,  "Unfair 
Prejudice  in  the  House  of  Lords"',  Company  lawyer,  (2000),  21(8),  London,  Oyez  Publishing 
Limited,  at  p  253;  Farrar  (1991),  (above,  note  42)  at  pp  455,457. 
116  Ebrahimi  x,,.  Westbourne  Galleries  Ltd.  (1973),  A.  C.  360  at  379. 
224 Wilberforce  who  was  in  charge  of  the  case  regarded  such  removal  as  an  act  which  is 
legally  effective,  meanwhile  deserving  a  winding  up  remedy  on  equitable  grounds.  "' 
Which  approach  reflects  the  positive  law  on  this  issue  cannot  be  answered  with 
precision,  as  the  law  currently  is  not  sufficiently  clear.  Nonetheless,  for  a  number  of 
reasons,  one  can  accept  that  the  second  approach  constitutes  a  more  acceptable 
interpretation  of  the  law  on  this  matter.  For  one,  section  122  (1)  g  Insolvency  Act  1986 
does  not  speak  of  any  fault  requirement,  while  giving  wide  authority  to  the  courts  in 
order  to  grant  remedy.  "'  For  another,  the  remedy  would  have  seemed  redundant,  if 
fault  had  been  a  requirement  for  it.  A  fault  based  winding  up  order  can  always  be 
given  to  a  minority  plaintiff  who  petitions  for  a  remedy  under  section  459  Companies 
Act  1985.  Hence,  there  will  be  no  rationale  for  section  122  which  offers  a  just  and 
equitable  winding  up  remedy,  unless  we  believe  that  it  has  a  jurisdiction  wider  than 
that  of  the  section  459  and  as  a  result  fault  is  not  a  requirement.  "9 
V.  1.2.2.  Unfairly  Prejudicial  Remedy 
Where  the  courts  find  that  the  affairs  of  the  company  is  being  conducted  in  a  manner 
which  is  unfairly  prejudicial  to  interests  of  its  members  generally  120  or  some  parts  of  its 
117  Ibid. 
118  It  must  yet  be  bore  in  mind  that  according  to  the  section  125(2)  Insolvency  Act  1986,  the 
winding  up  is  the  residual  remedy.  This  means  a  fair  offer  to  purchase  the  shares  of  the 
petitioner,  made  by  the  controllers  will  often  disentitle  the  plaintiff  from  pursuing  the  winding 
up  proceeding.  Also  the  possibility  of  an  unfair  prejudice  petition  may  produce  the  same  result. 
See  further  in  Pettet  (above,  note  40)  at  p  247. 
119  Acton  (2001),  (above,  note  109)  at  p  134-137. 
120  Section  145  Companies  Act  1989  has  amended  section  459  Companies  Act  1985  in  order  to 
enable  the  new  mechanism  to  cover  situations  in  which  all  shareholders  suffer  loss.  The 
wording  of  the  section  is  as  follows:  'to  the  members  generally  or  part  of  the  membership, 
including  the  petitioner.  See  Meyer  &  Another  v.  Scottish  Textile  and  Manufacturing  Co  Ltd  & 
Another  (1954),  SC  381  at  392  per  Lord  Cooper;  See  also  Griffin  Stephen,  "Negligent 
225 members,  a  grant  of  the  unfairly  prejudicial  remedy  will  matter.  "'  The  background  of 
the  remedy  goes  back  to  the  section  210  Companies  Act  1948  that,  in  disregard  of  the 
rule  established  in  Foss  v  Harbottle  122 
, 
had  allowed  minority  actions  to  be  taken  against 
the  majority  who  conducts  the  affairs  of  the  company  oppressively  against  minority 
interests.  As  the  wording  of  the  section  was  narrow,  it  had  failed  to  address  the 
possibility  of  majority  abuse  effectively.  The  section  had  also  required  a  minority 
shareholder  to  establish  a  course  of  oppressive  conducts.  This  was  to  mean  that 
omissions,  future  conducts  or  a  single  conduct  were  not  recognised  as  oppressive. 
Furthermore,  the  oppression  was  required  to  be  suffered  in  one's  capacity  qua 
shareholder  rather  than  in  any  other  capacities.  Hence,  exclusion  from  management 
could  not  constitute  oppression,  though  it  was  one  of  the  most  common  grounds  for  a 
complaint  under  the  old  section  210.  It  was  a  requirement  for  a  conduct  to  be  regarded 
as  oppressive  that  it  would  have  justified  an  order  to  wind  up  the  company 
too.  123 
Besides,  the  courts  tended  to  interpret  the  word  oppression  in  its  narrowest  meaning 
that  could  hardly  cover  cundocts  other  than  those  of  illegal  and  unconstitutional.  124 
These  deficiencies  were  identified  by  the  Jenkins  Committee  that  suggested  the  remedy 
should  be  amended  in  order  to  include  a  wider  sense  of  abuse  of  rights  by  majority 
shareholders.  In  particular,  it  highlighted  two  instances  of  such  abuse,  exclusion  from 
Mismanagement  as  Unfairly  Prejudicial  Conduct,  ",  (1992),  The  law  Quarterly  Review,  Vol.  108, 
389,  London,  Stevens  and  Sons. 
121  Section  459(l)  Companies  Act  1985. 
122  Re  Saul  D  Harrison  &  Sons  plc  (1995),  1  BCLC  14  per  Hoffman  J  at  p  18;  See  also  Davies 
(above,  note  60)  at  p  738. 
123  See  Clark  (above,  note  95)  at  pp  170-1;  Clark  (1999),  (above,  note  110)  at  pp  321-2;  Conway 
(above,  note  43)  at  p  13-15. 
124  This  tendency  was  reflected  in  the  House  of  Lords  decision  in  Scottish  Competitive  Co- 
operative  Wholesale  Society  Ltd  v.  Meyer  once  defining  oppressive  conducts  as  something 
'burdensome,  harsh  and  wrong'.  [(1958),  3  All  E.  R.  6,  HL] 
226 management  and  cases  where  minority  shareholders  suffer  indirect  loss  that  most 
importantly  needed  to  be  included.  "'  Accordingly,  the  Parliament  replaced  section  210 
with  section  75  companies  Act  1980  (now  subject  of  sections  459-461  Companies  Act 
1985)  that  introduced  the  new  unfairly  prejudicial  remedy.  The  wide  wording  of  the 
new  section,  which  enjoyed  the  terms  'interests'  and  'unfairly  prejudicial'  in  substitute 
of  "rights'  and  'oppression",  its  generous  relief  plus  the  liberal  attitude  of  the  courts 
have  largely  remedied  deficiencies  associated  with  the  old  section  210  and  removed 
obstacles  to  which  minority  complains  were  tied.  "' 
The  new  section,  however,  has  raised  uncertainty  concern  among  scholars  of  company 
law,  as  it  gave  no  definition  of  its  underlying  equity  principles.  "'  It  could  not  offer  a 
reasonable  level  of  precision  in  order  to  allow  the  involved  persons  to  predict 
consequences  of  their  acts  or  omissions.  Its  vagueness  could  cause  the  judges  to  fall 
into  disagreement  with  the  likelihood  of  litigants  and  their  solicitors  become  mislead.  It 
could  even  enable  oppression  of  the  majority  by  an  opportunist  minority.  "'  One  could 
further  point  to  the  lengthy  proceedings,  more  complicated  case  law,  inefficiency  of  the 
statutory  remedies,  waste  of  public  time  and  money  and  increased  uncertainty  in 
commercial  decisions  that  could  ensue  from  the  new  section. 
129 
125  Jenkins  Committee,  Report  of  the  Company  Law  Committee,  Cmnd.  1749,  (1962),  at  206;  See 
also  Clark  (above,  note  95)  at  pp  170-1;  Clark  (1999),  (above,  note  110)  at  pp  321-2;  Conway 
(above,  note  43)  at  pp  13-15;  Davies  (1997),  (above,  note  60)  at  p  737. 
126  Sealy  (above,  note  31)  at  175. 
127  Clark  (above,  note  95)  at  p  170;  Clark  (1999),  (above,  note  110)  at  p  322. 
128  Farrar  John  H.,  "Company  Law,  ",  (1985),  London,  Butterworths,  at  p  474;  See  also  Clark 
(1999),  (above,  note  110)  at  322. 
129  Sealy  L.  S,  "Companý  7  Law  and  Commercial  Reality",  (1984),  London,  Sweet  &  Maxwell,  at 
pp  15,30;  Clark  (1999),  (above,  note  110)  at  p  322. 
227 Yet,  it  is  generally  accepted  that  the  Parliament  has  intentionally  drafted  the  section  in 
such  an  uncertain  format.  "O  The  idea,  it  is  said,  is  to  confer  on  the  courts  unlimited 
jurisdiction  to  hear  unfair  prejudice  claims  because  this  is  the  only  way  with  which 
they  can  deliver  maximum  justice  in  each  case.  "'  The  uncertainty  associated  with  the 
section  frees  the  courts  from  technical  considerations  of  legal  rights  and  confers  on 
them  wide  power  to  do  what  appears  to  be  just  and  equitable. 
132 
The  Law  Commission,  too,  recommended,  in  its  consultation  paper,  that  the  term 
unfairly  prejudicial  should  not  be  defined  in  section  459  and  it  is  preferable  to  keep  the 
very  general  wording  of  the  section  as  it  now  stands  in  order  to  cover  the  conducts 
which  may  fall  short  of  actual  illegality  hereby  to  avoid  the  risk  of  further  limitation  to 
the  section.  "'  In  its  view,  uncertainty  could  be  controlled  through  using  several 
techniques  including:  1)  to  empower  the  courts  to  exercise  effective  case  management; 
2)  to  amend  the  section  to  cover  specific  conduct  rather  than  the  overall  conduct  of  the 
affairs  of  the  company  and;  3)  to  impose  time  limit  for  bringing  claims  under  this 
section.  Nonetheless,  the  proposed  techniques  have  limited  capacity  to  address  the 
uncertainty  concern,  as  they  only  serve  as  a  pain  relief  rather  than  cure.  The  Law 
Commission-'s  recommendation  also  seems  inconsistent  with  its  already  publicised 
130  Goddard  Robert,  "'Closing  the  Categories  of  Unfair  Prejudice",  Company  Lawyer,  (1999), 
20(10),  333  London,  Oyez  Publishing  Limited,  at  p  334;  Clark  (above,  note  95)  at  p  171;  Davies 
(1997)  (above,  note  60)  at  p  735. 
131  Vinelot  J.,  "'Minority  shareholders",  (1985),  Company  Lawyer,  Vol.  6,  London,  Oyez 
Publishing  Limited,  at  p  31;  Prudential  Assurance  Co  Ltd  v.  Newman  Industries,  (1981),  Ch,  p 
257;  for  an  analysis  of  the  approach  see  Boyle  A.  J.,  ""The  Judicial  Interpretation  of  Part  xvii  of 
the  Companies  Act  1985"  in  'Company  Law  in  Change'  (1987),  Edited  by  Pettet  B.  G.,  London, 
Stevens,  at  pp  23,24;  Boyle  (2000),  (above,  note  115)  at  p  253;  Mayson  Stephan,  French  Derek 
and  Ryan  Christopher,  "Mayson,  French  &  Ryan  on  Company  Law",  (2003),  19th  ed.,  Oxford, 
Oxford  University  Press,  at  pp  619-620. 
132  Re  Saul  D  Harrison  &  Sons  plc  (1995),  1  BCLC  14  at  17-20  and  O'Neill  and  Another  v. 
Phillips  and  Others,  (1999),  2  All  ER  HL  961  at  966  both  per  Hoffman  J. 
133  Law  Commission  (above,  note  68)  at  pp  41-44. 
228 objectives  that  seek  for  codification  of  the  present  law  through  introduction  of  clear  set 
of  rules  concerning  derivative  actions  and  unfair  prejudice  remedy  with  more  flexible 
and  accessible  criteria. 
134 
Unlike  the  law  commission,  the  company  law  steering  group  proposed  in  the  interests 
of  greater  certainty  for  making  a  connection  between  the  unfair  prejudice  concept  and 
cases  that  involve  either  a  breach  of  constitution  or  a  breach  of  directors"  duties.  135  The 
government,  which  seems  to  have  taken  side  with  the  Law  Commission,  did  not  show 
any  intention  to  amend  the  current  section  459,  as  its  proposed  Companies  Bill  does 
not  include  a  reform  of  the  section.  "' 
V.  1.2.2.1.  Under  what  circumstances  as  459  remedy  can  be  given 
The  common  law  offers  some  guidance  to  shed  light  on  circumstances  under  which  a 
section  459  remedy  can  be  given.  Lord  Wilberforce"',  who  by  analogy  extended 
equitable  principles  relevant  to  partnerships  to  companies,  gave  the  first  guidance 
which  is  the  element  of  personal  relationship.  "'  According  to  him,  equitable  principles 
can  be  used  only  where  the  relationship  between  members  relies  on  personal 
commitments  and  mutual  trust.  This  was  to  mean  that  a  member,  when  his  legitimate 
expectations  are  put  at  risk,  might  be  allowed  to  flee  from  his  contractual  duties.  A 
criticism  was  that  the  term  "legitimate  expectations',  as  stated  by  Lord  Wilberforce 
134  Ibid.,  at  pp  72,42. 
135  The  Company  Law  Steering  Group,  "Modem  Company  Law,  "Final  report,  (2001),  Vol.  I,  p 
33. 
136  The  Companies  Bill  (108-20  Jul  2006)  available  from  the  DTI  website  at  the  following 
address:  http:  //www.  publications.  parliament.  uk/pa/pabills/200506/companies.  htm. 
137  Ebrahimi  v.  Westbourne  Galleries  Ltd.  (1973),  A.  C.  360 
138  Hirt  (2003),  (above,  note  66)  at  p  101;  Clark  (1999),  (above,  note  110)  at  322;  Poole  and 
Roberts  (above,  note  115)  at  pp  41-43. 
229 could  excessively  enable  escape  of  parties  from  contractual  duties.  Re  RA  Noble  &  Sons 
(Clothing)  Ltd  139,  Re  Saul  D  Harrison  &  Sons  plc"O  and  particularly  O"Neill  and  another  v. 
Phillips  and  others"'  offered  further  guidance,  trying  to  avoid  the  criticism.  According 
to  these  authorities,  legitimate  expectations,  which  allow  escape  from  contractual 
duties,  should  not  be  viewed  as  something  which  sits  "under  a  palm  tree". 
14' 
They  must 
be  taken  into  account  in  combination  with  certain  equitable  principles  that  increase 
certainty  in  law.  141  These  principles  suggest  that  the  use  of  the  measure  of  legitimate 
expectations  must  be  exceptional  and  limited  to  cases  in  which  some  form  of  mutual 
understanding  and  informal  agreement  in  excess  of  the  written  contract  is  present.  144 
These  have  led  the  case  law  to  view  the  remedy  under  section  459  as  having  a 
145 
contractual  nature.  The  view  has  been  supported  by  the  House  of  Lords  "  the 
Company  Law  Steering  Group 
146 
and  the  government. 
147 
Several  implications  can  derive  from  the  view.  The  first  implication  is  that  the  unfairly 
prejudicial  remedy  is  suitable  almost  only  for  small  companies  where  members' 
relationship  continues  a  pre-existed  quasi  partnership.  Although  the  remedy  can  in 
theory  be  used  in  companies  of  any  size  and  for  unfairness  of  any  kind,  it  is  normally 
relevant  in  cases  where  there  is  a  breakdown  in  relationships  between 
139  (1983)  B.  C.  L.  C.  273. 
140  (1995)  1  B.  C.  L.  C.  14. 
141  (1999),  2  All  ER  961,  HL. 
142  Re  jE  Cade  &  Sons  Ltd.  (1992)  B.  C.  L.  C.  213  at  227  per  Warner  J. 
143  ONeill  and  Another  v.  Phillips  and  Others  (1999),  2  All  ER  961,  HL  at  pp  967-8  per 
Hoffman  J.  See  also  Goddard  (above,  note  133)  at  pp  334-5. 
144  Re  RA  Noble  &  Sons  (Clothing)  Ltd,  (1983)  B.  C.  L.  C.  273  at  287  per  Nourse  J.;  Re  Saul  D 
Harrison  &  Sons  p1c,  (1995)  1  B.  C.  L.  C.  14  at  pp  17,18  per  Hoffmann  L.  J. 
145  O'Neill  and  Another  v.  Phillips  and  Others  (1999),  2  All  ER  961,  HL  per  Lord  Hoffman. 
146  Modern  Company  Law  for  a  Competitive  Economy:  Final  Report,  (London,  DTI,  2001), 
URN/942  &  URN/943,  para  7.41. 
230 owner/managers  of  small  private  companies. 
14' 
As  to  large  companies,  the  remedy 
seems  irrelevant  because  the  relationship  between  members  of  such  companies 
commonly  rely  on  company  constitutions  and  the  documentation  shown  to  them  by 
controllers  at  the  outset. 
149 
The  second  implication  is  that  the  view  avoids  being  interventionist.  Relying  on  such 
view,  the  courts,  when  granting  a  section  459  remedy,  would  only  enforce  the  contract 
between  members.  "O  As  the  remedy  has  a  contractual  nature,  it  can  be  waived  by 
private  contracting  so  long  as  no  wider  public  purpose  is  at  stake.  "'  A  carefully  drafted 
articles  can  make  the  use  of  section  459  remedy  unnecessary"'  and  where  a  reasonable 
offer  is  made  to  buy  out  a  dissatisfied  minority,  he  should  not  be  able  to  ask  for  such  a 
remedy.  "'  This,  however,  can  be  criticised  for  its  contrariety  to  the  regulatory  role  of 
company  law  rules 
154 
and  especially  seems  to  fall  in  disagreement  with  the  primary 
objective  of  the  Parliament  which  wanted  to  offer  some  protection  to  minority 
147  Modernising  Company  Law:  White  Paper,  (London,  DTI,  2002),  Cm  5553,  Volume  1,  para 
3.3. 
148  Law  Commission  (above,  note  68)  at  pp  24,25;  Law  Commission,  Consultation  paper,  No 
142,  Para  1.7. 
149  Clark,  (above,  note  95)  at  p  172;  Conway  (above,  note  43)  at  pp  19-20;  Thomas  Katherine 
Reece  and  Ryan  Christopher  L.,  ""Section  459,  Public  Policy  and  Freedom  of  Contract:  Part  1", 
Company  Lawyer,  (2001),  22  (6),  177,  London,  Oyez  Publishing  Limited,  at  pp  180-181;  Poole  & 
Roberts  (above,  note  115)  at  pp  41-43;  Hirt  (above,  note  66)  at  pp  100,102;  Mayson,  French  & 
Ryan  (above,  note  131)  at  p  620. 
150  Boyle  (above,  note  115)  at  p  253;  Goddard  Robert,  "'Unfair  Prejudice  after  ONeill:  A  View 
from  Scotland,  ",  Company  Lawyer,  (2000),  21  (8),  254,  London,  Oyez  Publishing  Limited,  at  p  255; 
Thomas  &  Ryan  (above,  note  149)  at  pp  179-181;  Hirt  (above,  note  66)  at  pp  101-2;  Pettet  (above, 
note  40)  at  p  250. 
151  Thomas  &  Ryan  (above,  note  149)  at  pp  178-182. 
152  Clark  (above,  note  95)  at  p  174;  Thomas  &  Ryan,  (above,  note  149)  at  p  181. 
153  "the  unfairness  does  not  lie  in  the  exclusion  alone  but  in  exclusion  without  a  reasonable 
offer'  [ONeill  and  another  v.  Phillips  and  Others  [(1999),  2  All  ER  961,  HL  at  p  974-5  per 
Hoffman  J]  See  also  Thomas  &  Ryan  Ibid.  at  pp  181-182. 
154  Goddard  (above,  note  130)  at  p  335. 
231 shareholders.  155  Also,  company  contracts  rarely  provide  a  satisfactory  buy-out 
procedure'  56  and  this  can  further  evidence  that  a  non-negotiable  section  459  is  needed. 
The  third  implication  is  that  it  would  become  possible  for  the  courts,  as  a  result  of  such 
viewing,  to  measure  the  unfair  prejudice  concept  stated  in  section  459  objectively.  "' 
The  section  requires,  a  minority  plaintiff  to  show  that  his  prejudice  has  also  been 
unfair.  "'  This  unfairness,  according  to  the  authorities,  must  be  assessed  objectively 
which  means  the  courts  should  take  the  case  of  a  reasonable  bystander  and  ask 
whether  the  complained  conduct  is  regarded  by  such  person  as  unfairly  prejudicial.  "' 
The  reasonable  bystander  test  must  be  used  in  the  light  of  the  context  of  the 
complained  conduct  rather  than  the  mere  conscience  of  a  particular  judge.  Context  for 
the  purpose  of  section  459  may  include  the  type  of  company,  previous  business 
relationship  and  transactions  between  corporate  members,  pre-contract  negotiations 
and  mutual  trust.  "O  The  objective  measure  relieves  a  minority  plaintiff  from  having  to 
show  the  element  of  bad  faith  on  the  part  of  controllers.  Prejudicial  conducts  of 
controllers  even  shown  to  have  been  done  with  good  faith  still  might  qualify  for 
155  Cheffins  (above,  note  3)  at  p  260-1;  Riley  Christopher,  "Contracting  Out  of  Company  Law: 
Section  459  of  the  Companies  Act  1985  and  The  Role  of  The  Courts",  (1992),  Modern  Law  Review, 
782,  London,  England,  Stevens  &  Sons,  at  p  797. 
156  Farrar  (1991),  (above,  note  42)  at  p  475. 
157  Hirt  (above,  note  66)  at  p  102;  Boyle  (1987),  (above,  note  131)  at  p  24;  Thomas  &  Ryan 
(above,.  note  149)  at  p  181;  Goddard  (1999),  (above,  note  130)  at  pp  334-5;  Pettet  (above,  note  40) 
at  p  249;  Griffin  (above,  note  120)  at  p  389. 
158  Davies  (1997),  (above,  note  60)  at  p  746. 
159  See  Boyle  (1987),  (above,  note  131)  at  p  24;  Leader  Sheldon  &  Dine  Janet,  "United 
Kingdom"',  in  'The  Legal  Basis  of  Corporate  Governance  in  Publicly  Held  Corporations,  Edited  by 
Arthur  R.  Pinto  and  Gustavo  Visentini,  Kluwer  Law  International,  (1998),  219,  The  Hague, 
London,  at  p  229;  Pettet  (above,  note  40)  at  pp  249-250. 
160  Jenkins  Committee  (above,  note  125)  at  204;  See  also  Hirt  (above,  note  66)  at  p  102;  Clark 
(abox,  e,  note  95)  at  p  171. 
232 unfairness. 
161 
Yet,  while  a  minority  plaintiff  does  not  need  to  show  bad  faith 
162 
, 
he  must 
prove  fault  on  the  part  of  the  defendants.  163  If  a  case  involves  no  fault  in  its  broad  sense 
(covering  that  of  common  law  and  that  of  equity),  no  remedy  under  the  section  459  is 
available.  This  further  suggests  that  the  scope  of  the  unfairly  prejudicial  remedy  is 
much  narrower  than  that  of  the  winding  up  remedy  discussed  earlier.  "' 
The  last  implication  is  that  the  unfairly  prejudicial  remedy  is  viewed  as  exceptional 
rather  than  being  a  general  principle  of  the  law,  as  is  viewed  in  the  civil  law 
jurisdictions.  Accordingly,  a  minority  shareholder  has  no  recourse  to  exceptional  ways 
so  far  as  there  are  no  ordinary  ways  of  action.  "'  Therefore,  a  section  459  remedy  is  not 
suitable  to  an  oppressed  majority  who  seeks  to  pursue  wrongdoer  directors  because  he 
often  has  the  power  to  displace  such  directors  from  the  office. 
166 
A  corollary  of  such 
viewing  is  that  a  case  must  meet  certain  case-specific  conditions  to  qualify  for  as  459 
remedy  and  therefore  the  courts'  judgements  in  such  cases  have  very  limited  capacity 
to  extend.  The  courts  tend  to  escape  drawing  a  general  principle 
167 
while  their 
judgements  often  share  the  underlying  equity  principles.  The  same  or  similar 
principles  of  equity  can  also  be  used  to  address  different  examples  of  abuse  of  rights 
161  Boyle  (2000),  (above,  note  115)  at  p  253;  Boyle  (1987),  (above,  note  131)  at  p  24;  Clark  (above, 
note  95)  at  p  171;  Conway  (above,  note  43)  at  pp  13-15. 
162  For  a  different  view  see  Hirt  (above,  note  66)  at  pp  106-7. 
163  Boyle  (2000),  (above,  note  115)  at  p  253;  Clark,  (above,  note  95)  at  p  173;  Conway  (above, 
note  43)  at  pp  13-15;  Clark  (2001),  (above,  note  110)  at  pp  109-111;  Thomas  &  Ryan  (above,  note 
149)  at  p  181. 
164  Acton  (above,  note  109)  at  p  134;  Farrar  (1991),  (above,  note  42)  at  pp  473-4;  for  a  contrary 
view  see  Clark  who  suggests  that  both  remedies  of  unfairly  prejudicial  and  winding  up  ought 
to  operate  on  a  fault  based  mechanism.  [Clark  (above,  note  95)  at  pp  173-4  and  Clark  (2001), 
(above,  note  110)  at  p  111]. 
165  See  the  Outer  House  of  the  Court  of  Session's  argument  in  Scottish  case  of  Anderson  v. 
Hogg,  2000,  S.  L.  T.,  634  at  644  per  Lord  Ordinary. 
166  Clark  (above,  note  95)  at  p  171;  Pettet  (above,  note  40)  at  p  253;  Hirt  (above,  note  66)  at  p 
107. 
233 which  fall  within  the  scope  of  other  remedies.  Thus,  the  formula  is:  the  same  principles 
in  different  circumstances  can  generate  different  remedies  and  this  has  caused 
development  of  different  mechanisms  to  deal  with  the  question  of  abuse  of  right  in 
English  company  law.  168  In  the  courts'  view,  a  general  principle  on  the  model  of  civil 
law  jurisdictions  is  practically  hard,  if  not  impossible,  to  draw.  "'  They  may  also  argue 
that  there  is  no  need  for  drawing  a  general  principle,  as  the  existing  method  is  only  a 
different  way  of  doing  the  same  thing.  "O  A  criticism  is  that  this  way  of  addressing  the 
abuse  of  rights  possibility,  though  might  enable  the  judges  to  tailor  justice  to  each  case, 
generally  suffers  from  the  uncertainty  problem.  The  facts  that  the  courts  have  extensive 
equitable  discretion  which  might  be  exercised  any  time  "in  a  novel  and  unpredictable 
fashion'  171  and  that  their  judgements  have  limited  capacity  to  teach  other  similar  cases 
created  a  blured  picture  of  litigation  in  this  area. 
V.  1.2.2.2.  What  sort  of  wrongs  fall  within  the  scope  of  s  459 
Previous  to  the  introduction  of  s  459,  the  law  in  this  area  had  a  limited  scope  covering 
perhaps  only  conducts  which  were  illegal.  "'  Since  the  introduction  of  the  s  459  and 
because  of  the  wide  wording  of  the  section  which  enjoys  the  term  "interest"  in 
substitute  of  'right',  the  scope  of  the  section  has  extended  from  conducts  which  violate 
members'  legal  rights  to  behaviours  which  were  against  their  legitimate 
167  Estmanco  (Kilner  House)  Ltd.  v.  Greater  London  Council  (1982),  1  All  ER  437  (ChD) 
Megarry  VC. 
168  Estmanco  (Kilner  House)  Ltd.  v.  Greater  London  Council,  (1982),  1  All  ER  437  (ChD); 
North-west  transportation  Co  Ltd.  v.  Beatty  (1877),  12  App  Cas  589;  Allen  v.  Gold  Reefs  of  West 
Africa,  Limited,  (1900),  1  Ch.  656;  Greenhalgh  v.  Ardern  Cinemas  Ltd,  (1950),  2  All  ER  1120; 
Ebrahimi  v.  Westbourne  Galleries  Ltd  (1973),  A.  C.  360;  Clemens  v.  Clemens  Bros  Ltd.  and 
Another  (1976),  2  All  ER  268  (Ch  D)  at  282. 
169  Clemens  v.  Clemens  Bros  Ltd.  and  Another  (1976),  2  All  ER  268  (Ch  D)  at  282  per  Foster  J. 
170  O'Neill  and  Another  v.  Phillips  and  Others,  (1999),  2  All  ER  961,  HL  at  969  per  Lord 
Hoffmann. 
2  'S4 expectations.  "'  This  can  follow  that  a  minority  shareholder  is  now  able  to  pursue  the 
company  and  its  directors  not  only  for  breach  of  constitution  which  extends  to 
irregular  matters  174  but  also  for  breach  of  expectations  which  equity  regards  legitimate, 
even  though  that  involves  no  breach  of  constitution.  "'  Also,  a  shareholder  is  now  able 
to  initiate  as  459  proceeding  in  respect  of  breach  of  directors"  duties.  Although, 
directors  owe  their  duties  to  the  company,  a  shareholder  can  expect  them  to  act 
without  unfairly  prejudicing  their  interest.  176  The  concept  of  prejudice  in  the  wording 
of  the  section  is  inclusive  of  any  harm  defined  in  a  broad  sense  to  the  petitioner's 
interest"'  and  obviously  a  wrong  to  the  company  can  affect  interests  of  its  members 
too.  "'  A  shareholder  does  not  need  to  show  that  the  value  of  his/her  shares  has  been 
reduced  as  a  consequence  of  the  defendant's  unfairly  prejudicial  conduct  and  further 
he/she  can  now  use  section  459  to  take  action  against  persons  who  exert  defacto  control 
in  companies.  "'  In  summary,  any  unfair  disregard  of  controHers  from  members" 
interests  can  constitute  a  source  of  liability  under  s  459.  Some  of  the  more  familiar 
examples  are:  a  refusal  to  pay  dividend"O;  abusive  share  issues;  excessive  managerial 
remuneration;  and  exclusion  from  management. 
181 
171  Cheffins  (1997)  (above,  note  3)  at  pp  260-1. 
172  See  above,  at  V-1.2-2. 
173  Davies  (1997),  (above,  note  60)  at  p  737. 
174  Davies  Ibid. 
175  Clark  (above,  note  95)  at  p  172;  Hirt  (above,  note  66)  at  p  101;  Poole  &  Roberts  (above,  note 
115)  at  p  42;  Thomas  &  Ryan  (above,  note  149)  at  p  181. 
176  Sterling  (above,  note  68)  at  pp  474,484. 
177  Hirt  (above,  note  66)  at  p  102. 
178  Davies  (1997),  (above,  note  60)  at  p  737;  Hirt  (above,  note  66)  at  p  103. 
179  Re.  R.  A.  Noble  &  Sons(Clothing)  Ltd.,  (1983),  BCLC  273  at  p  287  per  Nourse  J.;  For  a 
contrary  opinion  see  Leader  &  Dine  (above,  note  159)  at  p  229. 
180  See  Sealy  (above,  note  31)  at  p  180. 
181  Conway  (above,  note  43)  at  pp  13-14;  Clark  (above,  note  95)  at  pp  170-171;  Clark  (1999), 
(above,  note  110)  at  pp  321-2;  Pettet  (above,  note  40)  at  pp  259-260. 
235 Whether  section  459  can  cover  mere  mismanagement;  i.  e.  wrongs  that  faH  short  of  a 
breach  of  directors"  duties"';  has  been  a  matter  of  controversy.  For  some  good  reasons, 
the  courts  are  reluctant  to  review  managerial  decisions,  using  their  discretion  to 
identify  unfair  prejudicial  conducts.  "'  They  may  think  that  they  are  not  informed  and 
experienced  enough  to  decide  questions  of  business.  Also,  they  often  see  hard  to  find 
the  element  of  unfairness  in  cases  involving  questions  of  mismanagement  and  often 
concede  that  business  decisions  is  normally  taken  in  uncertain  conditions  which  make 
them  often  risky  and  thus  directors  must  not  be  blamed  for  taking  such  decisions.  "'  A 
recent  example  of  such  reluctance  is  the  Re  Elgindata  case  in  which  Warner  J.  held  that 
'Short  of  a  breach  by  director  of  his  duty  of  skill  and  care  ...  there  is  prima  facie  no 
unfairness  to  a  shareholder  in  the  quality  of  the  management  turning  out  to  be  poor'.  185 
In  addition  to  matters  of  judicial  reluctance,  the  use  of  section  459  to  address  the  issue 
of  mere  mismanagement  can  fall  in  contradiction  with  certain  principles  of  company 
law.  Most  commonly  the  primary  victim  of  mismanagement  is  the  company,  itself, 
rather  than  its  shareholders.  Shareholders  assume  loss  only  reflectively.  Recent  decided 
cases  suggest  that  when  the  loss  is  reflective,  186  a  shareholder  cannot  recover  it  unless 
the  company,  itself,  is  unable  to  pursue  and  the  wrongdoers  owe  a  separate  duty  in 
182  See  Chapter  four  (above,  at  IV-1-1-C). 
183  Davies  (1997),  (above,  note  60)  at  p  746;  Clark  (above,  note  95)  at  p  171;  Conway  (above, 
note  43)  at  p  16. 
184  See  Chapter  four  (above,  at  IV.  1.1-C). 
185  Re  Elgindata  Ltd.  (1991),  BCLC  959  at  994. 
186  For  reflective  loss  see  generally  Sterling  (above,  note  68);  Mitchell  (above,  note  9);  Bowen 
Andrew,  J.,  "Professional  Negligence  and  the  No  Reflective  Loss  Principle"",  (2002),  Greens 
Business  Law  Bulletin,  59,2,  Edinburgh,  W.  Green  &  Son  Ltd.;  Bowen,  Andrew  J.,  "Giles  v. 
Rhind",  (2003),  Greens  Business  Law  Bulletin,  65,1,  Edinburgh,  W.  Green  &  Son  Ltd.;  Watts, 
Peter,  "The  Shareholder  as  Co-Promisee",  (2001),  The  Law  Quarterly  Review,  Vol.  117,388, 
London,  Stevens  and  Sons;  Ferran,  Eilis,  "Litigation  by  Shareholders  and  Reflective  Loss", 
(2001),  The  Cambridge  Law  journal,  245  Cambridge,  Cambridge  University  Press;  Sagar,  David, 
236 his/her  favour.  187  Exclusion  of  the  shareholder  action  in  such  cases  is  the  logical 
consequence  of  the  proper  plaintiff  limb  of  the  rule  in  Foss  v.  Harbottle.  1  88  It  respects  the 
corporate  personality'"  and  avoids  unnecessary  shareholder  actions.  '90  Considering 
these  principles,  the  Law  Commission  also  opined  that  section  459  would  not  probably 
be  suitable  for  pursuing  negligent  directors.  9' 
Some  commentators  have  taken  the  view  that  the  judicial  reluctance  is  concerned  with 
mere  negligence  rather  than  mismanagement  that  involves  gross  negligence.  Gross 
negligence  is  to  be  distinguished  from  both  mere  and  serious  mismanagement  and 
although  falling  short  of  breach,  it  ought  to  be  treated  like  breach  of  duty  or  even 
fraud.  With  the  gross  negligence  measure  it  is  possible  for  the  courts  to  extract  some 
more  disastrous  negligence  of  directors  out  of  the  mere  mismanagement  category 
hereby  to  hold  negligent  directors  liable.  "' 
Despite  its  attractiveness,  the  very  idea  of  gross  negligence  lacks  a  clear  definition  and 
is  unable  to  offer  a  criterion  by  which  one  may  distinguish  gross  negligence  from  the 
two  other  types  of  negligence;  i.  e.  that  of  mere  and  that  of  breach  of  duty.  English 
"Reflective  Loss",  (Feb-2003),  Accountancy,  London,  Society  of  Incorporated  Accountants  and 
Auditors. 
187  Prudential  Assurance  Co  Ltd  v.  Newman  Industries  LTD.  and  others  (No.  2)  (1981),  Ch  257; 
Gardner  v.  Parker,  (2004),  1  BCLC  (Ch  D)  417;  Giles  v.  Rhind,  (2002),  4  All  ER  (CA),  977; 
Johnson  v.  Gore  Wood  &  Co,  (2001),  1  All  ER  (HL),  481;  Day  v.  Cook,  (2002),  1  BCLC  (CA),  1; 
Stein  v.  Blake  and  Others  (No  2),  (1998),  1  BCLC  (CA),  573;  George  Fischer  (Great  Britain)  Ltd. 
v.  Multi  Construction  Ltd,  Dexion  Ltd  (third  party),  (1995),  1  BCLC  (CA),  260;  Gerber  Garment 
Technology  Inc  v.  Lectra  Systems  Ltd.  [(1997),  RPC  443;  Lee  v.  Sheard  (1955),  3  All  ER  777;  Giles 
v.  Rhind,  (2002)  4  All  ER  (CA)  977;  Christensen  v.  Scott,  (1996),  1  N.  Z.  L.  R.,  273  at  280  (NZCA); 
See  also  Bowen  (2002)  (above,  note  186);  Sterling  (above,  note  68)  at  p  474. 
188  Foss  v.  Harbottle,  (1843)  2  Hare  46. 
189  Hale  (above,  note  39)  at  p  219. 
190  Gray  v.  Lewis,  (1873),  8  Ch  App,  1035,  p  1051  per  James  L.  J;  See  also  Sagar  (above,  note  186) 
at  p  88;  Sterling  (above,  note  68)  at  p  485. 
191  Law  Commission  (above,  note  68)  at  pp  84-85. 
237 judges  have  always  had  'a  healthy  disrespect'  for  differentiating  between  mere 
negligence  and  gross  negligence.  "'  They  tend  to  make  the  difference  between  fraud,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  mere  negligence,  however  gross,  on  the  other  hand.  The  doctrine  of 
the  common  law  is  that  "gross  negligence  may  be  evidence  of  mala  fides,  but  is  not  the 
same  thing'  194  and  has  often  cautiously  been  employed  in  a  few  areas  of  law  such  as 
trust,  particularly  when  it  involves  exemption  clause, 
195 
and  criminal  law  when 
negligence  causes  the  death  of  a  victim  in  manslaughter  cases.  "'  The  gross  negligence 
measure  can  be  pertinent  as  to  jurisdictions  such  as  US  where  the  courts  tend  to  make 
a  distinction  between  process  and  substance  and  hold  directors  liable  for  negligence 
made  only  in  relation  to  the  latter.  English  company  law  does  not  know  such 
distinction"  and  consequently,  in  spite  of  the  breadth  of  the  section  459,  it  can  be 
concluded  that  the  current  position  of  the  English  company  law  is  to  exclude 
mismanagement,  however  serious,  from  the  scope  of  section  459  unless  it  entails  a 
breach  of  duty. 
192  Griffin  (above,  note  120)  at  pp  390-392. 
193  Armitage  v.  Nurse  and  Others,  (1998)  Ch  241,  (1997)  2  All  ER  705;  See  also  Willes  i  in  Grill 
v.  General  Iron  Screw  Collier  Co  (1866)  (LR)  1CP  600  observing  that  gross  negligence  is 
ordinary  negligence  with  a  vituperative  epithet;  And  further  in  Hinton  v.  Dibbin  (1842)  2  QB 
646,114  ER  253  Lord  Denman  C.  J.  doubted  whether  any  intelligible  distinction  exists. 
194  See  Goodman  v.  Harvey  (1836)  4A&E  870  at  876,111  ER  1011  at  1013  per  Lord  Denman; 
Armitage  v.  Nurse  and  others,  (1998)  Ch  241,  (1997)  2  All  ER  705  per  Millett  LJ. 
195  See  generally  Gerard,  McCormack,  'The  Liability  of  Trustees  for  Gross  Negligence', 
Conveyancer  and  Property  Lawyer,  (1998)  Mar/Apr,  100-114,  London,  Sweet  &  Maxwell;  "'Trustee 
Exemption  Clauses",  New  Law  journal,  11  April  2003,153.7075,  London,  Butterworth;  and  see 
particularly  Armitage  v.  Nurse  and  others,  (1998)  Ch  241,  (1997)  2  All  ER  705. 
196  See  generally  Brian,  Napier,  "Disciplinary  Procedure,  Unfair  Dismissal  and  the  Contract  of 
Employment",  New  Law  journal,  25  (March  1988)  Vol.  138  No.  6349  p  197,  London,  Butterworth; 
Rakhi,  Talwar  and  Andrew,  Dawson,  "Corporate  Killing",  New  Law  journal,  (13  June  2003), 
153.7084(908),  London,  Butterworth;  "The  Zeebrugge  Disaster:  Crime  or  Negligence?  ",  New  Law 
journal,  16  October  1987  Vol  137  No.  6327,959,  London,  Butterworth;  "Manslaughter:  Corporate 
Liability  for  Manslaughter-Gross  Negligence"',  Criminal  Law  Review,  (2000),  June,  475-479, 
London,  Sweet  &  Maxwell. 
197  See  Chapter  four  (above,  at  IV.  1.1.  C.  2). 
238 V.  1.2.2.3.  Nature  of  the  unfairly  prejudicial  remedy 
The  remedy  under  s  459  is  generally  seen  to  be  fulfilling  part  of  a  shared  task  between 
the  Parliament  and  the  courts  to  review  the  exercise  of  rights  by  persons  either  natural 
or  legal  so  far  as  that  exercise  may  involve  unfair  consequences  for  individuals  and  the 
society.  198  It  is  a  special  statutory  invention  of  the  common  law  system  functioning 
along  with  other  devices  such  as  "derivative  action"99,  "bona  fide  for  the  benefit  of  the 
company  as  a  whole 
,  200 
and  'just  and  equitable  winding 
UP/201  to  fill  a  decisive  gap  in 
laws  relating  to  companies  so  far  as  they  fail  to  prevent  legal  rights  being 
instrumentally  abused.  In  creating  the  remedy,  the  Parliament  made  use  of  equity 
principles  in  order  to  extend  rules  of  liability  to  conducts  which  fall  short  of  the 
concept  of  actual  illegality  but  involving  some  sort  of  abuse  of  rights  by  the  majority.  "' 
Equity  principles  enable  the  courts  to  intervene,  in  a  discretionary  case-by-case  basis, 
into  the  contractual  relationship  of  shareholders'O'  so  as  to  stop  abusive  exercise  of 
rights  by  the  majority  in  companies.  204  This  type  of  intervention  constitutes  what  is 
generally  known  and  represented  in  usage  by  using  the  phrase  "supervisory  role'  of  the 
courts.  It  is  a  discretionary  power  acquired  by  the  courts  under  the  law  to  review 
companies'  activities. 
205 
198  Davies  Paul  L.,  "'Gower  and  Davies'  Principles  of  Modem  Company  Law",  (2003),  Th  ed., 
London,  Sweet  &  Maxwell,  at  p  517. 
199  Wedderburn  (1957),  (above,  note  39)  at  p  206. 
200  Allen  v.  Gold  Reefs  of  West  Africa,  Limited  (1900),  1  Ch.  656  per  Lindley  M.  R.  at  p  671. 
201  Insolvency  Act  1986,  Sec.  122  (1). 
202  Pettet  (above,  note  40)  at  p  246. 
203  Goode  Roy,  "'Commercial  Law  in  the  Next  Millennium",  (1998),  London,  Sweet  &  Maxwell 
at  pp  16,31-  32;  Bradgate  Robert,  "'Commercial  Law",  (2000),  3rd  ed.,  London,  Butterworths,  at 
pp  3-4  and  26-34. 
204  Sealy  (above,  note  31)  at  181. 
205  Baird  v.  Lees,  (1924),  S.  C.  83,92  per  Lord  Clyde;  See  also  Sealy  Len  lbid;  Sinclair  Michael, 
"Companies  and  Judicial  Review",  (1994),  Company  Lawyer,  15  (8),  235,  London,  Oyez 
Publishing  Limited,  at  p  239. 
239 The  courts'  discretion  under  section  459  must  be  distinguished  from  their  other 
discretions.  Generally  speaking,  there  are  two  other  discretions.  One  is  the  courts' 
discretion  to  sanction  private  contracts.  In  the  exercise  of  this  discretion,  the  courts 
emphasise  on  legal  rights  and  duties  hereby  sanctioning  a  relationship  that  is  already 
recognised  under  the  law.  A  court's  decision  here  is  only  important  for  the  involved 
parties,  but  is  not  important,  at  all,  in  case  law  terms,  as  no  legal  rule  is  created.  This 
function  is  common  to  most  legal  systems  which  work  on  the  basis  of  rights  and  duties 
in  order  to  regulate  the  relationship  between  private  persons.  The  exercise  of  this 
discretion  is  in  fact  an  example  of  the  law's  respect  to  the  party  autonomy.  206  The  other 
is  the  courts'  discretion  to  create  law  in  particular  cases  through  delivering  judgements 
which  are  not  only  important  for  the  parties  to  a  particular  case  but  are  also  important 
for  future  similar  cases.  This  discretion  constitutes  a  unique  feature  of  the  common  law 
courts,  as  they,  unlike  their  counterparts  in  civil  law  jurisdictions,  create  law  in  order  to 
fill  statutory  gaps.  The  discretion  is  linked  with  the  case  law  in  ten-ns;  of  binding 
precedent  -  the  idea  that,  for  example,  all  other  courts  in  the  hierarchy  must  follow  the 
view  of  the  House  of  Lords  on  a  particular  issue.  Binding  precedents  commonly 
emerge  from  those  areas  of  law  that  are  created  by  the  judges.  They  may  also  be 
created  when  a  court  gives  an  authoritative  opinion  as  to  the  proper  interpretation  of  a 
statutory  provision. 
207 
Now,  while  the  analysis  of  the  writer  is  to  describe  discretion  of  the  courts  under 
section  459  as  an  example  of  the  supervisory  discretion,  recent  case  law  suggests 
206  Goode  (above,  note  203)  at  p  31;  Bradgate  (above,  note  203)  at  pp  4,6,35-36. 
207  For  example,  see  the  decision  of  the  House  of  Lords  in  O'Neill  and  Another  v.  Phillips  and 
Others,  (1999),  2  All  ER  961,  HL.  10 
240 differently.  '"  According  to  it,  because  legitimate  expectations  do  not  constitute 
independent  excuse  the  courts  in  cases  of  unfairly  prejudicial  conducts  function  not  to 
interfere  but  to  enforce  the  contract  between  members  and  company.  "'  A  criticism  is 
that  the  courts'  functioning  in  such  cases  can  require  imposition  of  standards  of 
fairness  to  substantive  elements  of  corporate  members'  contract.  "O 
V.  1.2.2.4.  Section  459  and  the  reflective  loss  recovery 
Although  a  grant  of  corporate  remedy  is  a  possibility  in  the  list  of  remedies  prescribed 
by  section  461  Companies  Act  1985,  the  unfairly  prejudicial  remedy  is  generally  seen  as 
personal.  Records  of  the  reported  cases  proceeded  under  section  459  evidence  that  the 
most  sought  and  ordered  remedy  under  this  section  has  been  buy  out  order,  which 
benefits  the  petitioner  personally.  "'  The  wide  meaning  of  the  word  "interest"  expressed 
in  the  section  allows  a  petitioner  to  apply  to  the  court  for  a  personal  remedy  in  relation 
to  any  unfair  prejudice  to  his  interests  either  direct  or  indirect.  These  features  connect 
unfairly  prejudicial  remedy  to  the  issue  of  reflective  loss.  While  principally  a 
shareholder  cannot  recover  his  reflective  loss"',  section  459  seems  to  be  capable  of 
giving  way  to  a  likely  petitioner  in  order  to  recover  such  loss.  Reflective  loss 
allegations  can  now  get  the  form  of  petitions  under  section  459  for  an  exit  order.  While 
recent  decided  cases  suggest  that  when  reflective  loss  is  at  issue,  a  shareholder  cannot 
208  See  above,  notes  150-3. 
209  Boyle  (2000),  (above,  note  115)  at  253;  Goddard  (2000),  (above,  note  150)  at  p  255;  Thomas  & 
Ryan  (above,  note  149)  at  pp  179-181;  Hirt  (above,  note  66)  at  pp  101-2;  Pettet  (above,  note  40)  at 
p  250. 
210  See  generally  Goode  (above,  note  203)  at  pp  16-18;  Bradgate  (above,  note  203)  at  p  226. 
211  Pettet  (above,  note  40)  at  pp  252-3;  Hirt  (above,  note  66)  at  pp  101-2;  Stephen  Copp, 
"'Company  Law:  Individual  Shareholder  Rights",  (2000),  "International  Company  and  Commercial 
Lazv  Rcz,  iezv',  11  (1),  N  6-8  London,  UK,  Sweet  &  Maxwell,  at  p  8. 
212  Prudential  Assurance  Co  Ltd  v.  Newman  Industries  LTD.  and  others  (No.  2)  (1981),  Ch  257. 
241 recover  his  personal  loss"'  a  grant  of  the  personal  remedy  under  section  459  can  fall  in 
disagreement  with  the  "no  reflective  loss'  principle.  An  interesting  question  is  whether 
a  shareholder  can  take  a  personal  action  using  section  459,  while  a  corporate  action  by 
the  company  and  in  failure  of  the  company  a  derivative  action  is  available?  The 
question  becomes  particularly  important  in  relation  to  buy  out  orders  where  shares  are 
priced  at  a  date  prior  to  the  wrongdoing.  214  Several  issues  are  to  be  addressed  before 
we  could  answer  the  above  question.  The  following  discussion  respectively  examines 
theseissues. 
V.  1.2.2.4.1.  Background 
The  "no  reflective  loss'  principle  can  be  traced  back  in  the  judgement  of  the  Court  of 
Appeal  in  the  Prudential  case.  "'  In  this  case,  two  directors  of  the  Newman  company, 
Mr  B  and  L,  by  breaching  their  fiduciary  duty  to  the  company  conspired  to  buy  for  the 
company  a  land  at  an  overvalue  from  another  company  called  TPG  in  which  they  have 
had  substantial  personal  interest.  When  it  became  aware  of  directors'  tricks,  a  minority 
shareholder,  the  Prudential  Company,  took  two  actions,  (derivative  for  the  recovery  of 
loss  suffered  by  the  company  and  personal  for  the  recovery  of  its  personal  loss).  The 
personal  action  was  successful  at  first  instance 
216  but  in  appeal  judges  dismissed  it 
taking  the  view  that  the  claimed  loss  in  situations  like  this  is  reflective  of  the  loss 
suffered  by  the  company.  It  is  not  personal  and  consequently  cannot  be  recovered  by  a 
213  Gardner  v.  Parker,  (2004),  1  BCLC  (Ch  D)  417;  Giles  v.  Rhind,  (2002),  4  All  ER  (CA),  977; 
Johnson  v.  Gore  Wood  &  Co,  (2001),  1  All  ER  (HL),  481;  Day  v.  Cook,  (2002),  1  BCLC  (CA),  1; 
Stein  v.  Blake  and  Others  (No  2),  (1998),  1  BCLC  (CA),  573;  George  Fischer  (Great  Britain)  Ltd. 
v.  Multi  Construction  Ltd,  Dexion  Ltd  (third  party),  (1995),  1  BCLC  (CA),  260. 
214  Hirt  (above,  note  66)  at  p  109. 
215  Prudential  Assurance  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Newman  Industries  Ltd.  and  Others  (No.  2),  (1982)  Ch. 
204;  (1982)  1  All  E.  R.  354  (C.  A.  ). 
216  ibid.,  at  pp  302-3. 
242 shareholder.  "'  The  Prudential  principle,  the  principle  that  no  shareholder  in  his 
personal  capacity  can  recover  reflective  loss,  was  later  amended  by  the  judgement  of 
the  House  of  Lords  in  Johnson.  "' 
V.  1.2.2.4.2.  Nature  of  reflective  loss 
Whether  reflective  loss  can  be  considered  personal  has  been  until  recently 
controversial.  Traditionally,  English  judges  have  tended  to  view  it  as  corporate  rather 
than  personal.  This  was  mainly  because  in  such  cases  the  direct  victim  of  the  loss  is 
normally  the  wronged  company  rather  than  its  shareholders.  Shareholders  only  suffer 
indirectly  and  their  loss  "would  be  made  good  if  the  company  had  enforced  its  full 
rights  against  the  party  responsible".  "'  In  Prudential  case,  a  diminution  in  the  market 
value  of  the  company's  shares  and  a  cut  off  of  the  likely  dividends  which  occurred  as  a 
result  of  a  reduction  in  the  wronged  company's  assets  and  profits  were  sought  by  the 
plaintiff.  However,  the  judges  of  the  Court  of  Appeal  viewed  the  claimed  loss  as 
reflective  rather  than  personal  and  as  a  result  they  rejected  the  claim.  "O  In  their  view, 
because  corporations  are  separate  legal  persons  and  corporate  shares  only  grant 
participatory  right  to  shareholders,  in  cases  where  reflective  loss  is  at  issue  only  the 
former  can  take  action. 
Similar  views  have  also  been  taken  by  some  company  law  scholars.  For  instance,  in 
Leader  and  Dine's  view,  a  share  is  only  an  instrument  by  which  a  shareholder 
217  Prudential  Assurance  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Newman  Industries  Ltd.  and  Others  (No.  2),  (1982)  Ch.  204 
at  223. 
218  Johnson  v.  Gore  Wood  &  Co.  (2001),  1  All  ER  (FIL),  481. 
219  Ibid.,  at  504  per  Lord  Bingham. 
220  Prudential  Assurance  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Newman  Industries  Ltd.  and  Others  (No.  2),  (1982)  Ch.  204 
at  pp  223-4. 
243 participates  in  determining  what  forms  general  interests  of  the  company.  A  share  has  a 
contractual  nature  but  does  not  confer  proprietary  rights.  "'  Proponents  of  the 
economic  analysis  of  the  law  even  go  one  step  further  by  arguing  that  shares  confer 
neither  proprietary  nor  participatory  rights,  though  having  contractual  nature.  Hence, 
a  shareholder  cannot  take  action  in  respect  of  any  reduction  of  the  value  of  his  shares 
because  his  role  is  only  to  put  money  at  risk  in  companies  to  be  used  by  them  in 
exchange  for  financial  return  and  that  explains  why  a  share  (ordinary  share)  is  named 
equity  distinguished  from  other  securities. 
222 
These  views,  however,  sit  uneasily  with  a  range  of  decided  cases  in  English  company 
law  which  suggest  a  share  is  a  thing  which  can  be  owned.  "'  According  to  these  cases,  a 
share  is  a  piece  of  property  giving  the  holder  almost  all  proprietary  rights  that  an 
owner  may 
enjoy. 
224  Of  those  rights,  one  is  the  right  of  every  owner  to  take  action  to 
the  courts  in  order  to  recover  damages  to  his  property  caused  by  a  wrongdoer.  "' 
English  academics,  also,  have  tended  to  regard  shares  as  having  contractual  nature  and 
conferring  property  rights  which  enable  shareholders  to  take  action  in  respect  of 
them.  "'  From  a  property  law  perspective,  shares  are  "things  in  action'  which  refers  to 
rights  of  one  person  to  certain  benefits  and  privileges  that  may  be  enforced  through 
actioning  in  the  courts  when  they  are  denied.  Shares,  particularly,  and  other  forms  of 
221  See  Leader  &  Dine  (above,  note  159)  at  p  230. 
222  See  Farrar  (1991),  (above,  note  42)  at  pp  224,318;  Easterbrook  and  Fischel,  (above,  note  1)  at 
p  403. 
223  Burland  v.  Earle,  (1902),  A.  C.  83;  North  West  Transportation  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Beatty,  (1887),  12 
App  CAS  589;  Pender  v.  Lushington,  (1877),  6  Ch.  D.  70. 
224  Davies  (2003),  (above,  note  198)  at  p  618. 
225  Sterling  (above,  note  68)  at  p  470. 
226  Birds  John  Et.  Al.  (eds.  ),  "Boyle  &  Birds"  Company  Law",  (1995),  3rd  ed.,  jordans,  Bristol,  at 
pp  209,214,368;  Farrar  (1991),  (above,  note  42)  at  p  226;  Lee  Hazen  Thomas,  "Silencing  the 
244 investment  securities  in  general  are,  therefore,  personal  property  capable  of  being 
owned  by  persons  and  when  owned  they  will  confer  proprietary  rights.  "'  This  will  not 
cause  any  overlap  between  a  shareholder's  property  in  the  company  and  the 
company/s  own  property  because  the  shareholder  will  not  be  considered  as  a  joint 
owner  of  the  company's  property.  "'  He/she  only  owns  share  represented  by  share 
certificates...  in  the  companys  property"'  which  is  itself  separate  in  the  legal  sense.  "' 
That  means  while  a  share  confers  on  its  holder  personal  right  of  recovery,  it  represents 
a  physically  unidentifiable  unit  of  the  company's  capital,  which  belongs  to  the 
company.  232  In  Prudential  case,  only  this  latter  side  was  given  attention,  whereas  later 
cases  have  shown  that  the  other  side  must  also  be  considered.  "'  In  addition  to  these, 
shares  are  bought  and  sold  in  the  market,  meaning  that  they  enjoy  and  represent 
financial  value  for  which  interested  people  are  ready  to  pay  money.  This  financial 
value  derives  not  merely  from  the  participatory  aspect  but  rather  from  the  proprietary 
Shareholders'  Voice",  North  Carolina  Law  Review,  (2002),  Vol.  80,  Chapel  Hill,  North  Carolina 
Law  Review  Association,  at  pp  1900,1910. 
227  See  generally  MacNeil  lain,  "An  Introduction  to  the  Law  on  Financial  Investment",  (2005), 
Oxford,  Hart  Publishing  Ltd.  at  Ch.  Ip7;  Mayson,  French  &  Ryan,  (2003),  (above,  note  131)  at  p 
183. 
228  For  the  same  reasoning  see  Macaura  v.  Northern  Assurance  Co.  Ltd.  in  which  the  House  of 
Lords  took  the  view  that  a  shareholder  did  not  have  an  insurable  interest  in  the  company's 
property.  [(1925)  AC  619  HL]. 
229  Section  186  Companies  Act  1985. 
230  See  section  744  Companies  Act  1985:  ""share  means  share  in  the  share  capital  of  a  company". 
231  Section  182  Companies  Act  1985: 
"(1)  The  shares  or  other  interest  of  any  member  in  a  company- 
(a)  are  personal  estate  or,  in  Scotland,  moveable  property  and  are  not  in  the  nature  of  real  estate 
or  heritage  --- 
"' 
- 
232  'although  a  share  is  an  identifiable  piece  of  property,  which  belongs  to  the  shareholder  and 
has  an  ascertainable  value,  it  also  represents  a  proportionate  part  of  the  company's  net  assets...  ' 
[Johnson  v.  Gore  Wood  &  Co.  (2001),  1  All  ER  (HL),  481  at  528  per  Lord  Millett]. 
233  Johnson  v.  Gore  Wood  &  Co.  (2001),  1  All  ER  (HL),  481;  Gerber  Garment  Technology  Inc  v. 
Lectra  Systems  Ltd.,  (1997),  RPC  443;  George  Fischer  (Great  Britain)  Ltd  v.  Multi  Construction 
Ltd,  Dexion  Ltd  (third  party),  (1995),  1  BCLC  260;  Christensen  v.  Scott  (1996),  1  N.  Z.  L.  R.,  273  at 
280  (NZCA).  See  also  Bowen  (2002),  (above,  note  186). 
245 aspect  of  shares  . 
234 
If  it  was  so,  non-voting  shares  should  not  have  had  marketable 
value  because  they  do  not  confer  right  of  participation.  As  Farwell  J.  observed  in 
Borland's  Trustees  v.  Steel  Bros.  Ltd,  'a  share  is  the  interest  of  a  shareholder  in  the 
company  measured  by  a  sum  of  money,  for  the  purpose  of  liability  in  the  first  place, 
and  of  interest  in  the  second,  but  also  consisting  of  a  series  of  mutual  covenants 
entered  into  by  all  shareholders  inter  se 
/.  235 
V.  1.2.2.4.3.  What  justifies  the  'no  reflective  loss'  principle? 
Although,  in  principle,  an  individual  shareholder  ought  to  be  able  to  recover  reflective 
loss,  he  might  be  debarred  from  taking  action  to  the  courts  if  the  case  involves  some 
important  considerations  of  policy  that  are  ranked  prior  to  protection  of  property 
rights.  As  the  case  law  reveals,  there  are  certain  policies  which  should  be  considered 
before  the  courts  could  allow  a  claim  of  reflective  loss  to  proceed.  These  policies  will  be 
examined  below. 
1)  Where  a  reflective  loss  case  involves  the  risk  of  double  recovery  by  individual 
shareholders,  it  must  be  rejected.  "'  Suppose,  for  example,  a  company  with  three 
shareholders  of  equal  shareholdings.  Due  to  some  wrongdoing,  the  company  suffers 
E1500  loss  and  each  of  its  shareholders  initiate  a  separate  personal  action  for  the 
recovery  of  his  share  of  E500  loss,  which  is  reflected  to  him  in  the  form  of  diminution  in 
the  value  of  the  shares,  and  gets  a  judgement  in  his  personal  favour.  Then  the  company 
itself  pursue  the  wrongdoer  for  the  recovery  of  E1500  loss  caused  by  the  defendant  and 
234  Sterling  (above,  note  68)  at  470;  Mitchell  (above,  note  9)  at  459. 
235  Borland's  Trustees  v.  Steel  Bros.  Ltd.,  (1901),  1  Ch  288. 
246 the  court  holds  the  defendant  responsible  for  the  recovery  of  the  demanded  loss.  While 
the  entire  damage  to  the  company  and  its  shareholders  caused  by  the  defendant  is  only 
one  : E1500,  at  the  end  of  the  two  trails  he  may  be  held  liable  for  that  E1500  twice.  The 
question  of  double  recovery  has  root  in  English  restitution  law  particularly  in  cases 
that  involve  actions  by  two  co-promisees  who  seek  to  recover  damages  caused  by  a 
promisor  in  respect  of  the  same  property  or  activity.  23'  The  traditional  example  is 
found  in  a  baihnent  case  where  both  the  bailor  and  the  bailee  are  given  right  to  recover 
damages  caused  by  a  third  party  to  the  thing  bailed.  "'  In  such  cases,  there  will  be  no 
risk  of  double  recovery  because  the  courts  allow  both  actions  to  proceed  but  as  soon  as 
one  first  obtains  full  recovery  they  preclude  the  other.  "9  This  solution  was  clearly 
rejected  by  the  House  of  Lords  in  the  Johnson  case  that  chose  to  bar  the  personal  claim 
in  favour  of  the  corporate  one.  Members  of  the  House  thought  "protection  of  the 
interests  of  the  company's  creditors  requires  that  it  is  the  company  which  is  allowed  to 
recover  to  the  exclusion  of  the  shareholder. 
*240 
The  view  of  the  House,  however,  does  not  simply  seem,  for  a  number  of  reasons,  good 
enough  to  deprive  a  shareholder  from  the  benefits  of  his  cause  of  action.  For  one,  it 
fails  to  work  where  the  wronged  company  is  not  insolvent  and  possesses  good 
236  Prudential  Assurance  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Newman  Industries  Ltd.  and  Others  (No.  2),  (1982)  Ch.  204 
at  223;  Johnson  v.  Gore  Wood  &  Co.  (2001),  1  All  ER  (HL),  481  at  p  528  per  Lord  Millett;  see  also 
Bowen  (2003),  (above,  note  186)  at  p  2. 
237  McMeel  Gerald,  "Complex  Entitlements:  The  Albazero  Principle  and  Restitution",  (1999), 
Restitution  Law  Review,  21,  London,  Mansfield;  Mitchell  (above,  note  9)  at  pp  463-4;  Watts 
(above,  note  186)  at  p  390. 
238  Palmer  Norman  E,  "Bailment",  (1991),  2nd  ed.,  London,  Sweet  &  Maxwell,  at  pp  308-380;  See 
also  Henderson  v.  Merrett  Syndicates  Ltd  (1995)  2  A.  C.  145. 
239  McMeel  (above,  note  237)  at  pp  24-28,49;  at  463-4;  Mitchell  (above,  note  9)  at  pp  463-41 
Watts  (above,  note  186)  at  pp  390-2. 
240  Johnson  v.  Gore  Wood  &  Co.  (2001),  1  All  ER  (HL),  481  at  p  528  per  Lord  Millett;  see  also 
Ibid,  per  Lord  Bingham  at  p  503;  Ferran  (2001),  (above,  note  186)  at  p  246. 
247 financial  position  to  meet  its  creditors'  likely  claims.  241  For  another,  while  interests  of 
creditors  can  bar  personal  claim  of  an  individual  shareholder,  it  is  not  very  certain  why 
the  same  consideration  fails  to  prevent  the  very  wronged  company  from  failing  to 
pursue  the  wrongdoer  or  from  compromising  the  claim  at  an  undervalue  with  him. 
Further,  the  double  recovery  argument  ceases  to  be  forceful  where  the  company 
chooses  not  to  enforce  its  right  of  action  against  the  defendant,  or  settles  its  claim  at 
undervalue,  or  cannot  recover  because  the  defendant  has  a  good  defence.  "'  In  such 
cases,  permission  of  a  personal  action  would  not  seem  inconsistent  with  creditors" 
interests  because  it  is  the  wronged  company's  inaction  rather  than  the  shareholder 
action  that  may  harm  such  creditors. 
2)  According  to  the  analysis  of  the  House  of  Lords  either  the  wronged  company  sues 
successfully  to  recover  the  loss  with  the  effect  that  all  its  shareholders  would  be  fully 
and  equally  compensated,  or  the  company  decides  not  to  pursue  and  settles  its  claim. 
In  either  case,  the  company's  decision  will  bind  the  individual  shareholders  because  in 
the  first  contingency  there  remain  no  reflective  loss  to  be  recovered  and  in  the  second 
the  loss  to  individual  shareholders  is  caused  by  the  company's  decision.  "'  This  is, 
however,  misconceived.  There  seems  no  causal  link  between  the  company"s  decision 
and  a  shareholder's  reflective  loss.  When  the  company  refuses  to  pursue  or  settles  at 
undervalue,  this  only  means  that  the  reflective  loss  to  the  shareholder  is  not  going  to  be 
241  Watts  (above,  note  186)  at  pp  391-2. 
242  Mitchell  (above,  note  9)  at  464;  See  also  Thomas  J.  in  Christensen  v.  Scott  arguing  that  the 
problem  of  double  recovery  does  not  arise  where  the  company  had  settled  its  claim  [(1996),  1 
N.  Z.  L.  R.,  273  at  280  (NZCA)]  Also  see  Day  v.  Cook  (2002),  1  B.  C.  L.  C.  1  Para  38  per  Ardern  L.  J. 
243  Johnson  v.  Gore  Wood  &  Co.  (2001),  1  All  ER  (HL),  481  at  p  532  per  Lord  Millett. 
248 compensated  through  the  company"s  action.  It  does  not  mean  that  the  company  has 
caused  loss  to  the  shareholder.  " 
3)  To  allow  shareholder  action  is  to  mean  to  outflank  the  company"s  autonomy  which 
can  result  in  undermining  the  company's  compromises  . 
24'  However,  the  argument  fails 
to  explain  why  a  shareholder  action  which  seeks  to  recover  a  loss  that  is  not  yet 
compensated  through  the  company  can  form  damage  to  the  autonomy  of  the  wronged 
company.  Difficulties  of  establishing  a  successful  negligence  case  against  directorS246 
and  of  derivative  actions  plus  time  and  costs  of  such  proceedings...  suggest  that 
permission  of  personal  action  in  reflective  loss  cases  can  'ensure  that  the  party  who 
has,  in  fact,  suffered  loss  is  not  arbitrarily  denied  fair  compensation"  - 
248 
4)  Permission  of  a  shareholder  action  can  put  corporate  directors  in  a  position  where 
249 
their  interests  conflict  with  their  duties 
. 
Clearly,  this  can  occur  in  small  companies 
where  shareholders  and  directors  are  one  and  the  same,  as  were  the  case  in  Johnson  v. 
Gore  Wood.  However,  that  will  not  always  be  the  case  because  many  companies  now 
use  non-shareholder  directors.  250  Moreover,  directors'  conflict  of  interests  is  principally 
244  For  a  similar  line  of  argument  see  Mitchell  (above,  note  9)  at  pp  468-9. 
245  Johnson  v.  Gore  Wood  &  Co.  (2001),  1  All  ER  (HL),  481  at  p  532  per  Lord  Millett;  see  also 
Ferran  (2001),  (above,  note  186)  at  p  247. 
246  For  further  study  see  Sterling  (above,  note  68)  at  pp  483,486-7;  Davies  (1997),  (above,  note 
60)  at  p  746;  Clark  (2001),  (above,  note  95)  at  p  171;  Conway  (above,  note  43)  at  p  16;  Sealy 
(above,  note  129);  Deakin  Simon,  Ferran  Ellis  and  Nolan  Richard,  "'Shareholders'  Rights  and 
Remedies:  An  Overview",  (1997),  Company  Financial  and  Insolvency  Law  Review,  163,  Oxford, 
Mansfield  Press,  at  163. 
247  Sterling  (above,  note  68)  at  485;  Deakin,  Ferran  and  Nolan  (above,  note  246)  at  p  163;  Hale 
(above,  note  39)  at  p  219. 
248  Johnson  v.  Gore  Wood  &  Co.  (2001),  1  All  ER  (HL),  481  at  p  503  per  Lord  Bingham. 
249  Ibid.  at  p  532  per  Lord  Millett. 
250  Watts  (above,  note  186)  at  p  392;  See  also  Mitchell  (above,  note  9)  at  p  470. 
249 curbed  in  law  through  the  mechanism  of  fiduciary  duty  and,  thus,  there  is  no  need  to 
create  extra  devices;  i.  e.  to  exclude  shareholder  action. 
251 
The  choice  between  shareholder  and  corporate  action  is  a  difficult  one.  It  is  possible  to 
disallow  the  corporate  claim  in  favour  of  shareholder  action.  This  way  opens  the  gate 
for  an  individual  shareholder  to  recover  reflective  loss.  It  requires  every  shareholder  to 
sue  individually  and  in  the  end  he  will  be  given  his  share  in  the  loss  and  nothing  more. 
However,  certain  drawbacks  associate  with  this  method.  To  begin  with,  the  prospect  of 
too  many  individual  shareholders  who  take  personal  actions  to  the  courts  can  make  the 
proposition  impractical.  "'  Furthe=ore,  in  large  companies  where  shareholders  often 
passively  choose  not  to  take  actions  this  can  encourage  extensive  escape  of  wrongdoers 
from  liability.  In  addition,  it  can  discourage  investors  who  will  find  corporations 
unsafe  and  troublesome  for  financing.  Alternatively,  It  is  possible  to  disallow 
shareholder  action  in  favour  of  the  corporate  one  because  otherwise  shareholder  action 
can  give  some  extra  benefit  to  the  person  who  initiates  the  action  at  the  expense  of 
253 
other  shareholders  in  the  wronged  company.  Moreover,  corporate  action  is  not  only 
for  the  benefit  of  shareholders  and  creditors  but  also  is  for  the  benefit  of  other 
interested  groups  such  as  employees  and  consumers  who  might  be  prejudiced  due  to 
exclusion  of  the  corporate  recovery. 
254 
251  Watts  (above,  note  186)  at  392;  Mitchell  (above,  note  9)  at  p  470. 
252  Gray  v.  Lewis,  (1873),  8  Ch  App,  1035,  p  1051  per  James  L.  J;  Sagar  (above,  note  186)  at  p  88; 
Sterling  (above,  note  68)  at  p  485. 
253  Johnson  v.  Gore  Wood  &  Co.  (2001),  1  All  ER  (HL),  481  at  p  528  per  Lord  Millett;  see  also 
Ferran  (2001),  (above,  note  186)  at  p  246. 
254  Sterling  (above,  note  68)  at  pp  488-9. 
250 One  way  to  make  optimal  use  of  positive  points  in  both  actions  is  to  view  them  as 
supplement  devices.  This  does  not  follow  that  they  are  retained  and  permitted  to  be 
used  by  corporations  and  their  shareholders  simultaneously.  That,  as  Lord  Millett 
suggested,  might  cause  either  the  problem  of  double  recovery  or  a  shareholder  might 
recover  at  the  expense  of  the  company's  creditors  and  other  shareholders.  It  is  only  to 
mean  that  where  the  rationale  for  a  corporate  action  is  absent  shareholders"  personal 
action  ought  to  be  allowed. 
V.  1.2.2.4.4.  What  sort  of  loss  is  considered  reflective? 
Reflective  loss  is  normally  taken  to  its  quite  clear  examples  of  diminution  in  the  market 
value  of  shares  and  the  likely  diminution  in  dividend.  "'  Whether  it  is  limited  to  these 
two  instances  or  it  can  extend  to  all  other  types  of  payments  which  a  shareholder  might 
have  received  from  the  company  should  the  company  was  not  deprived  of  its  money 
due  to  the  wrongdoing,  is  not  determined.  "'  Clearly,  reflective  loss  differs  and  must  be 
distinguished  from  distinct  loss  which  is  considered  recoverable.  "'  An  example  of  the 
latter  was  provided  in  the  Prudential  case  where  the  Court  of  Appeal  considered  as 
distinct  expenses  of  attendance  in  a  fraudulently  called  meeting.  258  The  distinct  loss 
aside,  it  is  not  very  clear  whether  the  reflective  loss  can  include  some  more  the 
complicated  examples  of  loss  such  as  where  a  shareholder's  deprivation  of  the 
255  Prudential  Assurance  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Newman  Industries  Ltd.  and  Others  (No.  2),  (1982)  Ch.  204 
at  223. 
256  Hirt  Hans-Christoph,  "Companies  In  General",  (Jul-2003),  Journal  of  Business  1,  aw,  420-429, 
London,  Stevens,  at  pp  422-3,428. 
257  Johnson  v.  Gore  Wood  &  Co.  (2001),  1  All  ER  (HL),  481  at  p  530-1  per  Lord  Millett,  and  at  p 
503  per  Lord  Bingham. 
258  Prudential  Assurance  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Newman  Industries  Ltd.  and  others  (No.  2),  (1982)  Ch.  204 
at  223. 
251 opportunity  to  accept  the  higher  offer  in  a  take-over  bid  case...  and  where  a  reduction 
in  the  saleability  of  the  plaintiff-s  shares  in  the  market"'  were  at  stake.  According  to  the 
Lord  Millett  for  the  same  policy  reasons  "the  same  applies  to  other  payments  which  the 
company  would  have  made  if  it  had  had  the  necessary  funds  even  if  the  plaintiff 
would  have  received  them  qua  employee  and  not  qua  shareholder  and  even  if  he 
would  have  had  a  legal  claim  to  be  paid-.  "'  This  view  was  later  interpreted  differently 
in  the  Humberclyde  Finance  Group  Ltd  Hicks  case  where  262  Neuberger  J.  observed  that 
only  where  the  plaintiff  shareholder  is  the  sole  owner  of  the  company,  these  types  of 
loss  can  be  considered  reflective.  His  reading,  however,  can  fall  in  contradiction  with 
corporations'  separate  corporate  personality  and  further  fails  to  explain  why  should 
the  amount  of  a  shareholders  shareholding  in  the  company  play  any  role  in 
determining  what  loss  is  and  what  loss  is  not  reflective?  26'  As  Lord  Millett  pointed  out 
the  test  is  to  see  whether  the  alleged  loss  primarily  relates  to  the  claims  of  a  plaintiff 
over  the  company's  assets  or  not,  no  matter  the  plaintiff  is  a  shareholder  or  is  an 
employee  in  the  company  and  no  matter  if  he  owns  the  company  or  not.  More  recently, 
in  the  Giles  v.  Rhind  case  Waller  L.  J.  opined  that  a  shareholder/  employee's  capacity  to 
recover  his  loss  of  salary  would  not  be  hurt  simply  because  he  is  also  a  shareholder  in 
the  company.  "'  This  view  seems  to  have  been  inspired  from  the  Lord  Bingham's 
259  Heron  International  Ltd  v.  Lord  Grade  (1983),  BCLC  244. 
260  R.  P.  Howard  Ltd  and  Others  v.  Woodman  Matthews  and  Co  (1983)  BCLC  117. 
261  Johnson  v.  Gore  Wood  &  Co.  (2001),  1  All  ER  (FIL),  481  at  pp  532-3  per  Lord  Millett;  See  also 
Crisp  Morris  Ashurst,  "'Shareholders'  Recovery"',  (2001),  Practical  Law  Companies,  12  (9),  59-60, 
London,  Sweet  &  Maxwell;  "'Shareholders  Cannot  Recover  Loss  That  Company  Is  Not 
Pursuing",  (2001),  Insolvency  Intelligence,  14  (8),  63,  London,  Sweet  &  Maxwell;  Mitchell  (above, 
note  9)  at  pp  473-5;  Bowen  (2002),  (above,  note  186)  at  p  3;  Alistair  Alcock,  "Some  Temporary 
Relief  for  Auditors",  (2002),  Company  Lawyer,  23  (7),  217,  London,  Oyez  Publishing  Limited,  at  p 
219. 
262  (2001)  All  E.  R.  (D)  202  (Nov). 
263  See  Blackburn  J's  argument  in  Gardner  v.  Parker,  (2004),  1  BCLC  Ch  D  417  at  pp  437-438. 
264  Giles  v.  Rhind,  (2002)  4  All  ER  (CA),  977  per  Waller  LJ  at  p  991.  See  also  Hirt  (above,  note 
256)  at  p  428. 
252 statement  in  the  Johnson  case  in  that  loss  of  dividend  and  a  diminution  in  the  value  of  a 
shareholding  are  clear  instances  beyond  them  'a  finer  judgement  will  be  called 
for 
... 
(and)  any  reasonable  doubt  must  be  resolved  in  favour  of  the  claimant".  "' 
5)  When  a  shareholder  may  recover  reflective  loss? 
As  authorities  suggest,  two  requirements  must  be  met  when  a  shareholder  seeks  to 
recover  his  reflective  loss.  "'  One  is  that  the  plaintiff  needs  to  have  a  separate  duty  in 
his  favour  made  by  the  wrongdoer.  "'  Thus,  where  a  company  suffers  loss  due  to  a 
breach  of  duty  on  the  part  of  defendant  who  owes  no  duty  to  any  individual 
shareholder  in  that  company,  only  the  company  can  take  action  against  the  wrongdoer 
simply  because  the  cause  of  action  belongs  to  the  company  and  shareholders  hold  no 
cause  of  action.  26'  Nonetheless,  if  conditions  are  met,  a  shareholder  may  only  initiate  a 
derivative  action.  The  other  is  the  plaintiff  must  show  that  the  wronged  company  no 
longer  has  a  cause  of  action.  A  shareholder  action  is  only  heard  where  the  company 
suffers  loss  without  having  a  cause  of  action.  In  such  a  case,  the  plaintiff  cannot  initiate 
a  derivative  action  simply  because  the  wronged  company  itself  has  no  cause  of 
action.  "9  One  question  which  must  be  addressed  is  to  determine  circumstances  within 
265  Johnson  v.  Gore  Wood  &  Co.  (2001),  1  All  ER  (HL),  481  at  p  504  per  Lord  Bingham;  See 
Mitchell  (above,  note  9)  at  pp  473-5;  Hirt  (above,  note  256)  at  pp  427-8. 
266  Prudential  Assurance  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Newman  Industries  Ltd.  and  others  (No.  2),  (1982)  Ch.  204 
at  223;  Johnson  v.  Gore  Wood  &  Co.  (2001),  1  All  ER  (HL),  481  at  p  528  per  Lord  Millett  and  at  p 
503  per  Lord  Bingham;  Giles  v.  Rhind,  (2002)  4  All  ER  (CA),  977  at  p  988-990  per  Waller  LJ;  Stein 
v  Blake  and  Others  (No  2),  (1998),  1  BCLC  (CA)  573;  Gardner  v.  Parker,  (2004),  1  BCLC  Ch  D 
417;  See  also  Hirt  (above,  note  256)  at  pp  421-2;  Bowen  (2002),  (above,  note  186);  Crisp  (above, 
note  261);  Hale  (above,  note  39)  at  p  219. 
267  Bowen  (2002),  (above,  note  186);  Sterling  (above,  note  69)  at  p  474. 
268  Prudential  Assurance  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Newman  Industries  Ltd.  and  others  (No.  2),  (1982)  Ch.  204; 
Stein  v.  Blake  and  Others  (No  2),  (1998),  1  BCLC  (CA)  573;  Gardner  v.  Parker,  (2004),  1  BCLC  Ch 
D  417. 
269  Prudential  Assurance  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Newman  Industries  Ltd.  and  Others  (No.  2),  (1982)  Ch.  204 
at  223;  Johnson  v.  Gore  Wood  &  Co.  (2001),  1  All  ER  (HL),  481;  Giles  v.  Rhind,  (2002)  4  All  ER 
(CA),  977;  Lee  v-  Sheard  (1955),  3  All  ER  777;  George  Fischer  (Great  Britain)  Ltd  v.  Multi 
253 which  a  company  may  suffer  loss  without  having  a  cause  of  action  for  it.  Authorities 
suggest  that  such  circurnstances  could  be  found  where  there  is  neither  a  contractual 
nor  a  tort-based  cause  of  action  between  the  company  and  the  wrongdoer.  "O  These 
authorities,  however,  are  silent  where  a  case  involves  a  company  which  has  a  cause  of 
action  but  the  cause  is  simply  not  good  enough  to  allow  a  successful  corporate  action 
against  the  wrongdoer.  For  instance,  where  a  case  involves  directors'  mere 
negligence"'  or  when  the  corporate  cause  of  action  becomes  procedurally  time 
212 
barred 
,  the  wronged  company  cannot  take  action.  Whether  a  shareholder  action  in 
such  cases  can  be  authorised  is  not  clear.  "'  Recently,  the  Giles  case  took  the  view  that 
term  'cause  of  action'  should  be  taken  to  mean  a  good  cause  of  action  so  as  to  enable  a 
shareholder  action.  274  The  rationale  of  the  Giles  case  can  perhaps  be  used  to  extend  a 
shareholder's  right  of  action  to  cases  where  the  company  simply  decides  not  to  pursue 
its  cause  of  action,  or  where  its  action  is  rejected  due  to  a  good  defence  by  the 
wrongdoer,  and  where  it  compromises  its  action  at  undervalue.  The  permission  of  a 
shareholder  action  in  such  cases  is  justified  on  the  principle  that  there  will  be  no  wrong 
without  a  remed  Y2"  and  that  the  law  should  provide  remedy  to  a  person  who  suffers 
Construction  Ltd,  Dexion  Ltd  (third  party),  (1995),  1  BCLC  (CA)  260;  Gerber  Garment 
Technology  Inc  v.  Lectra  Systems  Ltd.  [(1997),  RPC  443. 
270  Johnson  v.  Gore  Wood  &  Co.  (2001),  1  All  ER  (FIL),  481  at  p  503  per  Lord  Bingham  and  at  p 
528  per  Lord  Millett;  George  Fischer  (Great  Britain)  Ltd  v.  Multi  Construction  Ltd,  Dexion  Ltd 
(third  party),  (1995),  1  BCLC  (CA)  260;  Gerber  Garment  Technology  Inc  v.  Lectra  Systems  Ltd. 
[(1997),  RPC  443;  Lee  v.  Sheard  (1955),  3  All  ER  777. 
271  In  Galoo  Ltd.  v.  Bright  Grahame  Murray,  for  example,  the  alleged  negligence  of  the 
accountants  in  auditing  the  accounts  caused  the  company  to  carry  on  trading  at  accumulating 
losses,  for  which  the  auditors  could  not  be  held  liable.  [(1994),  1  W.  L.  R.  13601;  See  Alistair 
(above,  note  261)  at  p  219. 
272  John  v.  Price  Waterhouse,  (2001),  EWHC  438  (Ch). 
273  Mitchell  (above,  note  9)  at  p  473. 
274  Giles  v.  Rhind,  (2002)  4  All  ER  (CA)  977  at  No.  (34)  p  990  per  Waller  Lj;  For  analysis  of  the 
Giles  case  see  Bowen  (2003),  (above,  note  186)  at  p  2;  Mitchell  (above,  note  9)  at  pp  468-473. 
275  Mitchell  (above  note  9)  at  pp  468-479;  Hirt  (above,  note  256)  at  pp  428-9;  Crisp  Morris 
Ashurst,  "Reflective  Loss",  (2002),  Practical  Law  Companies,  13  (11),  59,  London,  Sweet  & 
25  4 unfair  loss.  "'  This  interpretation  can  also  be  of  very  help  to  extinguish  any  likely 
conflict  with  section  459  petitions.  According  to  this  analysis,  a  shareholder  cannot  use 
section  459  to  outflank  the  'no  reflective  loss"  principle  if  the  company  itself  has  a  good 
cause  of  action.  However,  if  the  company  has  no  cause  of  action,  or  in  the  light  of  the 
Giles  case,  if  it  is  not  going  to  exercise  its  cause  for  any  reason  excluding  the 
observation  of  the  company's  best  interest,  a  shareholder  may  initiate  his  own  action, 
either  in  the  form  of  a  personal  action  for  the  recovery  of  his  reflective  loss  or  in  the 
form  of  a  petition  under  section  459,  for  a  court  order  to  oblige  other  shareholders  or 
the  company  to  buy  his  shares  at  a  compensating  rate. 
277 
V.  1.2.2.5.  Section  459  and  the  derivative  action 
Whether  or  not  section  459,  since  its  introduction,  has  taken  over  the  derivative  action 
has  been  controversial  in  English  company  law.  Technically  seen,  although  they  are 
possible  to  be  sought  interchangeably,  they  importantly  differ.  The  former  is  mostly 
classified  as  personal.  This  means  that  a  section  459  petitioner  normally  seeks  to 
preserve  his  personal  interests  and  the  total  benefit  of  his  action,  if  any,  goes  directly  to 
his  pocket.  But,  the  latter  is  corporate  in  the  sense  that  the  plaintiff  seeks  on  behalf  of 
the  wronged  company  to  make  good  any  wrong  done  to  the  company  and  for  the 
benefit  of  the  company.  If  the  classification  was  that  simple,  there  might  arise  no  or 
little  confusion  because  one  could  assure  that  while  derivative  is  only  corporate, 
unfairly  prejudicial  remedy  is  absolutely  personal.  However,  the  issue  is  more 
Maxwell;  Crisp  Morris  Ashurst,  "'Reflective  Loss",  (2003),  Practical  Law  Companies,  14,  (7),  49, 
London,  Sweet  &  Maxwell. 
276  Giles  v.  Rhind  (2002)  4  All  ER  977  (CA)  at  989  per  Waller  L.  J.;  See  also  Sagar  (above,  note 
186)  at  p  87;  Hirt  (above,  note  256)  at  p  427;  Bowen  (2003),  (above,  note  186)  at  p  3;  Crisp  (2002 
and  2003),  (above,  note  275);  Mitchell  (above,  note  9)  at  pp  468-479. 
277  Section  461  (2d)  Companies  Act  1985. 
255 complicated,  as  a  section  459  action  might  also  be  considered  corporate  because  of  its 
contentS278  and  of  the  remedy  sought.  279  The  complication  can  become  worse  where  a 
case  involves  a  breach  of  duty  by  directors,  as  the  very  same  breach  may  constitute 
under  the  section  459  a  wrong  both  to  the  company  and  to  its  shareholders.  In  such 
cases,  a  minority  plaintiff  can  petition  for  either  a  personal  or  a  corporate  remedy,  no 
matter  what  majority  shareholders  choose.  "O  This  can  cause  some  overlap  between 
corporate  and  personal  rights  of  actions  and  further  can  immeasurably  harm  the  rule  in 
Foss  v.  Harbottale  case.  An  interesting  question,  which  must  be  addressed,  is  whether  a 
shareholder  can  petition  using  section  459  while  a  corporate  action  is  available? 
Generally  speaking,  there  are  two  differing  lines  of  arguments.  One  argues  that 
although  the  same  set  of  facts  may  constitute  fraud  and  unfairly  prejudicial  conduct,  it 
is  not  possible  to  choose  between  taking  a  derivative  action  and  petitioning  under 
section  459  interchangeably.  There  are  distinguishable  limits  on  the  use  of  each  action. 
Proponents  of  this  argument,  however,  have  diverged  in  proposing  what  constitutes 
the  dividing  element.  In  Hirt"s  view,  when  the  alleged  wrong  constitutes  fraud,  a 
shareholder  may  only  use  the  derivative  form  of  action.  281  The  touchstone  argument 
for  this  view,  which  seems  to  be  inspired  by  the  views  of  the  Jenkins  Committee"',  is 
278  As  Millett  J.  observed  the  same  set  of  facts  may  give  rise  to  a  complaint  both  of  breach  of 
duty  owed  to  the  company  which  is  prosecuted  by  the  company  or  by  a  minority  shareholder 
derivatively,  and  of  unfair  prejudice,  which  is  prosecuted  by  a  petitioning  shareholder.  [Re 
Charnley  v.  Davies  Ltd.  (No.  2),  1990,  B.  C.  L.  C.  7601. 
279  Sec.  461  (2c)  Companies  Act  1985. 
280  See  Re  Charnley  v.  Davies  Ltd.  (No.  2),  1990,  B.  C.  L.  C.  760  per  Millett  J. 
281  Hirt  (above,  note  66)  at  pp  106-7. 
282  The  Jenkins  Committee's  proposition  was  that  company  law  should  provide  relief  for  those 
corporate  wrongs  the  relevant  decision  makers  of  which  fail  to  pursue  wrongdoers  in 
circumstances  where  the  very  wrong  does  not  constitute  fraud.  [Jenkins  Committee"s  Report 
(above,  note  125)  at  2061;  See  also  Hirt  (above,  note  66)  at  pp  104-5;  For  a  different  interpretation 
of  the  Jenkins  Committee's  proposition  see  Davies  (above,  note  60)  at  p  737. 
256 the  one  suggesting  that  so  far  as  a  minority  shareholder  has  ordinary  ways  of  action  in 
hand,  no  turn  goes  to  exceptional  ways.  "'  The  essence  of  a  complaint  under  section  459 
is  unfairness  while  in  a  derivative  action  the  essence  is  unlawfulness.  Claims  of 
unfairness  if  not  involving  any  unlawfulness  have  always  been  exceptional  and  only 
available  where  no  legal  ways  remain. 
284 
There  is,  however,  some  drawback  with  such 
view.  First,  the  wide  wording  of  the  very  section  459  implies  that  any  unfair  disregard 
from  a  member"s  interest  may  trigger  a  section  459  petition.  Second,  it  would  seem 
unreasonable,  if  we  require  a  plaintiff  to  use  a  much  easier  way  of  action  under  section 
459  for  less  serious  cases  while  he  is  required  to  use  the  difficult  way  of  derivative  for 
fraudulent  behaviours.  Third,  the  proposition  ties  the  prospect  of  petitions  under 
section  459  to  the  difficult  concept  of  fraud  in  the  sense  that  a  likely  petitioner  will  be 
asked  to  show  that  his  case  does  not  involve  fraud.  Finally,  and  most  importantly,  this 
view  seems  to  be  inconsistent  with  a  number  of  decided  cases.  "'  In  fact,  the  courts 
have  tended  to  hear  allegations  of  unfairly  prejudice  on  the  basis  of  conducts  which 
were  or  could  have  been  wrongs  to  the  company  and  consequently  eligible  for  a 
derivative  action. 
286 
283  Gardner  v.  Parker,  (2004),  1  BCLC  Ch  D  417;  Re  Charnley  v.  Davies  Ltd.  (No.  2),  1990, 
B.  C.  L.  C.  760;  See  also  Crisp  (2002  and  2003)  (above  note  275). 
284  See  the  Outer  House  of  the  Court  of  Session's  argument  in  Scottish  case  of  Anderson  v. 
Hogg,  (2000),  S.  L.  T.,  634  at  644  per  Lord  Ordinary. 
285  Anderson  v.  Hogg,  (2002),  S.  L.  T.,  354  (Inner  House);  Lowe  v.  Fahey  (1996),  1  B.  C.  L.  C.,  262; 
Re  Charnley  v.  Davies  Ltd.  (No.  2),  1990,  B.  C.  L.  C.  760;  Re  A  Company  (No.  00370),  1988,1 
W.  L.  R  1068;  Re  London  School  of  Electronics  Ltd.  (1986)  Ch.  211;  Re  A  Company  (No  005278  of 
1985),  (1986)  1WLR  281. 
286  Davies  (above,  note  60)  at  pp  737-9;  Pettet  (above,  note  40)  at  pp  261-2;  Hirt  (above  note  66) 
at  p  103;  Gray  Joanna,  "'A  Derivative  Action  by  Way  of  s.  459"',  (1997),  Company  Lawyer,  18  (4), 
121-2,  London,  Oyez  Publishing  Limited;  Reisberg  (above,  note  43);  Hale  (above,  note  39)  at  pp 
221-2. 
257 Leader  and  Dine  proposed  another  dividing  element.  In  their  view,  the  use  of  section 
459  should  be  restricted  to  cases  where  there  is  a  chain  of  unfair  policies  that  target  a 
particular  shareholder.  "'  If  controllers  act  to  prejudice  interests  of  a  shareholder,  but 
their  acts  does  not  contribute  to  form  any  policy,  no  action  under  the  s  459  would  be 
allowed.  The  proposition,  however,  seems  to  fall  largely  in  contradiction  with  the  very 
wording  of  the  section  where  it  expressly  states  that  a  single  and  a  future  act  or 
omission  might  constitute  ground  for  the  unfairly  prejudicial  petitions.  "'  It  also  falls  in 
contradiction  with  a  number  of  decided  cases  which  did  not  require  the  petitioners  to 
show  the  course  of  unfair  conducts.  "' 
The  judgement  of  Millett  J.  in  the  Re  Charnley  v.  Davies  Ltd.  (No.  2)  case  290  offers  another 
dividing  element.  According  to  it,  although  the  very  same  facts  may  trigger  either  a 
derivative  action  or  a  section  459  petition,  but  they  differ  at  nature  and  relevant 
remedies.  The  essence  of  a  section  459  petition  should  be  a  disregard  by  controllers  of 
the  petitioner's  interests  when  conducting  company  affairs  rather  than  pursuing  a 
breach  of  duty  by  directors.  291  It  is  personal  in  nature  and  must  be  accompanied  by  a 
personal  remedy  while  derivative  actions  are  considered  corporate  in  nature  and  can 
only  be  granted  a  corporate  remedy.  Although  this  view  has  attracted  considerable 
support"',  it  'sits  rather  oddly  with  the  fact  that  one  of  the  remedies  which  the 
287  Leader  &  Dine  (above,  note  159)  at  p  229. 
288  Sec.  459(l)  Companies  Act  1985. 
289  See  above  note  285.  Also  see  Clark  (above,  note  95)  at  p  171;  Conway  (above,  note  43)  at  pp 
13-15;  Farrar  (1991),  (above,  note  42)  at  p  470. 
290  Charnley  v.  Davies  Ltd.  (No.  2),  1990,  B.  C.  L.  C.  760. 
291  Ibid.  at  783-4. 
292  For  support  of  this  view,  see  Hirt  (above,  note  66)  at  pp  104-5;  Reisberg  (above,  note  40)  at  p 
118;  Hale  (above,  note  39)  at  p  222. 
258 statute  293  expressly  empowers  the  courts  to  grant  is  to  authorise  civil  proceedings  to  be 
brought  in  the  name  and  on  behalf  of  the  company". 
294 
The  other  line  of  argument  states  that  it  is  a  matter  of  choice  between  two  absolutely 
interchangeable  procedures,  as  there  is  no  identifiable  limit  on  the  use  of  section  459.295 
A  plaintiff  shareholder  has  option  to  choose  between  taking  a  derivative  action  or  a 
section  459  petition  especially  where  he  seeks  a  corporate  remedy.  296  The  argument  is 
consistent  with  the  general  wording  of  the  very  section  459  and  is  further  beneficial  to 
minority  shareholders  because  it  allows  them  to  choose  between  alternatives  the  one 
which  is  more  advantageous.  Section  459  facilitates  taking  action  by  minority 
shareholders,  as  it  no  longer  requires  complainants  to  establish  difficult  elements  of 
fraud  and  control'9'  and  that  explains  why  there  have  been  relatively  few  derivative 
actions  since  the  introduction  of  the  unfairly  prejudicial  remedy.  '9' 
293  Section  461  Companies  Act  1985. 
294  Davies  (above,  note  60)  at  p  739. 
295  Pettet  (above,  note  40)  at  pp  262-4;  Davies  (above,  note  60)  at  pp  737-9;  Gray  (above,  note 
286)  at  pp  121-2;  Hale  (above,  note  39)  at  pp  219,221-2;  Reisberg  (above,  note  40)  at  p  116. 
296  Lowe  v.  Fahey  (1996),  1  B.  C.  L.  C.,  262  (Ch  D)  at  268  per  Aldous  Q-C.;  See  also  Re  Elgindata 
Ltd  in  which  Warner  J.  considered  an  alleged  diversion  of  company's  assets  by  those  in  control 
to  their  own  benefit  or  that  of  their  associates  as  an  example  of  unfairly  prejudicial  conduct. 
[(1991),  BCLC  959  at  1004. 
297  Reisberg  (above,  note  40)  at  p  118. 
298  See  Poole  and  Roberts  (1999),  (above,  note  81)  at  p  100;  Reisberg  (above,  note  40)  at  p  117. 
259 V.  2.  The  case  of  Iran 
This  part  concerns  the  rules  and  mechanisms  which  have  been  devised  by  the  Iranian 
lawmaker  either  to  prevent  abuse  of  rights  generally  or  in  particular  to  protect 
minority  shareholders  against  the  possibility  of  abuse  of  rights  by  majority 
shareholders  in  corporations.  These  mechanisms,  thus,  fall  into  two  categories.  One 
includes  the  "no  abuse  of  rights'  which  is  a  general  principle  of  law  and  the  other 
comprises  of  four  corporate  law  mechanisms  which  are  meant  to  protect  minority 
shareholders  specifically. 
V.  2.1.  The  "no  abuse  of  right'  principle 
The  'no  abuse  of  right'  which  is  a  general  principle  in  the  Iranian  law  requires  persons 
to  take  care  when  exercising  rights  in  certain  circumstances.  The  principle  which  is 
stated  in  the  Art  40  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran  (CIRI)  provides 
that  'no  one  is  entitled  to  exercise  his  rights  in  a  way  injurious  to  others  or  detrimental 
to  public  interests.  While  the  Art  recognises  abuse  of  rights  as  a  general  principle,  it 
provides  no  definition  of  circumstances  within  which  an  exercise  of  right  could 
constitute  abuse.  A  proper  understanding  of  the  abuse  of  right  would  then  require 
interpretation  of  the  principle  and  any  such  interpretation  will  inevitably  be  dependant 
on  understanding  the  issue  in  the  light  of  both  the  Islamic  law  and  the  European  law 
which  were  sources  of  learning  for  the  Iranian  lawmaker.  On  the  one  hand, 
codification  of  the  Iranian  law  on  the  European  model  which  occurred  in  the  early 
260 twentieth  century99  and  which  required  proclaiming  rights  in  general  terms  could 
generate  the  same  problem  of  abuse  of  right  as  existed  in  the  European  countries  and 
hence  the  experience  of  the  European  countries  could  help  the  Iranian  law  to  address 
abuse  of  right  cases  effectively.  On  the  other  hand,  as  the  reliance  on  the  European 
model  as  to  drafting  of  the  Civil  Code  was  mainly  in  form  rather  than  contents,  Islamic 
law  remained  decisively  relevant  as  to  defining  the  concept  of  abuse  of  right.  '00  Hence, 
I  shall  briefly  review  these  two  sources  in  order  to  discover  how  they  have  played  a 
part  in  the  development  of  the  "no  abuse  of  right"  principle  in  the  Iranian  private  law. 
Islamic  law  knows  no  "abuse  of  right"  principle,  though  it  offers  a  'no  harm"  principle 
which  has  been  relevant.  Historically,  development  of  the  'no  harm'  principle  goes 
back  to  a  very  famous  incident  which  occurred  between  two  persons  in  the  lifetime  of 
the  prophet  Mohammad.  The  incident,  which  is  known  as  the  "incident  of  the  Somarat- 
ebn-jandab  'or-'  Hadis-e-Somarat-ebn-jandab,  was  quoted  by  a  Zorareh  named  person 
who  was  one  of  the  students  of  the  Imam  Mohammad-ebn-Bagher  (the  Prophets 
grand  child)  who  told  the  story  after  the  Prophet's  death.  'O'  The  incident  involved  a 
person  who  had  bought  a  property  for  the  living  of  his  family  and  a  person  (Somarat- 
ebn-jandab)  who  owned  a  date  tree  in  the  property  bought  by  the  former.  A  dispute 
rose  when  Somarat  repeatedly  and  without  a  prior  notice  entered  in  the  said  property 
299  See  Chapter  one  (above,  at  1.2). 
300  fbid. 
301  Alsheikh  Mohamad-ebn-al-Hasan-al-Toosi,  ""Altahzib",  Vol.  7,  p  146  at  Hadis  no.  36,  Dar-ol- 
Kotob-ol-Islamieh  Publication,  Tehran,  Iran;  Mohammad-ebn-al-Yakgoob-al-Koleini,  "Al- 
Kaafi"',  Vol.  5,  p  292  at  Hadis  no.  2,  Dar-ol-Ketab-ol-Eslamieh  Publications,  Tehran,  Iran;  Sheikh 
Mohammad-ebn-al-Hassan-ebn-al-Yoosof-ebn-al-Motahhar-al-Helli  (Known  as  Fakhr-ol- 
Mohagheghin),  "'Al-Eizah  (Eizah-ol-Favaed)",  Vol.  2,  p  48,  para  Ketab-ol-Din  at  Fasl-ol-Tanazo, 
111  edition,  Ghom,  Iran;  Al-Akhoond  Sheikh  Mohammad  Kazem-ol-  Khorasani,  "Kefayat-ol- 
Aosool,  Al-Maghsad-ol-Sabe,  Al-Osool-ol-Amalie,  at  pp  380-1,  Moas-sa-sat  Al-ol-Beit,  Ghom, 
Iran;  Shikh  Morteza  Ansari,  "Makaseb",  1997,  Ghom,  Iran,  Daroleslam  Publications,  at  p  372. 
261 in  order  to  take  care  of  his  tree,  whereas  by  doing  so  he  could  see  the  owner  of  the 
property's  family  who  were  unlawful  for  him  to  see.  The  dispute  was  taken  to  the 
Prophet  and  his  lordship  held  that  'Islam  authorises  neither  injury  nor  intention  to 
injure  people.  That  ruling  later  became  one  of  the  key  principles  in  the  Islamic 
jurisprudence  which  commands  Muslims  to  avoid  injuring  their  fellow  Muslims 
generally.  302  It,  however,  could  clash  in  certain  circumstances  with  another  principle 
that  recognises  for  people  full  dominion  over  property.  The  latter  which  is  termed  as 
"Taslit"  or  "AnNas  Mosalatoon-a  Ala  Amvalehem"  also  relies  on  a  famous  saying 
(hadis)  from  the  Prophet  Mohammad"'  and  was  capable  of  authorising  in  general 
terms  every  owner  to  do  any  activity  in  his  property  even  injurious  to  others.  "' 
Traditionally,  Islamic  law  jurists  have  tended  to  resolve  the  said  clash  by  prioritising 
the  'Taslit'  principle.  "'  In  their  view,  private  property  must  be  respected  in  every 
contingency  and  there  is  hardly  a  limitation  on  it.  They  were  reluctant  to  rely  on  the 
'no  harm'  principle  in  order  to  hold  a  person  liable  for  the  exercise  of  his  rights.  The 
question  for  them  was  how  an  action  exercised  within  the  limits  of  a  legally  stated 
right  could  be  construed  as  abuse.  As  a  result,  the  "no  harm"  principle  was  often  taken 
302  The  'no  harm"  principle  is  most  manifested  in  sections  328-335  of  the  Iranian  Civil  Code 
1925  which  concern  civil  liability. 
303  Mohamad-ebn-Ali-ebn-al-Hossein-al-  Ghomi,  "Man  La  Yahzar-al-Faghih",  Dar-ol-Kotob-ol- 
Eslamieh  Publications,  Tehran,  Iran;  Ayatollah  Al-seied  Al-Boroojerdi,  "'Jame-o-al-Ahadis-al- 
Shia",  Dar-ol-Ketab-ol-Eslamieh  Publications,  Ghom,  Iran;  Mohammad-ebn-al-Hassan-al-Hor-aI 
Ameli,  "Vasael-ol-Shia",  Edited  by  Abdolrahim-al-Shirazi-al-Rabani,  Dar-ol-Ehia-ol-Toras-ol- 
Arabi  Publication,  Beirut,  Lebanon. 
304  The  'Taslit'  principle  is  reflected  in  Section  30  of  the  Iranian  Civil  Code  1929. 
305  This  is  the  traditional  view  taken  by  the  Hanbali,  Shafeai,  Hanafi  Schools  of  Thoughts  and 
by  a  minority  of  jurists  in  the  Shia  Jafari  School.  See  Fitzgerald  Seymour  Vesey,  "An 
Abridgement  of  Muhammadan  Law",  (1931),  Oxford  University  Press,  London  at  188-195; 
Mohamad-ebn-al-Hasan-al-Toosi,  ""Al-Mabsoot",  1351  (Persian  calander  year),  Al-Maktabat-ol- 
Mortazavieh  Publication,  Tehran,  Iran;  Mohaghegh-ol-Sani,  "Al-jame-ol-Maghased",  1408 
(Arabic  calander  year),  Al-ol-Beit  Publication,  Ghom,  Iran;  Mohamad-ebn-al-Edris-al-Helli,  "Al- 
Saraer",  1408  (Arabic  calander  year),  Moasasat-ol-Nashr-ol-Eslami  Publication,  Ghom,  Iran. 
262 to  be  used  as  a  source  of  civil  liability  in  areas  of  the  private  relationship  which 
involved  no  exercise  of  rights  (Al-javaz-al-Shariea  Yonafi-ol-Zeman). 
Over  time,  other  jurists  who  thought  that  the  traditional  view  could  cause  imposition 
of  disproportionate  damage  on  other  persons'  property  started  to  extend  the  use  of  the 
/no  harm"  principle  to  cases  involving  exercise  of  rights  in  certain  circumstances.  Their 
view,  which  reflects  the  prevailing  approach  among  contemporary  jurists,  holds  that  if 
a  person  who  exercises  his  right  could  not  reasonably  be  taken  to  have  considerable 
and  legitimate  interest  in  a  disputed  exercise,  he  will  be  held  liable  to  restore  the 
wronged  person"s  situation.  To  put  it  simply,  the  harm  to  the  plaintiff  must  outweigh 
the  benefits  which  go  to  the  defendant  as  a  result  of  an  exercise  of  right  by  the  latter 
(Dora"-al-Mafased-Aola  Men  Jalb-el-Manfa-at).  306  They,  however,  viewed  the  whole 
issue  from  the  angle  of  preventing  damage  to  rights  of  anyone  rather  than  of  restricting 
the  exercise  of  rights'O'  and  as  a  result  they  have  restricted  the  use  of  the  "no  harm' 
principle  in  this  area  only  to  resolve  disputes  between  owners  of  neighbouring 
properties.  In  summary,  the  respect  for  private  property  in  Islamic  law  has  prevented 
evolution  of  a  general  theory  of  the  "no  abuse  of  right'  that  requires  limiting  individual 
rights. 
306  Mohammad-ebn-al-Maki  Ameli  (known  as  Shahid  Avval),  "Al-Ghavaed  Va-l-Favaed", 
Ketab-forooshi  Mofid  Publication,  784  (Arabic  calander  year),  Ghom,  Iran;  Zein-ol-Din  Ameli 
(known  as  Shahid  Sani),  "'Tan-ihid-ol-Ghavaed-ol-Osoolieh  va-al-Arabieah  Letafrio  Ghavaed-ol- 
Ahkam-al-Sharia,  Daftar-e-Tablighat-e-  Islami  Publication,  1416  (Arabic  calander  year),  Ghom, 
Iran;  Sheikh  Mohammad-ebn-al-Hassan-ebn-al-Yoosof-ebn-al-Motahhar-al-Helli  (Known  as 
Fakhr-ol-Mohagheghin),  "Al-Eizah  (Eizah-ol-Favaed)",  Vol.  2,  para  Ketab-ol-Din  at  Fasl-ol- 
Tanazo,  1st  edition,  Ghom,  Iran;  Roohollah  Khomeini  (known  as  Imam  Khomeini),  "'Al-Rasael", 
Esmailian  Publication,  1385  (Arabic  calander  year),  Ghom,  Iran. 
307  Schacht,  Joseph,  "Islamic  Law  in  Contemporary  States",  The  American  Journal  of  Comparative 
LaW,  133  at  p  143. 
263 Islamic  law  aside,  another  source  of  law,  which  has  been  influential  on  the  Iranian 
lawmaker  as  to  drafting  the  'no  abuse  of  right"  principle,  has  been  the  laws  of  the 
continental  Europe  countries  which  recognise  the  'no  abuse  of  right'  as  a  general 
principle  . 
30'  A  common  feature  of  these  countries,  which  all  fan  in  the  civil  law  camp,  is 
to  proclaim  rights  in  general  terms  and  where  this  is  the  case  abuse  of  right  is  likely  to 
occur  because  rights  are  not  initially  hedged  with  qualifications  . 
309  A  general  principle 
of  "no  abuse  of  right'  could  prevent  this.  The  development  of  the  principle  owes 
especially  to  the  late  191hcentury  French  scholarship  and  in  particular  to  the  writings  of 
Louis  josserand  who  thought  rights  should  no  longer  be  considered  absolute.  In  his 
view,  an  exercise  of  right  must  be  compatible  with  its  social  function.  His  view  which 
was  in  fact  a  revision  of  the  traditional  philosophy  was  subsequently  put  to  use  by  the 
French  courts  in  order  to  develop  a  general  principle  of  "no  abuse  of  right.  Hence,  the 
courts  liberally  construed  sections  1382  and  1383  of  the  French  Code  Civil,  which  fix 
liability  on  the  author  of  any  harm,  in  order  to  cover  abusive  exercise  of  rights  where 
they  involve  intention  to  harm.  It  was  at  this  point  that  abuse  of  right  became  a  source 
of  civil  liability  subject  to  fault.  Nevertheless,  fault  for  the  purpose  of  abuse  of  right 
had  a  narrow  scope.  While  in  other  torts  every  act  or  omission  which  causes  damage 
could  be  a  source  of  liability,  in  an  abuse  of  right  case  such  act  or  omission  could 
generate  liability  only  where  certain  extra  conditions  existed.  In  a  case  of  normal  tort, 
the  tortitious  activity  is  never  legal  while  in  an  abuse  of  right  case  an  activity  which  is 
otherwise  legal  can  be  a  tort  when  certain  conditions  are  present.  These  conditions 
were  surnmarised  by  the  courts  within  one  formula  which  stated:  to  be  an  abuse  of 
right,  the  person  who  exercise  right  must  have  intention  to  harm  which  is  ascertained 
308  See  generally  Cutteridge  (above,  note  38);  Bolgar  (above,  note  38);  Byers  (above,  note  38). 
264 objectively;  i.  e.  the  enquiry  is  whether  the  defendant  can  reasonably  be  taken  to  have 
had  any  serious  and  legitimate  interest  in  what  he  was  doing. 
The  French  initiative  was  later  followed  by  other  European  countries  which  gradually 
accommodated  the  principle  in  their  Codes  of  laws  in  one  form  or  another.  In 
German  Y3  '0  Austria 
31  1 
and  Italy 
312 
,  intention  to  harm  was  chosen  as  the  test  with  which 
an  abuse  of  right  is  identified.  For  Russia 
313 
and  Czechoslovakia 
314 
,  the  test  is  whether 
an  exercise  is  contrary  to  its  social  and  economic  purpose.  Spain  gives  regard  to  both 
intention  to  harm  and  the  circumstances  of  the  harm  caused.  "'  In  Netherlands,  a 
number  of  elements  (intention  to  harm,  purpose  of  the  right,  and  whether  the  harm  has 
been  disproportionate)  are  considered'  16  while  the  Swiss  law  of  the  abuse  of  rights 
relies  on  the  element  of  good  faith.  "' 
As  we  have  seen  earlier,  the  Iranian  version  of  the  "no  abuse  of  right'  principle  which  is 
reflected  in  Art  40  is  too  wide  with  no  precise  definition  and  hence  is  capable  to 
seriously  defunct  individual  rights.  It  currently  makes  no  distinction  between  harms, 
which  are  allowed  to  be  borne  by  other  persons  and  the  society,  and  harms,  which  are 
not  so  allowed.  In  certain  conditions,  harms  may  ensue  not  from  one"s  action  but  rather 
309  Catala  P.  and  Weir  J-A.,  "'Delict  and  Torts:  A  Study  in  Parallel,  Part  Il",  (1964),  38  Tul.  L. 
Rev.,  221  at  pp  237-8;  Byers  (above,  note  38)  at  p  396. 
310  Section  226  of  the  German  Civil  Code  of  1900. 
311  Section  1295  (2)  of  the  Austrian  Civil  Code  of  1811. 
312  Section  833  of  the  Italian  Civil  Code  of  1939. 
313  Soviet  Code  1923,  para  Preface. 
314  Section  7  of  the  Czechoslovak  Civil  Code  of  1964. 
315  Section  7  of  the  Spanish  Civil  Code  of  1898. 
316  Section  13  (2)  of  the  1992  Civil  Code. 
317  Section  2  of  the  Swiss  Civil  Code  of  1907 
265 from  some  exogenous  risks.  "'  For  example,  when  a  person  builds  a  dam  in  his 
property  to  avoid  the  risk  of  an  imminent  flood,  he  will  not  be  held  liable  if  the  flood 
destroys  his  neighbour's  property.  "'  In  such  case,  the  harm  to  the  said  neighbour  is 
attributed  to  exogenous  events.  Also,  the  enjoyment  of  one  from  the  exercise  of  his 
rights  may  sometimes  require  some  harm  to  be  bome  by  other  persons.  Thus,  it  is 
lawful,  for  example,  for  a  man  to  open  air  holes  and  windows  on  his  walls  for  purposes 
of  light,  even  if  by  so  doing  he  can  see  his  neighbour"s  family  who  are  unlawful  for  him 
to  see.  "O  Everyone  can  deal  with  his  own  property  in  any  manner  that  would  not 
damage  his  neighbour's  property,  although  it  might  harm  him  by  opening  such 
windows.  These  considerations  were  taken  by  the  Iranian  Civil  Code  which  is  in 
contents  based  on  Islamic  law...  and  which  defines  the  general  principle  stated  in  Art 
40.  It  holds  in  section  132  that: 
"'No  owner  is  allowed  to  do  in  his  property  an  activity  which  requires  one's  neighbour 
to  incur  harm  unless  to  the  extent  that  it  is  exercised  reasonably  for  meeting  one's 
necessary  need  or  for  saving  him  from  the  risk  of  damage". 
The  section  determines  circumstances  within  which  an  act  or  omission  can  be  assessed 
as  constituting  abuse  of  right.  As  it  suggests,  the  "abuse  of  right'  occurs  where  a  person 
exercises  his  right  unnecessarily  and  carelessly  which  entails  injury  to  other  persons' 
property  or  rights.  Accordingly,  not  every  harm  to  other  persons  or  to  the  public 
interest,  which  might  arise  from  the  exercise  of  one's  right,  could  trigger  the 
318  Riley  CA,  "The  Company  Directors  Duty  of  care  and  Skill:  The  Case  for  an  Onerous  But 
Subjective  Standard",  (Sep-1999),  The  Modern  Law  Review,  vol.  62,697,  London,  England, 
Stevens  &  Sons,  at  p  706. 
319  Al-Akhoond  Sheikh  Mohammad  Kazem-ol-  Khorasani,  "'Kefayat-ol-Aosool",  AI-Maghsad- 
ol-Sabe,  Al-Osool-ol-Amalie,  at  p  383,  Moas-sa-sat  Al-ol-Beit,  Ghom,  Iran. 
320  Section  133  Civil  Code  1929. 
321  See  Chapter  one  (above,  at  1.2,  para  note  119). 
266 mechanism  of  abuse  of  right.  Only  harms,  which  are  not  bome  as  stated,  can  generate 
liability  for  a  person  who  acts  within  the  stated  frame  of  his  rights.  To  put  it  simply,  the 
abuse  of  right  is  subject  to  fault  which  is  construed  more  narrowly  than  it  is  done 
under  the  general  law  relevant  to  the  civil  liability.  "'  Although,  the  section  concerns 
property  law  and  specifically  disputes  between  owners  of  neighbouring  properties,  its 
rationale  in  the  light  of  the  very  Art  40  can  be  extended  to  other  areas  such  as  labour 
law,  contracts  including  companies,  and  legal  proceeding,  though  a  judicial 
willingness  to  include  these  areas  will  have  to  be  forthcoming. 
Currently,  Iranian  company  law  gives  no  specific  regard  to  the  issue  of  majority  abuse 
of  rights.  In  the  absence  of  any  such  specific  regard,  company  law  scholars  have 
approached  differently.  Some  recognises  no  possibility  for  any  extension  of  the 
rationale  from  section  132  to  companies  because  shareholders  are  absolutely  free  to 
exercise  their  voting  rights  in  any  manner  they  like.  The  only  exception  is  where  a 
motion  to  be  voted  constitutes  a  crime  and  shareholders  knowingly  vote  for  its 
adoption.  "'  Others  draw  analogy  between  the  existing  'no  abuse  of  right'  principle, 
and  the  issue  of  majority  abuse  of  rights  and  state  resolutions  of  meetings  can  be  set 
aside,  if  it  becomes  evident  that  the  majority  once  exercising  their  voting  rights  in 
meetings  was  pursuing  interests  other  than  that  of  the  company.  "' 
322  See  Chapter  four  (above,  at  IV.  2). 
323  Sotoodeh  Tehrani  Hasan,  "'Trade  Law",  (1997),  Tehran,  Dehkhoda  Publication,  vol.  2,  pp 
175-6. 
324  Erfani  Mahmood,  "Trade  Law",  (1999),  Vol.  2,  Tehran,  jehade  Daneshgahi  Institute 
Publication  (Majed),  at  p  180;  Erfani  Mahmood,  "Abuse  of  Position  and  Power  in  the  Law  of 
Iran"',  'Comparative  Law  Institution  Monthly',  (1981),  No  7,  University  of  Tehran  Publication, 
Tehran,  at  pp  148-231. 
267 V.  2.2.  Minority  protection  mechanisms 
Generally  speaking,  there  are  four  statutory  mechanisms  to  protect  minority  rights  in 
Iranian  company  law.  These  mechanisms  are:  convention  of  meetings  by 
shareholders  ...  ;  cumulative  voting  systeM326  ;  disinterested  majority32';  and  corporate 
action  by  shareholders...  which  will  be  discussed  respectively  below. 
V.  2.2.1.  Right  to  convene  shareholder  meetings 
As  a  minority  protection  measure,  company  law  allows  shareholders  to  convene 
shareholder  meetings  were  certain  conditions  exist"',  though  the  right  to  convene  such 
meetings  is  considered  corporate  and  hence  falls  principally  within  the  power  of 
directors.  330  This  statutory  right  can  be  utilised  where  shareholders  who  possess  one 
fifth  of  a  corporation's  issued  shares  choose  to  have  a  shareholder  meeting  convened. 
The  exercise  of  the  right  is  also  subject  to  observation  of  certain  procedural  steps  to  be 
taken  by  minority  shareholders.  They  must  demand  corporate  directors  and  upon  such 
demand  it  will  become  the  duty  of  the  directors  to  convene  the  requested  meeting 
within  20  days.  If  directors  refuse  to  do  so,  demanders  can  ask  inspectors  to  convene 
the  meeting  within  10  days  and  in  a  likely  failure  of  inspectors  case,  demanders  will 
have  the  right  to  convene  the  attempted  meeting  personaHy.  These  requirements  are 
intended  to  guard  against  any  likely  opportunistic  use  by  minority  shareholders  of  the 
statutory  right.  331 
325  Section  95  JSCA. 
326  Section  88  JSCA. 
327  Section  129-131  JSCA. 
328  Section  276  JSCA. 
329  Section  95  JSCA. 
330  Sections  89  and  138  JSCA. 
331  Sotoodeh  (above,  note  323)  at  p  175. 
268 The  right  offers  some  protection  to  minority  shareholders  against  controllers  in  Iranian 
companies.  332  As  the  power  to  call  a  shareholder  meeting  and  to  determine  its  agenda 
fall  within  the  authority  of  corporate  management  and  because  most  Iranian 
corporations  are  dominated  by  one  or  few  shareholders  who  can  control  corporate 
management333,  it  would  become  very  likely  that  controllers  do  not  allow  a  matter  of 
minority  concern  is  raised  at  meetings.  334  This  is  particularly  problematic  when 
minority  shareholders  are  trying  to  bring  up  issues  to  which  controllers  are  not 
interested;  for  instance,  where  minority  shareholders  seek  to  restrict  management's 
power  or  want  to  dismiss  them  from  the  office.  The  right  allows  minority  shareholders 
to  have  the  purported  meeting  convened  and  "in  such  meetings,  only  issues  which  are 
determined  by  demanders  are  discussed.  "'  Nonetheless,  the  statutory  right  is 
considered  not  very  important  because,  while  it  allows  minority  shareholders  to 
convene  a  meeting  and  raise  matters,  at  the  end  of  such  meeting  issues  will  be  resolved 
by  a  simple  majority  resolution. 
Minority  protection  aside,  the  right  can  constitute  effective  protection  for  shareholders 
generally  which  guards  them  against  management's  abuse  of  corporate  powers.  Such 
abuse  could  mainly  occur  in  companies  that  have  no  controlling  shareholders. 
Collective  action  problem  in  such  companies  allows  wayward  management  to  continue 
with  impunity  the  office  and  therefore  a  statutory  right  which  is  exercised  despite  such 
332  Erfani  Mahmood,  "Trade  Law",  (1999), 
Publication  (Majed),  at  p  96. 
333  See  Chapter  one  (above,  at  1.2). 
334  Sotoodeh  (above,  note  323)  at  pp  160-162. 
335  Section  96  JSCA. 
Vol.  2,  Tehran,  Jehade  Daneshgahi  Institute 
269 problem  could  ensure  that  shareholders  are  always  able  to  exert  effective  control  on 
management. 
V.  2.2.2.  Cumulative  voting 
Cumulative  voting  is  a  method  of  voting  through  which  directors  are  appointed  at 
shareholder  meetings.  According  to  it,  when  the  matter  to  be  decided  at  a  shareholder 
meeting  is  appointment  of  directors,  the  number  of  votes  owned  by  a  shareholder  is 
multiplied  to  the  number  of  directors  to  be  appointed.  If,  for  example,  five  directors  are 
to  be  appointed  in  a  company,  according  to  the  corporate  articles  and  corporate  law, 
and  a  shareholder  of  the  company  holds  five  shares  each  of  which  bear  one  vote  then 
he  will  have  twenty  five  votes  to  give  to  one  candidate  or  to  distribute  them  among 
candidates.  This  is  exceptional  to  the  principle  of  majority  rule  which  requires 
shareholders  to  take  resolutions  by  a  simple  majority  vote  on  the  basis  of  'one  share, 
one  vote-.  It  is  stated  in  section  88  JSCA  and  is  a  mandatory  rule  of  company  law 
especially  designed  to  enable  minority  shareholders  to  organise  their  dispersed  votes 
and  send  one  or  two  representatives  to  the  board.  "'  It  is  not  applied  where  the 
attempted  appointment  concerns  the  first  company  directors.  In  the  latter  case,  the 
336  "In  Ordinary  general  meetings  decisions  must  be  taken  by  a  simple  majority  vote  of 
attendees  in  a  formally  valid  meeting  except  in  relation  to  appointing  directors  and  inspectors 
for  which  a  relative  majority  vote  suffices.  In  the  latter  case,  the  number  of  votes  of  every 
member  are  multiplied  to  the  numbers  of  directors  to  be  appointed.  Shareholders  can  allocate 
their  votes  to  one  nominee  or  spread  them  among  nominees.  A  shareholder  contract  cannot 
displace  this  mechanism.  [Section  88  JSCA]. 
337  Erfani  (above,  note  332)  at  pp  105-107;  Rastiin  Mansoor,  "Commercial  Law",  (1975),  3rded., 
Tehran,  University  of  Tehran  Publications,  at  p  115;  Meshki  Siroos,  "'Legal  Organization  of 
Management  in  joint  Stock  Companies",  Ph.  D.  Thesis,  (1979),  Tehran,  University  of  Tehran, 
Faculty  of  Law  and  Politics,  Guiding  Code  86,  at  p  39. 
270 authority  to  appoint  the  first  corporate  directors  falls  within  the  power  of  a  founders' 
meeting  which  follows  different  rules.  338 
One  important  weakness  of  the  cumulative  voting  is  that  it  simply  concerns  with 
choosing  directors  and  has  no  application  when  a  removal  of  directors  is  to  be  decided. 
The  latter  still  remains  within  the  realm  of  the  general  rule  of  'one  share,  one  vote'  and 
as  a  result,  majority  shareholders  will  always  be  able  to  remove  and  replace  a  minority- 
selected  director.  In  other  words,  current  company  law  allows  the  cumulative  voting 
which  was  enacted  to  protect  minority  shareholders  to  be  outflanked  by  controllers.  "' 
In  addition  to  this,  its  effectiveness  will  depend  on  the  actual  conunitment  of  minority 
shareholders  who  might  not  want  to,  or  could  not,  coordinate. 
V-2.2.3.  Disinterested  ratification 
The  disinterested  ratification  which  is  stated  in  sections  129-131  JSCA  concerns  with 
ratification  of  directors'  intentional  faults  in  companies.  The  company  law  drafters 
enacted  it  with  the  intention  to  ensure  that  shareholders  always  respond  such  faults 
effectively.  According  to  it,  any  self-interested  transaction  of  a  corporate  director, 
which  causes  damage  to  company,  is  a  source  of  liability  that  can  be  exonerated  only 
by  effective  shareholder  ratification.  For  the  purposes  of  the  sections  129-131, 
ratification  is  effective  when  it  is  adopted  by  a  shareholder  resolution  which  does  not 
comprise  of  votes  cast  by  directors  who  were  interested  in  the  very  objected 
transaction.  As  directors,  according  to  the  Iranian  company  law,  are  appointed  among 
338  See  Chapter  two  (above,  at  11.2-1). 
339  Meshki  (above,  note  337)  at  p  50. 
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shareholders  ,  they  normally  enjoy  voting  rights  which  could  be  used  as  a  self-help 
device  in  shareholder  meetings.  This  could  potentially  cause  problems  for  minority 
shareholders  given  that  Iranian  corporations  tend  to  have  one  or  few  shareholders  who 
can  either  seize  or  control  the  corporate  management.  To  exclude  wrongdoer  directors' 
votes  from  being  cast  in  meetings  could  mean  to  exclude  interested  majority  vote  in 
certain  circumstances.  However,  directors  may  conu-nit  faults  in  which  they  are  not 
personally  interested  and  there  are  also  situations  in  which  not  the  very  wrongdoer 
directors  but  interested  shareholders  may  want  to  support  wrongdoer  directors,  using 
their  votes.  On  the  one  hand,  a  shareholder  resolution  which  concerns  directors" 
negligence  can  yet  be  affected  by  the  very  wrongdoer  directors'  self-help.  On  the  other 
hand,  directors  can  fix  some  private  benefits  not  for  themselves  but  rather  for  the 
controlling  shareholders  who  will  support  them  in  hard  times.  Current  company  law, 
thus,  permits  fraud  to  occur  in  companies.  Sections  129-131  do  not  address  these  issues. 
Whether  the  rationale  of  the  sections  129-131  could  be  used  to  impose  as  a  general  rule 
a  limitation  on  shareholders  in  meetings  which  excludes  not  only  directors'  votes  but 
also  interested  shareholders'  votes  from  being  cast  in  meetings  as  to  ratification  of 
directors"  faults  (which  broadly  interpreted  covers  both  self-interested  and  negligent 
activities)  cannot  be  answered  with  comfort.  Perhaps,  if  sections  129-131  were  the  only 
source  of  reference,  the  answer  would  become  negative,  as  the  formal  scope  of  the 
above  sections  are  expressly  limited  to  directors"  votes  as  to  their  self-interested 
transactions.  However,  in  addition  to  specific  statutory  provisions,  the  spirit  of  the  law 
in  this  area  can  be  taken  into  account,  as  the  general  law  authorises  the  courts  to 
consider  such  spirit  in  the  case  of  obscurity  or  silence  of  the  specific  provisions.  In  the 
340  Section  107  JSCA. 
272 light  of  such  consideration  one  can  notice  in  the  current  company  law  a  number  of 
sections  whose  purpose  of  provision  are  to  regulate  the  relationship  between 
shareholders  so  as  to  prevent  some  shareholders  from  taking  extra  advantages.  For 
example,  section  93  JSCA  requires  a  special  ratification  to  be  given  by  affected 
shareholders  as  to  an  ordinary  resolution  which  seeks  to  change  rights  attached  to  a 
particular  set  of  shares.  Likewise,  where  a  shareholder  meeting  considers  granting  of 
certain  advantages  to  one  or  few  corporate  members,  the  votes  of  such  members  must 
be  excluded.  341  Similarly,  when  a  shareholder  meeting  intends  to  resolve  to  exclude 
certain  shareholders"  pre  emption  right  as  to  buying  new  shares  in  the  interest  of  one 
or  few  other  shareholders,  its  resolution  must  not  reflect  the  votes  cast  by  those  who 
are  allocated  new  shares.  "'  Therefore,  it  does  not  seem  very  odd  to  suggest  on  the 
basis  of  such  consideration  that  not  only  directors  vote  but  also  interested 
shareholders'  vote  can  be  excluded  when  directors"  fault  in  its  wide  meaning  is  the 
subject  of  a  shareholder  meeting-s  resolution. 
V.  2.2.4.  Commencing  corporate  claims  by  shareholders 
Company  law  permits  shareholders  to  take  corporate  claims  against  directors  in  certain 
343  344 
circumstances.  According  to  section  276  JSCA,  which  is  mandatory  ,  shareholders 
may  raise  claims  of  liability  against  corPorate  directors  when  the  latter  conu-nits  fault  in 
connection  with  managing  affairs  and  business  of  companies.  This  is  often  known  as 
341  Section  77  JSCA. 
342  Sections  166-168  JSCA. 
343  Erfani  (above,  note  332)  at  P  177;  Meshki  (above,  note  337)  at  pp  205-207. 
344  Section  277  JSCA  states  that  a  resolution  of  shareholder  meeting  and  a  clause  in  the 
corporate  constitution  which  fall  in  contradiction  with  the  statutory  right  offered  by  the  section 
276  is  inoperative. 
273 i 
corporate  claims  initiated  by  shareholders  345  and  is  exceptional  to  the  principle  which 
exist  in  general  law  of  procedure 
346 
and  suggests  such  claims  must  be  commenced  by 
the  company  itself14'  rather  than  by  its  shareholders  . 
34' 
As  companies  enjoy  legal 
personality,  they  can  have  property  and  rights  of  their  own 
34' 
and  further  can 
prosecute  persons  who  commit  wrong  to  them.  This  is  normally  done  through  an 
appropriate  corporate  decision  taken  by  directors.  "O  Directors  represent  the  company 
and  as  agents  of  the  company  exercise  the  company's  power  to  pursue  wrongdoers. 
This  includes  the  circumstances  where  directors  are  themselves  wrongdoers.  In  cases 
where  one  or  two  of  directors,  for  example,  commit  wrongdoing,  it  is  the  responsibility 
of  other  directors  to  make  a  proper  decision  to  pursue  or  not  to  pursue  wrongdoer 
directors  and  even  if  every  director  in  the  board  is  involved  in  the  wrongdoing  the 
responsibility  will  rest  on  the  new  board  who  will  make  such  decision.  "'  In  any  case,  a 
shareholder  is  not  allowed  to  initiate  a  corporate  action  unless  there  is  a  special 
permission  either  in  the  corporate  constitution  or  in  laws  to  that  effect.  While 
constitutions  rarely  authorise  shareholders  to  take  corporate  actions,  company  law 
exceptionally  allows  such  actions  to  be  commenced  by  shareholders.  The  rationale  for 
this  is  to  deter  corporate  management  from  committing  of  fault.  To  this  end,  company 
345  Meshki  (above.,  note  337)  at  pp  205-6. 
346  See  Section  2  of  the  Civil  Procedure  Act  2000  (Hereafter  is  cited  CPA): 
"No  court  can  hear  a  claim  unless  a  person  or  persons  having  proprietary  interest  or  a  person 
or  persons  who  are  their  agents  (lawyer),  successors  or  legal  representatives  initiate  action  and 
demand  judicial  trial  according  to  the  law.  '";  Also  see  Section  84  (10)  of  the  same  Act:  "In 
following  issues  defendant  when  responds  in  substance  can  make  a  procedural  objection  to  the 
claim  initiated  against  him/her  ... 
(10)  Plaintiff  is  not  of  interest  in  the  claim". 
347  Sections  142  and  276  JSCA- 
348  Unlike  English  company  law  which  offers  a  common  law  rule  of  proper  plaintiff,  Iranian 
company  law  provides  no  such  rule.  Instead,  that  corporate  claims  are  to  be  commenced  by  the 
company  itself  is  an  instance  of  the  general  rule  of  procedure  which  regulates  taking  actions  by 
persons  as  to  their  property  and  rights.  [See  Sections  2  and  84  (10)  CPA  (above,  note  346)]. 
349  See  section  583  TC  which  provides  that  "All  types  of  commercial  companies  prescribed  in 
the  Code  own  separate  legal  personality". 
350  Principally,  legal  persons  take  decisions  and  act  through  their  incumbents.  [Section  589  TC] 
274 law  imposes  civil  liability,  which  can  be  enforced  by  shareholders,  on  negligent 
directors.  "'  Where  directors  are  personally  involved  in  the  wrongdoing  against  the 
company,  they  are  unlikely  to  pursue  themselves  and  hence  a  statutory  permission 
which  authorises  shareholder  action  against  wrongdoer  directors  can  ensure  that  such 
directors  are  always  liable  to  prosecution.  To  prevent  any  potential  abuse  of  the 
statutory  right,  a  check  was  put  on  the  exercise  of  it  which  requires  a  shareholder 
plaintiff  to  qualify  as  to  owning  of  at  least  one  fifth  of  the  corporate  shares.  "' 
The  shareholder  action  stated  in  section  276  has  similarities  and  differences  with  the 
English  derivative  action.  They  both  are  exceptional  devices  and  principally  target 
mismanagement.  These  aside,  they  differ  in  a  number  of  aspects.  They  diverge  in  the 
sort  of  wrong  which  can  be  addressed.  While  only  wrongs  which  qualify  as  fraud  fall 
within  the  scope  of  derivative  action,  a  section  276  action  can  cover  any  wrong  which 
involves  directors"  fault,  in  its  wide  meaning.  A  further  difference  is  that  an  English 
shareholder  is  allowed  to  take  derivative  action  against  third  parties  who  were 
involved  in  the  fraudulent  transaction.  An  Iranian  shareholder  can  prosecute  only  the 
wrongdoer  director  even  if  a  third  party  was  involved  in  the  fraudulent  transaction. 
Under  the  derivative  mechanism,  even  a  tiny  shareholder  can  initiate  the  action 
whereas  according  to  the  section  276  the  one-fifth-shareholding  requirement  must  be 
met. 
351  Section  118  JSCA. 
352  Erfani  (above,  note  332)  at  p  177;  Meshki  (above,  note  337)  at  pp  205-207. 
353  Section  276  JSCA  provides  that  "'a  person  or  persons  who  own  at  least  one  fifth  of  the  total 
shares  in  a  company  can  in  case  of  commission  of  fault  by  board  members  and  'director  general' 
initiate  legal  proceedings  in  the  name  and  for  the  benefit  of  the  company  but  at  their  personal 
expense,  against  them  and  ask  for  recovery  of  any  damages  suffered  by  the  company.  When 
directors  found  liable,  the  courts'  judgement  will  be  executed  for  the  benefit  of  the  company 
275 Whether  the  statutory  right  has  been  of  any  assistance  as  to  protecting  minority 
shareholders  against  abuse  of  power  by  majority  shareholders  can  be  answered  in 
negative.  It  only  concerns  with  directors'  faults  and  can-not  be  used  to  address  wrongs 
which  are  caused  by  the  majority  shareholders  or  other  persons. 
354 
Also  current 
company  law  allows  directors'  fault  to  be  ratified  by  an  ordinary  resolution  of 
shareholder  meeting.  Given  that  in  Iranian  corporations  often  the  same  persons  hold 
majority  of  shares  and  control  management,  this  could  mean  the  statutory  right  really 
serves  no  or  little  function.  In  addition  to  these,  the  section  276  which  offers  the 
statutory  right  is  uncertain.  It  is  not  clear  whether  a  minority  plaintiff  is  required  to 
take  the  issue  first  to  the  shareholder  meeting  or  he  is  free  to  take  action  at  his  expense 
when  it  is  liable  to  ratification  by  majority  shareholders.  Lastly,  section  276  requires  a 
plaintiff  minority  to  come  up  with  the  money  for  the  costs  of  a  purported  litigation. 
This  can  constitute  a  major  disincentive  for  a  likely  plaintiff  given  that  normally 
minority  shareholders  have  not  resource  enough  to  fund  such  claims  and  even  where 
they  do,  the  prospect  of  a  refund  order  at  the  end  of  a  successful  action  is  lost  at  the 
outset  where  the  fate  of  the  very  action  is  quite  gloomy.  It  is  hard  for  a  minority 
shareholder  to  show  directors'  fault  and  lack  of  adequate  information  often  makes  any 
purported  action  risky  and  unpredictable  and  hence  a  minority  shareholder  is  very 
except  in  relation  to  the  costs  of  such  action  to  which  the  judgement  will  be  executed  for  the 
benefit  of  the  plaintiff  who  initiated  the  action...  " 
354  By  making  analogy  Sotoodeh  suggested  a  contrary  opinion  where  he  argues  that  it  is 
possible  to  extend  the  rule  provided  by  Section  276  to  the  situations  where  wrongdoers  are  the 
majority  of  shareholders.  His  argument  rests  on  a  general  understanding  from  various  sections 
in  joint  Stock  Companies  Act  that  impose  civil  liability  on  promoters,  directors  and  inspectors 
when  they  commit  fault  in  certain  situations  wich  for  example  involve  formation  and 
registration  of  company  (Sec.  23),  issuing  share  certificate  when  the  company  has  not  been 
registered  (Sec.  28).  [Sotoodeh  (above,  note  323)  at  p191]  However,  the  argument  falls  in 
276 likely  to  see  him/herself  better  off  to  exit  from  the  company  rather  than  to  stay  and 
take  action. 
contradiction  with  the  wording  of  the  very  section  276.  [See  Meshki  (above,  note  337)  at  pp  205- 
2071. 
277 V-3.  Conclusion 
In  Chapter  five,  my  intention  was  to  see  what  and  how  company  laws  in  England  and 
Iran  have  done  as  to  preventing  the  possibility  of  abuse  of  righ  by  majority 
shareholders  and  whether  the  law  in  each  system  has  been  any  successful  to  facilitate 
formation  of  a  just  and  efficient  reconciliation  between  the  majority/  minority  interests 
in  companies.  examined  three  major  minority  protection  mechanisms;  i.  e.  derivative 
action,  just  and  equitable  winding  up,  and  unfairly  prejudicial  conduct;  as  to  the 
English  company  law.  All  three  mechanisms  rely  on  equity  principles  and  serve,  in  one 
way  or  another,  to  protect  minority  shareholders  against  a  likely  abuse  of  rights  by 
majority  shareholders.  They  are  meant  to  offer  tailored  solutions  to  different  cases  of 
majority  abuse  and  such  solutions  are  often  considered  as  case  specific  rather  than 
being  a  general  principle.  Derivative  actions  concern  a  corporate  wrong  in 
circumstances  where  wrongdoers  and  corporate  controllers  are  one  and  the  same.  They 
often  involve  some  sort  of  unjust  enrichment  on  the  part  of  controllers  who  try  to  ratify 
such  enrichment,  using  their  voting  rights.  When  successful,  they  are  normally  given 
remedies  like  damages  or  compensation,  restitution  of  the  companys  property  and 
account  of  the  profits  taken.  They  are  beneficial  as  to  protecting  rights  and  interests  of 
minority  shareholders,  as  they  require  controllers  /wrongdoers  to  make  good  any 
damages  inhered  by  the  wronged  company  whereby  prevent  majority  rule  form 
working  M  cases  which  clearly  involve  fraud.  Quite  the  different,  the  just  and  equitable 
winding  up  cases  often  involve  no  question  of  wrong  in  its  common  law  sense  and 
hence  there  is  no  unjust  enrichment  at  issue.  Instead,  such  cases  normally  concern 
circumstances  within  which  certain  activities  of  controllers  are  regarded  by  the  equity 
as  involving  abuse  in  the  exercise  of  rights.  As  a  result,  a  suitable  remedy  for  such 
278 cases  is  winding  up  which  ensures  that  there  will  be  no  more  damages  to  shareholders" 
interests.  The  unfairly  prejudicial  conduct,  on  the  other  hand,  concern  any  unfair 
disregard  of  minority  interests  by  controllers  which  results  in  breach  by  the  company 
of  the  contract  between  the  company  and  its  wronged  minorities.  The  breadth  of  it 
enables  the  mechanism  to  be  inclusive  of  abuse  of  rights  and  powers  against  minority 
interests  which  can  occur  in  various  shapes  and  ways  in  corporations.  By  providing  a 
number  of  reliefs  which  are  not  conclusive  and  which  can  fall  to  the  minority  plaintiff 
either  directly  or  indirectly,  it  can  respond  each  abuse  of  right  and  power  case 
appropriately.  "' 
Although  the  first  two  mechanisms  offer  some  advantages,  they  have  shown  in 
practice  to  be  short  of  ability  to  address  majority  abuse  sufficiently.  The  derivative 
action  fails  to  cover  cases  which  involve  directors'  negligence  and  breach  of  duties  of 
care  and  fiduciary.  Its  elements  of  fraud  and  control  can  hinder  any  commencement  of 
derivative  actions  by  minority  shareholders"'  and  further  factors  like  disinterested 
majority  vote  and  independent  sub-committees  view  which  are  regarded  by  the  courts 
could  function  as  barrier  rather  than  being  a  simple  check. 
357 
Too,  the  Law 
Commission's  proposed  derivative  action  in  its  current  format  can  increase  uncertainty 
associated  with  such  actions  and  can  further  require  a  shift  of  authority  from 
corporations  (put  it  precisely,  a  shift  of  authority  from  corporate  organs;  i.  e. 
management  and  meetings)  to  the  courts.  The  just  and  equitable  winding  up  remedy, 
too,  is  sometimes  rigid  and  prejudicial  because  it  simply  winds  the  company  up, 
355  Companies  Act  1985,  Section  461  (1  and  2). 
356  Law  Commission  (above  note  68)  at  p  71;  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry's  Consultation 
Paper  (above  note  79)  at  p  12. 
279 whereas  ideally  neither  the  plaintiff  minority  nor  the  defendant  majority  would  have 
wished  to  have  the  company  wound  up.  Instead  of  solving  the  problem,  it  simply 
dissolves  the  company,  killing  the  patient  instead  of  curing  the  cause  of  his  illness.  This 
particularly  seems  disastrous  when  the  company  prospers.  "'  The  break-up  value  of  the 
corporate  assets  could  worth  less  per  share  than  its  going-concern  value  and  this 
would  follow  that  every  shareholder  may  lose  some  of  their  investment.  359  Although, 
viewed  by  the  courts  as  being  exceptional  and  the  last  resort  remedy,  it  has  proved  in 
practice  to  be  widely  open  to  every  sinisiter  shareholder  who  can  cause  corporations  to 
get  involved  in  time  consuming,  tiresome  and  disruptive  winding  up  proceedings.  360 
In  addition  to  these,  both  mechanisms  have  little  relevance  to  large  companies.  A 
successful  derivative  action  requires  plaintiff  to  show  control  of  the  wrongdoers  and 
clearly  it  is  very  unlikely  for  a  plaintiff  to  be  able  to  show  such  control,  as  large 
companies  tend  to  have  dispersed  shareholders.  Also,  since  large  companies  tend  not 
to  accommodate  any  personal  relationship  which  is  a  requirement  for  a  grant  of  the 
just  and  equitable  winding  up  remedy,  it  will  be  very  unlikely  that  that  remedy  is 
given  as  to  such  companies.  When  entrusting  his  money  to  a  company,  an  investor 
trusts  to  the  documents  that  were  shown  to  him  and  not  to  the  people  who  control  the 
357  Conway  (above,  note  43);  Boyle  (1969),  (above,  note  81)  at  p  120;  Poole  and  Roberts  (above 
note  81)  at  p  99;  Farrar  (1991),  (above,  note  42)  at  p  453. 
358  Pettet  (above,  note  40)  at  p  247. 
359  Pettet  (above,  note  40)  at  p  247;  Instone  Ralph  "  Unfair  Prejudice  to  Shareholders",  New 
Law  journal,  (1981),  London,  Butterworths,  p  1316;  Bastin  N.  A.,  "Minority  Protection:  A  Plea 
for  Reform",  New  Law  journal,  (1977),  London,  Butterworths,  p  230. 
360  Law  Commission  recognised  this  problem  and  proposed  that  bringing  action  in  winding  up 
cases  should  become  subject  to  a  leave  of  the  court.  [Law  Commission  (above,  note  68)  at  p  461. 
280 company.  Besides,  no  deadlock  might  occur  in  large  companies  because  the  general 
meeting  resolves  any  deadlock.  "' 
In  contrast,  the  third  mechanism  remedies,  as  intended  by  its  drafters,  most 
shortcomings  of  the  first  two  mechanisms.  Many  issues  that  were  considered  in  the 
past  as  internal  matters  could  now  be  reviwed  by  the  courts  and  a  minority  plaintiff  is 
no  longer  required  to  face  difficulties  of  standing. 
36' 
The  mechanism  also  avoids  the 
rigidity  of  the  winding  up  remedy.  It  puts  strong  check  on  corporate  controllers  and 
helps  minorities  to  bring  such  controllers  to  the  negotiation  table  . 
36'An 
aggregate  of  the 
above  properties  have  helped  the  unfairly  prejudicial  remedy  to  leave  behind  the 
derivative  and  winding  up  forms  of  actions.  Nonetheless,  the  mechanism,  which  is 
64 
sometimes  described  as  being  an  English  innovation'  ,  suffers  from  some  deficiencies. 
For  a  start,  it  is  liable  to  abuse,  as  it  enables  minority  shareholders  to  make  opportunist 
use  of  the  statutory  right.  "'  This  is  because  under  the  current  unfairly  prejudicial 
conduct  a  minority  shareholder  will  become  able  to  demand  a  remedy  for  almost  any 
act  of  the  company  which  might  seem  inconsistent  with  their  interests.  It  thus 
disconnects  the  link  between  the  majority  rule  and  the  logic  that  minority  claims 
should  sensibly  be  curbed.  366  Likewise,  every  dissatisfied  shareholder  can  now  use  the 
mechanism  to  expose  the  company  and  its  shareholders  to  some  fallacious  and 
361  Farrar  (1991),  (above,  note  42)  at  p  458. 
362  Davies  (above,  note  60)  at  pp  735-6;  Pettet  (above,  note  40)  at  p  249;  Hirt  (above,  note  66)  at 
p  101. 
363  Pettet  (above,  note  40)  at  p  249;  Farrar  (1991),  (above,  note  42)  at  p  474. 
364  Sealy  (above,  note  31)  at  p  172. 
365  Clark  (2001),  (above,  note  96)  at  p  171;  Clark  (1999),  (above,  note  110)  at  p  322;  Sealy  (above, 
note  31)  at  173. 
366  Clark  (2001),  (above,  note  95)  at  pp  174-5;  Clark  (1999),  (above,  note  110)  at  pp  321-2;  Farrar 
(1991),  (above,  note  42)  at  p  474;  Davies  (above,  note  60)  at  pp  737-9. 
281 disruptive  litigation  in  order  to  extract  some  extera  advantages  for  themselves.  "'  That 
can  explain  why  litigation  in  this  area  has  tended  to  become  notorious.  "'  Further,  there 
are  some  uncertainties  with  the  mechanism.  As  Cheffins  observed,  "because  of  its 
broad  scope,  the  possibility  always  exists  that  a  judge  wiR  apply  section  459  in  a  novel 
and  unpredictable  fashion'  . 
169As 
the  choice  of  a  suitable  remedy  is  always  one  for  the 
courts  to  make,  litigants  can  hardly  predict  consequences  that  their  action  may 
generate.  Such  uncertainties  can  further  generate  unwanted  costs  to  be  borne  by 
shareholders,  as  they  "will  either  have  to  pay  legal  fees  in  order  to  try  to  clarify  matters 
or  carry  on  without  being  sure  whether  they  are  acting  in  a  legally  valid  manner.  370  in 
addition  to  the  costs,  the  mechanism  can  sometimes  be  tiresome.  Its  equitable  nature 
can  cause  any  claim  of  unfairly  prejudicial  conduct  to  require  historical  investigations 
and  evidential  discovery  in  the  affairs  of  companies.  "'  Above  all,  the  mechanism  can 
serve  inefficiently  in  relation  to  small  companies  and  be  a  mismatch  for  large 
companies.  As  to  small  companies,  it  may  discourage  financing.  This  is  the  context 
where  normally  those  who  wish  to  have  both  voting  and  managerial  control  provide 
the  large  part  of  finance  required  for  corporations"  business  and  they  would  feel 
uncomfortable  if  the  company  law  lays  too  much  attention  to  the  protection  of 
minorities.  "'  In  large  companies,  on  the  other  hand,  it  offers  little  use  for  two  reasons. 
367  O'Neill  and  Another  v.  Phillips  and  Others,  (1999),  2  All  ER  961,  HL  per  Lord  Hoffman  J.; 
See  also  Farrar  (1991),  (above,  note  42)  at  p  319;  Clark  (1999),  (above,  note  110)  at  p  322;  Clark 
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282 One  is  that  the  courts  have  construed  the  unfairly  prejudical  conduct  in  order  to  apply 
only  in  cases  where  the  relationship  between  corporate  members  is  built  on  some 
personal  connections.  Such  connections  are  non-nally  found  in  small  companies.  The 
other  is  that  the  availability  of  market  for  shares  which  normally  provides  an  adequate 
exit  procedure  for  shareholders  of  large  companies,  makes  the  use  of  the  mechanism  in 
that  area  unnecessary  and  redundant.  "' 
As  to  the  Iranian  company  law,  I  considered  five  mechanisms;  i.  e.  the  "no  abuse  of 
right",  right  to  convene  shareholder  meeting,  cumulative  voting,  disinterested 
ratification,  and  shareholder  action;  which  provide,  in  different  ways,  some  protection 
to  minority  shareholders.  The  first  mechanism;  i.  e.  the  'no  abuse  of  right';  has  a  high 
potential  to  curb  abuse  of  rights  by  majority  shareholders.  Using  its  measure  and 
without  requiring  a  separate  and  specific  law,  the  courts  can  identify  and  stop  many 
instances  of  majority  abuse  in  corporations.  For  example,  the  principle  can  be  used  to 
stop  abuse  by  controHers  where  corporations  are  dominated  by  one  or  few 
shareholders  who  attempt,  using  their  statutory  and  constitutional  right  and  without 
having  a  good  excuse,  to  remove  a  minority  shareholder/  director  from  the  office. 
Likewise,  the  principle  can  be  used  to  avoid  a  resolution  of  meeting  which  implicitly 
involves  some  discrimination  against  minority  shareholders.  Nonetheless,  as  the  courts 
are  often  under  the  influence  of  the  Islamic  law  which  limits  application  of  the 
principle  to  the  relationship  between  neighbouring  owners,  they  seem  reluctant  to 
utilise  this  high  potential  in  its  full  capacity. 
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283 The  second  mechanism;  i.  e.  right  to  convene  shareholder  meeting;  was  designed  to 
provide  shareholders  with  the  opportunity  to  convene  a  shareholder  meeting  in 
default  of  corporate  directors"  action.  It  serves  more  as  a  protection  for  shareholders  in 
a  shareholder/  management  dispute  rather  than  being  a  protection  for  minority 
shareholders  against  majority  shareholders.  Where  directors  are,  in  one  way  or 
another,  involved  in  the  wrongdoing  against  their  corporations,  the  right  allows 
shareholders  to  control  and  stop  such  directors.  Directors"  involvement  in  the 
wrongdoing  often  occurs  where  one  or  few  shareholders  do  not  dominate  a 
corporation.  It  can  also  occur  in  corporations  that  have  a  controlling  shareholder  who 
excert  weak  control  on  directors.  The  latter  is  normally  the  case  for  most  Iranian  public 
industrial  and  financial  enterprises  that  are  dominated  by  the  government  and  its 
dependant  organisations.  Dominant  shareholders  in  such  corporations  monitor 
directors  weakly  as  a  consequence  of  their  control  mechanisms  which  have  hierarchic, 
bureaucratic,  and  administrative  nature  and  because  those  who  represent  the 
government  normally  have  no  or  little  incentive  to  exert  control  effectively.  The  right  is 
of  little  use  where  directors  have  ownership  control,  because  even  if  a  meeting  is 
convened  at  minority  shareholders'  demand,  it  is  very  unlikely  to  result  in  anything 
favourable  to  the  demander.  Considering  that  private  corporations  in  Iran  tend  to  have 
one  or  few  controlling  shareholders  who  control  the  management,  the  right  does  little 
as  to  protecting  minority  shareholders  in  such  corporations  too. 
The  third  mechanism;  i.  e.  cumulative  voting;  was  intended  to  empower  minority 
shareholders  to  have  one  or  few  representatives  in  corporate  boards,  which  take  most 
284 corporate  decisions.  It,  however,  concerns  only  with  appointing  directors  rather  than 
their  removal  from  the  office.  The  latter  is  resolved  through  a  normal  majority  decision 
based  on  'one  share,  one  vote'.  The  result  is  there  is  always  a  possibity  that  a  minority 
elected  director  is  removed  from  the  office  by  a  simple  resolution  of  majority 
shareholders. 
The  fourth  mechanism;  i.  e.  disinterested  ratification;  is  a  mechanism  through  which 
exerting  effective  shareholder  control  over  directors'  activities  in  corporations  is 
facilitated.  It  seeks  to  prevent  wrongdoer  directors  from  having  the  ability  to  ratify 
their  wrongdoings.  It,  however,  seems  to  be  specific  to  small  private  corporations 
where  wrongdoer  directors  often  have  ownership  control  too.  As  to  large  corporations, 
it  is  irrelevant  because  persons  other  than  the  very  wrongdoer  directors  often  control 
such  corporations.  It  is  also  deficient  in  the  sense  that  it  concerns  only  wrongs  which 
involve  directors'  self-interested  transactions  rather  than  their  faults  in  a  wider  sense. 
The  fifth  mechanism;  i.  e.;  shareholder  action;  allows  shareholders  to  pursue  as  a 
matter  of  exception  and  on  behalf  of  the  wronged  companies  directors  who  commit 
fault.  Being  mainly  a  mechanism  for  protection  of  shareholders  generally  as  against 
abuse  of  power  by  directors,  it  is  relevant  and  can  be  utilised  in  cases  in  which 
different  persons  manage  corporations  and  hold  ownership  control.  It  does  not  concern 
wrongs  which  are  caused  by  the  majority  shareholders  and  since  directors'  faults  are 
considered  ratifiable  the  protection  serves  little  use  to  minority  shareholders  where  the 
same  persons  hold  management  and  ownership  control. 
In  summary,  English  company  law  seems  to  be  dynamicly  responsive  to  the  possibility 
of  the  majority  abuse  of  rights.  While  corporations,  excluding  private  corporations,  in 
285 England  tend  not  to  have  a  controlling  shareholder  and  consequently  are  less  liable  to 
the  problem  of  majority  abuse  and  need  as  a  result  less  legal  protections  for  minority 
shareholders,  company  law  has  provided  a  number  of  mechanisms  that  provide 
various  effective  and  appropriate  remedies  which  can  sensibly  curb  the  possibility  of 
majority  abuse.  They  provide  fucussed  solutions  that  target  majority  abuse  of  rights 
which  occurs  in  different  ways  and  shapes  in  corporations. 
In  contrast,  company  law  in  Iran  seems  to  be  under  developed  as  to  the 
majority/  minority  conflict  in  corporations.  It  provides  some  weak  and  at  times 
irrelevant  mechanisms  as  to  preventing  abuse  of  rights  by  majority  shareholders, 
whereas  most  Iranian  corporations  are  dominated  by  one  or  few  controlling 
shareholders  and  are  inevitably  liable  to  abuse  by  the  controlling  shareholders.  Four  of 
the  five  considered  mechanisms  that  exist  in  Iranian  company  law  mainly  concern 
preventing  abuse  of  power  by  corporate  directors  and  hence  are  pertinent  to  the 
shareholders/  directors  conflict  rather  than  being  minority  protections.  This  aside,  the 
only  mechanism;  i.  e.  the  "no  abuse  of  right";  which  is  relevant  to  the  majority/  minority 
conflict  has  lost  its  potentials  because  of  a  lack  of  statutory  definition  which  authorises 
the  use  of  principle  in  company  law  and  determines  its  circumstances,  concequences 
and  available  remedies  plus  an  unwillingness  on  the  part  of  judiciary  in  extending  the 
mechanism  from  disputes  between  neighbouring  owners  to  the  majority/  minority 
conflict  in  corporations. 
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In  this  thesis,  I  studied,  from  English  and  Iranian  company  law  viewpoints,  the 
principle  of  majority  rule  and  its  likely  clash  with  rights  and  interests  of  minority 
shareholders.  Given  that  majority  /minority  shareholder  conflict  commonly  occurs  in 
both  English  and  Iranian  corporations,  the  study  concerned  examination  of  that 
conflict  and  the  response  of  the  company  laws  in  the  two  mentioned  systems.  As  a 
matter  of  principle,  accepted  by  corporate  members  and  company  laws,  shareholder 
conflicts  in  corporations  are  to  be  resolved  intemally,  using  the  rule  of  majority.  in 
some  occasions,  however,  the  way  the  rule  is  used  could  itself  generate  conflicts 
between  majority  and  minority  shareholders.  The  governing  majority  shareholders  can 
use  it  as  an  instrument  in  order  to  extract  some  private  benefits.  Majority  shareholders 
may  also  adopt  or  authorise,  through  directors,  policies  that  are  considered,  in  the  view 
of  a  minority  shareholder,  poor  and  harmful  to  companies  and  their  shareholders' 
interests.  The  implication  is  that  while  the  rule  of  majority  can  have  unfair 
consequences  as  to  the  rights  and  interests  of  minority  shareholders,  it  allows  no 
recourse  to  be  taken  by  a  wronged  minority  and  this  can  generate  conflicts  between 
majority  and  minority  shareholders. 
As  shareholder  conflicts,  if  not  resolved  fairly,  could  damage  corporations  thereby 
undermine  their  service  to  the  society,  I  intended  to  discover  why  and  how  such 
conflict  could  occur  in  corporations  of  each  system.  I  also  wanted  to  determine  what 
and  how  company  law  in  each  system  has  done  to  resolve  such  conflict  plus  providing 
an  explanation  for  the  question  of  why  each  system  did  the  way  it  did.  Finally,  I 
intended  to  take  some  lessons  from  the  results  of  the  research  which  could  improve  the 
287 quality  of  the  law  in  this  matter.  To  reach  these  objectives,  I  had  to  examine,  from 
varying  aspects,  the  very  rule  of  majority  and  the  mechanisms  that  the  two  corporate 
laws  have  introduced  in  order  to  curb  abuse  of  majority  rights  against  minority 
shareholders.  The  examination  was  therefore  twofold.  One  concemed  direct  and 
indirect  factors  which  allow  majority  rule  to  be  used  opportunistically  against  minority 
shareholders.  Here,  I  emphasise  on  four  factors  which  are  considered  respectively  in 
Chapters  one,  two,  three  and  four.  In  Chapter  one,  in  addition  to  considering  the 
question  of  why  the  rule  is  justified,  I  showed  also  how  such  justifications  could  be 
used  by  the  majority  shareholders  in  order  to  ignore  appropriate  minority  complaints. 
Chapter  two  considered  the  relevance  of  general  laws  and  constitutions,  as  they  draw 
the  field  within  which  the  rule  of  majority  can  work,  and  showed  that  the  two 
mentioned  factors,  although  restricting  the  rule  of  majority  and  thereby  providing 
some  safeguards  for  minority  rights,  are  unable  to  address  a  great  part  of  majority 
abuses  which  occur  in  corporations.  In  Chapter  three,  which  was  about  demonstrating 
and  examining  the  voting  mechanism,  I  explained  how  majority  shareholders  could 
make  opportunistic  use  of  their  voting  rights  in  order  to  take  private  benefits  or  hurt 
minority  shareholders.  Chapter  four  concerned  the  role  of  corporate  directors.  It 
cautiously  accepted  the  idea  that  corporate  directors  can  offer  some  solution  to  the 
majority/  minority  conflict  in  corporations.  In  varying  degrees,  they  are  liable  to 
mismanagement  and  further  they  can  sometimes  serve  to  empower  majority 
shareholders  hereby  to  facilitate  majority  abuse  of  rights.  In  summary,  Chapters  one  to 
four  made  it  clear  why  and  how  the  rule  of  majority  can  be  abused.  They  also  showed 
that  contractual  and  market  mechanisms  plus  general  laws  have  limited  capacity  to 
prevent  such  abuse.  They,  thus,  urge  intervention  by  the  law  for  protection  of  minority 
shareholders. 
288 The  other,  which  was  the  subject  of  my  consideration  in  Chapter  five,  concerned 
examination  of  the  existing  mechanisms  in  company  laws  of  the  two  countries  that 
seek  to  protect  minority  shareholders  against  the  possibility  of  abuse  of  rights  by 
majority  shareholders.  The  examination  showed  that  although  minority  shareholder 
protection  mechanisms  in  both  company  laws  have  some  weaknesses,  the  English 
company  law  mechanisms  seem  to  be  more  focussed  and  more  responsive  on  the 
majority/n-dnority  conflict  compared  to  its  Iranian  counterparts. 
Chapter  one  demonstrated  and  examined  justifications  which  are  used  in  order  to 
support  application  of  the  principle  of  majority  rule  in  corporations.  It  considered  three 
approaches,  political,  economic,  and  doctrinal,  which  originally  evolved  in  England 
and  other  western  economies  and  which  were  later  adopted  as  part  of  the  imported 
pakage  of  corporation  by  the  Iranian  law.  While  they  agree  to  support  the  majority  rule 
generally,  they  use  different  reasoning  for  its  application.  For  the  political  approach,  it 
matters  because  corporate  directors  who  are  liable  to  abuse  should  be  controlled  and 
majority  rule  by  solving  the  collective  action  problem  can  facilitate  such  control.  The 
economic  approach,  on  the  other  hand,  regards  shareholder  control  as  irrelevant.  In  its 
view,  majority  rule  facilitates  the  collective  action  and  this  is  something  desirable  not 
because  it  enables  shareholder  control  but  rather  because  it  allows  shareholders  to 
react  to  unpredicted  events  quickly  and  appropriately  when  the  contract  is  incomplete. 
Besides,  by  placing  governance  in  the  hands  of  those  who  have  more  shares,  it 
facilitates  and  encourages  risk  taking  and  financing  in  companies  and,  thus,  it  is 
efficient  too.  The  doctrinal  approach  which  accommodates  the  rule  within  the 
corporate  laws,  justifies  the  rule  of  majority,  using  certain  legal  reasoning  and  policy 
considerations.  In  its  view,  the  rule  of  majority  saves  companies"  and  the  judiciary's 
289 resources,  respects  the  corporate  autonomy,  and  frees  management  of  companies  from 
noxious  allegations. 
There  are  some  advantages  and  disadvantages  with  each  of  the  three  approaches.  The 
political  approach  recognises  shareholder  control  which  is  desirable  and  necessary  as 
to  preventing  mismanagement.  At  the  same  time,  it  can  be  inefficient  as  individual 
shareholders  rather  than  their  capital  are  given  weight.  The  approach,  thus,  offers 
excessive  safeguards  for  minority  rights.  The  economic  approach,  on  the  other  hand, 
respects  corporate  capitalism,  which  is  efficient  generally,  but  at  the  same  time  it  can  be 
injurious,  unjust  and  perhaps  sometimes  even  inefficient  by  rejecting  any  idea  that 
relies  on  shareholder  control  or  supports  protection  for  minority  shareholders.  The 
doctrinal  approach  avoids  criticisms  that  are  made  to  the  two  mentined  approaches.  In 
its  view,  the  majority  rule  facilitates  both  shareholder  control  and  financing.  Yet,  on  the 
issue  of  minority  rights,  it  seems  deficient  too,  as  it  rigidly  ignores  minority 
shareholders"  rights. 
The  Chapter  went  on  to  explain  why  Iranian  lawmaker  adopted  company  law  on  the 
model  of  Europe,  as  distinguished  from  the  Anglo-American  model.  It  was  made  clear 
that,  unlike  the  latter,  the  former  model  could  successfully  penetrate  into  the  Iranian 
society  and  could  fit  effectively  with  the  existing  business  vehicles  and  laws, 
considering  the  political,  economic,  religious  and  legal  backgrounds.  This  divergence 
between  the  two  systems  on  their  corporate  governance  structures  can  further  mean 
that  the  rule  of  majority  in  English  corporations  will  not  be  as  strong  as  is in  its  Iranian 
counterparts.  While  corporations  in  the  former  tend  not  to  have  one  or  few  controlling 
shareholders  who  could  utilise  the  rule  effectively,  their  counterparts  in  the  latter  rely 
on  the  presence  of  such  shareholders.  A  corollary  could  be  the  majority/  minority 
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than  in  the  latter. 
In  summary,  it  is  possible  to  conclude  that  the  way  in  which  the  rule  of  majority  is 
justified  can  affect  the  majority/  minority  conflict  sharply.  While  a  justification  which 
supports  absolute  governance  of  capital  majority  in  corporations  can  be  risky  for 
minority  shareholders,  the  one  that  justifies  majority  rule,  relying  on  personality  of 
shareholders,  can  be  risky  towards  majority  shareholders.  Meanwhile,  both  can  be 
inefficient  when  they  are  put  to  use  in  inappropriate  context.  In  countries  like  Iran 
where  corporations  take  finance  internally  and  shareholder  control  dominates,  a  relax 
majority  rule  plus  excessive  emphasise  on  protection  of  minority  rights  could 
discourage  corporate  initiatives.  In  contrast,  such  rule  could  serve  efficient  for  English 
companies,  as  they  tend  to  attract  finance  externally  and  have  no  controlling 
shareholder.  The  conclusion  is  that  an  acceptable  justification  is  the  one  that  is  able  to 
accommodate  an  appropriate  balance  of  majority  /minority  rights,  considering  the 
context  within  which  the  rule  works. 
Chapter  two  considered  two  important  factors,  general  laws  and  constitutions,  which 
contribute  to  shape  the  framework  within  which  the  rule  of  majority  works.  The 
former  concerned  rules  that  limit  companies  and  their  majority  shareholders'  power  as 
a  matter  of  public  order  and  regulation  rather  than  being  a  matter  of  minority 
protection.  The  latter  concerned  with  rules  that  regulate  corporate  members" 
relationship  through  private  contracting.  These  rules  can  address  some  of  the 
majority/  minority  conflicts  deriving  from  abusive  exercise  of  rights  by  majority 
shareholders.  They  generally  prevent  an  unlawful  or  unconstitutional  decision  of  the 
majority  from  being  binding  on  minority  shareholders.  It  must,  however,  be  bome  in 
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rules  can  be  construed,  in  the  light  of  the  courts'  unwillingness  to  interfere  with 
corporations'  internal  affairs,  in  favour  of  majority  shareholders.  This  aside,  general 
laws  and  constitutions  cannot  avoid  an  abuse  of  right  that  may  occur  where  the 
majority  act  both  lawfully  and  constitutionally.  This  inability  explains  the  need  for 
intervention  of  the  law  in  the  majority/  minority  relationship  for  the  protection  of 
minority  shareholders. 
Chapter  three  considered  the  mechanism  of  voting  through  which  the  rule  of  majority 
works.  It  meant  to  examine  the  mechanism  in  order  to  show  how  opportunistic 
majority  shareholders  could  exert  control  against  minority  interests  while  relying  on 
the  majority  rule.  it  was  made  clear  that  shareholder  control  depends  on,  and  can  be 
exerted  by,  voting  which  itself  relies  on  share  ownership.  As  the  rule  is  'one  share,  one 
vote',  every  shareholder  will  have  and  exert  some  degree  of  control,  but  principally 
only  those  who  own  majority  of  shares  will  be  in  control  of  corporations.  That  means 
majority  shareholders  can  take  decisions  that  affect  minority  shareholders  and  further 
their  judgement  will  resolve  any  majority/  minority  dispute.  As  a  matter  of  principle, 
majority  control  is  desirable  and  necessary,  even  seen  by  minority  shareholders.  It 
offers  some  ease  to  collective  action,  resolves  internI  disputes,  enables  shareholder 
control  over  management,  encourages  financing,  and  saves  corporate  as  well  as  public 
resources.  These  explain  why  it  is  often  accepted  by  contract  parties  and  supported  by 
company  laws.  It  can,  however,  be  risky  as  to  minority  shareholders"  interests  where 
those  in  control  use  the  rule  of  majority  opportunistically.  By  voting  to  discriminatory 
resolutions  at  shareholder  meeings,  majority  shareholders  can  use  it  in  order  to  take 
some  private  benefits.  This  can  occur  in  the  majority/  minority  relationship  mainly 
because  voting  is  regarded  as  right  which  enables  shareholders  to  exercise  it  freely. 
29-1 Majority  shareholders  while  voting  can  constflt  with  their  personal  interests  with  no 
obligation  to  accommodate  minority  interests.  The  result  is  that  they  can  simply  pass  a 
shareholder  resolution  which  is  binding  upon  minority  shareholders  and  which  offers 
discriminatory  benefits  to  the  controlling  majority.  In  summary,  the  gist  of  my 
argument  here  is  to  evidence  that  the  mechanism  of  voting  through  which  the  rule  of 
majority  works  is  liable  to  abuse  and  such  abuse  occurs  in  the  light  of  the  element  of 
majority  control  plus  controllers'absolute  freedom  in  exercise  of  it. 
Having  observed  how  the  mechanism  of  voting  can  be  abused,  the  Chapter  also  raised 
the  question  of  how  such  abuse  could  be  curbed.  It  considered  relevance  of  company 
law  and  other  factors  which  could  function,  or  could  have  functioned,  in  order  to  curb 
the  abuse.  The  first  factor,  which  was  considered,  was  private  contracting.  It  was 
explained  that  the  mechanism  of  majority  rule  is  only  a  default  rule  that  can  be 
displaced  by  private  contracting.  Thus,  private  contracting  can  shift  away  control  from 
majority  shareholders.  Private  contracting  is  often  put  in  the  form  of  limitations  in 
corporate  constitution  or  shares,  which  allow  deviation  from  the  'one  share,  one  vote' 
rule.  Nonetheless,  such  private  contracting  often  only  affects  the  very  element  of 
control  which  means  instead  of  curing  abuse  of  majority  control,  it  simply  displaces  it. 
As  such  displacement  can  have  disproportionate  disadvantages,  contract  parties 
normally  do  not  want  it  and  as  a  consequence  the  use  of  it  is  uncommon.  The  second 
factor  concerned  variability  of  the  majority  rule.  The  argument  was  that  it  could  offer 
some  guarantee  to  minority  shareholders  because  it  prevents  the  same  group  from 
being  able  to  compose  the  majority  rule  all  the  times.  Nevertheless,  any  such  guarantee 
can  only  be  relevant  as  to  corporations  that  lack  a  controlling  majority.  Where  one  or 
few  shareholders  dominate  corporations,  the  factor  fails  to  work.  Furthen-nore,  even  in 
the  former  corporations,  dispersion  of  shareholdings  can  sometimes  serve  only  to 
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collective  action  problem  some  relatively  small  but  active  shareholders  may  be  able  to 
exert  control  constantly.  The  third  factor,  which  was  considered,  concerned  company 
law.  I  explained  that  company  law  in  both  England  and  Iran  are  aware  of  and  have 
been  responsive  to  the  possibility  of  abuse  in  the  exercise  of  voting  right  and  as  a  result 
they  both  imposed  some  limitation  on  majority  shareholders  which  require  them  to 
avoid  discrimination  when  voting  at  shareholder  meetings.  Nonetheless,  as  I  further 
explained  such  limitation  could  prohibit  only  clear  discriminations  while  informal 
discriminations  will  escape  a  review.  Lastly,  the  Chapter  considered  the  relevance  of 
institutional  shareholders  and  concluded  that  they  do  nothing  remarkable  as  to  the 
majority/  minority  conflict  while  they  can  be  relevant  as  to  preventing  mismanagement 
in  English  large  corporations  which  tend  to  suffer  from  weak  internal  control  over 
corporate  management. 
Chapter  four  examined  the  role  of  directors  as  to  the  majority/  minority  conflict.  It 
meant  to  challenge  the  idea  already  refered  briefly  in  Chpter  two'  that  directors  can 
serve  greatly  to  reduce  the  likelihood  of  abuse  of  rights  by  majority  shareholders.  The 
gist  of  the  idea  was  to  argue  that  because  a  great  deal  of  corporate  power  falls  within 
the  discretion  of  corporate  directors  who  are  under  duties  to  exercise  power  carefully, 
disinterestedly  and  impartially,  and  who  are  disciplined  through  market  constraints, 
and  whose  duties  can  be  enforced  by  shareholders,  there  will  be  a  remarkable 
reduction  in  the  size  of  any  likely  abusive  exercise  of  rights  by  majority  shareholders.  I 
generally  accepted  the  idea,  but  made  two  comments  on  it.  The  first  comment 
1  See  Chapter  two  (above,  at  11.2.1). 
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both  English  and  Iranian  corporations.  The  gist  of  my  comment  here  was  to  argue  that 
a  concentration  of  power  in  the  hands  of  directors  should  only  be  allowed  where 
company  law,  shareholders  and  the  market  are  able  to  curb  mismanagement 
effectively  otherwise  majority  abuse  can  be  substituted  by  managerial  abuse  whose 
harms  outweights,  those  of  the  former.  My  second  comment  concerned  corporations 
that  are  dominated  by  one  or  few  controlling  shareholders.  In  such  corporations, 
empowering  corporate  directors  can  simply  serve  to  facilitate  control  by  majority 
shareholders.  In  such  corporations,  normally  the  same  people  hold  a  majority  of  shares 
and  managerial  positions.  Even  if  different  persons  hold  them,  majority  shareholders 
can  exert  indirect  control  over  management,  using  the  majority  rule. 
Chapter  five  considered  legal  constraints  on  the  majority  rule.  It  concerned 
examination  of  limitations  and  mechanisms  in  English  and  Iranian  laws  that  either 
were  designed  as  a  minority  shareholder  protection  or  can  be  used  for  such  purpose. 
The  intention  was  to  see  how  they  respond  to  the  possibility  of  majority  abuse  of  rights 
and  what  are  their  weaknesses  and  strengths.  Four  mechanisms,  two  common  law 
made  and  two  statutory,  were  identified  as  to  the  English  company  law.  Of  them,  one 
mechanism  i.  e.  constraint  on  voting  had  already  been  examined  in  Chapter  three 
where  I  showed  that  the  constraint  which  is  a  general  principle  of  company  law 
concerns  majority  abuse  of  rights  which  is  put  in  the  form  of  discriminatory  resolutions 
of  meetings.  While  advantegous  for  addressing  formal  discriminations,  it  cannot, 
however,  avoid  discriminations  which  occur  informally.  The  other  three  were 
mechanisms  devised  to  target  special  cases  of  majority  abuse.  The  first  mechanism,  the 
derivative  action,  concerns  obvious  cases  of  fraud;  i.  e.  cases  that  often  involve  direct  or 
indirect  stealing  of  the  corporate  assets  or  profits  by  directors  who  possess  shares 
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cases  that  simply  involve  negligence  or  a  breach  of  duties  by  directors,  though  they  can 
be  used  to  address  a  breach  of  fiduciary  duty  and  negligence  which  benefits  the 
wrongdoer  director.  As  they  are  corporate  claims,  they  always  require  the  plaintiff  to 
show  the  element  of  wrongdoer  control  and  because  the  element  of  control  is  required, 
they  are  often  specific  to  small  corporations  where  a  controlling  shareholder  is 
normally  present.  The  second  mechanism,  'just  and  equitable  winding  up"  remedy, 
concerns  an  abuse  of  rights  by  majority  shareholders  which  involves  no  stealing  but  is 
instead  so  against  legitimate  expectations  of  minority  shareholders  which  hurts  the 
core  basis  of  the  corporate  contract.  This  is  so,  even  if  the  controlling  shareholder  exerts 
his  right  lawfully  which  means  a  plaintiff  is  not  required  to  show  controllers'  fault. 
Cases  that  commonly  fall  within  the  ambit  of  the  remedy  include,  but  are  not  limited 
to,  breach  of  mutual  trust,  exclusion  from  management  and  deadlock  situations.  The 
remedy  is  only  suitable  for  small  corporations  where  shareholders"  relationship  relies 
on  not  only  corporate  constitution  but  also  mutual  trust  and  legitimate  expectations. 
As  a  personal  remedy,  it  can  sometimes  be  severe  because  it  dissolves  the  corporation 
while  nobody  wants  it  so  dissolved.  The  third  mechanism,  'unfairly  prejudicial 
conduct'  remedy,  concerns  any  unfair  disregard  of  controllers,  majority  shareholders 
or  directors,  from  minority  interests.  It  allows  minority  shareholders  to  take  either 
corporate  or  personal  claim  in  respect  of  any  violation  done  by  controllers  to 
constitution  and  laws  as  well  as  their  legitimate  expectations  in  the  company.  Unlike 
the  two  other  remedies,  it  has  a  considerably  wider  scope.  It  covers  breach  of  directors' 
duties  without  requiring  the  plaintiff  to  show  the  elements  of  fraud  and  control.  It  also 
covers  any  unconstitutional  acts  of  controllers  that  were  categorised  under  the 
common  law  as  simply  an  irregular  issue.  The  remedy  can  also  be  used  as  a  substitute 
to  the  just  and  equitable  winding  up  remedy  for  cases  like  breach  of  mutual  trust, 
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conclusive  ambit  of  the  latter.  '  Yet,  like  the  two  other  remedies,  it  is  suitable  mainly  for 
addressing  abuse  of  rights  by  majority  shareholders  in  small  corporations. 
An  imporatnat  advantage  of  these  various  remedies  that  all  focus  on  preventing  and 
responding  abuse  of  rights  by  majority  shareholders  has  been  provision  of  adequate, 
relevant  and  tailored  safeguards  for  protection  of  rights  and  interests  of  minority 
shareholders  in  English  company  law.  They  generally  recognise  the  link  between 
ownership  control  and  abuse  of  rights  by  controllers,  which  can  be  direct  and  indirect 
and  which  can  occur  in  various  ways  and  shapes,  and  hence  they  provide  solutions  to 
prevent  such  abuse.  Their  solutions  are  tailored  which  means  each  focusses  on  specific 
type  or  types  of  abuse  and  provides  relevant  solution.  As  tailored  solutions,  they  are 
specific  to  small  corporations  because  large  corporations  often  lack  presence  of  a 
controlling  shareholder  and  hence  they  are  very  unlikely  to  be  liable  to  abuse  of  rights 
by  majority  shareholders.  At  the  same  time,  they  are  inclusive  because  they  provide 
solutions  which  are  wide  enough  to  cover  new  forms  of  abuse.  Nonetheless,  a  criticism, 
which  concerns  the  most  the  third  mechanism,  is  that  troublesome  minorities  could 
now  opportunistically  outflank  the  majority  rule,  as  a  result  of  uncertainty  which  is 
incurred  by  the  remedy. 
2  Conway  Mark,  "'Minority  Shareholder  Protection  and  the  Rule  in  Foss  v  Harbottle: 
Increasingly  a  Foss  about  Nothing"  in  'Companies  in  the  1990s'  edited  by  Gary  Slapper,  1995, 
London,  Cavendish,  at  pp  13-14;  Clark  Bryan,  "Unfairly  Prejudicial  Conduct:  A  Pathway 
Through  the  Maze",  Company  Lawyer,  (2001),  22  (6),  170,  London,  Oyez  Publishing  Limited,  at 
pp  170-171;  Clark  Bryan,  "Unfairly  Prejudicial  Conduct",  Scots  Law  Time  (S.  L.  T.  ),  (1999),  38, 
321,  Edinburgh,  W.  Green  &  Son  Ltd,  at  pp  321-2. 
297 Majority/  minority  conflict  aside,  English  company  law  does  not  seem  very  successful 
at  handling  shareholder/  management  conflicts,  which  dominate  English  large 
corporations.  It  was  made  clear  in  Chapters  one  and  four  that  such  corporations  tend 
to  have  weak  internal  control  which  could  follow  they  are  more  likely  to  incur 
mismanagement.  Market  forces  fail  to  sufficiently  discipline  negligent  managers  and 
company  law,  by  providing  impunity  for  managers  who  conu-nit  mere 
mismanagement,  is  too  friendly  towards  them.  The  reviewed  remedies,  while  good  at 
addressing  abuse  of  rights  by  majority  shareholders  in  small  corporations,  are  basically 
irrelevant  as  to  mismanagement  that  occurs  in  large  companies. 
As  to  the  Iranian  company  law,  five  mechanisms  were  examined.  The  first  mechanism, 
the  'no  abuse  of  right"  that  is  a  general  principle  of  law,  is  potentially  capable  to  cover 
abuse  in  the  exrcise  of  righs  that  can  occur  in  various  forms  and  ways  in  any 
relationship  including  the  one  between  majority  and  minority  shareholders  in 
corporations.  In  practice,  however,  because  of  the  Islamic  law  background  which  limits 
the  scope  of  it  to  owners  of  neighbouring  properties"  realationships  and  because  the 
existing  Iranian  Codes  of  laws  (The  Civil  Code)  define  the  principle  only  in  such 
relationship  and  in  the  light  of  an  absence  of  a  specific  and  separate  definition  in  laws 
relevant  to  corporations  including  JSCA,  the  courts  have  been  reluctant  to  utilise  the 
principle  in  its  full  capacity.  The  other  four  mechanisms;  i.  e.  right  to  convene 
shareholder  meeting,  cumulative  voting,  disinterested  ratification,  and  shareholder 
action;  mainly  concern  preventing  abuse  of  power  by  corporate  directors  and  hence  are 
pertinent  to  the  shareholders  /directors  conflict  rather  than  being  minority  protections. 
In  summary,  Iranian  company  law,  unlike  its  English  counterpart,  seems  to  be  less 
responsive  to  the  possibility  of  majority  abuse  of  rights,  while  laying  emphasis  on 
preventing  abuse  of  power  by  directors.  It  provides  some  weak  and  at  times  lrrelevant 
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Iranian  corporations  are  dominated  by  one  or  few  controlling  shareholders  and  should, 
therefore,  inevitably  be  liable  to  abuse  by  the  controlling  shareholders.  At  a  glance, 
such  low  responsiveness  of  the  Iranian  company  law  can  seem  odd.  However,  when 
viewed  in  its  cultural,  political  and  economic  backgrounds,  as  considered  in  Chapter 
one,  the  method  of  company  law  can  be  explained.  Attention  to  minority  shareholders' 
rights  could  reduce  control  of  the  dominating  shareholder  (the  government)  over  the 
private  sector  and  could  further  discourage  majority  financing.  Furthermore,  because 
the  government  as  the  dominating  shareholder  was  represented  in  corporations  by  its 
human  agents  who  could  generate  agency  costs,  it  wanted,  through  rules  of 
directors'liability,  to  make  sure  its  agents  will  stay  in  line.  After  all,  the  very  concept  of 
abuse  of  right  (in  the  sense  of  imposing  a  general  limitation  on  the  exercise  of  rights  by 
owners  and  other  persons)  was  relatively  unknown  to  the  Iranian  lawmaker  who  was 
influenced  by  the  Islamic  law  teachings.  Instead  of  'abuse  of  rights,  the  question  that 
mattered  much  for  the  lawmaker  was  -abuse  of  power'  which  is  found  in  the 
relationship  between  agents  and  principal  and  which  was  well  known  to  the  Iranian 
lawmaker  and  the  Islamic  law. 
These  explanations  are  no  longer  forceful.  Art  40  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Islamic 
Republic  of  Iran  (CIRI)  has  already  offered  the  potential  that  'abuse  of  rights'  which  is 
a  modem  law  concept  is  recognised.  Also  Islamic  law  seems  on  the  move  towards 
recogniation  of  the  "no  abuse  of  right"  in  a  wider  sense.  Furthermore,  the  govenu-nent 
has  recently  decided  on  efficiency  reasons,  which  was  considered  in  Chapters  one  and 
four,  to  reduce  its  control  over  the  economy  and  to  empower  the  private  sector  through 
adopting  and  implementing  a  number  of  privatization  programs.  If  privatization  is 
that  urgent  and  desirable,  then  providing  political  as  well  as  economic  securities  for 
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of  adequate  minority  shareholder  protection  will  become  inevitable  and  forthcoming. 
Now  that  we  have  learned  why  and  how  majority  rule  is  liable  to  abuse  against 
minority  shareholders"  rights  and  interests  and  further  how  company  laws  in  England 
and  Iran  have  responded  to  such  abuse  plus  what  have  been  their  weaknesses  and 
strengths,  my  intention  is  to  suggest  as  a  conclusion  that  minority  protection 
mechanisms  which  exist  in  the  English  model  and  which  reflect  more  than  a  century 
experience  and  achievements  of  that  model  on  the  issue  of  majority/  minority  conflict 
can  be  worth  learning  by  the  Iranian  lawmaker.  No  doubt,  such  learning  does  not 
require  the  Iranian  lawmaker  to  facilitate  a  shift  in  corporate  governance  structure 
from  its  current  model  to  that  of  the  Anglo-American.  That  is  undesirable  and 
unnecessary,  though  privatization  programs  are  pursued.  Any  such  shift  can  require 
massive  changes  in  cultural,  socio-economic,  political  and  legal  elements,  which  are 
very  unlikely  to  occur  and  which  can  be  inefficient.  Comparative  research  has  also 
shown  that  none  of  the  models  are  ideal  and  the  choice  for  a  country  is  only  one  of 
cultural,  socio-economic,  and  political.  Also,  the  fact  that  the  minority  protection 
mechanisms  in  the  English  model  rely  on  equity  principles  which  are  unknown  to  the 
Iranian  laws  does  not  thwart  the  very  leaming.  The  gist  of  these  mechanisms  is  to 
prevent  majority  rights  being  instrumentally  abused  against  minority  shareholders  and 
such  idea  is  common  to  the  Iranian  laws  which  use  only  a  different  method;  i.  e.  'no 
abuse  of  right'  principle;  of  doing  the  same  thing.  In  addition  to  these,  such  learning 
relies  on  elemens  that  are  shared  between  the  two  systems;  i.  e.  the  fact  that 
majority  /minority  conflict  occurs  in  corporations  that  are  dominated  by  one  or  two 
shareholders  and  that  both  systems  commonly  need  to  address  such  conflict.  As  a 
result,  the  reviewed  English  company  law  mechanisms  which  are  largely  specific  to 
300 small  companies  where  dominating  shareholders  are  present  can  be  inspirational  to  the 
Iranian  company  law  as  to  addressing  the  issue  of  abuse  of  rights  by  majority 
shareholders  in  Iranian  corporations.  They  identify  actual  examples  of  abuse  of  rights 
by  majority  shareholders  and  define  circumstances  under  which  such  abuse  can  occur. 
They  provide  a  range  of  suitable  remedies  for  protection  of  minority  rights  in  such 
circumstances  and  allow  the  courts  to  tailor  such  remedies  so  as  to  make  them  fit  with 
the  circumstances  of  each  case  whereby  to  make  considered  balance  between  majority 
rule  and  minority  rights  in  each  given  case.  They  are  not,  at  the  same  time,  exhaustive 
which  means  they  allow  new  examples  of  abuse  which  the  future  unfolds  to  be 
covered  by  the  existing  mechanisms. 
Iranian  company  law  is  deficient  as  to  the  protection  of  minority  shareholders.  In 
summary,  it  allows  directors'  faults,  however  serious,  to  be  ratified  by  majority 
shareholders.  While  excluding  a  wrongdoer  director  from  voting  at  shareholder 
meeting,  it  only  concerns  fault  that  involves  self-dealing.  It  permits  shareholders  to 
take  corporate  actions  against  negligent  directors  while  failing  to  avoid  ratification  of 
the  very  cause  of  action  by  majority  shareholders.  Moreover,  it  fails  to  prevent  informal 
discriminations  that  can  occur  against  minority  shareholders  in  corporations  and 
further  falls  short  of  capability  to  avoid  unfair  exclusion  of  directors  who  either  hold 
minority  shareholding  or  represent  such  shareholdings.  Lastly,  it  fails  to  offer  personal 
remedies  in  the  form  of  winding  up  or  buy  out  orders  which  can  be  used  by  wronged 
minorities  in  circumstances  where  the  company  is  unfairly  conducted  against  minority 
interests.  These  deficiencies  can  be  remedied,  using  the  experience  of  the  English 
company  law  on  minority  protection.  Inspired  by  the  derivative  mechanism,  company 
law  can  help  minority  shareholders  to  avoid  ratification  of  some  of  more  serious  faults 
of  directors  by  majoritry  shareholders.  The  winding  up  and  unfairly  prejudicial 
301 remedies  can  also  be  inspirational  to  the  Iranian  lawmaker  as  to  providing  suitable 
personal  remedies  for  minority  shareholders  in  certain  circumstances.  The  latter 
remedy  can  further  be  used  to  allow  the  lawmaker  to  define  the  existing  'no  abuse  of 
right'  principle  in  the  light  of  company  law  and  particularly  as  relevant  to  solve 
majority/  minority  conflicts.  Any  such  definition  can  generally  cover  abuse  of  rights  by 
majority  shareholders  and  faults  of  directors  and  can  further  address  the  informal 
discrimination  and  exclusion  from  management  problems. 
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